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Abstract
UN PEACEKEEPING IN
LEBANON AND SOMALIA:
INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES
ByRayMurphy
Supervisor: Professor Nigel White
School of Law
The initial focus of the thesis is on Ireland, a small militarily neutral state, but
one with a long tradition of contributing to peacekeeping operations.
Despite its significant contribution to peace support operations to date, there
is little research on the past and future implications of this for Ireland. This
thesis seeks to address some of the key legal and political issues confronting
Ireland, and to provide a unique perspective on the dilemmas and problems
confronting many small states of the UN in the post cold war era.
The thesis uses two case studies, Somalia and Lebanon, to conduct a
comparative analysis of traditional peacekeeping and that of peace
enforcement The conduct of UN forces in Somalia, and the outcome of the
UN mandated operations there, had a profound effect on the willingness of
states to support UN peace support operations in the post cold war period.
UNOSOM II was one of the most ambitious and controversial multi-
dimensional operations ever mounted by the UN. It reflected the optimism
associated with the dawn of a 'new world order' and an effective Security
Council. The UN operation in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in contrast, was a less
ambitious traditional peacekeeping mission, but it too was controversial and
the Force encountered serious difficulties implementing the apparently more
straightforward mandate. Both operations show that whatever the nature of a
peace support operation, its role and effectiveness is dependent upon support
from the Security Council. Without political support and adequate resources,
especially at the time of its establishment, a UN force remains at the mercy of
the parties to the conflict. Both operations also highlighted serious difficulties
that arise in the command and control of UN peace support operations,
although the larger more complex UNOSOM II mission presented
significantlymore serious dilemmas in this regard. These problems are often
exacerbated by deficiencies in the municipal laws and domestic political
concerns of contributing states.
An important distinguishing feature between traditional peacekeeping
operations and that of more robust peace enforcement operations is the policy
regarding the use of force. Nevertheless, both Lebanon and Somalia
presented remarkably similar difficulties regarding devising and adopting
appropriate rules of engagement, and the differing interpretations of what
action justified the resort to, and the degree of force deemed appropriate in a
UN multi-national operation.
The thesis seeks to draw lessons from the experiences of UNIFIL and
UNOSOM in regard to these and related issues. The matter of the
applicability of international humanitarian law to UN forces was also relevant
to both sets of operations. Despite the recent adoption of the Convention on
the Protection of UN Personnel, and a Secretary-General's bulletin on the
applicability of humanitarian law to UN forces, the situation remains
unsatisfactory.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of cases cited. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Acknowledgements.... Vll
Chapter One: Introduction
The UN and peacekeeping operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1
Peacekeeping and enforcement operations.. .. . .. . .. .. . . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .... 6
Collective security and the role of the Security Council. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Peace support operations and current conflicts.. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. 10
The structure of the thesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15
Chapter Two: Ireland, Peacekeeping and Defence Policy: Challenges
and Opportunities
Introduction. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The implications of UN membership for Ireland........ 27
Ireland and middle power status.... 35
The Defence Forces and the peacekeeping tradition...................... 37
The implications of participation in peacekeeping operations. . . . . . . . ..... 44
Guidelines for future participation.......................................... 52
Conclusion..................................................................... 57
Chapter Three: Constitutional Issues Arising from Ireland's
Membership of the UN
Introduction..................................................................... 63
Constitutional considerations 65
The UN and the use of military force...................................... 67
The Gulf conflict 1990/91.. .. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Ireland's role during the 1990/91 Gulf conflict......................... 77
The implications of the CrottY judgement for membership of the UN. . 87
Conclusion. . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . 91
Chapter Four: A Comparative Analysis of the Municipal Legal Basis for
Canadian and Irish Participation in UN Forces
Introduction '" 95
Municipal Legal Basis for Canadian and Irish Participation
in Peacekeeping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . .. 100
Parliamentary Control of Canadian and Irish
Participation in UN Forces............................................... .... 104
The Policy of Sending Volunteers on UN Operations and
The Implications of 'Active Service' Status................................. 112
Legality of the arrest of Irish and Canadian personnel part
of international forces. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Conclusion 124
Chapter Five: Legal Framework of UN Peacekeeping Forces and
Issues of Command and Control
Introduction.............................................................. 128
Legal framework of UN operations and the SOFA................... 130
The case ofUNIFIL 133
Consequences for Irish and Canadian personnel
in breach of UN regulations........... 136
Command and control 137
Command and control of peacekeeping operations. . .. . . . . . . . . . . 144
Command and control of UN Forces in Somalia 148
Command and control of Canadian forces 158
Constitutional issues arising in the command
ofIrish Defence Forces personnel.... 163
Conclusion. . . . . .. . .. . .. ... . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. 171
Chapter Six: The Political and Diplomatic Background to the
Establishment of UNIFIL in Lebanon, and the UNITAF and
UNOSOM Missions in Somalia
Introduction............................................................... 176
Factors influencing the decision to deploy UN forces in
Lebanon and Somalia 178
Security Council considerations and the decision to intervene
The ca.re0/Somalia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
The caseo/ubanon 186
Response to the deployment of UN forces in Somalia and Lebanon
DeploymentrfUNOSOM 1................ 191
Optionsfacing the Secretary-Generaland the deploymento/UNITAF . 197
11
The dilemma of disarmament and the creationof a safe environment
in Somalia. .. 203
Securi(yCouncilfails to support UNIFIL .. . . .. . . 206
Lack of co-operationfrom theparties in Lebanon .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Problems of military effectiveness in UNIFIL and
UNOSOM II 214
Problems of command and control.............................................. 214
Defiaenaes in the UN o'l,anisation and struaures 217
Reconciliation and mediation in Somalia and Lebanon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 230
Chapter Seven: United Nations Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia,
and the Use of Force
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
The establishment of peace support operations in
Lebanon and Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
Standing Operating Procedures and
Rules of Engagement (ROE) 243
The dilemma of when to use force to implement
the UNIFIL mandate. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
Escalating the response and the tactical use of force 254
The tactical use of force by UNIFIL and the adoption of
Resolution 467(1980) . 256
Somalia and the strategic use of force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
Conflicting interpretations of the concept of operations and
the slide into combat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 264
Assessment of tactics and concept of operations adopted
by UNIFIL and UNOSOM II .. . 270
Conclusion 274
Chapter 8: International Humanitarian Law and Peace Support
Operations
Introduction 285
Human rights and humanitarian law... 289
Humanitarian law and armed conflicts 293
International and non-international armed conflicts 300
The UN and the maintenance of International peace and security. . .. 303
Peace enforcement operations 306
Humanitarian law and UN operations 308
The UN position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
The ICRC position , . 319
iii
The 1994 Convention on the Safety of UN
and Associated Personnel , .
Humanitarian law and UN forces in Lebanon and Somalia ..
Thepredicament ofUNIFIL .
Summary .
Somalia .
Summary - Practical difficulties applying the Conventions in Somalia
Lessons for Ireland from recent Canadian experience in
H .. I ..umarutanan aw trauung ..
Conclusions .
Chapter Nine: Conclusion .
Appendix A (Documents UNIFIL) ..
Appendix B (Documents UNOSOM 11) .
Appendix C (Survey results IHL and related issues) ..
Maps .
Appendix D ..
Bibliography ..
iv
322
330
322
340
342
349
352
360
367
383
386
397
404
406
410
TABLE OF CASES CITED
Legal Consequencesfor States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, (1971) 1.C.J .
Reports 16.
Bemaur v. The Queen, C.M.AC. of Canada, 16 September, 1988.
Boland u:An Taoiseach, [1974] I.R 338.
Ryan u: Ireland, The Attorn~ General and the Minister for Dtfen«, [1989] I.R 177.
Case Concerning Certain Expenses of the United Nations - Article 17 (2), Advisory Opinion,
(1962) r.cj Reports 176.
Conditions ofAdmission Case, (1948) r.cj Reports 57.
Corfu Channel Case, (Merits), (1949) I.C]. Reports 4.
Crotty v. Ireland, [1987] I.R 713; [1987] I.L.R.M. 400.
Devitt u:Minister for Education, [1989] I.L.R.M. 696.
Dillane v. Ireland, Supreme Court, 31 July 1980.
Finta Case, Canada High Court of Justice, 10 July 1989, 82 I.L.R 435.
Government of Canada v. Employment Appeals Tribuna~ [1982] LL.R.M. 325.
Her Majesty theQueen v. Private D. J. Brocklebank, C.M.AC. of Canada, 2 April 1996.
The State (Gilliland) v. GovernorofMoungoy Prison, [1987] I.R. 201; [1987] I.L.R.M. 287.
Judgement of the Belgian Military Court regarding violations oflntemational Humanitarian Law
committed in Somalia and Rwanda, Nr. 54 AR. 1997,20 November 1997.
lViwait AirwtfYS Corporation v. Iraq Airwqys Co. [2001] 1UL.Rep. 161.
Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, (1996) I.C.]. Reports
226.
McGimps~ v. Ireland, High Court, [1989] I.L.R.M. 209; Supreme Court, [1990] I.R.
110.
Meade v. Cork County Coundl; Supreme Court,July 31,1974.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua u: United States),
(Merits), (1986) I.C.]. 14.
v
Nissan v. Attorney General, [1968] 1 Q. B. 286, and [1969] 1 A. E. R. 629.
Norris v. the Attorney General, [1984] LR. 36.
OLoughlin v. O'Callaghan, [1874] I.R. 8.
oNeill v. Beaumont Hospital Board, [1990] I.L.R.M. 419.
People (Attorney-Genera~ v. O'Callaghan, [1966] I.R. 501.
People (DirectorofPllblic Prosecution) v. Conroy, Supreme Court, 31 July 1986.
People (Director of Public Prosecution) v. Shaw, [1982] I.R. 1.
People (Director of Public Prosecution) v. O'Higgins, Supreme Court, 2 November 1985.
People (Director of Public Prosecution) v. 0'Loughlin, [1979], I.R. 85.
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Judgement, Appeals Chamber, No. IT-95-14/1-A, March 24,
2000.
Prosecutor u: Blaskic,Judgement, Trial Chamber, No. IT-95-14, March 3, 2000.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR-72, October 2, 1995.
R v. Mathieu, C.M.A.C. of Canada 379, November 6, 1995.
Re: Application of Woods, [1971] I.R. 154.
Re: 0 Ugh/eis, [1960] I.R. 93.
Reitfy v. Minister for Agriculture and Food, High Court, June 9, 1989.
Reparationfor Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case, (1949) I.CJ. Reports
174.
Shelfry v. Mahon, [1990] I.R. 36.
The Paqllete Habana 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
The People (D.P.P) v. O'Higgins, Supreme Court, November 22, 1985.
The People (D.P.P) v. OLlighlin, [1979] I.R. 85.
The People (D.P.P) v. Shaw, [1982] LR. 1.
The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul A~sell, LC.T.R., Case No. ICTR-96-4- T, September 2,
1998.
The State (Byrne) v. Frawfry, [1978] I.R. 326.
The State (D.P.P.) v. Walsh, [1981] LR. 412.
The State (Holland) v. Kennetfy [1977] I.R. 193.
vi
The State of the Netherlands v.A.I. Toonan, Supreme Court, 8 February, 1980;
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, (1981).
United States v. Captain LP. &ckwood II, (1998) 48 M.J. 50l.
West Rand Central Mining Co. Dd v. The King, [1905] 2 K.B. 391.
vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author wishes to thank Prof. Nigel White for his invaluable advice,
guidance and encouragement while supervising this thesis. I also want to
thank all those who have shared information and experience with me in
regard to peace support operations over the years. A special thanks to Prof.
Liam 0 Malley, Dean, Faculty of Law, National University ofIreland,
Galway, for his support and encouragement over many years, and Prof.
William Schabas, Director, Irish Centre for Human Rights.
Lasdy, I want to thank my wife Carol, and my family, without whose support
this would not have been possible.
viii
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The UN and peacekeeping operations
The concept of peacekeeping is neither defined nor specifically provided for in the
UN Charter.' Historically, it is by no means a concept associated exclusively with
the UN.2 Consequently, it does not lend itself to precise definition.' In the
circumstances, it is not surprising that there is some confusion regarding what
See B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations - A Commentary,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1995), 566-603; N. White, Keeping the Peace, (2nd
ed.), Manchester: Manchester: University Press, (1997), 207-284; L. Goodrich, The
United Nations, London: Stevens, (1960), 159-189; The Blue Helmets- A Review of
UnitedNations Peacekeeping, (3nd• Ed.), New York: United Nations, (1996), esp. 3-9;
J. Roper, M. Nishihara, O. Otunnu, and E. Schoettle, Keeping the peace in the post-
Cold War era: Strengthening Multilateral Peacekeeping, New York: A report of the
Trilateral Commission: 43 (1993); D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces, London:
Stevens, (1964); L. Goodrich, E. Hambro and A Simmons, Charter of the United
Nations, (3 rd. ed.) New York: Columbia University Press, (1969), 71-72 and passim;
S. Ratner, The New UNPeacekeeping, London: Macmillan, London, (1995), 117-136
and passim; W. Durch (ed.), Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of
the 1990's, London: Macmillan, (1997); J. Mayall, The new interventionism 1991-
1994, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1996); A. James, Peacekeeping in
International Politics, London: Macmillan, (1990); I. Rikhye and K.Skjelsbaek (eds.),
The United Nations and Peacekeeping, London: Macmillan, (1990); A. Cassese, A,
UnitedNations Peacekeeping: Legal Essays, The Hague: Sijthoff & Nordhoff. (1978);
D. A Charters,.(ed.), Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution.
New Brunswick: Center for Conflict Studies, (1994); P. Diehl, International
Peacekeeping. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, (1993); G.
Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond.
Victoria, Australia: Allen and Unwin, (1993); A B. Fetherston, Towards a Theory of
United Nations Peacekeeping, London: St. Martins Press, (1994); H. McCoubrey and
N.White. The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations,
Aldershot: Dartmouth, (1996); Weiss, T. G. (ed.) Beyond UN Subcontracting,
London: Macmillan, (1998); D. Daniel and B. Hayes (eds.), Beyond Traditional
Peacekeeping, London: Macmillan, (1995); J. F. Murphy, The United Nations and the
Control of International Violence: A Legal and Political Analysis, Manchester
Manchester University Press, (1983); I. Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of
Peacekeeping, London: Hurst & Company, (1984); W. Wainhouse, International
Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support, Experience and Prospects,
Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, (1973); H. Wiseman,(ed.),
Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals, New York: Pergamon Press, (1983).
2 See H. McCoubrey and N. White, International Organizations and Civil
Wars,Aldershot; Dartmouth, (1995), 183.
3 See TheBlue Helmets, op. cit., 3-9.
exactly constitutes peacekeeping. Indeed, it is sometimes easier to say that a
particular mission or force does not possess the generally recognised
characteristics of a peacekeeping operation, than it is to confirm that it fulfils the
necessary criteria." Part of the reason for this is the looseness with which states
adopt such terms. It has a distinctly positive resonance, and those charged with
the government of states are usually more concerned with public relations and
opinion polls, than with legal criteria or political reality. For this reason, the term
is often applied to controversial situations where states intervene militarily and
then seek to justify or portray their actions as some kind of benign peacekeeping
operation.
The cold war era between the US and the Soviet Union was marked at
the UN by continual wrangling over the correct interpretation of the Charter
provisions.i The Charter's own ambiguity and failure to make provision for
specific problems contributed to these disputes." In order to survive, the
Organization had to be capable of adapting to the changed political circumstances
and this meant adopting roles not specifically provided for in the Charter," When
the required consensus among the major powers did not materialise, it seemed the
UN would be unable to fulfil a significant role in the maintenance of peace, and
the growth of regional self-defence systems was just one indication of the lack of
confidence in the Organization as the international guarantor of peace. In these
circumstances, it was not surprising that the UN sought to circumvent the
4 The UN Emergency Force (UNEF),which was established and deployed after
the British and French military interventionin Suez in 1956, is generally regarded as the
first true UN peacekeeping operation; Summary Study of the experience derived from
the establishment and operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary-General, 9
October 1958; GAOR, 13 Session, Annex 1: Document Al3943. See also document
Al3289 and A/3302, the latter was approved by General Assembly Resolution 1001
(ES-I) of 7 November 1956. D.W. Bowett, op. cit., 90-152 esp. 90-98 and The Blue
Helmets, op. cit., 37-55.
See generally B. Simma (ed.), op. cit., 25-44; and L. Goodrich, E. Hambro
and A. Simmons, op. cit., 1-17 and I. Claude, Swords into Ploughshares, New York:
Random House, (1956), Chapter 12.
6 Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, op. cit., 107.
7 See generally N. D. White, 'The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces:
Constitutional Issues', in M. Pugh, (ed.), The UN, Peace and Force, 3 (4) International
Peacekeeping, London: Frank Cass, (1996), 43-63.
2
obstacles caused by cold war rivalries.
When the divisions of the cold war blocked effective action by the
Security Council, the concept of UN peacekeeping was invented.! However, it
should be stressed that peacekeeping is not the sole preserve of the UN. The
concept predates the formation of the Organization and peacekeeping missions
continue to be organised outside its framework. In this way it can be argued that a
peacekeeping force established and deployed by one or more states may
legitimately profess to belong to some kind of internationally recognised category
of peacekeeper. Peacekeeping operations were intended to end hostilities by
peaceful means and create a climate in which the peacemaking process could be
successfully applied. In recent years, this traditionally passive role has been
replaced by a more active role of peace making, involving, inter alia, national
reconstruction, facilitating transition to democracy, and providing humanitarian
assistance." Initially referred to as 'second generation"? or multi -dimensional
peacekeeping, lithe more generic title of peace support operations has been
adopted to cover the wide range of activities involved.
The UN Charter, as finally adopted, contained two significant Chapters
in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security. Chapter VI
provides for the pacific settlement of disputes by, among other things, negotiation
and adjudication; and Chapter VII contains the collective security provisions
which were intended as the cornerstone of its policy in the maintenance of world
peace. It is Chapter VII of the Charter that provides for enforcement measures
under the direction of the Security Council as the central military instrument for
the maintenance of peace and security. The lack of an express mention of
peacekeeping in the Charter'? has not inhibited its development and may, in fact,
8 Simma, op. cit., 565-603 and The Blue Helmets, op. cit., esp. 3-9.
9 See J. Roper, M. Nishihara, O. Otunnu, and E. Schoettle, op. cit., 4.
10 The Blue Helmets, op. cit., 5.
II See for example S. Ratner, op. cit." 117-136 and passim. For a good
definition of terms see W. J. Durch, 'Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the
1990's' in W. Durch (ed.), Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of
the 1990's, op. cit., 3-7.
3
have helped its establishment as a flexible response to international crises but at
the same time contributed to a misunderstanding regarding its true nature.
Although authorities have differed on the exact legal basis for peacekeeping
operations, the International Court of Justice has held that such operations are
within the power of both the General Assembly and the Security Council.13
A further complication arises by virtue of the kind of operations
conducted under Chapter VII and intended to be enforcement action in nature,
despite the failure to conclude the requisite agreements with the UN under
Article 43 of the Charter." Military actions conducted during the Korean
conflict, and more recently the Gulf conflict, belong to this category.
Operations of this kind can be established under Article 42 of the Charter by
way of a decision of the Security Council, or they may be authorized by way of
a recommendation under Article 39.15 In the special circumstances of the
Korean conflict, the Uniting for Peace resolution procedure then adopted by the
General Assembly provides a possible further mechanism that could be availed
of in the future, though it would be a mistake to exaggerate its potential in such
circumstances. Article 42 is the central element in enforcement operations and
leaves a wide measure of discretion to the Security Council whether a particular
situation calls for the application of military enforcement measures, and their
nature and extent."
12 See D. Ciombanu, 'The Power of the Security Council to Organize
Peacekeeping', in Cassese (ed.), op. cit., 23-25.
13 Certain Expenses of the United Nations - Article 17(2), Advisory Opinion,
July 20, 1962, InternationalCourt of Justice Reports, 1962, 176. See generally N. D.
White, 'The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues', in M. Pugh,
(ed.), op.cit., 43-63.
14 Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, op. cit., 317-326 and Simma, op. cit., 636-
639
IS The Korean action was taken on the basis of a 'recommendation' by the
Security Council under Article 39, SCOR/5th Year/473-474 Mtgs./June 27 and 27,
1950. On the binding nature of resolutions, see R. Riggins, Problems and Process -
International Law and How We Use It, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1994), 24-27 and
37.
4
In spite of the controversy and problems encountered by peacekeeping
missions, the concept has survived and developed. One of the primary reasons for
its success is that it has combined adherence to basic principles with extraordinary
flexibility. In particular, it has managed to maintain the essence of what is
acceptable to UN membership at large, while at the same time adapting individual
peacekeeping operations to the needs of particular circumstances. The Secretary-
General plays a central role in the conduct of peacekeeping operations, but the
exact nature and extent of this role has not been defined, and problems of
demarcation with that of the Security Council remain to be resolved." In the
course of the peacekeeping operation in the Congo, serious difficulties arose in
this regard. I 8
The legal authority for the creation of UN peacekeeping forces remains
unsatisfactory and there seems little prospect of a change in their ad hoc nature."
While it may be argued that agreement on basic principles would lessen the
opportunity for conflicting interpretations of the Charter and divisive
controversies, there is merit in maintaining a flexible and adaptive approach to
peacekeeping operations. The issues of consent and domestic jurisdiction raise
difficult questions in the context of internal conflicts or civil wars.20 There were
reservations about UN involvement in the Congo, Somalia and Lebanon for these
very reasons. However, internal conflicts frequently escalate into regional
16 Simma, op. cit., 428-436 and Goodrich, Hambro and Simmons, op. cit.
315-315.
17 See L. Gordenker, The United Nations Secretary General and the
Maintenance of Peace, New York & London: Columbia University Press, (1967) esp.
235-260; and D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective
Security, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1999), esp. 50-85.
18 See generally R. Higgins, United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)
1960-1964, London: Royal Institute of InternationalAffairs, (1980); and L. Gordenker,
op. cit., esp. 261-296 and B. Urquhart, Hammarskjold, New York: Alfred Knopf,
(1972), 389-456.
On the legal parameters of peacekeeping, see generally N. White, Keeping
the Peace, op. cit., 224-247.
19
20 McCoubrey and White, op. cit., 38.
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conflicts and these in tum may involve breaches of international law thereby
removing the conflict from the reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction.
The resolution of internal or domestic conflict has been a dominant
feature of recent operations and involved the establishment of democratic
governments culminating in the nation building attempted for a time in
Somalia. Any interventions by UN forces may, intentionally or otherwise, alter
the delicate balance of power between the warring parties." Maintaining
impartiality can present peacekeepers with a dilemma, especially when they
confront situations in which civilians are victimised, or when UN forces are
themselves the subject of attack.f The question of consent to a UN presence is
particularly problematic in those situations. The blue berets involved must be
prepared to resort to force rather than be bystanders to large-scale human rights
abuses or even genocide. In this way, the continuum from peacekeeping to
peacemaking and enforcement can be difficult to track, but when all else fails
and the political will exists, the Security Council retains the right to resort to
the use of force under Chapter VII.
Peacekeeping and enforcement operatlonsf
There is a great deal of semantic and conceptual confusion surrounding
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.i" In general terms,
peacekeeping involves non coercive intervention based on the consent of the
parties to a conflict, and it does not permit the use of force except in self
21 See J. Peck, 'The U.N. and the Laws of War: How Can the World's
Peacekeepers be Held Accountable', 21 Syracuse Journal Of International Law,
(1995), 283-310, at 288.
22 The Blue Helmets, op. cit., 5.
23 See generally E. Schmidl, Peace Operations Between War and Peace,
London: Frank Cass, (2000) and I. Rikhye, The Politics and Practice of United
Nations Peacekeeping: Past, Present and Future: Clementsport NS, Canadian
Peacekeeping Press, (2000).
24 See for example J. G. Ruggie, 'Wandering in the Void: Charting the UN's
New Strategic Role,' 72 (5) Foreign Affairs, (November/December 1993), 26; and A.
Roberts, 'From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force,' 37 (4)
Survival, (Winter 1995-96), 26.
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defence.f ' Many discussions are characterised by a failure to understand and
distinguish between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement, and the grey
area in between.i'' This was especially evident in debates on Somalia, which
involved a combination of operations and mandates embodying all three
elements mentioned, and more besides. Peacekeeping remains quite distinct
from the enforcement measures envisaged by the Charter. Nonetheless, both
concepts are based on similar conditions, in particular, the availability of military
forces and the effective co-operation of members of the Security Council. Not
surprisingly, there is considerable confusion regarding these very distinct and
separate concepts. Recent deployments in Albania and East Timor could be
described as hybrid operations comprised of coalitions of the willing based on
consent also, but the consent involved, especially in the case of East Timor, is
somewhat qualified by the international pressure brought to bear on the
Indonesian government at the time.
Peace enforcement must also be distinguished from enforcement
action as envisioned under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Peace
enforcement does not involve identifying an aggressor, but it may involve the
threat and actual use of force to 'compel or coerce' the implementation of
international norms or mandates." In this way, the two most important
characteristics that distinguish traditional peacekeeping from the more robust
peace enforcement operations are the use of force and the issue of consent.
Closely linked to these issues, and also of crucial importance, is the principle
of impartiality. Impartiality is easily maintained in traditional peacekeeping
but difficult in enforcement operations. Insistence that intervention in intra-
state conflict adhere to the principles of consent and impartiality is not always
2S See A. James, op. cit., 1-13; N. White, Keeping the Peace, op. cit., 232-247
and D. Bowett, op. cit., 196 andpassim.
26 See T. Weiss, 'Rekindling Hope in UN Humanitarian Intervention', in W.
Clarke and J. Herbst, Learning From Somalia, Boulder: Westview Press, (1997), 207-
228, at 211.
27 See D. Daniel, 'Wandering Out of the Void? Conceptualizing Practicable
Peace Enforcement,' in A. Morrison, D. Fraser and J. Kiras, Peacekeeping With
Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution, Cornwallis: Canadian
Peacekeeping Press, (1997), 1-15 at 4. The quote is from, FM 100-23, Washington
DC, (1994), 12.
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practical and may prove counter productive." It is generally accepted that the
peacekeeping force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is based on the traditional
peacekeeping model, and that the UNIT AF and UNOSOM II missions in
Somalia may be categorised as peace enforcement operations.
The semantic confusion is not helped by the application of the term
peace enforcement to a large-scale international military operation such as the
Gulf war.29 Portraying operations involving enforcement measures by a group
of states in such superficial 'sound bite' terms merely undermines the credibility
of the genuine attempts by the UN to keep or enforce the peace as the case may
be. One of the few situations to which the description peace enforcement can
accurately be applied is that of the NATO led force (IFOR) in the former
Yugoslavia following the Dayton Accords, and the more recently deployed
KFOR in Kosovo. The notion of consent also marks an important distinction
between peacekeeping and related humanitarian aid missions on the one hand
and humanitarian intervention on the other.i" Humanitarian intervention is
generally understood to mean intervention by a third party in the affairs of
another without that country's consent in order to protect serious human rights
violations of the local citizens.i'
28 See S. Duke, 'The United Nations and Intra-state Conflict', 1 (4)
International Peacekeeping (F. Cass), (Winter 1994), 375-93.
29 The term is often used by UN officials, see for example the comments by D.
Shagra, Legal Officer, Office of Legal Affairs, and R. Zacklin, Director and Deputy to
the Under Secretary-General, Office of Legal Affairs, 'The Applicability of
International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace-keeping Operations:
Conceptual, Legal and Practical Issues', Symposium on Humanitarian Acton and
Peacekeeping Operations Report, Geneva: ICRC,(1994), 40 and passim. Talk given
by Prof. F. Halliday, LSE, UN Training School, Military College, Ireland, October
1995.
30 S. L. Turley, 'Keeping the Peace: Do the Laws of War Apply?' 73 Texas Law
Review, (1994),139-176 at p.l51. See also A. C. Arend & R. J. Beck, 'Humanitarian
Intervention', in International Law and the Use of Force, New York: Routledge,
(1993), 112-137 and C. Greenwood, 'Is there a right of Humanitarian Intervention?',
49(2) World Today, (1993), 34-40.
31 See S. D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, University of Pennsylvania,
(1996), 8-20. T. Weiss, 'Intervention: Whither the United Nations?', 17 (1) The
Washington Quarterly, (Winter 1994), 109-128 at 110-111; R. B. Lillich,
'Humanitarian Interventions through the United Nations: Towards the Development of
8
Collective security and the role of the Security Councn32
While the Security Council has 'primary' responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, it does not possess an exclusive competence in
this area.33 Peace was to be maintained by international co-operation, as
embodied in the UN Organization itself, rather than through some kind of new
world governmental system. However, the collective security provisions were
seriously flawed as the basic premise of major power consensus in international
affairs did not materialise and the provisions upon which so much depended were
inoperable from the beginning.i" In this way, the former allies became classical
victims of their own propaganda.
In hindsight, it is difficult to see how the drafters of the Charter could have
expected this system to work. The so called 'big powers' had a right of veto in
the Security Council rendering collective security unenforceable against them, yet
it was they that posed the greatest potential threat to international peace. In spite
of the fact that this created a ruling oligarchy within the Security Council that was
to some extent imposed on the smaller states, the UN did not confer power where
it did not in fact already exist. Itmerely reflected the reality of post World War II
economic and political power. Unfortunately, peoples and nations not part of the
formal state system were not represented at all. However, in examining the
Criteria', 53 (2) Hiedelberg Journal of International Law, (1993), 556-575 at 559; 1.
Donnelly, 'Human Rights, humanitarian crisis, and humanitarian intervention, 48 (4)
International Journal, (1993), 607-640, esp. 608; K. Pease and D. Forsythe,
'Humanitarian Intervention and International Law,' 45 Austrian Journal of Public and
International Law, (1993), 1-20; and more generally J. Harris (ed.), The Politics of
Humanitarian Intervention, Pinter, (1995), P. Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention
and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, (1993); and A.
Eknes & A. McDermott(eds.), Sovereignty, Humanitarian Intervention and the
Military, Oslo: Norwegian Institute ofInternational Affairs, (1996).
32 See generally Rikhye, op. cit., 1-28.
33 See Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, op. cit., 257-343; S. D. Bailey and S.
Daws, The Procedure of the United Nations Security Council, (3nd. Edn.), Oxford:
Clarendon, (1998), esp. 353-377; and The UN Security Council and Human Rights.
London: Macmillan, (1994); R. Hiscoks, The Security Council, London: Longmans,
(1974), 24-81. See also H. McCoubrey, 'International Law and National Contingents
in UN Forces', 12 International Relations, (1994),39-50.
34 See generally J.G. Ruggie, 'The UN and the Collective Use of Force:
Whither or Wheter?', in M. Pugh, (ed.), op. cit., 1-20.
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collective security provisions of the Charter, it is important to bear in mind that
peace depends more upon international co-operation than on the mechanisms
contained in the Charter. While the threat or actual use of the veto may prevent
the UN taking action, the real problem is a lack of consensus among the major
powers, and the veto merely reflects the reality of the international political
system."
Since no formal agreement under the Charter for the provisions of troops to
the UN has yet been concluded, member states are under no legal obligation to
supply the Security Council with armed forces except on a voluntary basis. In
recent years stand-by arrangements and other 'offers' have been made by states,
and it is on this basis, in contrast to what was intended for enforcement measures,
that states usually provide the necessary troops to make up a peacekeeping
force.i" The course of UN peacekeeping has not always run smoothly and the
crisis that occurred during the operation in the Congo threatened the existence of
the whole Organization for a time."
Peace support operations and current conllicts38
Since its establishment, the UN has been kept on a tight rein and prevented
from developing its full potential. During the cold war both sides used the
threat of veto in the Security Council to good effect, and both shared a common
interest in hindering the General Assembly from developing its full capacity.
3S See generally B. Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of
Veto: A Constitutional Perspective, Hague: Kluwer, (1998), esp. Chapters 8 and 9; and
D. Malone, Decision Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti, 1990-
1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1998), esp. 7-36.
36 Personal interview, Mr. J.C. Aime, UN Secretariat, New York, July 1988.
Up to relatively recently, these were usually small and middle powers to the exclusion
of the 'big five' .
37 See R. Higgins, op. cit; E. W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, A United
Nations Force in Action, Washington DC: Brookings Institute, (1965), and H.
McCoubrey and N. White, op. cit, 177-178 andpassim.
For a good overview of many key issues, see A. Roberts, Humanitarian
Action in War, Adelphi Paper 305, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1996), esp. 10-
38
10
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war has given rise to a
situation where there is in effect one world superpower, the United States. The
'new world order' was intended to unlock the UN mechanism for the
maintenance of international peace, and exploit opportunities for peacekeeping
and nation building. Instead, there is a perception and fear in the countries of
the developing South that the UN is being exploited to police a world order
based on the interests of the powerful few.39 This fear is linked to the lack of
success in reforming the Security Council and making it more representative of,
and accountable to, the membership of the UN as a whole." However, one of
the biggest problems confronting the UN remains one of its most banal, i.e.
lack of finance." This problem more often than not reflected political division
among members, rather than financial difficulty.
In June 1992, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, published
An Agenda for Peace.42 This was an important report that stimulated a major
international debate about the role of the UN, and the international community, in
securing and maintaining peace in the post cold war era. The report expressed the
optimism and confidence of the time, but these were to be very short lived.
Recent events have highlighted the deficiencies in the UN system, in particular the
controversy over UN action and policy in Somalia and Rwanda, and the failure to
secure peace and protect Bosnia in the former Yugoslavia. Despite the noble
aspirations of the Charter, for many millions the world is still a dangerous and
31.
39 See 1. Ciechanski, 'Enforcement Measures under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter: UN Practice after the Cold War', in M. Pugh, (ed.), op. cit., 82-104, esp. 97-
99, and 1. Johnstone, Aftermath of the Gulf War: An Assessment of UN Action,
International Peace Academy, Occasional Paper Series, Boulder and London: Lynne
Rienner, (1994), 10 and 43-45.
40 See generally M. Reisman, 'The Constitutional Crises in the United
Nations', 87 (1) American Journal of International Law, (January 1993),85-86; and O.
Otunnu, 'Maintaining Broad Legitimacy for United Nations Action', in 1. Roper, M.
Nishihara, O. Otunnu, and E. Schoettle, op cit., 67-83.
41 See 'Financing Peacekeeping' in The Preparedness Gap: Making Peace
Operations Work in the 21 st Century, A Policy Report of the United Nations
Association of the United States of America, (2001),33-37.
42 UN document: AJ47/277 - S/24111, (June 1992).
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miserable place in which to exist. War, famine, pestilence, and disease continue
to ravage the peoples of this planet, especially those subsisting in the abject
poverty prevalent in most states of the developing South. These exacerbate pre-
existing cultural, ethnic and political tensions. The end of the cold war has
witnessed a resurgence of conflict, especially within states, as old enmities come
to the fore.
The UN and the international system seemed unprepared and ill-
equipped about the potential consequences. Not surprisingly, the UN has come
in for considerable criticism, much of which is merited. However, the criticism
is sometimes misplaced in that it fails to identify the real problems of the
Organization as a whole and to recognise its many achievements. In addition,
there is sometimes a failure to distinguish between the UN as a whole, and its
separate organs, especially the Security Council
The end of the cold war has also heralded a significant increase in the
UN's willingness to pursue its role in the maintenance of international peace
and security by the adoption of military solutions. The importance attached to
the Security Council's power to order military measures did not stem from
expectations that it would often be necessary to do SO.43 It was thought that the
threat of military action would be sufficient to deter aggression and to induce
states to comply with measures deemed appropriate by the Security Council to
maintain or restore international peace and security. However, the reality is that
although the military agreements envisioned under Article 43 of the Charter did
not materialise, the UN has had a significant involvement in military operations
of one kind or another since the first major UN authorized operation during the
Korean conflict in 1950.
The adoption by the UN of resolutions under Chapter vn of the Charter
involving enforcement measures has been one of its most controversial actions in
recent years. The real problem is not the legality of such action, but the question
of which states decide when it is appropriate and what are the criteria used? In
fact, the practice of the Security Council of authorising states to use armed force
does not correspond to the express text of Chapter VII of the Charter." The
43 Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, op. cit., 291.
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current practice allows the permanent members of the Council to determine and
decide the agenda, thus facilitating a very selective, secretive and undemocratic
response to international crises. The situation is made worse by the ambiguity
surrounding the extent to which peaceful settlement procedures, including
diplomatic efforts and diplomatic sanctions must be exhausted before military
sanctions are applied."
Co-operation with regional bodies and coalitions of the willing is a
characteristic of contemporary UN approved operations, a situation which has
been brought about by a number of factors, not least the lack of finance."
Substantial co-operation between NATO and the UN was forced by the necessity
to respond to the Yugoslav crisis." The complex nature of many contemporary
conflicts require significantly larger and more heavily equipped forces, and this in
turn has led to greater participation by the permanent members of the Security
Council. The distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement action remains
crucial. Nonetheless, this distinction has become blurred in the grey area that
exists between peacekeeping and so called 'peace enforcement', and by the
number and complexity of peace support operations in the post cold war era. Prior
to 1990, the UN had authorized two enforcement missions, that against North
Korea in 1950 and the Congo in 1960 (ONUC).48 It has since approved a number
44 See L. Heffernan 'Military Action Under the Auspices of the United
Nations', Irish Law Times, (March 1993), 59-62; N. D. White, 'The UN Charter and
Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues', in M. Pugh, (ed.), op. cit., 43-63.and M.
Howard, 'The United Nations and InternationalSecurity' in A. Roberts & B. Kingsbury
(ed.), United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Role in International Relations, 31-45,
Oxford: ClarendonPress, (1988).
45 This was a source of controversyand debate before the adoption of Resolution
678 (1991), which authorized collective measures against Iraq and led to Operation
Desert Storm. See O. Schacter, 'United Nations in the Gulf Conflict' 85 American
Journal of International low, (1991), 452 and L.C. Green, 'Iraq, the U.N. and the
Law', Alberta low Review (1991), 560.
46 Though costs are minuscule compared to the national defence budgets, see E.
Schoettle, 'Financing Peacekeeping', in 1. Roper, M. Nishihara, O. Otunnu, and E.
Schoettle, op cit., 17-48 at 20.
47 See generally M. Nordquist, What Color Helmet?: Reforming Security
Council Peacekeeping Mandates, Newport RI: Naval War College, Center for Naval
Warfare Studies, (1997), esp. 46-50.
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of major operations with similar characteristics, in Kuwait, Somalia, the former
Yugoslavia, Kosovo, East Timor, Albania'", the Central African Republic and
Sierra Leone. However, some of these are UN mandated forces, while others are
merely authorized 'coalitions of the willing' .50
The end of the cold war has not brought the realisation of the early
optimism associated with that event, and the ambitions for the UN and the
Security Council reflected in the Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace, did not
materialise. The Secretary-General sought to give legitimacy to the concept of
peace enforcement by formally proposing the establishment of such units.
However, the concept of peace enforcement can prove to be a contradiction in
terms, and it was disastrous when attempted in Somalia. Ultimately, it merely
served to discredit UN activities in the maintenance of international peace and
security. A more sobering and reflective sequel to this was published a short
time later in which the Secretary-General acknowledged certain limitations."
In order to respond to the problem of intrastate conflict, there is need for
reform of doctrinal foundations and structures in the UN system. Military
48 ONUC amounted to at least de facto enforcement action, see N. D. White,
'The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues', in M. Pugh (ed.),
op. cit., 43-63 at 53. Cf. Certain Expenses of the UN - Article 17(2), Advisory Opinion,
July 20, 1962, International Court of Justice Reports, 1962, 177, where the I.C.J. said
the 'the operation did not involve "preventative or enforcement measures" against any
state under Chapter VII' .
49 Though Albania had elements of traditional peacekeeping and peace
enforcement combined in one mandate, see D. Kritsiotis, 'Security Council Resolution
1101 (1997) and the Multi-national Protection Force of Operation Alba in Albania', 12
Leiden Journal of International Law, (1999),511-547.
SO It is best to view the action by NATO forces in Kosovo during 1999 as sui
generis, see B. Simma, ' NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects', 10
European Journal of International Law, (1999) 1-22; K. Ambos, 'NATO, the UN and
the Use of Force: Legal Aspects. A comment on Simma and Cassese', 2 Humanitdres
Volkerrecht, Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, (1999), 114-115; A. Cassesse, 'Ex iniuria ius
oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian
Countermeasures in the World Community?' 10 European Journal of International
Law, (1999), 23-30 and C. Guicherd, 'International Law and the War in Kosovo',
41 (2) Survival, (Summer, 1999), 19-34. See also 'The Kosovo crisis and international
humanitarian law', International Review of the Red Cross, No. 837, (2000), in which
the whole edition is devoted to contributions on the topic.
Sl Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, New York: United Nations, (1995).
See M. Reisman, 'Peacemaking', 18 Yale Journal of International Law, (1993), 415.
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intervention in any internal conflict is fraught with uncertainty and danger. There
is a growing consensus that much greater emphasis must be placed on preventive
measures, as opposed to reactive corrective strategies that are more often than not
too little and too late. In particular, the limited ability of the Security Council and
office of the Secretary-General, to deploy, direct, command and control
enforcement operations in response to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace
or acts of aggression. The consequences of this are well known, but worth
restating. International and internal armed conflicts have continued to flare
around the globe, and one of the ironies of the end of the cold war is that local or
internal conflicts have increased. 52 With the UN's inability to respond effectively
to these crises, the Security Council has left the establishment and management of
international forces to individual member states, in particular the United States. In
some of these cases e.g. the UN has divested itself explicitly of its competence in
leading enforcement actions and has instead 'authorized' member states to
undertake enforcement measures by use of force. Some have described the action
by the Security Council as a form of abdication of responsibility, with little or no
command and control by the UN, and no strategic direction either."
The structure of the thesis
The thesis examines two important peace support operations, the traditional
peacekeeping operation established in Lebanon in 1978 (UNIFIL), and what is
arguably one of the most significant peace enforcement operations of the last
decade, UNOSOM II in Somalia. These were chosen as representative of the
types of military operations undertaken by the UN, and of reflecting the
problems that are associated with their establishment, deployment, and
command.
Adopting criteria to determine the success of an operation is
52 See D. Smith, The State of War and Peace Atlas, International Peace
Research Institute, Oslo, London: Penguin, (1997).
53 See N. White, Keeping the Peace, op. cit., 115-128 esp. 117-118.
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problematic, as no internationally accepted criteria exist at present. 54 Despite
this, most commentators still need to find some formula for evaluating the
performance of peacekeeping and related operations. This dilemma is usually
solved by using a variety of criteria based on the extent to which the mandate
or objectives of the mission were fulfilled, and/or the extent to which the
operation limited armed conflict, or promoted relative peace and security in
the area. 55 There is also a need to be aware of the time frame used to
determine 'success' or 'failure'. 56 Were the short term efforts to feed the
starving success, and what then of the long term strategy and eventual
withdrawal? Most of the systematic studies of UN peacekeeping have been of
the case study and comparative nature.57 Such studies often focus on
particular dimensions of peacekeeping in the context of a selected mission or
54 Paul Diehl identified two criteria for evaluating a traditional peacekeeping
operation i.e. the extent to which it limited armed conflict and promoted conflict
resolution, P. Diehl, op. cit., 3, 34. However, this theoretical framework has serious
flaws, see review by R. C. Johansen in the 38 Mershon International Studies Review
(1994) 307-310. For an excellent but now somewhat dated analysis of this question
with respect to the entire UN, see K. Stiles and M. MacDonald, 'After Consensus,
What?: Performance Criteria for the UN in the Post Cold war Era,' 29 Journal oj
Peace Research, (1992),299-311. See also D. Jett, Why Peacekeeping Fails, London:
Macmillan, (2000), esp. 1-20.
55 Brown identified three criteria for determining success: Was the mandate
fulfilled, as specified by the appropriate Security Council resolution? Did the
operation lead to a resolution of the underlying disputes of the conflict? Did the
presence of the operation contribute to the maintenance of international peace and
security by reducing or eliminating conflict in the area of operation? M. A. Brown,
'A., United Nations Peacekeeping: Historical Overview and Current Issues', Report
Jor Congress, Washington DC, Congressional Research Service, 1993. See also D.
Bratt, 'Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations', in M. Pugh (ed.), op.
cit., 64-81. Rikhye emphasizes the importance of the mechanics and logistical
dimensions of peacekeeping, in particular the role of 'command and control' and the
role of the superpowers in a peacekeeping operations success, I. J. Rikhye, op. cit., 81-
82.
56 See T. Weiss, op. cit., 207-228, at 215.
57 See for example, E. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the UN Congo
Operation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (1967); A. James, op. cit.; J. Hirsch
and R. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, Washington: US Institute of
Peace, (1995), 18; W. Clarke and J. Herbst, op. cit.; R. I. Rotberg (ed.), Namibia,
Political and Economic Prospects, Lexington, (1983); S. Ratner, op. cit., B. Skjomo,
UNIFIL, Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, (1989); R. Thakur,
International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United Nations and Multilateral Force,
Boulder: Westview, (1987).
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missions.i" and this is the model adopted in this thesis. Many studies have
also tended to place too much emphasis on what is theoretically desirable,
rather than politically and practically possible. In truth, it is probable that
there are no definitive criteria to determine the ultimate success of any UN
military operation absolutely, and the more complex second generation multi-
dimensional operations are even more problematic in this regard than the
generally more straight forward traditional peacekeeping operations." In the
latter case, it may be possible to evaluate the extent to which a cease-fire was
maintained, but multi-dimensional operations require analysis from a number
of perspectives.
Nevertheless, a useful means of providing a framework to evaluate the
performance of a force is to apply factors identified as essential for its success.
In his first report to the Security Council on UNIFIL, the Secretary-General
outlined the three essential conditions that needed to be met for the Force to be
effective. First, it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the
Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full co-operation of all the
parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and
efficient military unit.6o In 1983, the now retired Under Secretary-General of
the UN with special responsibility for peacekeeping operations, Mr. Brian
Urquhart, elaborated upon this when writing about the Multi National Force in
Beirut and stated that successful peacekeeping depends, inter alia, on a sound
political base, a well defined mandate and objectives, and the co-operation of
the parties concerned." The requirement of a well defined mandate and
objectives was a somewhat glaring omission from the Secretary-General's
otherwise pragmatic report. Using these factors as criteria, chapter 6 focuses on
the establishment and deployment of the UN forces in Lebanon and Somalia.
Its purpose is to explain how the background influenced the outcome of the
58 For example, legal questions, the organization aspects, political and military
aspects or how the operations fits into the larger security regime.
59 Ratner, op. cit., 189/190.
60 Document S112611, 19 March 1978, para 3.
61 The New York Times, 19 December 1983.
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operations, and the central role played by the United States throughout, the
primary contention being that the lack of support from the permanent members
of the Security Council, especially the United States, undermined the political
base and viability of the operations from the beginning.
The research focus of the thesis relates to Ireland, a small militarily
neutral state but one with a long tradition of contributing to peacekeeping
operations. Despite its significant contribution to peace support operations to
date, there is little research on the past and future implications of this for
Ireland. This thesis seeks to address some of the key legal and political issues
confronting Ireland, and to provide a unique perspective on the dilemmas and
problems confronting many small states of the UN in the new international
order.
Membership of the UN has been a cornerstone and determiner of Irish
foreign policy since 1955. The key issue relating to UN peace support
operations and Irish foreign policy at present is the focus on maintaining
military neutrality while fostering a security role within Europe. The
participation in UN led and sponsored operations is not a controversial issue,
but the growing trend of recent years to contract out peace support operations to
regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
may present problems for a country that has up to now shied away from
difficult or controversial decisions on security and defence issues. Important
questions, however, remain unanswered. The Gulf War and more recent events in
Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia place a responsibility on Ireland to
re-defme its role, especially in regard to UN peace support operations. Ireland
needs to examine whether military neutrality is appropriate or even relevant in the
post cold war era. Chapter 2 seeks to explore these themes and the implications
for Ireland of recent developments in international peace support operations. It
looks at the role of the Irish Defences Forces that, in the absence of external
conflict, have been defined by the role in support of the civil power and as
peacekeepers for the UN.
In 1993, Ireland revised and updated the municipal legal basis for troop
participation in UN operations to allow it to contribute soldiers to UNOSOM II
in Somalia. This brought about a fundamental change in policy, after which
participation in peacekeeping forces not specifically of a police nature was
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permitted. Nevertheless, senous deficiencies exist in the municipal legal
framework governing participation in peace support operations, especially in
relation to the command of Defence Force personnel. These are addressed in
Chapter 3, where a comparative analysis is made with that of the municipal
legal basis governing Canadian participation in such operations, while Chapter
4 examines the constitutional implications ofIrish membership of the UN.
The question of command and control of UN and other multi-national
operations is a fundamental issue confronting the formation of international
forces. The problems encountered at international level often have their origins in
the national policy of contributing states. In theory, the command structure of
such forces is straightforward, but in reality it is fraught with difficulties arising
from subjective human factors, and objective legal constraints. Unless the
Security Council has specifically delegated command to a particular country, any
one government should not effectively control a UN operation. Revision of the
legal framework governing UN peace support operations is long overdue.
Chapter 5 examines these and related issues in the context of Canadian and Irish
participation in UN operations.
As previously noted, Chapter 6 analyses the political and diplomatic
background to the establishment of the UN mandated military forces in
Lebanon and Somalia. In the case of Lebanon, the mandate adopted was
controversial and it was considered to be deficient in a number of respects.
While UNIFIL was deployed with undue haste against the advice of many
commentators at the time, its survival should not be seen as a reflection on the
appropriateness of the mandate. The UN operations in Somalia were more
ambitious in comparison, and they involved significantly more resources.
Initially at least, they were also less controversial. The consensus and
enthusiasm for involvement in Somalia changed quickly as 'mission creep'
set in and doubts were expressed about the efficacy of UN policy there.
The most controversial aspect of recent UN operations has been the policy
with regard to the use of force, which is a fundamental determiner of the
nature of any peace support operation. Chapter 7 examines the use of force
and the experience of UNIFIL and UNOSOM II. The premise of the analysis is
that strict adherence to the principle in self defence is the only option available
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in traditional peacekeeping operations, and that the nature of the UNOSOM II
mission meant that the coercive enforcement measures adopted inevitably led to
its role as third party UN force being converted to that of factional participant.
Chapter 8 examines the applicability and relevance of international
humanitarian law (humanitarian law) to all types of military action undertaken
by or on behalf of the UN. Owing to the controversy surrounding action by
UNOSOM forces in Somalia, the question of respect for the principles of
humanitarian law by UN forces has been the subject of controversy and debate.
The less controversial traditional peacekeeping missions can also involve
important issues of humanitarian law, especially when the situation that
UNIFIL found itself in after the Israeli invasion of 1982 is considered.
The UN system was designed carefully to make war illegal and
unnecessary.f and nowhere in Chapter VII, and Article 42 in particular, is
'war' mentioned.Y The obvious implication of this is that military action taken
by the UN is not to be regarded as 'war', and this was the commonly accepted
view of the UN action in Korea." While there appears to be no record of the
UN ever claiming that humanitarian law does not apply to operations
authorized by or undertaken on behalf of the Organization, the issues raised are
complex and the policy of the UN remains ambivalent. The thesis examines
the problems associated with the application of humanitarian law to UN peace
support operations. It looks in particular at how to address infringements of
humanitarian law by UN forces, and whether a duty exists to protect the rights
of third parties against violations of applicable international law in areas where
UN troops are deployed.
These are real issues confronting today's peacekeepers, but especially
those participating in the so-called 'robust' peacekeeping operations similar to
that of UNOSOM II in Somalia. While none of the existing Conventions or
62 See T. M. Franck and F. Patel, 'Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and
Foreign Relations Law: UN Police Action in Lieu of War: 'The Old Order Changeth,'
85 American Journal of International Law, (1991), at 63.
63 See generally, C. Greenwood, 'The Concept of War in Modem International
Law', 36 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (1987), 283-306.
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Protocols address the specific issue of UN forces, or forces acting on the
authority of the UN, in situations of armed conflict, it could be said that this
situation leaves military forces acting under the control of the UN in somewhat
of a limbo. Human rights are a key issue in guaranteeing consistent and
effective peacekeeping." Recent UN operations have involved authorized and
mandated missions being mounted in situations of conflict where clashes
involving UN soldiers were inevitable. Many combatants are not soldiers of
regular armies but militias or groups of armed civilians with little discipline and
an ill-defined command structure" Fighters of this nature do not always fit
easily into the matrix of humanitarian law combatant status.
Despite the dangers involved, the international community and the UN has
a responsibility not to shy away from complex and dangerous situations. Esoteric
debates on legal principles have a value, but they should not be allowed to detract
from the establishment and deployment of peace support operations as facilitators
of conflict resolution. Apart from deciding on an appropriate and authoritative
mandate, the real issue is who will decide when these forces will be deployed and
their subsequent command and control. In this regard the role of the Security
Council is vital, especially for middle and small powers like Ireland. The recently
published Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations (Brahimi
Report) called for more robust rules of engagement (ROE) in operations
involving intra-state/transnational conflicts.f" While the report acknowledged
that this would involve 'bigger forces, better equipped and more costly', it did
not seem to take full cognisance of the fact that the use of force must be
accompanied by political will, a willingness to accept casualties (UN personnel,
64 Bowett,op. cit., 53.
6S See D. Garcia-Sayan, 'Human Rights and Peace-Keeping Operations', 29
University of Richmond Law Review, (1995), 41-65 at 45. This article deals primarily
with the UN mission to El Salvador (ONUSAL). See also D. Forsythe, 'Human Rights
and International Security: United Nations Field Operations Redux', in Castermans,
van Hoof and Smith (eds.), The Role of the Nation State in the zr' Century, Dordrecht:
Kluwer, (1998), 265-276.
66 The Blue Helmets, op. cit., 4.
67 See the Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations, UN, 23
August 2000 (Brahimi Report, A/55/305-S/2000/809 available from
<http.www.un.org.».
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civilians and others), and a need for an effective command and control
mechanism to ensure cohesion and uniform application. It also failed to
address the issues raised by regional peacekeepers or coalitions of the willing
acting under the authority of the UN. Somalia shows that robust ROE and
increased size are not enough, and while it is imperative not to employ an
emasculated UN force, the UN operations in Somalia and Lebanon show that it
is essential to have a clear military and political strategy agreed at the outset.
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Chapter 2
IRELAND, PEACEKEEPING AND DEFENCE POLICY: CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES
Introduction
Membership of the United Nations (UN) has been a cornerstone and determiner
of Irish foreign policy since 1955.1 For many years, prior to accession to the
European Community, the UN was the only forum where Ireland could express
its concerns across a wide range of international issues. The building and
maintenance of a strong and effective UN, especially in the area of conflict
prevention, forms a key objective of Irish foreign policy within which
peacekeeping operations have come to playa central role.' As a small country,
Ireland had a vested interest in the promotion of multilateral diplomacy and
collective security. Despite the deficiencies in the UN Charter and the general
framework of the UN, the advantage to a small 'middle power' of having a voice
among the states of the world was apparent from the beginning. Eager to
participate fully in every aspect of the Organization, Ireland was not hesitant
about committing its defence forces to UN command in far flung lands largely
unknown to most Irish people at the time.
Today participation by Defence Forces and Gardai (police) in a range of UN
sponsored activities is commonplace.' This involvement has become a
Department of Foreign Affairs, Challenges and Opportunities Abroad, White
Paper on Foreign Policy, Dublin, (1996), 149-167, and Department of Defence, White
Paper on Defence, Dublin, (February, 2000),59 - 70.
2 Ibid.
3 See Department of Defence, Defence Forces Annual Report, Dublin, (1999),
32-38 and Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland's Involvement in
International Police Missions - A Discussion Paper, Dublin, (November, 1999). See
also J. P. Duggan, A History of the Irish Army, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, (1991),
249-278 and An Cosantoir - The Defence Forces Magazine, UN Anniversary Edition,
(October 1995). For a list of the missions to which the Defence Forces have
contributed, see Appendix D.
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significant element of Irish foreign policy, and a concrete manifestation of
commitment to the UN and the maintenance of world peace." A tradition of
active membership of both the League of Nations and the UN has assisted in
establishing a peacekeeping tradition.' Furthermore, the effects of Ireland's
policies over a range of issues including decolonisation, disarmament, human
rights, and its history under colonial rule and non-membership of a military
alliance, combined to make it acceptable as a contributor to peacekeeping and
related activities."
Despite the ongoing involvement in peace support operations, there is
surprisingly little debate on the issue in Ireland. There seems to be a general
acceptance that such activities are good for the Defence Forces and the
international community. In spite of the fact that this may be correct, it is not
something that should be just assumed. In 1993, Ireland revised and updated the
municipal legal basis for troop participation in UN operations to allow Ireland to
contribute soldiers to UNOSOM II in Somalia. This brought about a
fundamental change in policy, after which participation in peacekeeping forces
not specifically of a police nature was permitted.' This did generate some debate
24
4 See for example the statement to this effect by the Tanaiste (Deputy Prime
Minister) and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dick Spring, in The Irish Times, 6 May
1997; and J. Morrison Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, 1945-65, Dublin:
Irish Academic Press, (1997).
5 Skelly, op. cit. and Michael J. Kennedy, Ireland and the League of Nations,
Dublin: Irish Academic Press, (1996). See also Norman 1.D. McQueen, 'Irish Neutrality
: the United Nations and the Peacekeeping Experience 1945-1969', D. Phil. thesis, New
University of Ulster, 1981, esp. the Introduction 1-13. Nina Heathcote, 'Ireland and the
United Nations Operation in the Congo', III International Relations, (May 1971), 880.
Patrick Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy: Dublin, Institute of Public
Administration, (1973), 7 and 83-86; and A Place Among the Nations: Dublin, Institute
of Public Administration, (1978), 158-161.
6 Ibid.
7 The Defence (Amendment) Act, 1993 amended and extended the Defence
(Amendment)(No. 2) Act,1960 in significant respects. The principle amendment is
contained in Section 1, which by defining an 'International United Nations Force' as an
international force or body established by the Security Councilor General Assembly,
goes beyond the previous definition which limited participation to peacekeeping or
police type forces. See R. Murphy, 'Ireland: Legal issues arising from participation in
as to whether Ireland should contribute forces to new kinds of military action by
the UN.
The most significant political development in recent years was the publication
of the Government White Paper on Foreign Policy, and a White Paper on
Defence.f The White Paper on Foreign Policy was strong on ideals, but weak in
identifying Irelands interests and the practical implications of foreign policy
decisions. Likewise, the White Paper on Defence was dominated by bland
descriptive passages, mixed with cost cutting suggestions disguised as
expenditure analysis, and an especially glib assumption regarding the domestic
security situation following the Good Friday Agreement. 9 The Paper lacked
policy analysis and vision.l'' The surprise decision to reduce the Defence Forces
even further to around 10,500 sparked off the most serious public dispute ever
between the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces." This had the
unfortunate consequence of detracting attention from other defence and security
issues discussed in the White Paper. Although both the Foreign Policy and
Defence Forces White Papers were vague in many respects, the chapters dealing
with overseas peace support operations did set out the background to Irish
involvement, and the factors that will inform the government's consideration of
requests for troops were enunciated in clear terms. They also spelled out the
guiding principles the government should consider in deciding whether or not to
participate in enforcement operations in the post Somalia era.
United Nations operations', 1International Peacekeeping (Kluwer), No.2, (March-May
1994),61-64.
8 Supra, n. 1.
9 See White Paper on Defence, op. cit., 12.
10 See criticisms by Mr. T. Murray, a former government consultant who
reviewed the Defence Forces, The Irish Times, 4 March 2000, 10. He was especially
critical of the treatment of the Naval Service and Air Corps. For the view of the
Minister for Defence, M. Smith, see The Irish Times, 26 Apri12000, 16.
See for example, Jim Cusack, The Irish Times, 9 February, 2000, 3, where a
former Chief of Staff asked the Taoiseach to intervene in the dispute.
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While these criteria were mere guiding principles that leave considerable
discretion to the government of the day, they are significant given the Irish
governments reluctance to fetter its discretion in foreign policy matters. The
publication of the criteria should have facilitated democratic accountability and
informed parliamentary debate. This does not seem to have been the case. What
is most surprising about the criteria and guidelines is how little reference is
actually made to them in the Dail (Irish Parliament) debates seeking approval for
participation.V Part of the problem may be the need to respond quickly to
humanitarian emergencies. The key issue relating to peacekeeping and Irish
foreign policy arising from the White Paper on Foreign Policy was the focus on
maintaining military neutrality while fostering a security role within Europe."
The security role within Europe was expanded upon in the White Paper on
Defence with a commitment to pledge troops to the European Rapid Reaction
Force." The participation in UN led and sponsored operations is not a
controversial issue, but the growing trend of recent years to contract out peace
support operations to regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) may present problems for a country that has up to now
shied away from difficult or controversial decisions on security and defence
issues.
The debate stimulated by the publication of the White Paper on Foreign Policy
was a welcome attempt to engage the Irish public in the formulation of foreign
See for example the debate on participation in KFOR, Dail Debates 507, (852-
869), 1 July 1999.
12
13 White Paper on Foreign Policy, op. cit., 191-205. In considering the constitutional
implications of a policy of neutrality, the Report of the Constitution Review Group
stated that neutrality has 'always been a policy as distinct from a fundamental law or
principle, and the Review Group sees no reason to propose a change in this position,'
Report of the Constitution Review Group, May 1996,Dublin: Government Publications,
93.
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14 White Paper on Defence, op. cit., 15-18, The Irish Times, 31 October and 1
November 2000, 16, 17. At the Helsinki EU Summit of December 1999, it was agreed
that by 2003, the EU would be in a position to deploy a 60,000 military force, see
policy, and it has assisted in identifying and clarifying some key issues. The
importance of maintaining a clear distinction between traditional peacekeeping
and operations involving some degree of enforcement action is not just important
for the UN, but also contributing states like Ireland. The intra state conflicts of
today present complex and dangerous situations for all peacekeepers, and while
there is general support from the Irish public for participation in such operations,
they are not prepared to accept any significant casualties or unnecessary
exposure to risk. Politicians in Ireland are not unlike their counterparts
elsewhere, they will respond to public opinion and may even succumb to a
media driven agenda. The real risks are not well understood, although Ireland
contributed to UNIFIL for over twenty years, there was still a large degree of
ignorance among the Irish general public of the dangers and general situation
prevailing there for UN peacekeepers." For this reason it is useful to consider
the implications of Irish participation, and how these were perceived historically.
The implications of UN membership for Ireland
In spite of the fact that Ireland was not admitted to membership of the UN until
December 1955, the possibility of Irish participation in enforcement operations
was discussed at length in the Dail in July 1946 when the debate regarding
membership took place. The proposal to join the UN was controversial at the
time, but it is evident that it was a decision taken in full knowledge of the fact
that the UN Charter, unlike that of the League of Nations, contained coercive
military provisions binding on all member states by the decision of the Security
Council." Indeed, the origins of the UN in 1945 can be seen as an extension
into peacetime of the wartime alliance against the 'Axis powers'. In fact, the
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Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council Annex IV, Brussels, European
Council 1999, and P. Gillespie, The Irish Times, 20 May 2000.
IS See the comments by Pat Kenny and others on 'Kenny Live', 25 April 1998.
The two hour RTE television show was exclusively devoted to the Defence Forces and
UN peacekeeping.
"Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland and the Partnership for Peace, an explanatory
guide, Dublin, (1999), 9.
term 'United Nations' originally dates from the Atlantic Charter of 1941. In the
course of the debate, many deputies present displayed a keen awareness of the
commitments involved and with considerable foresight, drew attention to the
inherent weakness in the collective security provisions of the Charter that were
intended to be the cornerstone of UN policy in the maintenance of international
peace and security."
The then Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Mr. de Valera, was initially
unenthusiastic about membership. This was not surprising given what he saw as
the failure of the major powers to support its predecessor, the League of Nations,
and the distribution of power and responsibilities within the new Organization.
The UN was premised upon the maintenance of a consensus among the major
powers and former wartime allies:
in all these organizations being projected ...for the maintenance of
international peace, there is a tendency to give the great powers an
overwhelming influence, which generally means, in the long run
that if they keep together all goes well, but, when they want to
quarrel, then the whole purpose for which the League [sic] was
established goes to pieces."
De Valera's extensive experience with the League of Nations meant it
was obvious to him that the collective security provisions of the UN were not
designed to deal with the ideological divisions of the post war period. What was
not evident then, however, was that the military and other commitments under
the Charter would not materialise as planned. Consequently, when de Valera did
decide that Ireland should apply for membership, he went to great lengths to
point out the 'serious obligation contained in Article 25 of the Charter,' and the
See, for example, comments by Mr. Norton, leader of the minority Labour
party at the time Dail Debates ,102 (1343),24 July 1946.
17
18 rxn Debates, 97 (2779-2881), 19 July 1945.
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military significance of the Articles contained in Chapter VII.19 Even at that
early stage the problems associated with the veto were apparent.i" While the
implications for Irish neutrality were a source of some confusion in the Dail,
certain deputies did consider that membership would have serious
consequences." In contrast to that of Switzerland, it is noteworthy that de
Valera, the person most associated with Ireland's policy of neutrality during
World War II, did not consider that membership of the UN would present any
significant problem for Irish foreign policy. However, he did share the concern
of other deputies regarding the military obligations imposed by admission 'as
there was no indication whatsoever as to what contribution they might expect
from US'.22
Not all of the debate was so well informed or incisive in analysis. There
were consistent attempts to raise the question of the partition of Ireland, and
submissions such as those from Mr. Cosgrave, leader of the opposition, that they
consider for a moment the 'grave factor .... that up to the present the Vatican had
not been invited to participate in the framing of the Charter' /3 while another
Deputy seemed concerned by the absence of any reference to 'the Supreme
Being,.24 Nonetheless, when the motion was passed, those present for the debate
would have been well aware of the potential for Irish military involvement in
UN enforcement action under the provisions of the Charter. At that time even
19 osn Debates, 102 (1315-1325), 24 July 1946.
20 Ibid. According to de Valera, 'the balance of argument would be in favour of
getting rid of the veto and of trying to get larger states to accept the rule of law.'
21 See the contributions from Mr John Costello, a leading member of the main
opposition party and future Taoiseach, and others, in Dail Debates, 102 (354-1355 and
1374),24 July 1946.
22 Ibid. Dail Debates, 102 (1403-1408), 24 July 1946. See generally E.
O'Halpin, Defending Ireland, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1999), 270-271.
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23 osn Debates, 102 (1460),25 July 1946.
24 Dail Debates, 102(1336),24 July 1946.
the most imaginative observers had not considered the concept of preventive
diplomacy or peacekeeping.
Despite de Valera's reservations, it was probably a fear oflreland being
isolated and denied a role on the world stage that finally prompted him to opt for
membership. In this way, the decision was based on pragmatic considerations,
rather than any idealistic or similar commitment to the UN itself.25 There are
interesting parallels with the debate regarding membership of the NATO
sponsored Partnership for Peace and Irish participation in the UN mandated but
NATO commanded Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR)
missions in the former Yugoslavia. There was a very real fear among officials in
the Department of Foreign Affairs and the military that ifIreland did not join the
Partnership for Peace programme, it would be isolated and out of touch with
international developments in peacekeeping." Those fears echoed similar
concerns expressed by de Valera some fifty years earlier in relation to
membership of the UN.27
When the Dail approved the motion to apply for membership on 26 July
1946, the government did not hesitate to exercise its mandate. It was somewhat
ironic then, that after protracted debate and consideration of the issue, the actual
application to join was vetoed by the Soviet Union.28 The prospect of this
2S 'We in the Government have balanced the pros and cons [of membership]. In
our circumstances, although it is impossible to be enthusiastic, I think we have a duty
as member of the world community to do our share in trying to bring about general
conditions which will make for the maintenance of peace " Dail Debates, 102 (1325),
24 July 1946.
26 Personal interview, senior Department of Foreign Affairs official, Department
of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, May 1997; and personal interview, senior serving Defence
Forces officer, Department of Defence, Dublin, May 1997. See also the article by Lt.
Gen. G. McMahon, retired Chief of Staff, in The Irish Times, 8 October 1998, 16 and
the statements by the General Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr. P.
MacKernan, quoted in The Irish Times, 29 October 1998,9.
30
27 Ireland's willingness to participate in SFOR, despite reservations, was also
based upon pragmatic considerations and a desire to playas full a role as possible in
world affairs for a country of its size and resources, see Dail Debates 479 (514-539), 14
May 1997.
28 In its Advisory Opinion on Conditions of Admission of a State, the majority of
the International Court of Justice considered it illegal to render the admission of a state
happening does not appear to have occurred to anyone in Ireland at that time.
The reason given for vetoing the application was that Ireland did not have any
bilateral diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.29 This was a dubious
justification for a policy primarily based on cold war rivalry. At that time the
General Assembly was dominated by pro-Western countries, the so-called Afro-
Asian group had not yet emerged on the international stage as the decolonisation
of the 1950's and 1960's had yet to take place. A clue to Soviet reasoning may
also lie in the history of the League of Nations, as Ireland was one of only three
countries that opposed Soviet admission in 1934.30 The 'package deal' under
which Ireland's application for membership was accepted finally had been put
together carefully by the United States and the Soviet Union to increase the size
of the General Assembly, without changing significantly the balance of cold war
forces within it.3l This arrangement was so delicately balanced that Ireland's
membership was in doubt almost up to the last moment. 32 It is unlikely the
Soviet Union monitored the Dail debate on the matter, but had it done so, it
dependent upon conditions other than those referred to in Article 4 (1) of the UN
Charter (membership and admission), in particular upon the condition of the
admissibility of another state. The Court, however, went on to point out the elastic
nature of the criteria contained it Article 4 (1), which provided a wide scope for their
application. From this the Court concluded that 'Article 4 does not forbid the taking
into account of any factor which it is possible reasonably and in good faith to connect
with the conditions laid down in that Article... no relevant political factor-that is to say,
none connected with the conditions of admission-is excluded' - Conditions of
Admission, ICJ Reports (1948), 56, 63. See L. Goodrich, E. Hambro and A. Simmons,
Charter of the United Nations, (3rd. ed)., London: Columbia University Press, (1969),
85-96 and B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the UnitedNations - A Commentary, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, (1995), 158-175, L. M. Goodrich, The United Nations.
London: Stevens, (1960), 83-103 and I. L. Jnr. Claude, Swords into Ploughares, New
York: Random House, (1964), 72-92.
29 Keatinge, op. cit. and Norman J. McQueen, 'Ireland's entry into the United
Nations, 1946-1956', in T. Gallagher and 1. O'Connell (eds), Contemporary Irish
Studies, Manchester: Manchester University Press, (1983), 65-77.
30 Andre Fontaine, History of the Cold War, New York: Vintage Books,
(1970),84.
31 McQueen, op. cit. 69.
32 The Irish Times, 9-16 December 1955.
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would have confirmed the suspicion that Ireland was unambiguously aligned
with the pro-Western group of states then dominant within the UN.
Ireland did eventually gain admission in December 1955. By this time
the advent of the cold war made the potential for collective security and
enforcement action under the Charter appear redundant. It was replaced by the
UN policy of 'political military control of local conflict by politically impartial
essentially non-coercive methods' .33 The then Taoiseach, Mr. Costello, resisted
attempts to have the issue debated again, pointing out that in real terms the
obligations were less onerous than they had been in 1946.34 Once the hurdle of
admission was over, the immediate issue confronting the government was the
formulation of a coherent foreign policy that would represent an individual
perspective on international affairs. As Ireland had largely shunned any real
involvement in international affairs over the previous fifteen years, it had not
been necessary to express precisely any strict definition of its foreign policy for
that period. Mr. Cosgrave, the then Minister for External Affairs, was quick to
realise that UN policy would require 'nothing less than the basic principle on
which our policy towards the outside world and its problems is based' .35
Cosgrave led the Irish delegation to its first UN General Assembly
session in the autumn of 1956. By this time he had formulated three broad
principles upon which Irish participation would be based." These represented as
32
33 The definition of peacekeeping or preventive diplomacy is taken from Larry
Fabian, Soldiers Without Enemies, Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, (1971),
16.
34 nsu Debates, 153 (160-1608), 15December 1955.
35 nsn Debates, 159 (139), 3 July 1956.
36 These principles were as follows: support for the principles and obligations of
the UN Charter; to try to maintain a position of independence; and, 'to do whatever we
can to as a member of the UN to preserve the Christian civilisation of which we are a
part, and with that end in view to support wherever possible those powers principally
responsible for the defence of the free world in their resistance to the spread of
communist power and influence...we belong to the great community of states, made up
of the United States of America, Canada andWestern Europe'. Ibid. (127-146).
clear and unambivalent a statement of Ireland's pro-Western anti-Communist
policy as can be found and it appeared to vindicate Soviet reservations about
Irish membership. Even the question of partition was relegated to avoid giving
the impression that 'we have no interest in matter of international policy save
that of partition alone' .37 There was still no mention of peacekeeping or related
activities, but Cosgrave did add a significant rider in acknowledging that Ireland
would have certain sympathy with peoples seeking self-determination."
Although this may appear as something of an afterthought, it was an important
distinguishing feature in Irish foreign policy. It could, if adhered to, provide
Ireland with an opportunity to adopt an independent policy in relation to de-
colonisation and self-determination in the decade ahead. It was not surprising
then that Ireland was expected to vote along similar lines to that of the United
States, and in the course of attending its first session of the General Assembly,
the Irish delegation did nothing to disappoint these expectations, the thrust of
Irish policy being 'unequivocally pro-Western and unremittingly anti-Soviet'. 39
Although Cosgrave did not get an opportunity to oversee the implementation of
his principles, as the coalition government of which he was a member was
defeated at a general election within a year, they nevertheless proved to be
influential/" Cosgrave was succeeded by Mr. Frank Aiken," an experienced
37 Ibid. (137). At the time, neither de Valera nor Aiken of the main opposition
party, Fiannna Fail, raised any opposition to the relegation of this issue in Ireland's
foreign policy. This was important as the 'national question' had tended to dominate
foreign policy discussions to the detriment of the consideration of more internationally
significant issues
38 Conor Cruise O'Brien, 'Ireland in International Affairs', Dudley-Edwards,
Conor Cruise O'Brien Introduces Ireland, London: Dutsch, (1969), 104-134, esp. 129-
132.
39 McQueen, in Gallagher and 0' Connell (eds), op. cit. n.22.
40 Mr. Frederick H. Boland, Secretary ofthe then Department of External Affairs
in 1955, was designated as Ireland's first permanent representative at the UN. While
Mr. Cosgrave's tenure was of short duration, Mr. Boland remained as Ireland's
permanent representative for five years. He and his successor, Mr. C.C. Cremin, were
known to approve and support the "three principles" expounded by Mr. Cosgrove. A
recent study, however, has challenged the view that the three principles were so
influential, Skelly, op. cit. n.4.
33
politician who aspired to play a similar role in the UN as that played by de
Valera in the League of Nations. On account of this, a stronger emphasis was
placed on Cosgrave's second principle, that of 'independence'. This was not
surprising as Aiken had been critical of the contradictions apparent between the
first two principles enunciated by Cosgrave, and that of the third.42
Aikin's period in office spanned a number of significant international
developments, some of which did test the mettle of Ireland's espoused
independence in relation to foreign policy issues." In hindsight, these may not
seem very significant, however, in the context of the time they did indicate a
willingness by Aiken to take an independent stance on certain issues. 44 On
account of this, 'the Irish delegation carried rather more weight in the Assembly,
during this period, than what might have been expected from the size and
importance of the country it represented. ,45
41 Mr. Aiken was Minister for External Affairs on two separate occasions, for
three years from 1951 to 1954, and for twelve years from 1957 to 1969. See Keatinge,
TheFormulation of Irish Foreign Policy, op. cit., 84-89 and 32-34.
42 nsn Debates 159 (148), 3 July 1956.
43 Despite strong opposition from the US and the Catholic church, Aiken supported
and Ireland voted in favour of the discussion of the representation of the People's
Republic of China at the UN. Aiken also put forward plans for military disengagement
in Central Europe and general disarmament, which were opposed by the US. These
were part of general efforts by him to reduce tensions between the Soviet Union and the
West during the cold war. In addition, Aiken supported some of the small non-aligned
new members of the UN, and adopted an independent policy during the Algerian crises.
See generally Skelly, op. cit. n.4.
44 For some interesting background to the pressure put upon the Irish
Government and the Irish delegation at the UN by the Catholic church and the United
States, see Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back-a UN Case History, New
York: Grosset and Dunlap, (1962), 21-25.
45 O'Brien,op. cit. n.37 at 130.
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Ireland and middle power status
Ireland's history as a fanner colony, and Aiken's reputation for independence at
the UN, combined with non-membership of any military alliance, went a long
way towards Ireland acquiring 'middle power' status. The term 'middle power'
is common in the language of peacekeeping. It has never been defined clearly
and can have different connotations depending on the context in which it is used.
Hammarskjold reverted to the term frequently when discussing peacekeeping."
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to consider Ireland a 'middle power'
in terms of voting patterns at the UN. A study of Irish voting there between
1956 and 1970 found it more clearly aligned to that of the Western block.47 But,
the basic nature of the Irish position was demonstrated by the consistently high
degree of similarity with Sweden." Similarly, another commentator concluded
that Ireland has been a consistent supporter of the United States policies at the
46 Larry Fabian has examined the semantic confusion surrounding its usage and
he drew the following conclusion: 'the term middle power acquired in the United
Nations context, a variety of connotations. At first it was used in an objective sense to
identify those member states with comparatively medium level resources, measured in
tenus of geography, wealth or military capabilities. It later took on a second meaning
according to which middle power endowments were seen as circumstantial and perhaps
temporary this description was given to countries occupying a political middle on
given issues A member state could be classified as a middle power for some
purposes but not for others Middle power membership has thus not taken identical
forms in peacekeeping, in debates on colonial or racial rights questions, in disarmament
negotiations, or in economic matters - although a Canada, a Sweden, an Austria, or an
Ireland has repeatedly acted out the middle power role on a range of problems'. Fabian,
op.cit., 88.
47 McQueen, D. Phil. thesis, op. cit., Cpt. 6, esp.199-200. The study indicates
that Irish voting behaviour in relation to other states compared showed a gradual move
towards greater co-operation with Western countries. However, the evidence indicated
that this process did not begin in 1961, the date usually assigned to the modification of
Ireland's 'independent' stance at the UN. The study found that the process appeared to
begin around 1959 at the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly and to reach an
extreme in the 1961 at the Sixteenth Session. After that, co-operation with the US in
plenary votes remained more or less steady throughout the 1960's.
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48 Ibid. This close affinity was detectable throughout the period under
examination and it appears to be little affected by the supposed right shift in Irish policy
after 1961. In fact, the conclusion drawn was that voting behaviour in tenus of co-
operation with block leaders, does not offer convincing support for the comment that
UN policy underwent a process of deradicalisation after 1961
UN during the period 1957 to 1961.49 It was also observed that Ireland headed
the list of those states, which because of their voting record were 'pro- United
States' .50 Ireland, in fact, was found to have voted more often with the United
States than did three members of NATO-Denmark, Norway and Greece.
By the time Ireland did gain membership of the UN, the concept of
collective security and enforcement action under the Charter had been largely
relegated by the cold war.5! While Ireland could not claim to have played any
significant part in this transformation, the changed situation did offer a new and
important role as 'peacekeeper' or 'middle power' policeman. Itwas against this
background that peacekeeping became a central feature of Irish foreign policy in
the early nineteen sixties. Despite this, Ireland's contributions to the Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations are unremarkable. 52 This has not been
helped by the policy of European Union member states of making common
submissions on behalf of all members. 53 While it may be argued that Irish
49 D. Driscoll, 'Is Ireland really "Neutral"?', 1(3) Irish Studies in International
Affairs, (1980), 55-61.
so M.R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of
International Relations, New York: The Free Press, (1972), 327-328. The Singer and
Sensinig study of voting on cold war issues in the General Assembly from 1955 to 1959
shows that Ireland was a consistent supporter of the United States on such issues. The
same was not the case in respect of the states considered truly non-aligned in the
international system
51 The action in Korea should be seen as sui generis, as the Security Council had
merely recommended that states provide assistance to South Korea on the basis of
Article 51, see L. Goodrich, E. Hambro and A. Simmons, op. cit., 314-317 and B.
Simma,op. cit., 630, L. M. Goodrich, op. cit., 159-189 and I. L. Jnr. Claude, op. cit.,
Cpt. 12.
52 See for example, UN General Assembly, Document AlAC. 121137,29 March
1990, 13-15; AlAC.121136/Add.l, 4 April 1989,4-9, and AlAC. 12115,5 August 1965,
4-6.
53 See for example, UN General Assembly, Document AlAC. 121136,21 March
1989, submission by Spain, 30 -34; and AlAC.121141, 16 March 1994, submission by
Greece, 6-8. The 1989 submission was mostly concerned with financial implications
and efficiency measures. The 1994 submission, on the other hand, made reference to
the need for proper command and control mechanisms, planning, civilian personnel, and
stand-by forces.
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foreign policy has been largely no more than declaratory without consequential
action, Ireland, in terms of its size and resources, has made a substantial
contribution to peacekeeping operations that continues to the present day.
The establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in
1956 was the first practical application of Hammarskjold's concept of preventive
diplomacy.i" The actual contributors to this Force were not the so called great
powers, but rather small and middle power intermediaries like Ireland, drawn
from sources acceptable to the parties involved. Though Ireland was not called
upon to contribute troops to this force, the government had agreed in principle to do
so if called upon by the Secretary-General. 55 The success of this force laid down
foundations and precedents with regard to future peacekeeping forces and the
principle of non-coercive moral authority was also used in the setting up of smaller
observation and verification missions.
The Defence Forces and the peacekeeping tradition
Although peace support operations are generally associated with the UN, in reality
Ireland has contributed to operations under the auspices of NATO, the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the European Union for
some years. 56 While the single most important contribution is currently to UNIFIL
in Lebanon, peace support operations involve around one thousand military
54 See D. W. Bowett, United Nations Forces, London: Stevens, (1964), esp. 99-
103; N. D.White., Keeping the Peace, (2 nd. Ed.), Manchester: Manchester University
Press, (1997), 253, and A. James, Peacekeeping in International Politics: London:
Macmillan, (1990), 210 -223.
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55 Skelly,op. cit. 268-269.
56 For a list of the missions to which the Defence Forces have contributed, see
Appendix D. Full details are contained in Department of Defence, Defence Forces
Annual Report 1999, Dublin, (2000), 32-38. See also Department of Defence,
Department of Defence and Defence Forces Strategy Statements 1997-1999, Dublin,
(1997), 8. When the term Defence Forces is used, it refers to the Permanent Defence
Forces established under Section 18(a) of the Defence Act, 1954, and includes army,
navy and air corps.
personnel in a range of countries and in future will include the UN Stand By
Arrangements System, which the government agreed to support in 1996.57 The
Defence Forces have been traditionally a small and well-integrated force in Irish
society. In recent times, most of the duties performed have been in aid to the civil
power, or as a stand-by force to maintain essential services during serious industrial
disputes. They do not possess any heavy support weapons usually associated with
the modem armies of larger states and they are accustomed to operating without
such equipment. 58 Despite its conventional structure, the real role of the Defence
Forces has been closer in nature to that of a garrison based 'gendarmerie' than a
modem army." In this way the defence of Ireland was seen by many as 'a joke',
requiring little more that a small paramilitary force to quell civil disorder.t" These
factors, together with the emphasis on adaptability and ability to operate
independently of large scale supporting forces, combined to make them suitable for
traditional peacekeeping missions. However, they also contributed to an ambiguity
surrounding the role of the Defence Forces in modem Ireland.
The first indication of Ireland's potential suitability as a UN troop
contributor state came in 1958, when officers participated in an observer mission in
Lebanon. However, Ireland's first major involvement in peacekeeping came two
years later when Irish troops departed for the Congo in July 1960.61 This was one
57 Ibid.
58As far back as 1986, the then Chief of Staff commented publicly that much of the
equipmentwas either obsolete or obsolescent,see interview,Lt. Gen. T. O'Neill, The Irish
Press, 1 April, 1986. For a more current analysis, see J. Cusack, The Irish Times, 9
October 1999, 11.
59 The Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. C. Mangan, recently described the Forces as
'moving from a garrison-based organization, dominated by ATCP (aid to the civil
power) and security duties, to having a significant part of the Defence Forces prepared
to deploy with a rapid reaction force for European operations', reported in The Irish
Times, 15 November 2000,9.
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60 This description would not be accepted by many serving Defence Forces
personnel, personal interview, op. cit., n. 26.
61 The Irish Times, 18 July 1960 and Duggan, op. cit., p. 250.
of the most important decisions made by any Irish government in relation to the
UN and foreign policy, and it was certainly the most significant decision taken in
the context of defence and security matters since the foundation of the state. It was
in a very real sense a baptism of fire for Irish peacekeepers that demonstrated
Ireland's commitment to the principles of the UN Charter.f It is very much to the
credit of the soldiers involved, and the Irish government of the day, that neither
wavered in their support for the UN at a time when it was undergoing its most
serious crisis to date. In many ways the Congo crisis marked the high point in Irish
involvement with the UN.63 The precedent for Irish participation in peacekeeping
was thereby established, and an Irish contingent was still in the Congo when a
request was received for another unit to participate in the peacekeeping Force in
Cyprus.i"
In October 1973, the UN decided to send a peacekeeping force to the
Sinai desert to monitor the cease-fire between Israel and Egypt following the Yom
Kippur War.65 Almost simultaneously with agreement being reached on the
establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF In, the 25 Infantry
Group from Ireland was arriving for a tour of duty with the UN force in Cyprus.
Following a request by the Secretary-General, and Dail approval, this unit spent
just one week in Cyprus when it was transferred to UNEF II in the Sinai. 66
62 In all 6,197 Irish personnel servedwith the peacekeeping force in the Congo and
twenty six of these lost their lives
63 There was a substantialmilitarycommitmentto ONUC; Irelandwas a permanent
member of the Congo Advisory Committee; an Irishman, Frederick Boland, became
President of the General Assembly; another, Lt. Gen. Sean McKeown, became Force
Commander for a time, and Conor Cruise O'Brien became the Secretary-General's special
representativein the Congo. See Skelly, op. cit., 266-283.
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64 Between April 1964 and October 1973 over 9,000 Irish personnel served with
this Force. At one stage there were over 1,000 troops in Cypruswhile the strength of the
Armywas less than 8,000 personnel.
6S Security Council Resolution 340, 25 October 1973.
66 Dail Debates 268 (797-830), 30 October 1973. The Group was later
augmented by another infantry company (130 men approx.) and it crossed the Suez
canal on 9 November 1973. Itwas replaced by the 26 Infantry Group on 26 April 1974.
However, in early 1974 following the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, the
government withdrew the Irish contingent. 67 The decision did not come as a
surprise to the Irish military authorities.t" In hindsight, it can be said that the threat
to the security of the state was not as great as that perceived by the government at
the time. Although the decision may have may have damaged temporarily
Ireland's standing with the UN as a reliable troop contributor to peacekeeping
operations, the adverse consequences of the decision have long since faded into
insignificance.t"
The Secretary-General again requested that Ireland contribute a unit to
form part or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978.70
Despite the difficult and quite often dangerous nature of the mission, up to recently
the government has generally expressed its continued support for the UN force in
the area." This again underscores Ireland's commitment to UN peacekeeping and
the high price that participation in such operations entails. It is not surprising then
67 See statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Fitzgerald, Dail Debates
273 (692-693), 6 June 1974, see also the statement by the Minister for Defence, Dail
Debates 273 (1715-1716),27 June 1974.
68 When the motion to approve the despatch of the contingent to UNEF II was
being debated in the Dail, the Minster for Defence and others had emphasised the need to
recruit more volunteers for the army, due to the security situation in the country. Dr
Fitzgerald said at the time that 'it was not without careful thought' that the Government
agreed, see Dail Debates 268, (797-830),30 October 1973.
69 Personal interview, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations official, Pisa,
Italy, June 1997.
70 osu Debates, 306, (595-613), 9 May 1978. In July 1977, the UN requested
that Ireland contribute a full contingent once again to UNFICYP in Cyprus. However,
owing to a later decision to reduce the overall size of the force, the request was not
maintained. There have been forty-five Irish casualtieswith this peacekeeping Force, this
figure includes Private Kevin Joyce who was taken captive on 27 April 1981. He is still
categorisedas missing in action.
7l See DaB Debates 361, (1088-1091), 5 November 1985 and 357, (428-434);
and The Irish Times, 11 June 1985. However, in October 1985, the then Taoiseach, Mr
Fitzgerald, warned that the participation of Irish troops in UNIFIL could be put in
jeopardy if Israeli forces continued to prevent them fulfilling their mandate, The Irish
Times, 21 October 1985, 1 and The Sunday Tribune, 20 October 1985, 1.
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that fulsome tributes to Irish UN personnel are commonplace.f Among the
disadvantages of participation is the fact that it added to the difficulties of under
strength units at home, and must have prompted the question in some quarters, if all
these officers and personnel can be permanently abroad, did the Defence Forces
need them in the first place? It also allowed the Department of Foreign Affairs a
significant influence on matters essentially military in nature 73, although most
times this did not matter, as it was supportive of involvement in UN operations
when civil servants in the Departments of Defence and Finance opposed
participation.
Although the Irish commitment to the UN forces in Somalia (UNOSOM
IT)was quite small and numbered around one hundred and eighty personnel, the
decision to participate had significant political and military implications." It was
the first time Irish soldiers participated in a Chapter VII peace enforcement
operation of this kind and it set a precedent that helped pave the way for the current
participation in the Stabilisation Force in the former Yugoslavia." It marked a
watershed in Irish involvement in peacekeeping activities, and a realisation that
Ireland could be left behind in the changing nature of the international security
environment unless it too adapted to events. Though the UN operation in the
Congo (ONUC) in the 1960's did involve a degree of enforcement action to which
the Irish contingent was a party, the recent decisions to participate in SFOR,
72 See, for example, reports by Kieran Fagan, The Irish Times, 21 September
1998, p.10, J. Cusack, 16 July 1994 and 24 October 1995; Kevin Myers, 25 November
1995 in the same paper, and J. Marcus, 'Irish Defence Policy: Debate on Neutrality',
Janes Defence Weekly, (4August 1984),152-154.
73 O'Halpin, op. cit., 272.
74 Figures supplied by Military Archives, Dept. of Defence, Dublin, August
1997.
75 This is not to deny that the ONUC operation in the Congo did involve a
number of mandate changes and enforcement operations on the ground. See Roselyn
Higgins, The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 1960-1964, London:
Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs, (1980); Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo,
Washington: The Brookings Institute,(l965) and Alan James, 'The Congo
Controversies', 1 (1) International Peacekeeping (Kluwer), (Spring 1994), 44-58.
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KFOR, UNAMET (East Timor) and UNOSOM II were conscious decisions made
in response to the changed international environment. In the case of SFOR, KFOR
and UNAMET, the government has also agreed to pay all the expenses associated
with Irish participation. More significantly, the participation in the NATO led,
albeit UN mandated operations, placed Irish troops under the de facto command of
NATO for the first time.76 There are significant legal and constitutional difficulties
involved in command and/or control of Irish forces by non-defence force
personnel, but successive governments to date have quietly ignored these."
Despite this, Irish military and other personnel have adapted successfully to such
missions, but there remains an ongoing need to keep up to date in training, and to
ensure equipment levels and standards complement this.
In 1994, a leaked confidential report by the Price Waterhouse consultants
described the Defence Forces as, inter alia, 'badly structured, too old, poorly
trained, and inappropriately equipped'." Though this was controversial at the time,
the Defence Forces Review Implementation Plan later accepted and adopted the
conclusiona " After neglect over many years by successive governments, most of
the deficiencies in structures, training and equipment identified were self evident to
76 See generally R. Murphy, 'Legal Framework of UN Forces and Issues of
Command and Control of Canadian and Irish Forces' , 4 Journal of Armed Conflict Law,
(June 1999), 41-73; and R. Murphy, 'Ireland: Legal issues arising from participation in
United Nations operations', 1(2) International Peacekeeping (Kluwer), (March-May
1994),61-64.
77 Ibid.
78 The Irish Times, 10August 1994 and the Irish Independent, 6 August 1994. In
1984, the Defence Forces were described by one commentator as 'a small but highly
professional Defence Force', and he went on to say that Ireland 'faces the essential
dilemma of all small nations seeking to provide their own securitywith limited resources',
while at the same time 'Irish troops have servedwith distinction in the Congo, Cyprus and
the Middle East in UN sponsored peacekeeping activities' J. Marcus, 'Irish Defence
Policy:DebateonNeutrality', Janes Defence Week/y, 4 August 1984, 152-154.
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79 Department of Defence, Defence Forces Review Implementation Plan,
Dublin, February, (1996).
members of the Defence Forces.i" However, others were not, and the Price
Waterhouse analysis offered a serious indictment of the levels of collective training
and management structures, which they rightly identified as the key to operational
capability in the Defence Forces." This had important implications for
participation on UN operations, as deficiencies in training would also undermine
operational capability on the ground. As a result, the government committed itself
to reorganise the Defence Forces as an 'all arms conventional force. ,82
This raises the question, how have Irish soldiers been so successful at
conflict resolution and peacekeeping duties in general, despite the deficiencies
identified? While the Defence Forces were supposedly organised and trained to
fulfil a primary role in the defence of the state against aggression, their most
important function evolved to that of providing military assistance to the civil
power/" Internal security tasks expanded due primarily to the conflict in Northern
Ireland and became the major operational involvement of the Defence Forces. In
this way much of the work of the army over the past twenty-seven years has in fact
been the performance of duties of a police nature. This is one of the reasons why
Irish troops adapted so successfully to a UN peacekeeping role where the duties
performed up to recently have also, for the most part, been of a police character.
Other important reasons were evident in a recent analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of the Defence forces, namely the 'can do' and professional approach
of military personnel at all levels which has meant that the roles assigned by
80 Personal interviews, Defence Forces personnel during 1996 and 1997. In
addition, the Report of the Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in
the Defence Forces, Government Publications/Stationary Office, Dublin, (31 July
1990), was a damning indictment of not just pay and conditions, but bureaucratic and
ineffective structures, and a remarkably militarily ineffective organization.
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81 Defence Forces Review Implementation Plan, op cit., 105-106.
82 Ibid., Executive Summary, i and ii. The reorganization of the Defence Forces
was to be based on a three brigade structure, with a manpower level of 11,500. See also
Department of Defence, Department of Defence and Defence Forces Strategy
Statements 1997-1999, Dublin, (1996), 37-41.
Personal interview, op. cit. n.26, see also Department of Defence and
Defence Forces Strategy Statements 1997-1999, op. cit., 5-9.
83
government have been carried out despite impediments to operational
effectiveness; and the extent to which conventional military skills have been
retained within the system notwithstanding the many barriers preventing
implementation of an optimum training programme." The difficulty with the 'can
do' work ethos is that in the long run it can be counter productive if it perpetuates
the illusion that all is well, when this in fact is not the case. This was one of the
reasons identified as contributing to the debacle of Canadian involvement in the
UN operation in Somalia.85 In this regard the deficiencies identified in the recent
review would indicate that matters were anything but satisfactory.
The implications of participation in peacekeeping operations
There has been considerable research into the characteristics of peacekeeping
forces and one distinguished sociologist proposed the 'constabulary' concept in
relation to conventional military forces participating in peacekeeping operations."
The military establishment becomes a 'constabulary' force when it is continuously
prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks international
relations rather than victory.87He suggested that the military would look upon such
police-type work as less important and prestigious than traditional military
operations. While this may have been true in the past among the armed forces of
84 Defence Strategy Statements, op. cit., 13.
85 See Dishonoured Legacy, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the
Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia , Canadian Government Publishing,
Ottawa, 1997, also available at <http://www.dnd.ca.somaliae.htm> (english version).
86 M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: New York: Free Press, (1960). The
term 'constabulary' was probably an unfortunate choice of word as it conjures up an
image of the unarmed British 'bobby' keeping the peace along his beat.
87 Ibid. See also C. Dandeker and J. Gow, 'Military Culture and Strategic Planning', in
E. Schmidl, Peace Operations Between War and Peace, London: Frank Cass, (2000),
58-79.
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the larger powers, it was never the case with the Defence Forcea" Later, four
characteristics in particular that renders a military force suitable for peacekeeping
missions were identified." The first is an emphasis on a high degree of adaptability
in the military sector, including an ability to operate independently of large scale
supporting forces; a major emphasis on the differentiation of skills and the
development of initiative in professional training; a distinctly non-political role,
and finally, a high degree of discipline. The Defence Forces at present satisfies all
of these requirements. The first two requirements are straight- forward and could
be said to be necessary characteristics of any small viable military force.
Furthermore, since the end of the Irish Civil War and the establishment of the
modern Irish state, the army has avoided any involvement in politics. There has
never been a suggestion of partiality by the army made by any deputy in the course
of Defence and other debates.
The success of the army's participation in peacekeeping forces is
evidence that it has a sufficiently high level of discipline. Further evidence is
provided by the manner that the army carries out the many and varied roles that it is
called upon to fulfil. The soldiers are drawn from all sections of Irish society. The
majority of these personnel live in homes alongside their civilian counterparts and
not in barracks or on military bases, a factor that has assisted the integration of the
army in Irish society.
The Defence Forces' involvement in UN operations has been
considerable. When one considers the small size of the Forces and the fact they
were generally several thousand personnel below authorised strength, the
contribution has been enormous. Even in absolute tenus the contribution is
impressive - in 1986 the Irish battalion was the second largest in UNIFIL. One of
the consequences of the low strength and organization is that it has nearly always
88 D. R. Segal and M. Wechsler Segal, Peacekeepers and their Wives: London:
Greenwood Press, 1993, 9. This view of the Defence Forces is from sixteen years
service therein, and extensive interviews and conversations with Irish military
personnel. Furthermore, the participation in UNmissions in the cause of peace has been
part of the stated mission of the Defence Forces since the 1960's.
89 J. A. Jackson, 'The Irish Army and the Development of the Constabulary
Concept' in J. Van Doorn (ed.), Armed Forces and Society, Sociological Essays, The
Hague, (1968).
45
proved necessary to establish the units that serve with peacekeeping forces from the
Defence Forces as a whole. Although this has obvious disadvantages, experience
shows that any problems that arise in practice are resolved easily and the unit
adopts an identity of its own very quickly. The organization of an infantry
battalion serving with UNIFIL is significantly different from that at home. In fact,
the so-called infantry battalion in Lebanon comprises infantry, artillery, cavalry,
signals, engineer, supply and transport, ordnance and medical corps personnel. For
this reason it is self sufficient, and tailor made for the tasks it performs."
It is difficult to access in general terms the impact that this involvement
has had on the Defence Forces. As a matter of policy, military service abroad is
voluntary, and for the most part, there are more places than volunteers available."
Nonetheless, it is evident from conversations with serving and former personnel of
the army that what is generally referred to in Irish military circles as 'overseas
service' has always been viewed as a welcome respite from the day to day barrack
routine at horne.? It has also boosted morale, especially in the early 1960's when
the government first agreed to contribute large numbers of troops to the
peacekeeping operation in the Congo. UN service has increased the wages and
salaries of serving personnel by way of overseas allowances, a factor not to be
90 Plans are now in place to change this, and it is planned to send smaller
composite units to more missions, similar to that ofUNAMET in East Timor, interview,
senior officer, November, 2000.
91 Although from time to time the Defence Forces have encountered difficulty
filling places in the UNIFIL battalion, personal interview, op. cit. n.26. In 2001, around
thirty technical staff have been detailed for service with UNIFIL owing to the need to
complete work arising from the redeployment following the Israeli withdrawal. In
October 1984, an army medical doctor instituted proceedings in the High Court to
restrain the Minister for Defence from sending him to Lebanon as part of the Irish
contingent with UNIFIL. He claimed his health would be damaged by such service. His
action was unsuccessful. The Irish Times, 26 October 1984. However, this was an
exceptional case.
92 This fact was acknowledged to some extent by the Minister for Defence, Mr
Paddy Donegan, in 1974when announcing the withdrawalof Irish troops from UNEF II.
He said he wanted 'our troops to know it was only a temporary measure', as he knew the
opportunity to serve abroad is a considerable incentive for young people to join the army.
SeeDail Debates 273, (1715-1716), 27 June 1974.
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overlooked when considering the number of volunteers of all ranks for service with
the UN.93 However, it was the new sense of purpose, which the army felt in the
1960's that provided the most significant boost to morale. The Irish Times in 1963
summed up the effect:
there had been created a better public image of the army. This had
been achieved by much mention in the speeches of politicians at home
and abroad. The national newspapers have given it much publicity
albeit somewhat dramatic and hysterical at times ...there was the
enormous benefit in experience that active service gives ...(and)
...Irish troops did at last receive adequate pay in terms of overseas
allowances."
More importantly, from a military point of view, peacekeeping operations provide
an ideal training ground for an army of Ireland's size and resources. This is
especially true in southern Lebanon today, owing to the general operational
envirorunent of the UN Force there. The training and exercising of at least two
battalions for UN service annually is probably the most obvious non-monetary
benefit the present level of commitment to UNIFIL. Contributions to other
missions allow officers in particular to hold command and staff appointments in
international forces that would otherwise not be open to them." This experience,
though difficult to quantify and evaluate, is recognised as being of immeasurable
benefit to the training and other standards associated with professional armies.
Despite the current deficiencies in training and equipment, these and other
military aspects of Irish involvement with the UN today compare favourably with
93 See survey results of troops serving with UNIFIL, see Appendix C.
94 The Irish Times, 29 July 1963.
95 Given the relatively small size of the Defence Forces, a large number of officers
have also served in senior Command and Staff appointmentswith UN missions. See the
article by Lt. Col. M. Shannon, 'Thirty Years of Peacekeeping, A Perspective on Staff
Appointments', An Cosantoir, Apri11989. t
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that of the early 1960's.96 In keeping with the long-standing tradition of
participation in UN activities, and in an effort to harness the extensive experience
accumulated to date, the Defence Forces opened a UN Training School in 1993.97
However, the first army battalions that formed up for UN duty in the Congo were
not well equipped for the mission ahead, and nor were they well informed
politically of the situation there. One retired senior officer recalled how the Irish
soldiers arrived to the sweltering heat of Central Africa in heavy bulls wool
uniforms and with bolt-action rifles." Inmilitary terms, they were responsible for
a huge area and they had at their disposal a mere sixteen jeeps, no helicopters and
no armoured cars." He compared the strength of the army then at around eight
thousand, to the period during World War II when the strength was about fifty
thousand, and remarked that most of the men were absorbed doing routine duty.
As a result, the standard of basic training was poor and almost non-existent in some
instances. Ironically, the fact that Irish troops are accustomed to working without
heavy support weapons has worked to their favour on traditional peacekeeping
operations. While the basic infantry soldier is well equipped and supported at that
level, on an overall basis the army does not possess expensive military hardware.
As weapons and equipment of this nature are not permitted in a traditional
peacekeeping role, the Irish soldier adapted particularly well to peacekeeping
duties, as he or she is unaccustomed to depending upon this type of equipment
anyway. The army's role within the state is also such that few soldiers experience
96 Defence Forces Review Implementation Plan, op. cit.. 105-106.
97 See Lt. Col. O. McDonald, 'Peacekeeping Lessons Leamed: An Irish
Perspective', 4 International Peacekeeping (Kluwer), (Autumn 1997), 94-103. The
School provides general and mission specific national and international courses and
training for peacekeeping duties. It is also responsible for keeping abreast of
developments in the field and the development of a peacekeeping doctrine.
98 Personal interview, Col. R Bunworth, Dublin, February 1985. Col. Bunworth
was the Officer Commanding SouthernCommand and also Assistant Chief of Staff of the
defence Forces prior to his retirement. He had extensive experience with the UN in the
Middle East and he was chairman of the Israeli Syrian Mixed Armistice Committee in
1967,and Chief of Staff of UNTSOduring 1973and 1974.
99 At a late stage the Irish battalions with ONUC were supplied with helicopters,
and armoured cars were dispatched from Ireland.
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live combat situations and most incidents involving Irish soldiers on UN service are
more in the nature of skirmishes than full-scale battles.l'" This generally means
that the army is unaccustomed to offensive military operations and resorting to the
use of force. As a result of this, they can be very adept at resolving confrontations
by negotiation and mediation, qualities useful in any mission that seeks to establish
a degree of peace and security in an area by deploying an international UN force. It
is, however, noteworthy that the Defence Forces have not had any difficulty
adapting to peace enforcement missions either.
The primary role of the Defence Forces is to defend the state against
aggression. However, the capacity to fulfil this mission is hampered by the lack of
adequate resources. In such a situation it may well be asked why the state
maintains a standing army at all? The answer probably lies in the historical
background to the foundation of the Irish state. The perceived threat to the
democratically elected government and the institutions of the state has always been
greater from within the state than from any potential foreign aggressor, except for a
period during World War II. This may account in part for the disproportionate
strength of the army with the Defence Force establishment. The independent state
of Ireland has never been invaded and its soldiers have not participated in any
foreign wars. Security and defence matters are seldom topics of public debate, and
when they do arise it is usually in the context of European integration and
neutrality. Unlike most other European countries, the ministerial portfolio of
Defence is regarded as a minor cabinet post. Successive Ministers for Defence
from different political backgrounds have not been known for their political
dynamism or significant contribution to public debate on security or defence.'?'
100 That is not to say that certain incidents, especially in the Congo, did not
amount to prolonged fir- fights to seize or defend strategic locations. These incidents,
such as the 'siege of Jadoville' and 'the tunnel', or the battle for At-Tiri in Lebanon had
all the ingredients of a full-scale military operation. However, they were nonetheless
exceptions to the general rule that confrontations were usually of short duration and in
most cases the UN troops managed to contain them by means of restraint and
forbearance in what often amounted to extreme provocation.
101 In February 1986, the Defence portfolio was relegated even further when the
Minister, Mr Paddy O'Toole, was given responsibility for the Dept. of An Gaeltacht in
addition. The present Minister for Defence is also responsible for the Dept. of the
Marine.
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The Department of Defence and the Irish military authorities have been equally
reticent over the years. The lack of policy and debate on defence issues reflected a
general lack of ideas and interest at all levels. In recent years, the formation of
representative associations and the publication of Strategy Statements, Annual
reports, and the White Paper has improved this situation, but the overall level of
public debate and knowledge remains abysmally low.
Since World War II the Irish army has suffered from a lack of purpose and
a certain ambiguity regarding its role. Ireland's initial refusal to join NATO,
largely on account of partition, and the adoption of a policy of military neutrality
meant that the army was denied any international role.I02 This decision had serious
implications for national defence.l'" A policy of neutrality meant that the state
should maintain a credible military deterrent. However, up until recently a country
of Ireland's size and resources could not afford the required investment in its armed
forces organised along conventional military lines. As a result, the Defence Forces
became run down in the 1950s and early 1960s.104
The most important function fulfilled by the Defence Forces is currently
in aid to the civil power. Such a role is not dissimilar in certain respects from that
performed on traditional peacekeeping operations. This means that the experience
gained by all ranks is of direct benefit to the maintenance of internal security in
Ireland. As the operational basis of the Defence Forces both at home and on UN
102 In 1949, the Minister for External Affairs, Mr Sean McBride, when answering
a question in the Dail regarding NATO membership stated: 'As long as partition lasts,
any military alliance or commitment involving joint military action with the State
responsible for partition must be quite out of the question', Dail Debates 114 (323-326),
23 February 1949. See also Owen Dudley Edwards (ed.), op. cit., 118-127, Keatinge, A
Place Among the Nations, op.cit., 93-99.
103 O'Halpin,op. cit., 261.
104 The situation the army found itself in during this period has been succinctly
stated by one commentator as follows: 'Much (of the army's) equipment became
increasingly outdated, and although some items, such as small arms and uniforms were
renewed, this was done without any clear idea of the army's mission. More seriously,
opportunities for training were limited and career prospects were restricted. Only in the
early nineteen sixties did large scale participation in UN peacekeeping operations lift
professional morale out of the routine rut of state ceremonials, guard duty, civilian
emergencies and horse shows', Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, op.cit., 93.
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service is the use of minimum force only, there is no question of having to retrain
personnel on their return from service abroad. This can occur in the case of larger
contributor states such as France and Britain.IOS In this way participation in UN
peace support operations has enhanced the image of the Defence Forces as a
disciplined and well-integrated military force both at home and abroad. Although
it is difficult to assess the impact UN service has had in general, soldiers of all
ranks are unanimous in their belief that it has improved considerably both training
and morale in the Defence Forces.l'"
At one time there was controversy regarding Irish participation in UN
peacekeeping owing to the backlog in reimbursement of expenses from the UN.I07
Reports gave the impression that Ireland was losing considerable sums of money,
especially in Lebanon.l'" The financial implications are not as simple as might
appear at first glance, and it can be argued that, far from being a loss making
exercise, UN operations can be a net contributor to the Irish exchequer, especially
as commitments were met from within existing resources.l'" In contrast, recent
UN approved operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor are paid for entirely
from the states own resources, and it is intended to fmance the European Rapid
lOS Personal interview, senior French officer, Naquora, September 1998.
106 For certain disadvantages associated with participation, see R. Murphy,
'Ireland and Future Participation in Peacekeeping Operations' , 5 International
Peacekeeping (F. Cass), No.1, (1998), 22-45 at 37.
See comments by Ireland to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations, UN General Assembly, Document AlAC.121/36/Add.l, 4 Apri1I989, 4-9.
107
108 See The Irish Times, 15 April 1993, and 15 and 17 May 1993.
109 This was especially evident in 1986when a former Secretary of the Department
of Defence informed the Committee of Public Account that Ireland had made some five
million pounds profit from its involvementin UNIFIL, andwould at that time havemade a
further net gain of nearly sixteenmillion if defaultingnations had paid their dues at the UN.
This was confirmed by the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs who said:
'There has been no additional cost to the Irish taxpayer for keeping troops stationed in
Lebanon over and above what it would have cost to keep them in Ireland', see The Irish
Times, 10September 1986.
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Deployment Force along similar lines.llo The current trend is towards delegation of
by the Security Council of its powers to establish peace support operations to
'coalitions of the willing' .111 However, this is dependent on a powerful state
agreeing to take the lead, and others agreeing to contribute. It is when states are
unwilling to form such coalitions that the UN often falls back on peacekeeping or
peace enforcement operations under Chapter VII, in the latter case, not always
successfully. Participation in 'coalition of the willing' can have serious political
implications and raises policy issues for countries like Ireland that to date have
eschewed participation in formal military alliances. The matter of who actually
commands and controls such forces also presents practical and legal difficulties.I12•
Guidelines for future participation
The Irish government has committed itself to supporting the unique role and
authority of the UN in the field of conflict resolution and peacekeeping. However,
in view of the number, size and complexity of current peace support operations, it
was deemed necessary to develop a selective response to future requests from the
UN based on certain factors.!" These factors are so broad and imprecise that it
110 Training and re-equipment for this is planned to be completed by 2003, see
speech by Lt. Gen. C. Mangan, Chief of Staff, reported in The Irish Times, 15
November 2000,9.
See generally D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of
Collective Security, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1999), esp. Chapters 6 and 7.
III
112 See Chapter 5 infra.
113 The factorsthat will informconsiderationof such requestswill include:-
an assessmentof whether a peacekeepingoperation is the most appropriate response to the
situation; considerationof how the mission relates to the priorities of Irish foreign policy;
the degree of risk involved; the extent to which the particular skills or characteristics
required relate to Irish capabilities; the existence of realistic objectives and a clear
mandate which has the potential to contribute to a political solution; whether the
operation is adequately resourced; and the level of existing commitment to
peacekeeping operations and security requirements at home; see White Paper on
Defence,op. cit., p. 63 and White Paper on Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp.l94-195. The
White Paper on Defence outlined additional factors for consideration, including on-
going developments in UN peace support operations, the evolution of European security
structures, and the resource implications for the defence budget.
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could be said that all peacekeeping forces established will fall foul of at least one or
more of them, and they could thus be used to avoid participation in, or even to deny
the legitimacy or raison d'etre of certain operations. This, however, is too cynical a
view, and the factors are just what they are stated to be i.e. matters relating to an
operation which will be taken into account when deciding whether or not it is
appropriate to participate. It can also be claimed that if these were rigidly applied
in the past, Ireland would not be in Lebanon today, and we would not have
participated in any UN peacekeeping mission mounted to date. In this regard they
are somewhat unrealistic, and they do not reflect precedent or practice to date.
Nonetheless, they are potentially useful guidelines in assessing the nature and
extent of what Ireland's support should be for any UN peace support operation.
Some of the factors, if interpreted and applied in a wise and flexible
manner, might even provide a yardstick by which to measure the likely success of
the operation, with or without Irish participation. Others reflect very subjective
considerations, such as consistency with broader foreign policy objectives, and the
extent of other similar commitments. These are legitimate factors for any
sovereign state to take into account, and each request must be considered on its
own merits. What should not be taken for granted though, is that the very
complexity and evolving nature of peacekeeping may diminish the role of the
Defence Forces, and the White Paper on Foreign Policy is somewhat unrealistic in
this regard. It appeared to assume that Ireland would always be in demand as a
contributor to peacekeeping operations. This is not necessarily the case. If Ireland
wants to stay in what has been described as the 'premier league' of peacekeepers,
then it must ensure that it is in a position to do SO.114
There will always be a need for traditional peacekeeping, but there may
not always be need for Irish personnel to form part of such operations. The support
from Ireland for the inclusion of the so called Petersburg tasks of peacekeeping and
similar humanitarian tasks into the Amsterdam Treaty on Europe indicated a
growing awareness of the need to respond to the changing international security
114 Comdt. B. 0 Keeffe, spokesperson for the commissioned officers (RACO),
RTE 9 0 Clock News, 11May 1998.
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environment. us The White Paper on Defence also recognised the changing trends
in international peace support operations, while at the same time the government
has consistently stressed that participation in UN approved European peace support
initiatives does not change Ireland's traditional policy on military neutrality.i'" This
may well be official government policy, but it is hard to reconcile with the fact of
participation with other European states in military operations of whatever nature,
and the increasing co-operation envisaged for European Union states under the
common foreign and security provisions of the Nice treaty. 117
Although Ireland was not tarnished by the policies pursued by other
contributors to the UN operation in Somalia, participation in any enforcement
mission is risky. Apart from the obvious physical danger, there are other more
fundamental issues to be considered. The real agenda of the larger powers may not
be apparent at first, and small or middle powers run the risk of being dragged
unwittingly into an intervention that owes little to the noble aspirations of the UN
Charter. Humanitarian intervention and international law are not always high on
the priorities of those states whose motives and policies are determined by the
'realpolitik' of international relations and domestic concerns.
Taking into account of the experience of Somalia, the Irish government's
approach to participation in future enforcement operations will be guided by certain
criteria.i'" There is nothing radical or innovative about the criteria, and they are
115 See The Irish Times, 11May 1998.
116 White Paper on Defence, op. cit., 61. See articles by B. Cowan, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, The Irish Times, 18 November 2000, 9, and The Examiner, 14 July
2000, 15.
117 See the Nice Treaty White Paper, Dublin: Government Publications, March
2001,62-63; and The Irish Times, 29 March 2001, 8. See also J. Maguire, Defending
Peace - For an Alternative to NATO/PjP and a Militarised Europe, Afri, Dublin,
(1999); and Afri Position Paper No.2, Towards Real Security - A Contribution to the
Debate on Irish Defence and Security Planning, Dublin, (1999), and C6mhlamh, Focus,
Issue 62, Dublin, (AuglSep 2000), 16-24.
118 The criteria are as follows: that the operation derives its legitimacy from
decisions of the Security Council; that the objectives are clear and unambiguous and of
sufficiency and urgency and importance to justify the use of force; that all other
reasonable means of achieving the objectives have tried and failed; that the duration of
54
broadly similar to those adopted by Canada.119 However, the level of public
knowledge and debate has been increased by their publication. They also set down
the factors to be taken into account before a decision is made to participate, and
they allow for the political and military implications of individual missions to be
assessed and evaluated on an ongoing basis. Then, an informed decision can be
taken on the basis of all the facts. This may lead to accusations of naivete,
especially as Ireland must now compete with other states to participate in such
operations.V" The end of the cold war has witnessed the industrial-military
complex of both camps searching for a new identity and raison d'etre. The recent
UN sponsored military operations have provided a means for armed forces to resist
pressure to rationalise and reduce their capacity. Proposals from smaller states
indicate that this is not simply a concern of the larger powers.V' Nonetheless,
Ireland should not be afraid to decline to participate in any UN operation when this
is the right course of action to take.
The guidelines were applied for the first time in 1996, when the Irish
government decided to the contribute troops to the proposed Canadian led UN
the operation be the mmrmum necessary to achieve the stated objectives; that
diplomatic efforts to resolve the underlying disputes should be resumed at the earliest
possible moment; that the command and control arrangements for the operation are in
conformity with the relevant decisions of the Security Council and that the Security
Council is kept fully informed of the implementation of its decision. White Paper on
Foreign Policy, op. cit., 199-200.
119 Lt. Col. Ernest Reumiller, 'Canadian Perspectives and Experiences with
Peacekeeping' paper delivered to seminar on Conflict Resolution and
PeacemakinglPeacekeeping: the Irish and Canadian Experiences, Dublin, Association of
Canadian Studies in Ireland, May 1997.
120 See reported warning by Defence Forces Chief of Staff that Irish peacekeepers
are facing competition, The Irish Times,S October 1995; and the Defence Strategy
Statements,op. cit. 15.
121 The Irish Defence forces established a UN Training School in 1993, and
agreed to participate in UN Stand-By forces in 1996. See also 'Improving the UN's
Rapid Deployment Capability: A Canadian Study', February 1995; 'A UN Rapid
Deployment Brigade: the Netherlands Paper', January 1995; and' A Multifunctional UN
Stand By Forces High Readiness Brigade: Chief of Defence, Denmark', 25 January
1995.
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intervention force planned for Central Africa.122 In the event, the troops were not
required. When the matter of contributing troops to the NATO led SFOR and
KFOR was being considered, the guidelines were applied again. There was general
support for the proposal from the main political parties.123 The Defence Forces and
the Department of Foreign Affairs were strong advocates of the proposal.P" In July
1999, Ireland agreed to send a transport company to Kosovo as part of KFOR.
There was nothing radical or new in this decision, and their role is very similar to
that performed by the Irish contingent with UNOSOM 11.125 Nonetheless, Irish
involvement in SFOR and KFOR sets the scene for a longer-term re-orientation of
Irish participation in international peace support operations. If the Defence Forces
are to retain the skills and reputation acquired to date in the new context of
European security, then it may be necessary to participate in the organizations
where best contemporary practice is developed. This is all the more so with the
UN move from traditional peacekeeping to more complex peace support operations
conducted by regional organizations with UN approval. This was a significant
development for Ireland that should assist in ensuring that the prominent role
played by the Defence Forces to date in peacekeeping operations is not diminished
in the future. This is an important consideration as some of Ireland's attributes for
traditional peacekeeping, namely the non-membership of NATO and the small
armed forces, could be barriers to participation in future UN but NATO led
regional operations.
There is, however, a positive dimension to Ireland's situation.
Peacekeeping was confined usually to small and middle powers, whereas
122 Personal interview, Department of Foreign Affairs official, op. cit. n.26. See
also Ddil Debates 472 (701-725), 4 December 1996 and The Irish Times, 22 and 28
November 1996.
Dail Debates 479 (514-539), 14 May 1997 and The Irish Times, 23 January,
28 April and 8 May 1997.
123
124 Personal Interviews, op. cit, n. 26. See also Department of Foreign Affairs,
Ireland and the Partnership for Peace, an explanatory guide, Dublin, 1999. It had been
hoped to send a company strength contingent to SFOR, but some fifty personnel in a
militarypolice capacitywas ultimatelyagreed.
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enforcement operations are dominated by the larger powers. With the UN in
financial crisis, there may be little alternative but to hand over enforcement
operations to regional bodies such as NATO. This has serious implications not just
for the UN, but for smaller states like Ireland that are not part of any formal
military or regional alliance. Nonetheless, Ireland's military neutrality and history,
the very factors that excluded it from such alliances, make Irish soldiers especially
acceptable as traditional peacekeepers. The need for contributors to such
operations will continue, and Ireland is well placed to support and contribute to the
myriad of tasks that such missions involve.
Conclusion.
The decision to allow Irish troops participate in the UN enforcement mission in
Somalia was one of the most significant developments in Irish defence and foreign
policy in recent years. The need to pass enabling legislation in Ireland arose from
the dualist nature of Ireland's legal system, rather than any new obligation
undertaken by the state in relation to UN membership.F" The high standard of
officer training within the Defence Forces, the internal security role performed in
aid to the civil power, and the 'can do' professional working ethos of all personnel,
render the Defence Forces especially suitable for all UN operations. This,
however, is something that should not be taken for granted. Despite all the reports
or recent years, defence policy still lacks a coherent strategy. The Defence Forces
must be given the resources to maintain the capacity to respond to requests to
contribute to peace support operations, when appropriate. There is a very real
danger that this could be undermined by current 'reforms', combined with
government lack of vision. The current strength of the Defence Forces is
inadequate for the tasks it is intended to fulfil. This situation is all the more critical
when it is taken into account that for every battalion or unit on UN or similar
service, there should be another in preparatory training, and another standing down.
125 Dail Debates, 507, (852-86), 1 July 1999. See also The Irish Times, 31
August 1999 and 1 and 2 July 1999.
The Defence (Amendment) Act, 1993, for background and analysis see
Chapter 4.
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It will not be possible to meet the commitment to the UN Stand By force
arrangement, and the European Rapid Reaction Force, at the same time.127 Nor is it
clear that the Defence Forces will be prepared for the security implications of a
breakdown or serious para-military threat to the Northern Ireland peace process.
Despite protestations to the contrary by the Minister for Defence and Minister for
Foreign Affairs, the numbers just do not add Up.128
Successive governments have been neither honest nor realistic in their
designation of the role of the Defence Forces, and what is being signalled now is a
clear move away from traditional UN operations in favour of the post cold war
model of 'tendered out' or delegated peace support operations. This may well be
the way of the future, but what is missing is an honest and clear policy from the
government on where Ireland stands on this and related issues.F' As one recent
author put it, 'as the Mother Teresa of the international community'P", Ireland is
uncomfortable with the truth and the dilemmas of the post cold war era. For many
years the real mission of the Defence Forces was to defend the state from a
perceived internal threat, while external security was guaranteed by slipping under
the NATO umbrella.!" When this was combined with an underlying distrust of the
military by the political establishment, the consequences for the Defence Forces
was that of a policy of deliberate neglect.
127 See reports by J. Cusack, The Irish Times, 5 February 2000, 3, and N.
Murray, The Examiner, 14 July 2000, 1, and article by Lt. Gen. G. McMahon, former
Chief of Staff, The Irish Times, 26 July 2000, 16. For an alternative view, see J.
McConnell, Press Officer, Dept. of Defence, letter, The Irish Times, 1August 2000, 13.
128 See speech by Brian Cowan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the UN General
Assembly, Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, September 2000, and D. de Breadun,
The Irish Times, 16 September 2000, 13, and the denial of the reduction in UN role by
the Minister for Defence reported in B. Roche, The Irish Times, 2 August 2000, 4.
129 See generally J. Maguire, op. cit.• and Afri Position Paper No.2, op. cit., and
Comhlamh, Focus. Issue 62, Dublin, (Aug/Sep 2000), 16-24.
130 O'Halpin, op cit., 353.
131 See A. J. English, 'The Irish Republic - Odd Man Out of European Defence',
Jane's Military Review. London: Jane's Publishing, (1987), 31 and B. Mac Sweeney,
'Irish Defence in the Context of Irish Foreign Policy', Irish Studies, (Spring 1998), 51.
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Ireland has moved on significantly from its statement to the Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations a decade ago that '[w]e would underline
again that UN peacekeeping derives its strength from its collective character and its
resulting impartiality. The financing, command and composition of these forces
must be consistent with this'. 132 The controversial decision to join the NATO
sponsored Partnership for Peace programme, and the commitments under the
European Common Foreign and Security Policy have important implications for
lreland.!" To a large extent the debate over membership of the Partnership for
Peace programme took place among political elites and certain interest groups.
However, the development of co-operative military relations and compatibility
with the Western European Union and NATO in particular, albeit for
peacekeepinglhumanitarian purposes, raises important issues for Ireland. The
Defence Forces could benefit from, and contribute to, the stated objectives of the
Partnership for Peace.134 Its focus is declared to be on co-operation, training and
joint exercises, and its framework document entails participation on a voluntary
basis only.135 It includes most of the other 'neutral' European states, and former
Warsaw Pact members. However, because of its association with NATO,
membership of the Partnership for Peace may dilute Ireland's independent middle
132 See comments by Ireland to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations, UN General Assembly, Document AlAC.121/37, 29 March 1990, 13-15 at
14.
133 Ireland formallyjoined the Partnershipfor Peace programme in December 1999,
see The Irish Times, 2 December 1999, 3. See also R. Doherty, 'Partnership for Peace:
the sine qua non for Irish Participation in Regional Peacekeeping', 7 International
Peacekeeping (F. Cass), No., 2, (Summer 2000), 63-82; and Challenges and
Opportunities Abroad, op. cit., 128-140, Defence Strategy Statements, op. cit., pp.7-9,
and Afri, Towards Real Security, op. cit., 2-7 and P. Gillespie, The Irish Times, 30
September 2000, 13.
134 It is difficult to take issuewith the first three stated objectives of the Partnership
for Peace, namely, transparency in defence planning, ensuring democratic control of
defence forces, maintenance of capability and readiness to contribute to UN and the
Organizationfor SecurityandCo-operationin Europe(OSCE)operations.
135 Challenges and Opportunities Abroad, op. cit., 129-131.
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power identity even more than has already occurred, and it may make forging and
maintaining links with the countries of the developing South more difficult.
The issues are complex, and the dilemmas confronting Ireland were
evident in the debate about participation in the multinational force in the former
Yugoslavia.l " The government policy of military neutrality, however, did not
preclude Irish participation in this force, when it was deemed appropriate to do so.
In reality, both SFOR and KFOR are NATO forces, albeit operating with the
authority of a UN Chapter VII resolution and with non-NATO member
contributors. In military terms, Ireland does not possess the capacity to make any
significant contribution to such large-scale operations. Irish involvement in these
forces sets the scene for a longer-term re-orientation of Irish international
peacekeeping. If Ireland is to retain its skills and reputation in the field of
peacekeeping, it is necessary to adapt and to participate in the organizations where
best contemporary practice is developed. But in doing so, is Ireland contributing to
the demise of the UN at the behest of the United States and other permanent
members of the Security Council? At the same time, there are some issues that
Ireland should not remain neutral in respect of - the genocide, ethnic cleansing,
mass rapes, and other crimes against humanity perpetrated in the former
Yugoslavia are but one example. The reality is that it has taken a NATO led force
to impose some measure of peace, and prevent the seemingly endless slaughter of
so many innocent civilians in the former Yugoslavia. But why have the same
NATO powers left the UN strapped for cash and unable to act? The unilateral
NATO response to the Kosovo crises may provide a more accurate insight into the
true nature and purpose of these forces.137
The Kosovo crisis occurred at a time when Irish foreign policy was
preoccupied with other matters, notably Northern Ireland and East Timor.138 The
136 For an examination of the security issues, see P. Keatinge, European Security-
Ireland's Choices, Dublin: Institute of European Affairs, (1996).
137 See R. Murphy 'Kosovo: Reflections on the legal aspects of the conflict and
its outcome', 11 Irish Studies in International Affairs, (2000), 7-30; and J. Maguire, op.
cit., at 60-64.
SeeN. Rees, 'The Kosovo Crisis, the International Response and Ireland', 11
Irish Studies in International Affairs, (2000), 55-70, esp.67-68.
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images of violence shocked the Irish public, but it remained divided over NATO
action. The government's initial reaction mirrored this ambivalence, and as a result
it neither supported nor condemned NATO action.139 It is noteworthy that this
changed and later Ireland supported a joint European Union foreign minister's
statement that the bombing was 'necessary and warranted'. 140 This was a
significant change in policy and it probably reflected a desire to maintain European
solidarity.
The neutral states tradition of involvement in international peace support
operations is confirmed once again by the agreement of European neutrals to send
soldiers to serve with the UN mandated but NATO commanded KFOR141 This
participation raises the issue of the compatibility of a policy of political and/or
military neutrality with such operations'Y Ireland is almost unique among the
European neutrals in that the Defence (Amendment) Act, 1993, permits the
participation of Defence Forces personnel in any kind of UN military operation.143
It may be that other states will follow this example, but the experience of
Switzerland indicates that nothing should be taken for granted. The situation with
regard to Switzerland highlights the difficulties that can arise for genuinely neutral
countries. Although not a member of the UN, Switzerland has participated in a
number of UN operations.i'" In order to formalise and expedite the process of
139 Ibid.
140 The original draft statement said it was 'justified', but the Irish Foreign
Minister Andrews and other neutrals opposed this on the grounds that it implied it was
legally justified; see The Irish Times, 15April 1999.
For example, KFOR includes non- NATO contingents from, inter alia,
Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, and Austria. See www.kforonline.com.
141
See S. Dragon, 'Permanent Neutrality and Peacekeeping', 5 International
Peacekeeping (Kluwer), Nos. 1-2, (1999), 37-40.
142
143 See R. Murphy, 'A Comparative Analysis of the Municipal Legal Basis for
Canadian and Irish Participation in United Nations Forces', 38 Revue de Droit Militaire
et de Droit de la GuerrelThe Military Law and the Law of War Review, (1999), 163-
208, and Infra. Cpt. 3.
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participation, the Swiss Federal Council enacted a statute in 1993 establishing a
standby military force. Like Ireland, peacekeeping is deemed to be an important
aspect of Swiss foreign policy. However, the statute was rejected by referendum
because the population, among other reasons, considered participation in UN
missions a threat to the neutrality of Switzerland.145 It may be that Irish political
leaders had this in mind when they decided not to hold a referendum on Irish
membership of Partnership for Peace.l'" The Swiss experience shows that the
general public there are wary of the extended parameters of recent UN military
operations, and that the threat to neutrality is perceived as very real. The blurring
of the distinction between peacekeeping, peace enforcement and enforcement
action missions does not help this either.
The risks of involvement for Ireland are not insignificant, as they were
during the Congo crisis nearly forty years ago, but the duty to act as responsible
member of the international community remains and is compelling, in particular,
given the shameful record of Ireland and other European countries throughout the
Yugoslav contlict. However, NATO makes for an unpredictable bedfellow. Once
it gave the UN full co-operation as part of peacekeeping and enforcement missions
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now it seems to be competing with the UN and to have
taken its place in the European area. This may suit the cash strapped UN in the
short term, but what of NATO's plans outside its own area of operations and
without UN authorisation? Where does Ireland's interests lie in such a scenario?
The lessons of history are clear, Ireland's interests as a small state lie with the UN,
collective security and intemationallaw.
144 Switzerland participated in many operations, for example, UNEF, ONUC and
UNFICYP. A Swiss military medical unit was first sent to Namibia in 1988. Since then
Switzerland has regularly contributed to peacekeeping operations through such units.
145 Dragon, op. cit., 38.
146 See The Irish Times, 2 December 1999, 3. A major source of controversy
arose from the fact that one of the Government parties, Fianna Fail, had promised before
gaining power that it would hold a referendum on the issue. It changed its mind in
government. For the terms of Irish membership, see The Irish Times, 6 October 1999,
6 and 2 December 1999,3.
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Chapter 3
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARISING FROM IRELAND'S
MEMBERSIDP OF THE UN
Introduction
Ireland has been a member of the UN since 1955, and apart from when the issue
of membership was first debated in 1946, there has been no serious consideration
of the full implications of belonging to an international organization which is
charged with, inter alia, the maintenance of international peace and security.
Participation in UN peacekeeping operations has been a cornerstone of Irish
foreign policy since the late 1950's. I While traditional peacekeeping remains an
integral part of the United Nation's machinery for the maintenance of
international peace and security, in recent years there has been a shift in emphasis
from the traditional operation based on consent to a more robust or 'second
generation' UNmilitary operation. In addition, the UN has been forced to adopt a
decentralised military option as opposed to the original Charter scheme that was
based on a more centralised collective system.' Ireland has participated in the UN
enforcement operation in Somalia and is currently part of the UN sanctioned but
NATO led Stabilisation Force in the former Yugoslavia. This and participation in
other UN military and multi-dimensional operations is a direct result of
membership of the UN. Moreover, membership has provided an opportunity for
Ireland to play a role in the most important international organization of this
century that is far in excess of Ireland's relative political, economic or military
significance.'
Supra., Chapter 2, and Challenges and Opportunities Abroad, White Paper on
Foreign Policy, Dublin: Department of Foreign Affairs, (1996), 191-206 andpassim.
2 See N. D. White and O. Ulgen, 'The Security Council and the Decentralised
Military Option: Constitutionality and Function', XLIV (3) Netherlands International
Law Review, (1997),378-413 at 380.
3 See Chapter 2, supra.
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The most controversial period of Irish participation in peacekeeping
operations occurred during the Congo (ONUC) operation in the 1960's.4 Even
then, however, actual membership of the UN Organization itself was not
questioned seriously. Despite the history of significant Irish involvement of
peacekeeping, it is ironic that it was the Gulf conflict of 1990-91 that gave rise to
the most sustained debate in recent times concerning Ireland's obligations arising
from membership of the UN. Prior to that, participation in peacekeeping and
similar operations, even those established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
had always been undertaken on a voluntary basis and with the approval of Dail
Eireann (Irish Parliamenn.' Though these did give rise to debates, these usually
centred on the issue of participation and were mission specific in nature. The
more general legal obligations arising from Ireland's commitment to
multilateralism and collective security within the UN system were not given due
consideration. Yet such a debate is crucial to Irish participation in peacekeeping
and similar operations, as these arise within the framework of the Charter, in
particular those provisions dealing with the maintenance of international peace
and security. The Gulf conflict raised matters regarding Ireland's obligations
under the Charter that had neither arisen nor been considered significant issues
before then. In particular, the compatibility between provisions in the Irish
Constitution dealing with international relations and associated matters, and the
obligations imposed by the UN Charter, carne in for scrutiny. These are
fundamental questions that impinge upon Ireland's participation in the UN at all
levels, but especially in military operations of a peacekeeping or other nature. It
was following a Supreme Court decision in 1986 that serious questions were
raised concerning the constitutionality of Ireland's membership of the UN.6 In
order to consider these issues it is necessary to examine the constitutional
provisions governing international relations and agreements entered into by the
State, and what action Ireland may be obliged to take as a member of the UN.
4 See for example 184 Dail Debates, (734, 1018, 1284) 9,16 and 17 December
1960, and 185 (864-865, 1090-1091) 7 and 14 December 1960.
5 Ibid.
6 Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] Irish Reports 713.
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Constitutional considerations
In the first instance, Article 29.5.2 of the Constitution provides:
The State shall not be bound by any international agreement involving a
charge upon public funds unless the terms of the agreement shall have
been approved by Dail Eireann.i
The practice has been that the government of the day first seeks the approval of
the Dail for any international agreement or convention involving a charge upon
public funds in advance of ratification or signature, if binding. This is the most
obvious constitutional requirement resulting from Article 29.5.2 and it was a
constitutional imperative before Irish membership of the UN could be undertaken.
Arising from this, the then Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Mr. de Valera, moved the
following motion in the Dail on 24 July 1946, and it was passed unanimously the
following day:
That Dail Eireann, being willing to assent to acceptance of the obligations
contained in the Charter .....recommends the government to take steps with a
view to Ireland's admission to membership of the United Nations
Organization as soon as they consider it opportune to do so.8
The background to Ireland's application has already been dealt with, but it was
December 1955 before Ireland was permitted to join." By this time the
government had changed, and despite misgivings by de Valera, reliance was
placed on the motion of 1946 as being sufficient to satisfy the constitutional
7 See IM. Kelly, The Irish Constitution, 3rd. ed. (G. Hogan and G. White,
eds.), Dublin: Butterworths, (1994), 295-300; J. Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland,
3rd ed., Dublin: Round Hall/Sweet and Maxwell, (2000), 215-220, 231-232, 299.
102 Dail Debates, (1308). Mr. de Valera was also Minister for External
Affairs at the time.
8
9 Supra, Chapter 2.
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requirements under Article 29.10 The problem with this was that the perceived
and de facto requirements of UN membership had changed somewhat in the
intervening period, and the question could validly be asked whether the terms of
the Charter in 1955 were identical to that of 1946. The then Taoiseach, Mr.
Costello, commented that the only difference between the position regarding the
obligations as set out during the Dail debate of 1946 and then, was the experience
of the Korean conflict which demonstrated that the obligations envisaged under
Article 43 of the Charter and the making available of armed forces were not
mandatory. In this way, the obligations were less onerous than anticipated and
any military commitments under Article 43 were, according to Mr. Costello,
'entirely within our own control' .II This was not quite correct as Ireland was still
bound by the terms of the Charter as a whole, and as there were no formal
amendments during those years, the potential for agreement under Article 43 still
remained.
Not surprisingly, the emphasis during the early debate had been on the
military obligations arising from Article 43.12 Those commitments envisaged had
not in fact materialised. After the Korean conflict, the anticipated requirements of
the Charter were indeed somewhat different, but the advent of the cold war and
the changing international environment made it difficult to predict what military
commitments might arise in the future. Within a year following Ireland's
accession, UNEF was established, setting a precedent for one of the most
significant but unforeseen developments in the maintenance of international peace
and security by the UN.13
10 153Dail Debates, (1603,1605 and 1606) 15December 1955.
II /bid., (1602).
12 See L. Goodrich, E. Hambro and A. Simmons, Charter of the United Nations,
(3rd. ed.), London: Columbia University Press, (1969),317-326 and B. Simma (ed.),
The Charter of the United Nations - A Commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
(1995),636-639.
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The UN and the use of military force.
The UN Charter envisages a central executive role for the Security Council in the
maintenance of international peace and security." The members of the UN,
including Ireland, have agreed in Article 25 of the Charter to 'accept and carry
out' the 'decisions' of the Security Council. It follows that decisions taken under
Chapter VII of the Charter, to the extent that they come within Article 25, create
legally binding international obligations for member states. There are no
definitive criteria for determining whether a resolution of the Security Council is
either a decision or a recomrnendarion.P In its Advisory Opinion on Namibia, the
International Court of Justice provided the following guidelines:
The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully
analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In
view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question whether
they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, having
regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussion
leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all
circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of
the resolution of the Security Council."
See D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces, London: Stevens, (1964), 90-151
and TheBlue Helmets, (3rd ed.), New York: UN, (1996), 15-32.
13
14 See generally N.D. White, Keeping the Peace-The United Nations and the
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 2nd. ed., Manchester: Manchester
University Press, (1997), 3 and 80-128 and R. Hiscocks, The Security Council-A Study
inAdolescence, London: Longman, (1973), 51-81.
IS The actual language of the resolution may be relevant, and the use of phrases
such as 'recommends' or 'decides', or of specific mention of Article 25 itself may be
taken into account.
16 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia [1971], I.C.J. Rep. 16. See R. Higgins, 'The Advisory
Opinion on Namibia: which UN resolutions are binding under Article 25 of the
Charter?', 21 International Comparative Law Quarterly, (1972), 270-86, and S.
D.Bailey and S. Daws, The Procedure of the United Nations Security Council, (3rd
Ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1998), 4 and 263-273.
67
The capacity of the Security Council to order the use of armed force is provided
for in Chapter VII of the Charter. The failure of states to conclude agreements
under Article 43 has meant that the express provisions of Article 42 regarding the
'taking of action by land, sea and air forces' proved inoperable during the cold
war.17 But this did not prevent the adoption of enforcement measure by the
Security Council in accordance with what were presumably determined to be
implied powers under Chapter VII in general, and Article 39 in particular. In
effect, the failure to implement the obligatory arrangements envisaged in Article
43 was circumvented by a 'recommendation' to all the individual members."
The first occasion when the Security Council adopted military sanctions
was in the case of the North Korean invasion of the South in 1950. This was
especially significant for Ireland as it occurred before membership took place, and
it was not anticipated in the debates preceding the application for admission in
1946. The Security Council quickly found a breach of the peace, and called for
the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces.
This call was also ignored and was backed up by the Council recommending
military action against North Korea." The Council called on all members to
refrain from rendering any assistance to North Korea and it recommended that
members furnish such assistance to South Korea 'as may be necessary to repel the
armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. ,20
The Secretary-General wanted some form of central control of this force,
but this was unacceptable to the United States." Instead, Resolution 84 (1950)
was adopted and this 'recommended that all members providing military
forces ...make such force available to a unified command under the United
States. ,22 The use of the UN flag was also authorised. The action was explained
17 N.D. White, op. cit, 117.
18 R. Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Organs of the
United Nations, London: Oxford University Press, (1963), 227.
19 S/1501, Resolution 83 of27 June 1950.
20 Ibid. See also White, op. cit., pp.l06 and 121-122; and D.W. Bowett, op.cit.,
29-31.
21 T. Lie, In the Cause of Peace, New York: Macmillan, (1954), 334.
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as coming under Article 39 of the Charter on the basis that in the absence of
agreements made under Article 43, the Council could not 'decide' upon military
action within the terms of Article 42, but could call on states to volunteer help."
This arrangement seems to come within the implied powers of the Council, but it
involved a degree of delegation to a single member state never envisaged under
the Charter. Furthermore, those volunteering forces were given carte blanche to
pursue their own agenda with little or no accountability to the UN or the
international community as a whole. Resolution 84(1950) appeared to go further
than just delegation, in effect it abdicated responsibility to the United States,
which supplied ninety per cent of the forces.24 Although the force was obliged to
make regular reports to the Security Council, the United States exercised effective
command and control.
Military sanctions were again invoked in response to the Rhodesian
cnses in 1965.25 On that occasion the Security Council ultimately adopted
Resolution 221(1965) after the United Kingdom had sought clarification and
further authorisation to implement an earlier resolution which had called upon
states to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, to refrain from the
supply of military aid, and to impose and embargo on oil and petroleum
products.f Resolution 221(1965) called upon 'the Government of the United
Kingdom to prevent by the use of force if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels
reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia'." This contained
stronger language than that of the Korean resolution, but the objectives were
limited and the measures were considered to be in the nature of a
22 7 July 1950. See OJ. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, (5th.
ed.), London: Sweet and Maxwell, (1998), 951-955.
23 White, op. cit. p.l21-122. For an analysis of Articles 39,42 and 43, see L.
Goodrich, E. Hambro and A. Simmons, op. cit., pp. 293-302, and 314-326; and B.
Simma,op. cit., pp.605-616 and 628-639.
24 Ibid.
2S See A. James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, London: Macmillan,
(1990), 177.
26 Resolution 217(1965). See D. J. Harris, op. cit., 887
27 Resolution 221(1965), para. 5.
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recommendation.f The exact parameters and circumstances where the use of
force might be resorted to were not set down. But it was clear that it was to be
used only if necessary, and then to prevent oil supplies arriving at the port of
Beira. Ultimately, it was the United Kingdom that would decide if force was
appropriate. The delegation of such decisions to a single state authorised to use
force that was otherwise unlawful, was not envisaged in the Charter. Although
very different than the situation in the Gulf conflict, the precedent of bestowing
such power and discretion on a state or group of states authorised to act on behalf
of the international community was followed in more dramatic fashion after the
invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
The Gulf conflict 1990/91
Arising from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, both economic and military
sanctions were imposed on Iraq. The situation thus created had the affect of
opening up the debate in Ireland regarding the obligations arising from
membership of the UN.29 As in the case of Korea, the United States determined
that it was necessary to have the backing of the Security Council in order to make
any military operation acceptable to the international community. On the day of
the actual invasion, the Council adopted Resolution 660(1990), determining the
existence of a breach of international peace and security." When there was
apparently no response to this, the Council adopted a further resolution which,
inter alia, and acting under Chapter VII, called upon all states, including non
members of the UN, 'to act in strict accordance with the provisions of the present
28 N. D. White, op. cit., 107.
29 See L. Heffernan & A. Whelan, 'Ireland, the United Nations and the Gulf
Conflict: Legal Aspects', 3 (3) Irish Studies in International Affairs, (1991), 115-145,
esp. 128-137.
30 2 August 1990. See International Legal Materials (1990), 1325. Purporting
to act under Article 39 and 40, it condemned the invasion, demanded the unconditional
and immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces, and called upon the two states to commence
intensive negotiations' for a resolution of their differences. See also Kuwait Airways
Corporation v. Iraq Airways Co. [2001] 1 Lt. L.Rep. 161 at 202 - 204.
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resolution. ,31 Wide rangmg economic embargoes in all but humanitarian
circumstances were imposed. The significance of this for Ireland was that it was a
decision of the Security Council that constituted a legally binding obligation. In
addition to the economic sanctions, all states were called upon to take appropriate
measures to protect assets of the legitimate government of Kuwait and its
agencies, and not to recognise any regime established by Iraq. Later resolutions
were of a similar vein and when states co-operating with Kuwait and deploying
maritime forces in the area concluded that the measures required the use of force
in order to enforce sanctions, Resolution 665(1990) was adopted. This permitted
them to 'use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may
be necessary. ,32
The somewhat ambiguous terminology of Resolution 665(1990) did not
lend itself to precise interpretation. This ambiguity was even more apparent in the
text of Resolution 678( 1990) that provided the authority for launching 'Operation
Desert Storm'. This authorised military action in the following terms:
The Security Council, ... acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations,
1. demands that Iraq comply fully with Resolution 660(1990) and all subsequent
relevant resolutions and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow
Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;
2. authorises Member States co-operating with the government of Kuwait, unless
Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph
one above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and
implement Security Council Resolution 660(1990) and all subsequent relevant
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;
3. request all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in
pursuance of paragraph 2 of this resolution;
31 Resolution 661, 6 August 1990.
32 Resolution 665, 25 August 1990.
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4. requests the States concerned to keep the Council regularly informed on the
progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this
resolution;
5. decides to remain seized of the matter."
The authorisation for states to 'use all necessary means' to implement
the UN objective would appear to be based on Article 39 of the Charter and on a
general reading of Chapter VII.34 The actual wording of the resolution is
remarkably vague in this respect. Paragraph 2 is addressed to any member state
co-operating with the government of Kuwait, without calling on states to do so or
outlining what such 'co-operation' actually entailed. As in the case of the Korean
crisis, Articles 42 and 43 were circumvented by the formulation of a request and
recommendation. In contrast to Resolution 84(1950),35 although some measure of
unified command is implied, there is no mention of a UN force nor is the
multinational volunteer force placed under United States command. The
authorisation to use all necessary means is a typical UN euphemism for the use of
force. Despite this, it is still not clear what it means in practice, and whether an
individual state or group of states, as opposed to the Security Council, can decide
on the measure of force deemed appropriate. While any action must respect
international law, including international humanitarian law and international
norms for the conduct of military operations, there seemed to be no other
constraints set down. A great deal of authority seems to have been delegated to
very few to act on behalf of the international community in a way that required
little or no accountability. One of the consequences of the language used was that
it led to uncertainty regarding the UN objectives under the resolution. A more
detailed resolution with clearer aims and objectives, setting down definite
33 Resolution 678, 29 November 1990. See generally 1. Johnstone, Aftermath of
the Gulf War: An Assessment of UN Action, International Peace Academy, Occasional
Paper Series, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, (1994), esp. 10 and 43-45.
34 For a discussion of Chapter VII and Article 39, see generally L. Goodrich, E.
Hambro and A. Simmons, op. cit., 290-353 esp. 293-302, and B. Simma, op. cit., 605-
678.
3S Adopted 7 July 1950.
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parameters for the use of force, and clarifying the nature and extent of United
States command, would have been preferable.
Two objectives can be discerned from the resolution; in the first place to
uphold and implement Resolution 660(1990) and all subsequent relevant
resolutions; and, secondly, to restore international peace and security in the
region. There are clear limitations to the former i.e. the legitimising of the use of
force to achieve the specific objective of securing an Iraqi withdrawal from all of
Kuwait. In contrast, the latter objective of restoring international peace and
security in the region is extremely vague and open to different interpretations.
Did it mean the removal by forceful means of the regime in Iraq, or intervention
on behalf of the Kurds in the north, or 'Marsh Arabs' in the south of Iraq, and
what were the precise geographical limitations of the 'region'? These questions
remain unanswered, but objectives could have been created on the pretence that
they were consistent with the overall mandate. In December 1998, the United
States and Great Britain launched air strikes against selected targets in Iraq as a
result of what they perceived to be Iraqi intransigence on disarmament. One of
the main legal justifications put forward was based on the continuing validity of
Resolution 678 (1990), in particular the mandate to restore 'international peace
and security to the area.'36 The February 2001 air strikes were also justified on a
similar imprecise basis."
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution are also significant elements of the
overall package. The subsequent execution of operation 'Desert Storm' raised
serious questions about the role of the Security Council in the initiation and
control of enforcement action. The request to keep the Council informed and the
decision that it shall remain seized of the matter seemed to count for little in the
commencement and conduct of the operation. This is a matter of serious concern,
as the Charter does not provide for the authorisation and then abdication of
36 D. A. Leurdijk and R.C.R. Siekmann, 'The Legal Basis for Military Action
Against Iraq,' 4 (3-4) International Peacekeeping (Kluwer), (January-April 1998), 71-
76; and Statement by the President, the White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
December 16, 1998 and Press Remarks on Military Attack on Iraq by Secretary of State,
December 17, 1998, US Department of State. Both press statements are more
remarkable for their lack of precise legal justification.
37 See M. White and R. Norton-Taylor, 'Doubts over Iraq air strikes', The
Guardian, 19February 2001.
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responsibility for enforcement action. It is the most important of the powers
possessed by the Council, and it has been said that the rights and powers in
respect of the use of force should be exercised with circumspection."
The effective hegemony of the five permanent members of the Security
Council is sufficient to cause disquiet among member states and prompt calls for
reform.39 But having authorised the use of force, if it was not actually necessary
under international law, it was at the least desirable that the Security Council
remain seized of the matter and that it be seen to be so by the international
community. Member states have entrusted what amounts to an oligarchy
comprising the permanent members of the Security Council with the authority and
power to authorise sanctions and military action. A corresponding responsibility
rests with the Council not only to specify the nature and extent of the use of force
permitted, but also to ensure that those tasked with this responsibility do not
exceed the objectives and parameters for the use offorce.
As Ireland fell outside the category of states actively 'co-operating with
Kuwait' under the terms of Resolution 678(1990), it was requested to provide
'appropriate support' for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2. It
would appear from an analysis of the resolution that military action was not
mandatory. In this regard it is similar to the decisive resolutions in respect of
Korea and Southern Rhodesia in that a significant measure of discretion was left
in the hands of members addressed directly under the resolution. It is more
difficult to classify the legal character of resolutions that are permissive in contrast
to mandatory, as states are licensed rather than obliged to take military action. In
any event, it does seem that non-belligerent states are not under a legal obligation
to provide the 'appropriate support' requested and some commentators have said
that Ireland was not in fact obliged to take or refrain from any particular course of
action.4o Nevertheless, there was an onus on all states to consider the request, and
38 I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, (1963), 335.
39 See statement by Mr. Dick Spring, Tanaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) and
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland during the general debate at the forty-ninth
session of the General Assemble, Press Release, Permanent Mission of Ireland to the
UN, 24 September 1994 and The Irish Times, 29 September 1994.
40 Heffernan andWhelan, op. cit., 126.
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in the case of states members of the UN, there was an additional obligation to
exercise its discretion in a manner compatible with that membership.
The question of immediate concern to Ireland was what constituted
'appropriate support' and did the terms of Resolution 678(1990) impose any legal
obligations on Ireland? Ireland was requested to afford landing and over flight
facilities to United States aircraft on route to the Gulf region. As a member of the
UN, Ireland is obliged to take cognisance of Article 49 of the Charter, which
provides that members 'shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out
the measure decided by the Security Council.t'" While it may be argued that the
wording suggests that this obligation exists only in respect of decisions, as
opposed to recommendations of the Security Council, Article 2(5) may be
invoked to solicit support for UN measures which members are not strictly
speaking legally bound by Charter provisions to support." This provides that all
members will give every assistance to the UN in any action taken in accordance
with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which
the UN is taking preventive or enforcement action. Arising from this
commitment and the vagueness of Resolution 678(1990), it is difficult to
determine what appropriate support Ireland should have rendered in the
circumstances. At the very least it was obliged to refrain from actions that might
frustrate or impede action taken on the basis of a Security Council resolution. In
the event, Ireland acceded to the request, and stopover and refuelling facilities
were provided. If Ireland had refused these facilities, could that have been
construed as frustrating or impeding military action by the multinational force and
indirectly that of the Security Council?
In can be argued that a refusal to facilitate the stop-over flights as
requested would have been a violation of Article 2(5) of the Charter. However, it
is worth asking if Ireland would have been bound to facilitate the stopover flights
even if not a member of the UN? The relevant paragraph of Resolution
678( 1990) was addressed to all states, not just member states, and Article 2(6) of
the Charter provides that the Organization will ensure that states which are not
41 L. Goodrich, E. Hambro and A. Simmons, op. cit., 337-340 and B. Simma,
op. cit., pp. 656-658.
42 Ibid. 58 and 129-130 respectively.
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members act in accordance with the principles so far as may be necessary for the
maintenance of international peace and security.f In this way, it may be argued
that the obligations for non-belligerent states arising from the Gulf Conflict did
not arise by virtue of UN membership alone. The request to all states is a
reminder of the general obligations arising from Article 2(6) and the obligation
under general intemationallaw not to recognise a situation of illegality."
One of the reasons for objecting to facilitating the stopover flights was
that it involved Irish participation, however indirect, in a 'war' and that it was
incompatible with the policy of military neutrality.f Such an argument fails to
take into account that Irish involvement arose from membership of an
international organization and that enforcement action is taken on behalf of the
international community. In this way it is a unique multilateral response to acts of
aggression contrary to the Charter and the issue of neutrality simply does not
arise. Membership of the UN precludes any other option and renders the classical
neutral stance redundant. This is not to ignore the political and military realities of
UN enforcement action in the Gulf conflict, and the perception in the countries of
the developing South that it was a United States operation motivated by the
economic and strategic interests of a few powerful Western states." In addition,
Resolution 678(1990) left a large degree of discretion in the hands of the United
States and others in regard to the course of action adopted, and this was later
exploited by the United States and Great Britain to give a dubious legitimacy to
the December 1998 bombing of Iraq.47 In such situations, national self-interest
43 Ibid. 58-60, and 131-139 respectively.
44 See generally the Advisory Opinion on Namibia, op. cit.
4S See the reported statements by politicians in The Irish Times, 16 and 19
January 1991. With regard to whether Article 28.3 of the Constitution should bind the
state to a policy of neutrality, the Report of the Constitution Review Group stated that
neutrality has 'always been a policy as distinct from a fundamental law or principle, and
the Review Group sees no reason to propose a change in this position,' Report of the
Constitution Review Group, May 1996, Dublin: Government Publications, 93.
46 E. Childers(ed.), Challenges to the United Nations, London: St. Martins Press,
(1994), 8-9.
47 For some general background on the subsequent debates in the Security
Council, see S. D. Bailey and S. Daws, op. cit., 31-34 and 58-60. See also D. A.
Leurdijk and R.C.R. Siekmann, op. cit., 71-76; and Statement by the President, the
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was bound to playa significant role. Had the action in the Gulf been taken on the
basis of self defence, Ireland's options would have been different, and no
obligation to facilitate the multinational force would have arisen under
international law or the UN Charter.
Ireland's role during the 1990/91 Gulf conflict.
As stated, the policy adopted by Ireland and the role played in facilitating United
States forces on route to the Gulf region during the conflict there became a source
of public controversy. Most of this controversy related to whether the provision
by the State of landing and refuelling facilities for United States military
personnel constituted participation in a war within the meaning of Article 28.3.1
of the Constitution." This and related issues arose for consideration in an
application before the High Court, an action which was ultimately overtaken by
events and not pursued. The issues raised are nevertheless worthy of some
consideration.
Article 28.3.1 of Bunreacht na hEireann provides:
War shall not be declared and the State shall not participate in any war
save with the assent of'Dail Eireann.
While Resolution 660(1990) expressly invoked Articles 39 and 40 of the
Charter, all other resolutions relating to the Gulf conflict were adopted pursuant to
Chapter VII, which includes both Article 51 relating to the right of individual and
collective self defence against armed attack, and Article 42 relating to
enforcement action by air, land and sea forces. With regard to action taken
pursuant to Article 42, the implication is that the Security Council will take
responsibility for those forces at its disposal, under Article 43 or otherwise.
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, December 16, 1998 and Press Remarks on
Military Attack on Iraq by Secretary of State, December 17, 1998, US Department of
State.
48 For a discussion of the legal framework governing war and armed conflict in
the United Kingdom, see Lord Hailsham ofSt. Marylebone (ed.), Halsbury's Laws of
England. (4th ed.), Vol. 49, London: Butterworths, (1984), 'War and Armed Conflict',
13-76.
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However, the reference to member states co-operating with the government of
Kuwait implies the collective defence of Kuwait against armed attack. The
principal member states involved were the United States, Great Britain and
France. If deemed to be acting under collective self defence, those states would
perceive themselves as being free to respond to the operational situation as it
unfolded until such time as the Security Council could order appropriate
measures.i" A more benign interpretation is that the Security Council was relying
on the totality of its powers under Chapter VII, both expressed and implied. The
difference could have been of significance to the outcome of the action before the
Irish High Court.
In the action entitled 0 'Neill v. An Taoiseach, the applicant sought, inter
alia, a declaration that the provision of facilities requested by the UN under
Resolution 678 (1990) for the UN coalition states led by the United States
amounted to participation in war within the meaning of Article 28.3.1 and
required prior Dail consent. so A further declaration was sought to the effect that
the State's provision of such facilities for the Gulf conflict constituted a voluntary
rather than mandatory obligation on the State, having regard to the provisions of
the UN Charter and the adherence of the State thereto and membership thereof,
and having regard to the provisions of the Constitution. This latter issue has
already been discussed, but an assessment of the nature of the conflict in the Gulf
is crucial to answering the former.
The applicant also sought a declaration that the 'necessary means'
authorised to be taken by member states co-operating with the Kuwaiti
government in accordance with Resolution 678( 1990) could not be construed as
individual or collective self-defence within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN
Charterr" Even if this were to be conceded, it was argued that the exercise of
such a right had been superseded and made redundant by the measures taken
49 For an analysis of this and related issues see N. D. White and U.Ulgen, op. cit.
50 Plenary Summons 1991No. 637P issued January 16, 1991. The plaintiff was
reported to be Ms. Lucia 0Neill, a Workers Party councillor, see the Irish Independent,
17 January 1991.
51 Ibid. See also G. Humphreys and C. Craven,Military Law in Ireland, Dublin:
Round Hall Sweet and Maxwell, (1997), 308-310.
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pursuant to the previous resolutions, which imposed and economic embargo on
Iraq. In any event, it was further argued that any such right of individual or
collective self-defence would not extend to the threatened war between the UN
coalition forces and Iraq, by reason of a breach of the principle of
proportionality, which would prohibit the State from participating therein.
The applicant further sought a declaration that the provisions of
Resolution 678(1990), even if they did constitute a mandatory obligation on the
State, had not yet become operative to empower member states to embark upon
the proposed armed conflict as a necessary means to uphold and implement
Resolution 660(1990) and all subsequent resolutions, and to restore
international peace and security in the area, given the absence of a decision of
the Security Council that the measures provided for in Article 41 of the Charter,
and resolved upon in the later economic sanctions, had proved inadequate
within the meaning of Article 42.52 It appeared to be the contention that this,
therefore, would prohibit the State's participation. As a part of this, the
plaintiff sought a declaration that the Security Council had not, either in fact or
in accordance with its jurisdiction under the Charter, considered the measures
provided for would be inadequate.
The case would have provided an interesting determination of the issues
raised, especially if it had ended in the Supreme Court, which would almost
certainly have transpired had the case proceeded as planned. An injunction to
prevent the State's co-operation with the UN coalition forces without prior
approval of the Dail was the ultimate objective of the action. The halt in the
United States led advance twenty-four hours after the commencement of ground
operations rendered the application for an injunction academic, and the case was
not pursued. Nevertheless, the issues raised were significant and worthy of
deliberation. Had the application been successful on any grounds, it would have
been very embarrassing for the government of the day, but it would also have
forced an honest and open debate and constitutional referendum on the issue or
issues at the centre of the debate regarding Irish membership to the UN. The
prospect of an Irish Supreme Court decision to the effect that the Security Council
had not acted in accordance with the Charter in authorising military action is an
79
interesting vista. Of much greater relevance to Ireland was the issue whether
facilitating United States forces on route to the Gulf amounted to participation in a
war within the meaning of Article 28.3.1 of the Constitution. At first the
government appeared to rely on some vague obligation under international law,
but later declared that the decision to facilitate the coalition forces was based on
an assessment that the measures involved did not amount to 'participation in
war.,53
The conflict in the Gulf was not an ordinary armed conflict arising from
a dispute between states. The Security Council had imposed almost total
economic sanctions and authorised states co-operating with Kuwait to use all
necessary measures to expel Iraq from Kuwait and to restore international peace
and security. 54 Furthermore, it had requested all states to support such action. It
was a UN sanctioned military action by land, sea and air forces under the Charter
and therefore within the parameters of international law. For this reason the
United Kingdom denied it was engaged in a war with Iraq and contended it was in
fact 'participating in an enforcement action on behalf of the UN pursuant to a
Security Council resolution' .55 While this may have seemed like a practical
nonsense to some, it is submitted that it reflected a correct statement of the legal
situation and the irrelevancy of the concept of war under contemporary
international law.
Before a decision could be made that Ireland participate in any war,
there are constitutional imperatives to be followed. In a dualist constitutional
system not unlike Ireland, it has been argued, citing Article 1.8 (11) of the United
States Constitution, 'that any enforcement action decided upon by the Security
Council must be treated in United States law as if it were nothing but an invitation
to go to war, requiring a traditional declaration of acceptance by Congress'. 56
52 Ibid.
S3 404a Dail Debates, (633-771, at 646),18 January 1991, and The Irish Times,
19 January 1991.
54 Resolution 678, op. cit, p.4.
55 Statement by the Lord Chancellors department, quoted in S. Singleton in
'''War'' in the Gulf, Netherlands International Law Journal, 141 (1991), 87.
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Some commentators appeared to fail to appreciate the full significance of a dualist
legal system when considering obligations arising from international treaties. The
debate over the issue of domestic 'war powers' in conflicts of this nature and
within a dualist system like the United States, has been described as irrelevant.57It
is said to be contrary to common sense to accept that there is a constitutional
requirement to obtain approval from a national legislature before complying with
a Security Council resolution as this would make what was intended to be a
legally binding decision a mere obligation to seek domestic approval or
permission to comply.
This argument is flawed and while it may have some application with
regard to action under Article 42 and pursuant to agreements under Article 43, it
does not apply to situation such as arose in the Gulf conflict. The terms of the UN
Participation Act suggest that the United States Congress, in approving a special
agreement under Article 43, would thereby prospectively approve uses of that
force that would not require subsequent re-approval, thus giving the Security
Council relative freedom to use the military resources made available to it.58
However, no agreements have been concluded pursuant to Article 43 and the
action initiated in response to the Gulf crisis was ad hoc and vague in crucial
respects.
Furthermore, it is easy to underestimate the consequence of a dualist
system, which Ireland and the United States share. The existence of a right or
obligation in international law does not automatically give rise to a corresponding
right or obligation in municipal law. This position is accepted by other
commentators and it has been said that the 'language [of] the UN Charter ...c1early
illustrates the neutrality of its obligations with respect to the internal distribution
of the war making power,.59In relation to the Korean conflict it was said that: 'UN
56 T. M. Frank and F. Patel, 'UN police action in lieu of war: the old order
changeth', 85 American Journal 0/ International Law, (1991), 63-74, 64. See also B.
Roth, 'Whatever Happened to Sovereignty? Reflections on International Law
Methodology', C. Ku and T. Weiss, Toward Understanding Global Governance,
ACUNS Reports and Papers (1998), No.2, 69-108 esp. 89-93.
57 Ibid. 64.
58 M. Glennon, 'The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter', 85American Journal of International Law, (1991),74-88,86.
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resolutions ... justified American military action under international law, [but]
they could not serve as a substitute for the congressional authorisation required in
national law by the Constitution'i'" Glennon, in response to other commentators,
expresses it thus:
A hortatory resolution of the Council, or one authorising the use of force
but not requiring it, can have no effect on the US domestic system of
reallocating constitutionally assigned power; that a right exists under
international law...says nothing about whether a power exists under
domestic law to exercise that right. The allocation of domestic power is
directed by the Constitution, not by international Iaw/"
In this way, it is a consequence of dualism that international law and municipal
law can ask in their separate spheres of application entirely different questions. In
this regard Article 29.6 of the Irish Constitution sets out in clear terms what the
position is:
No international agreement shall be part of the domestic law of the State
save as may be determined by the Oireachtas [legislature].
This provision distinguishes clearly between international and municipal law and
on a number of occasions the Supreme Court has rejected the contention that
certain domestic laws were unconstitutional on the basis that they were in
contravention of, inter alia, the European Convention on the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.62 In this way, the UN Charter, as an
international treaty, is not part of Irish municipal law and therefore it is not
recognised in the Irish courts. Even if it was incorporated into Irish domestic law
Note, 'Congress, the President and the power to commit forces to combat,' 81
Harvard Law Review, (1968), 1771-1805, at 1800.
59
60 A. Schlisinger, The Imperial Presidency, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, (1973),
134.
61 Glennon, op. cit., 81.
62 See for example re 0 Laighleis [1960] Irish Reports 93; the decision was later
expressly approved by the Supreme Court in Application of Woods [1970] I.R. 154,
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as has occurred in respect of other international agreements, it still has the status
only of ordinary legislation. The result of this then is that if the proposed action is
such that it involves participation in war and requires Dail approval in accordance
with Article 29.3.1. of the Constitution, then any international instrument or
obligation may not be invoked to dispense with this constitutional requirement.
Nor would there seem to be a way around this obligation by pleading
Ireland's commitment to general principles of international law enshrined in
Article 29.3 of the Constitution, which declares the State 'accepts the generally
recognised principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations
with other States'. This is more than an aspirational principle and in Saorstat and
Continental Steamship Co. v. De Las Morenas'" the Supreme Court treated it as
importing such generally recognised principles into Irish domestic law. These
principles do not constitute an immutable code, they are capable of change in
accordance with modification in the practice of states." The precise status of this
article has never been expressly adjudicated upon and it is still unclear whether
the generally recognised principles of international law are imported into the legal
system at the constitutional level, or at a lower level." If they have constitutional
status, they could not be abrogated by statute and a constitutional amendment
would be required. The issue is currently the subject of conflicting opinions. In
State (Sumers Jennings) v. Furlongs66 Henchy J. said (p.l90):
...section 3 of Article 29 of the Constitution was not enacted, and is not
to be interpreted in these courts, as a statement of the absolute restriction
of the legislative powers of the State by the generally recognised
principles of international law. As the Irish version makes clear, the
where reliance on the UN Declaration on Human Rights was ruled out on similar
grounds. See also Norris v. the Attorney General [1984] Irish Reports 36.
63 [1945] Irish Reports 291.
64 Supreme Court decision in Government of Canada v. Employment Appeals
Tribunal [1982] Irish Law Reports Monthly 325.
65 Casey,op. cit., 159. Customary international law was traditional regarded as
part of the common law, The Paquete Habana 175 US 677 (1900); West Rand Central
Mining Co. Ltd. v. The King [1905] 2 KB 391.
66 [1966]Irish Reports. 183 .
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section merely provides that Ireland accepts the generally recognised
principles of international law as a guide ......I would respectfully adopt
the dictum of Davitt P. in the 0 Laighleis case (at page 103): 'Where
there is an irreconcilable conflict between a domestic statute and the
general principles of international law or the provisions of an
international convention, the courts administering the domestic law must
give effect to the statute.
A different view of the law was put forward by three members of the
Anglo-Irish Law Enforcement Commission, which reported in 1974.67 The view
of the members concerned, though not in any way establishing a precedent, is of
some persuasive authority. If it were accepted that Article 29.3 gives
constitutional status to the generally recognised principles of international law,
this would have significant implications for the UN Charter in Irish law. It could
then be argued that state practice and near universal adherence to the Charter
created an obligation under customary international law to contribute to UN
collective security arrangements incorporated into Irish constitutional and
domestic law under Article 29.3. Even if UN obligations were given constitutional
status, then they must not be interpreted in isolation, but construed in a manner
that harmonises with other parts.68 However, the few authorities that do exist do
not support this argument, and other express provisions cast doubt on this thesis.
In particular, Article 29.6 makes it clear that an international agreement can be
incorporated into the domestic law of the State only by decision of the Oireachtas
(legislature). This is normally done by legislation, though a strict reading of
Article 29.6 indicates that a simple resolution is all that is necessary." Even more
significantly, the existence of State obligations at an international level cannot
preclude the necessity of complying with Article 28.3.1 regarding the necessity to
67 Report of the Law Enforcement Commission, (1974; Prl. 3832)
68 See Dillane v. Ireland, Supreme Court unrep. 31 July 1980; State (DPP) v.
Walsh [1981] Irish Reports 412.
69 Casey, op.cit., 160.
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obtain Dail assent to declare or to participate in a war, where necessary, in order
to fulfil them.70
The Gulf Conflict did not involve the dispatch of Irish troops to the
region, and there appeared to be a consensus that the provision of troops in any
capacity would have amounted to participation and thus required Dail approval in
accordance with Article 28.3.1 of the Constitution. Even though the conflict in
the Gulf did not constitute a 'war' in the sense understood under international law,
it was accepted as being such for the purposes of Article 28.3.1. In this way the
constitutional provisions are somewhat out of date and an amendment to Article
28.3.1 to incorporate 'war or other armed conflict' would be more appropriate." It
would clarify the issue somewhat and prevent the government from agreeing to
participate in an external conflict that did not come under the more restrictive and
outmoded meaning of war under international law. The difference highlights the
apparently contradictory views of the nature of the conflict under domestic and
international law. Though the aim may be the same, the two systems have
different concerns. The sole concern of Article 28.3.1 is to prevent Irish
involvement in war or international hostilities without the prior approval of the
Dail, The lawfulness or otherwise of the conflict, though crucial to international
law, is not a matter of direct concern under this Article.
There are in fact two matters to be determined in relation to this issue.
The first is what constitutes 'war' for the purposes of Article 28.3.1, and when
this is clarified, what constitutes participation for the same purposes." Although
there was no express determination to the effect that the test for what constitutes
war or participation in war under Bunreacht na hEireann is different than that
which might be employed by the UN, statements at the time indicate that this was
the accepted view of Irish parliamentarians. Unfortunately, there was no
70 Heffernan and Whelan, op. cit., 131.
71 Report of the Constitution Review Group, op. cit., 93.
72 On the concept of war, see Lord McNair and A. D.Watts, The Legal Effects of
War, (4th ed.), 1966; I. Brownlie, op. cit; L. C. Green, The Contemporary Law of
Armed Conflict, Manchester, 1993; C. Greenwood, 'The Concept of War in Modern
International Law,' 36 International and Comparative Legal Quarterly, 1987, 283. See
also M.N. Shaw, International Law, (4th ed.), Cambridge, 1997, 777-823, DJ. Harris,
op. cit, pp.817-907 and Lauterpacht, Oppenheims International Law, Vol. II, Disputes
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agreement on the crucial issue of what this test should be. The then Taoiseach,
Mr. Haughey, was of the view that the question was one of 'substance and
degree' .73 The parties to the left wished to adhere to the old law of neutrality, but
strict adherence to this concept in the context of a UN enforcement mission does
not seem apposite." In any event, it is difficult to accept the government's view
as expressed by Mr. Haughey, at face value. The provision of over flight and
refuelling facilities was a significant act during the conflict, and under the
classical rules on neutrality during war, it would have constituted a breach. But a
breach did not automatically mean a neutral state became a belligerent, there too a
sliding scale of substance and degree was employed.
The debate regarding participation became somewhat academic after the
resolution passed by Dail Eireann on 18 January 1991, though it still left the
issues of what constitutes participation unanswered. In a resolution proposed by
Mr. Haughey, Dail Eireann noted the agreement of UN member states to carry out
Security Council decisions, and expressed its regret that military force had
become unavoidable to secure compliance with such decisions. It also noted
Iraq's flouting of the relevant resolutions, and expressed the hope that the duration
and casualties of the conflict would be kept to a minimum, and that diplomatic
efforts would continue to try to ensure a diplomatic settlement and the restoration
of Kuwait's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The crucial
element in the resolution was the third paragraph:
At this critical time, Dail Eireann declares its full support for the
decisions of the Security Council and notes that Resolution 678, inter
alia 'requests all states to provide appropriate support for the actions
undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of the Resolution."
War and Neutrality, (7th ed,) Longmans, 1955.
73 See 404a Dail Debates (645), 18 January 1991, and The Irish Times, 19
January 1991.
74 See Lauterpacht, op. cit., 647, and 652-657.
7S 404a Dail Debates (636), 18 January 1991, and the Irish Times, 19 January
1991.
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This is an unambiguous statement of approval and support for the decisions of the
Security Council. It has been argued that while a declaration of support for an
obligation imposed in international law might constitute approval in municipal
law of measures taken to comply with that obligation, a declaration in respect of
what is in international law merely an authorisation to act in a certain fashion
(otherwise unlawful) need not have the same effect." There were no caveats or
reservations expressed, and the Dail resolution acknowledged with regret that the
use of military force had become unavoidable to ensure compliance with such
decisions. To argue that the resolution was not what it plainly purports to be
seems absurd.
The implications of the Crotty judgement for membership of the UN.
The decision in the Crotty case,77 and in the later case of McGimpsey v. Ireiand,78
which concerned the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, casts serious doubt over the
compatibility of Irish membership of the UN and Article 29.4.1 of the
Constitution. Article 29.4.1 provides:
The executive power of the State in or in connection with its external
relations shall ... be exercised by or on the authority of the Government.
This involves the concept of the separation of powers and there is sometimes
tension between the judicial arm of government and the government itself. This
tension was evident in the Crotty case, but in the end the fundamental rule of
government, the supremacy of the Constitution as interpreted and enforced by the
Courts, was upheld." While it may be argued that the obligations of UN
membership were indeed less onerous than has been anticipated when Ireland first
76 Whelan and Heffernan, op.cit., 137.
77 [1987] Irish Reports 713; [1987] Irish Law Reports Monthly 400.
78 High Court (1989) Irish Law Reports Monthly 209; Supreme Court [1990]
Irish Reports 110.
D.W. Morgan, Constitutional Law of Ireland, (2nd. ed.), Round Hall Press,
Dublin, 1990, 264.
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applied for membership, other developments took place that had not been
foreseen and the Security Council as the principal organ of the UN still retained
significant powers within the framework of the Charter. This was one of the
issues that must be considered when examining the obligations imposed on
Ireland by membership. Under Irish law it is possible to challenge the
constitutionality of Ireland's binding signature or ratification of an international
treaty once valid grounds exist for such a course of action, while at the same time
the courts have indicated that they do not wish to usurp or interfere with the
government's power and discretion in the conduct of foreign policy and
international relations. This is evidenced by their reluctance to review, ex post
facto, the exercise of the government's treaty making powers. Barrington 1.
expressed this as follows: 'if there is any area in which judicial restraint is
necessary, this is it' .80 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court decision in the Crotty
case demonstrated little or no such restraint when it made what is arguably one of
its most significant and controversial decisions to date, especially in the context of
Ireland's international relations and relations with the European Community.
Crotty argued that without a constitutional amendment, which required a
referendum by the people of Ireland, the State lacked power to ratify the Single
European Act. The Single European Act was an amendment to the European
Community treaties and consisted of a Preamble and four Titles, of which the
most important were Titles 11 and Ill. Title 11 amended the existing European
treaties in a number of ways, while Title 111 introduced a new system of co-
operation in the field of foreign policy.
As the Single European Act did involve a charge on public funds, it was
formally approved by the Dail in accordance with Article 29.5.2 of the
Constitution in December 1986.81 In accordance with the requirements of a
dualist legal system, the European Communities (Amendment) Act, 1986, was
enacted in order to make the Single European Act, though not Title III thereof,
part of the domestic law of Ireland.82 Just as the government was about to deposit
80 McGimpsey v. Ireland, High Court, [1989] Irish Law Reports Monthly 209 at
220.
81 370 osu Debates, (2365-2370) 10December 1986.
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the instrument of ratification with the Italian government, the plaintiff applied
successfully for and interlocutory injunction to prevent ratification taking place.
The matter eventually came before the Supreme Court, which rejected the
plaintiffs claim insofar as it asserted the constitutional invalidity of the European
Communities (Amendment) Act, 1986. However, the Court upheld his claim that
Title 111 could not be amended without a referendum and subsequent
constitutional amendment taking place. Needless to say the country and the
European Community as a whole, were taken aback by the judgement, the legal
niceties of which were probably not understood by many outside Ireland. The
shock to the body politic was evidenced in the statements in the course of the Dail
debates on the subsequent Tenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill 1987. The
then Taoiseach, Mr. Haughey said; ' ...the judgements in so far as they affect the
boundaries between executive and judicial areas of responsibility have caused
widespread surprise. ,83 The leader of the Labour Party, Mr. Spring commented
that:
...the judgements of the majority of the Supreme Court in the Crotty case
have exploded our traditional understanding [of Article 29.4.1] ...' and
later ' ...the decision establishes a new summit in judicial activism .....The
traditional view of the Constitution whereby external relations were a
matter for the Government subject to the supervision of the Dail can no
longer pass muster.l"
In order to determine the full significance of the judgement, it is worth examining
briefly the content of Title III of the Single European Act. This provided, inter
alia, that European Community member states 'shall endeavour jointly to
formulate and implement a European foreign policy' (Article 30.1). It called for
information and consultation on foreign policy matters of general interest, and for
due consideration of the desirability of adopting and implementing common
See G. W. Hogan, 'The Supreme Court and the Single European Act', 21 Irish
Jurist, (1987), 55-70.
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83 371 osn Debates, (2195), 22 Apri11987.
84 Ibid. at 2240 and 2248.
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European positions on such matters. In order to improve methods for reaching
and formulating common positions and joint action, members states were to
' ..ensure that common principles and objectives are gradually developed and
defined'(Artic1e 30.2(c». The Act also provided for the establishment of a
permanent secretariat to support the arrangements for this formalised system of
European political co-operation.
In the opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court, the Constitution
enshrined full sovereignty in foreign affairs, and in the conduct of those affairs the
government of the day was bound to respect this principle." In this way, the
government lacked authority to qualify or restrict that sovereignty in the manner
envisaged by Title 111 and the State could not ratify the Single European Act
without a constitutional amendment. The Court did not accept the argument that
Title 111 did little more than formalise existing arrangements, it was a binding
international treaty which was not static in its terms, and which went beyond
existing arrangements/" In addressing the issue as to whether the courts could
interfere with the government's power to enter into international treaties or
agreements, the majority of the court was of the view that intervention was
permissible on account of the courts function in upholding the primacy of the
Constitution.V It is not surprising then, that the majority of the Constitution
Review Group was in favour of inserting a specific clause dealing with the State's
85 Walsh, Henchy and Hederman JJ. emphasised Articles I and 5. Article 1
provides: 'The Irish nation hereby affirms its inalienable, indefeasible, and sovereign
right to choose its own form of Government, to determine its relations with other
nations, ...'. Article 5 provides: 'Ireland is a sovereign, independent and democratic
state.'
86 Finlay C.J. and Griffin J., in their dissenting judgements, denied that Title 111
required the State to cede any sovereignty or national interest in the conduct of foreign
policy, or give other Member states a right of veto on Irish foreign policy decisions.
Emphasis was place on the word 'endeavour', and it was their view that nothing ruled
out arrangements, formal or otherwise, for foreign policy consultation and discussion.
87 The Court distinguished an earlier decision in Boland v. An Taoiseacb [1974]
Irish Reports 338, where the SupremeCourt had refused to grant an injunctionrestraining
the executive from implementingthe SunningdaleAgreement of 1974, the ratio being that
it was not an agreement or treaty, but merely a declaration of policy and hence not
restrainable.
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membership of the UN.88 As well as having a certain symbolic value, it would
remove any uncertainty concerning the validity oflrish membership.
Conclusion.
The Crotty decision had far reaching political consequences, but its potential
significance for Irish membership of the UN is of most concern here. A later
challenge to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 on the basis of the Crotty
judgement failed. The decision of the Supreme Court in McGimpsey v. Ire/ancP
has delimited the significance of the Crotty judgement somewhat, but the former
decision was based, inter alia, on narrow grounds to the effect that the Anglo-
Irish Agreement of 1985 did not unconstitutionally fetter the executive in the
conduct of international relations." The Court found that the analogy drawn
between the Agreement and the Single European Act was misconceived on the
grounds that the latter could oblige the government in conducting foreign policy
to subordinate the States national interests to those of other member states.
The McGimpsey judgement is nonetheless important in the context of
any discussion of Ireland's membership of any supranational body like the UN.91
One of the main arguments was based on the fact that the Agreement established
an Intergovernmental Conference and Secretariat and committed each State to
make 'determined efforts ...through the Conference ...to resolve any differences, on
matters relating to Northern Ireland.' It was contented, based on the Crotty
judgement, that such an obligation fettered the power of the Irish government to
regulate its own external/foreign affairs and therefore contravened Article 29.4.1.
However, Barrington 1. distinguished Crotty and found against the plaintiff. The
following extract from his judgement has particular relevance for Irish
membership of the UN.
88 Report of the Constitution Review Group, op. cit., 113.
89 [1989] Irish Law Reports Monthly 209.
[1990] 1 Irish Reports 110; [1989] Irish Law Reports Monthly 209.90
91 For a definition of the term supranational, see H. G. Schemers and N. M.
Blokker, International Institutional Law, The Hague: Martinuus Nijhoff, (3nd ed. 1995),
60-65.
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We are not dealing in [McGimpsey] with a multilateral treaty conferring
powers on supranational authorities. We are dealing with a bilateral
treaty between two sovereign governments. The clear implication of
Article 29, Section 5 is that the State is entitled to enter into international
agreements. This means that the State may commit itself to deal with
some aspect of foreign policy in such a way rather than another. But this
is something quite different from purporting to transfer the conduct of
foreign policy of the State to some supranational authority .....
...Article [2 of the Agreement] also provides that:
'There is no derogation from sovereignty of either the Irish Government
or the United Kingdom Government, and each retains responsibility for
the decisions and administration of government within its own
jurisdiction. '
Under these circumstances it appeared to me that the present case is
totally different from the Crotty case and that it does not involve any
constitutional fettering of the executive powers of government.'"
In the Crotty case, the plaintiff argued successfully that since Article
29.4 vests the government with the power to conduct foreign affairs, it is not open
to the State to fetter the Government's authority by a treaty which would oblige it
to make foreign policy with a greater measure of co-operation with the other
states members of the European Community. The implications of the Crotty and
McGimpsey judgements remain far-reaching. While the McGimpsey decision did
delimit the implications of Crotty judgement to some extent, this is of no avail to
those who would argue that Ireland's membership of the UN is a result of general
treaty making powers, rather that a commitment to a 'multilateral treaty
conferring powers on supranational authorities.' Despite the ratio in McGimpsey,
there is nothing in the Crotty judgement that limits its implications to such
'supranational bodies.' Nor can the reasoning and import of the majority
judgement in Crotty be limited to the unique nature of the Single European Act,
though it would have been preferable if such had been the case. The better view
92 Ibid. at 227. The High Court decision was continned by the Supreme Court,
on substantially the same grounds, on 1 March 1990.
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is to consider the Anglo-Irish Agreement as an international agreement that,
unlike the Single European Act, did not fetter the sovereignty of the State in
external or foreign policy. Doubt has now been cast over the government's
general treaty making powers, and this includes multilateral agreements such as
membership of the UN.
The matter is complicated by the change in the Security Council's role in
the maintenance of international peace and security from that envisaged when
Ireland applied for membership in 1946, in particular the adoption of a
decentralised military option by the Council instead of a more centralised system
conceived in the Charter.r' The fact remains that Article 25 of the Charter
provides that members accept and agree to carry out the decisions of the Security
Council. This may range from the imposition of economic sanctions under
Article 41, to the potential to order military action under Article 42. It is difficult
to anticipate the consequences of a challenge to membership of the UN after over
forty years of active participation at every level in the Organization. The foreign
policy co-operation which was the determiner of the judgement in Crotty falls
very far short of the binding commitments entailed by accession to the UN.
Though the presumption of constitutionality applies to the State's foreign policy,
as it does to all acts of the executive, none of the other provisions would seem to
avail a court or government in avoiding reaching a conclusion that continued
membership is inconsistent with the Constitution." What then is the situation
if a successful action is taken on constitutional grounds against membership of the
UN? It is worth noting that in one case the Supreme Court invalidated a measure
of domestic law based on an international agreement previously ratified by Ireland
but not properly adopted in accordance with certain constitutional provisiona." In
this context the terms of Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties are relevant. This allows a state to invoke a breach of its internal law
regarding competence to conclude treaties in order to avoid treaty obligations only
where the violation is manifest and concerns a rule of internal law of fundamental
93 N. D. White and O. Ulgen, op. cit., 2.
94 See Heffernan and Whelan, op. cit., 140-145.
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importance. Is a violation that has existed for over forty years 'manifest', even if
it does concern an intemallaw of fundamental importance? Most likely not.
In the meantime the State remains bound by the Charter, and the
question must be asked if a referendum should be put to the people of Ireland to
determine the issue? From the point of view of a government, to do so might be
seen as a relinquishment or surrender of its pivotal role in what would be referred
to as essentially a political question in the United States. Nevertheless, there have
been a number of referenda in recent years and it is likely that there will be more
in the near future. Moreover, Ireland's ongoing commitment to UN peace support
operations now has a constitutional question mark hanging over it. This is in
addition to the political and other legal complications arising from such
participation and outlined elsewhere." At a time when Ireland has taken a seat on
the Security Council, it would be prudent to have this issue put to referendum at
the next available opportunity. 97 This would remove any doubt regarding
Ireland's membership of the UN, while at the same time reaffirming its
commitment to the ideals the Organization embodies.
9S The State (Gilliland) v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison [1987] Irish Reports
201; [1987] Irish Law Reports Monthly 287.
96 See Chapter 2, and Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.
97 See the statement by the General Secretary of the Department of Foreign
Affairs regarding Ireland's campaign to gain a seat on the Security Council reported in
The Irish Times, 29 October 1998,p.9.
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Chapter 4
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MUNICIPAL LEGAL BASIS
FOR CANADIAN AND IRISH PARTICIPATION IN UN FORCES.
Introduction
This Chapter explores the municipal legal bases for Irish and Canadian
participation in UN operations. It aims to examine, inter alia, the laws
governing the decision to participate in such operations, and further issues
concerning the status under municipal law of members of the respective armed
forces. In the next chapter, the issue of command and control of national
contingents participating in international UN forces and related topics is
explored. Canada and Ireland share a long tradition of involvement in
peacekeeping operations. Although Canada is a larger and more influential
country than Ireland, both states share a 'middle power' political image on the
world stage. Since 1971, participation in peacekeeping has been identified as
an integral and important part of Canada's defence policy. The legal system of
each country is significantly different, and the municipal legal basis for
participation in peacekeeping and related operations reflects this. Despite this,
on analysis, the aim and effect of different provisions contained in the two
respective legislative frameworks can be the same. In Ireland, the Defence
Acts, 1954 to 1998 govern the operation and organisation of the Defence
Forces. The operation of the Canadian Armed Forces is governed by a
legislative enactment called the National Defence Act, which came into force
in 1950 and is revised from time to time.
In Ireland, the Constitution of 1937 is the primary source of law and
all acts or statutes enacted must be consistent with its provisions. Unlike
Ireland, which is a unitary state, Canada is a country organised on a federal
basis with areas of responsibility assigned to the federal or provincial
governments in its Constitution.' Section 91 of Canada's Constitution Act
1 Lt. Col. K. Carter, 'The LegalBasis of Canada's participationin UnitedNations
operations',l (4) International Peacekeeping (Kluwer),(1994),116-118.
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gives the federal government exclusive authority over 'militia, military and
naval service, and defence' .2
At first glance, the most striking similarity between the legislative
framework governing the respective armed forces of Canada and Ireland is that
in both jurisdictions there is no mention of the aims of defence or security
policy, or the actual mission of the armed forces themselves. This has more to
do with history than any other reason. Canada, a former British colony like
Ireland, had a series of Militia Acts to govern the establishment and
maintenance of the armed forces. Neither country has any real military
tradition, and both states are relatively new members of the international club
of recognised states. This is a politically expedient way to conduct defence
matters, as each government can determine the priorities and mission of the
state's armed forces. The problem with this, despite the fact that Canada and
Ireland have well established and strong democratic institutions, is that it
allows the ruling party of the day more discretion than is necessary in a
parliamentary democracy. It also reduces the parliamentary control exercised
over the armed forces. While it is true to state there is no serious threat to
democratic institutions in either state, the maximum parliamentary control over
all elements of defence and security issues is the hallmark of a healthy
democracy. One of the many controversial issues surrounding the formation of
a European Rapid Deployment Force and Irish participation, is the that of
democratic control. Just who or what will command or control the force is not
yet clear.'
There does not appear to be any definition of the term defence in any
of the relevant legislation in either jurisdiction either, and one must look to
Irish and Canadian government policy statements to determine what is included
in the term. These are usually found in Canadian federal government 'White
Papers', which are published from time to time, and parliamentary debates. Up
2 Section 91, The Constitution Act, 1867, (The British North America Act,
1867),30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3.
J. Eya1, 'Democratic accountability key to success of European defence
force', The Irish Times, 21 November 2000,16.
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to recently, Ireland had a much less clear defence policy than that of Canada.
This has now changed with the publication of a government White Paper on
Defence and other reports." Prior to this, reference had to be made to Dail
[Irish Parliament] debates and ministerial statements to determine, as best one
could, what the policy was.
Despite the different juridical basis for participation in UN operations,
the decision whether of not to participate in either the traditional peacekeeping
operation or the more pro-active enforcement action missions of recent years, is
an executive decision in both countries. Given the similar parliamentary
democracy system prevailing in Canada and Ireland, the most important
practical consideration is whether the party or parties in government have a
sufficient majority in the parliament or Dail to ensure support for the proposal.
Approval for matters of this nature is usually a foregone conclusion, though it
would be necessary for the relevant Minister to acquaint himself or herself with
the background information to avoid appearing uninformed during debate.
Under the Defence (Amendment) (No.2) Act, 1960, the Dail must approve the
sending of troops abroad when the numbers exceed twelve.i In practice this
means that approval is required in almost all situations. On the other hand, in
Canada, there appears to be no constitutional requirement to have the decision
reviewed by the legislature, but the unwritten rules embodied in certain
'constitutional practices', require that the parliament be consulted on the
matter." The actual decision to participate is made by the Governor in
Council, which is the executive arm of the government. The Governor in
Council is formed by the Governor General, the Queen's representative in
Canada, whose role in such decisions is procedural rather than substantive.
When Ireland was first admitted as a member of the UN in 1955, the
government of the day did not consider that any enabling legislation was
required to allow Ireland to participate in all UN activities and meet the
4 See Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence, Dublin, (February,
2000), and Department of Defence, Defence Forces Annual Report, Dublin, (1999).
5 Section 2, Defence (Amendment)(No. 2) Act, 1960.
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obligations which membership entailed.I In the United Kingdom, on the other
hand, the United Nations Act, 1946 had been passed in order to give effect to
certain provisions of the UN Charter. This Act, however, referred specifically
to Article 41 of the Charter (relating to measures not involving the use of
armed force) and to decisions taken by the Security Council only. 8 Since the
Supreme Court decision in Crotty v An Taoiseach ' serious doubt has been cast
on the constitutionality of Ireland's commitments under the Charter."
However, similar issues are unlikely to arise in the context of participation in
UN forces at present as these are undertaken on a voluntary basis.
Nonetheless, other serious constitutional issues do arise regarding the
command and arrest of Irish troops abroad by members of an international UN
force who are not Irish citizens. II These issues could also arise in the context
6 Carter, op. cit. (n. 1).
When he was questioned by Mr. de Valera on the need to pass legislation
due to the acceptance ofIreland's application for membership, he replied that so far as
he knew ' ... ratification is not necessary nor is any legislation required'. The
obligations, he said, were now less onerous than had been anticipated in 1946 and any
military commitments under the Charter were 'entirely within our own control'. Dail
Debates, 153 (1601-1608), 15 December 1955. This was a reference to Article 43 of
the UN Charter which relates to the use of armed force, see Goodrich, Hambro and
Simons, Charter of the United Nations,(3rd. ed.), New York: Columbia University
Press, (1969), 317-326, and B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations - A
Commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1995), 636-639. For a comprehensive
discussion of the obligations of Irish membership of the UN see L. Heffernan and A.
Whelan, 'Ireland, The United Nations and the Gulf Conflict: Legal Aspects'. 3 (3)
Irish Studies in International Affairs, (1991), 115-145.
Section 1 (1) of the United Nations Act, 1946 states:
'If, under Article forty-one of the Charter ..... (being the Article which related
to measures not involving the use of armed force) the Security Council of the United
Nations call upon His Majesty's Government ... to apply any measures to give effect to
any decision of that Council. His Majesty may by Order in Council make such
provision as appears to Him necessary or expedient for enabling those measures to be
effectively applied ..... '
For a discussion on the legal status of British armed forces and related issues, see P.
Rowe, Defence - The Legal Implications, London: Brassey's, (1987).
[1987] Irish Reports 713. See J. Casey, Constitutional Law and Ireland, (3nd.
ed.) Dublin: Round Hall Sweet and Maxwell, (2000), 214-218.
10 Supra., Chapter 3.
11 Infra., Chapter 5.
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of Irish participation in European Union security arrangements or peacekeeping
operations in the future.
In the course of the Dail Debate on the Defence Amendment (No.2)
Act, 1960, which was intended to be the permanent statutory basis for Irish
participation in UN peacekeeping, deputies expressed reservations about
certain provisions of the Act. In particular, Section 2 appeared to give the
government more discretion than was required in determining the extent of
Irish participation.F In the event, the Act was passed with little controversy and
to date no serious problems have arisen regarding its implementation. This is
not to say that potential problems do not exist in relation to Defence Forces
involvement in UN forces, whether of a peacekeeping character or otherwise.
There are also problems in relation to the arrest and taking into
custody of members of the Defence Forces and the Canadian Forces when
carried out by international military police that are not part of either the Irish
nor the Canadian contingent respectively.l'' This situation is exacerbated in
respect of Defence Forces personnel by the fact that the command structure for
UNIFIL itself has not been formally established and no Force Regulations have
been issued to date. The official UN policy is that the delegation of command
within UNIFIL is in accordance with the normal military custom as applicable
to integrated command and does not require further elaboration." This
contrasts with the arrangements for other UN peacekeeping forces. In practice,
reliance is placed on the standing operating procedures and Force Commander
directives for UNIFIL, the legal basis of which is questionable, and reference is
also made to the Regulations governing the peacekeeping force in Cyprus.IS
None of these issues was addressed in the Defence (Amendment) Act, 1993,or
the more recent 1998 Act. The 1993 Act was passed to allow the Defence
12 Infra.
13 Infra.
Personal interview, UN Secretariat member, July 1990, Lebanon and infra.,
Chapter 5.
14
IS Ibid.
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Forces to participate in an international UN Force that is not simply of a police
or peacekeeping nature, and effectively permits the participation of Defence
Forces personnel in any kind of UN military operation."
Municipal legal basis for Canadian and Irish participation in
peacekeeping
The possibility of Canadian involvement in a major war during the 1930's was
uppermost in the minds of politicians when the then Prime Minister, Mackenzie
King, was responding to a question put regarding Canada's future role in the
event of a war in Europe. The policy of the government, he declared, is that
Parliament will decide what is to be done.!7 However, this declared policy was
not reflected in the provisions of the National Defence Act, which came into
force in Canada in 1950. The Act does not require that Parliament give its
formal approval or consent to the despatch of Canadian Forces on service
abroad, whether in a UN or other capacity. Under Section 31 of the Act, the
Governor in Council has power to place the Canadian Forces on active service,
a status that is usually conferred on troops involved in armed conflict. Despite
the fact that there is no specific legal requirement, there is a parliamentary
tradition in existence since 1950 for the government to reaffirm that Canadian
Forces are on 'active service' for specific UN, NATO and other operations
involving substantial numbers of troops when such missions are considered
potentially hazardous. IS The concept of 'active service' and its legal
implications under Canadian military law is confusing. The contemporary
legal purpose and effect of this status is unclear, and in this regard the National
Defence Act is in need of clarification."
16 For background see supra., Chapter 2.
17 House ofCommons(Canada), Debates, Vo1.111(1938),3183.
18 Carter,op. cit. (n. 1).
19 Infra.
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The tradition of informing Parliament arose from a decision by Prime
Minister Louis St. Laurent during 1950 while debating the National Defence
Act in the course of the Korean crisis. An undertaking was given that,
henceforth, whenever significant numbers of members of the Canadian Forces
were to be deployed outside Canada, the decision would be announced in the
House of Commons and an enabling order in Council would be tabled.
However, under the National Defence Act, a Governor in Council (Cabinet)
decision is all that is lawfully required to place the Canadian Forces on 'active
service'. Furthermore, an examination of the relevant legislation indicates that
Canadian Forces are not actually required to be placed on 'active service' to
participate in an operation. If Canadian Forces are placed on 'active service'
while Parliament is not sitting, Parliament must meet within ten days to
consider the Governor in Council decision. It is not surprising then that there is
a significant amount of confusion in Canada in relation to deployment outside
Canada and the concept of 'active service'. This was most recently evident
during preparations for participation in the so-called Gulf War, when the
requirement to recall Parliament became a matter of some controversy. In spite
of the absence of a strict legal or constitutional requirement, Parliament was
recalled as a result of what could best be described as political necessity owing
to public disquiet at how the matter was being handled.2o
Before the enactment of the Defence Act, 1954, the statutory basis of
the Irish Defence Forces was the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act,
1923. Amendments to this act were passed annually, until repealed and
replaced by the 1954 Act. In 1956, the question of amending the 1954 Act to
allow for an Irish contribution to the UN Emergency Force was mentioned by
the Taoiseach of the day, Mr. de Valera. In a reply to a question in the Seanad
(Senate) about the possibility ofIreland contributing troops to the Force, Mr de
Valera stated, inter alia, that:
20 Personal interview, senior Canadian diplomat in the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, 27 June 1998; and D.L Bland, Chiefs of
Defence-Government and the Unified Control of the Armed Forces, Toronto: Brown
Book Company, (1995), 203.
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the situation is new. We were not asked or requested to contribute,
nor was it suggested that we should .... .It is perhaps something that
should be considered, although if we felt morally obliged to make an
offer of volunteers, it would be necessary to have an amendment to the
law. That is not a very serious matter .... I think it would be necessary
to amend the Defence Forces Act [sic] before we could send any
troops."
However, as Ireland was not asked to contribute troops to the Force, the
question lost its urgency until 1960.
When Ireland was requested to contribute a contingent to serve as part
of an international UN force in the Congo on 14 July 1960, the question of the
legality of sending such a 'force' abroad for duty of this nature was considered
and new legislation was introduced into the Dail on 19 July, 1960. According
to the long title of the Defence (Amendment) Act, 1960, it was passed to
authorise the despatch of contingents of the army for service outside the State
with international UN forces for the performance of duties of a police character
and other related matters. In more specific terms, it was passed as a temporary
measure in order to enable the government to accede to Mr. Hammarskjold's
request to make a contingent of Irish soldiers available to go to the Congo.22
This statute was later repealed by Section 7 of the Defence (Amendment)(No.
2) Act, 1960, which was intended as the permanent legislation to authorise,
subject to the previous approval of Dail Eireann in certain circumstances, the
despatch of contingents of the Permanent Defence Force for service outside the
21 SeanadDebates 46, (1045 and 1154), 21 November 1956. It is interesting to
compare Mr. de Valera's statement that 'there is, in fact, no obligation on any member
(of the V.N.) to contribute to this police force (the V.N.E.F.), but there may be perhaps
considerations of humanity and a desire to contribute to the maintenance of peace ... '
with that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Fitzgerald, and Minister for Defence,
Mr. Donegan, seventeen years later. Dr. Fitzgerald stated that Ireland's decision to
contribute troops to the second U.N.E.F. in 1973 was fulfilling 'an obligation and one
that we recognize to be such'. Mr. Donegan stated that 'after consideration of the
request (for Ireland to contribute troops to the V.N.E.F.) it was decided that, in order
that our international obligations be met and our high reputation preserved, the request
should be complied with'. Dail Debates 268 (824 and 816), 30 October 1973.
22 Dan Debates 185 (774-781), 7 December 1960.
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State with international forces established by the Security Councilor the
General Assembly, for the performance of duties of a police character.r' There
is no definition in the Act of what constitutes such duties, presumably it was
intended to distinguish between what are now often termed traditional
peacekeeping duties, and enforcement action missions pursuant to Article 42 of
the UN Charter." In any event, the Minister for Defence declined to elaborate
upon its meaning when given the opportunity in the course of the debate in the
Dail, This was, and remains, an unsatisfactory position, as there are no
definitive legal criteria within the municipal legislative framework to determine
such matters. The more recently formulated policy guidelines or criteria for
deciding whether or not to participate in peacekeeping or related activities are
useful.25 They do not, however, constitute legal criteria that might be used to
challenge a decision of the government to participate in a particular operation.
While no such legal challenge has ever been mounted, there is significant
public disquiet about security and defence issues in the context of European
integration, and the possibility of such a challenge cannot be ruled out in the
future.
When the Taoiseach was moving the second reading of the Defence
(Amendment)(No. 2) Bill, 1960 (in December of that year) he first placed the
measure against the wider background of Ireland's attitude and obligations as a
member of the UN.26 Although he pointed out that there was no agreement
23 The Act extended the service of certain members of the Defence Forces and
for those purposes amended the DefenceAct, 1954 in certain respects. It also provided
for the registration of certain births and deaths occurring outside the State and the
application of Section 11 of the Wills Act, 1837, and Wills (Soldiers and Sailors) Act,
1918.
24 See H. McCoubrey & N. White, The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of
United Nations Military Operations, Aldershot: Dartmouth, (1996), 11-37, and
Goodrich, Hambro & Simons, op. cit. 314-317.
25 See Infra. Chapter 2, and R. Murphy, 'Ireland, the United Nations and
Peacekeeping Operations', 5 (1) International Peacekeeping, (1998), 22-45, esp. 38-40
and White Paper on Defence, op. cit., 59-70.
26 Dail Debates 185, (774-781), 7 December 1960.
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among the so called 'big powers' on the implementation of the provisions of
Chapter VII of the Charter, he neglected to distinguish between enforcement
action pursuant to this Chapter and what was initially intended as a preventive
diplomacy mission in the Congo. However, he was careful not to claim that
Ireland was being called upon to fulfil a legally binding obligation under
Article 43, but that other more general provisions referred to indicated that
participation in the UN Force in the Congo, and by implication any similar
peacekeeping force, was required by the spirit of the Charter. This reflected
the view that participation in UN forces was one of the few methods by which
small nations like Ireland could come together to influence world events, and
the Taoiseach invoked Article 29 of Irish Constitution which solemnly affirms
Ireland's 'devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst
nations, founded on international justice and morality'. 27 The question of the
validity of such a laudable contention may well be posed, but the record of Irish
initiatives at the UN, and the participation in peacekeeping and other UN
activities since admission, has been significant. It was certainly out of
proportion to the relative size and importance or the country on the world
stage.28 In any event, much of the discussion that took place in the Dail
concerned the political situation in the Congo and the function of the Irish and
other UN troops there." At times it appeared to be forgotten by some that the
Bill was intended as permanent legislation to enable the Dail to agree to Irish
participation in any similar UN peacekeeping mission around the world.
Parliamentary control of Canadian and Irish participation in UN forces
According to the 1997 Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry (the
Commission), Canada has begun a new relationship with its armed forces that
27 nsn Debates 185, (777), 7 December 1960.
28 See Chapter 2, infra., and R. Murphy, op.cit., n.25.
29 For example, Deputies Browne and McQuillan in particular drew attention to
the political situation in the Congo and to the dangers of the U.N. imposing a partition
on the Congo similar to that in Ireland.
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arguably requires greater involvement by members of Parliament and
Canadians generally in the direction, control and supervision of Canadian
Forces.3o It also identified a need to strengthen the role of Parliament in the
development and scrutiny of defence policy. One of the prerequisites for the
control of the military and defence policy in any democracy is a vigilant
parliament. During the course of the cold war, defence policy in Canada was
largely determined by the perceived threat and alliance commitments of the era.
There was little systematic monitoring of defence policy and military matters
by parliament in general." Since 1989, Canada has increasingly been called
upon to engage in a wide range of UN sponsored operations in complex
situations involving uncertain alliances with unclear mandates and inadequate
resources. The Senate and House of Commons Special Joint Committee also
highlighted the issue of strengthening the role of parliament in the whole
process in 1994 when it reported that:
whatever our individual views on particular issues of defence policies
or operations, there was one matter on which we agreed almost from
the beginning - that there is a need to strengthen the role of Parliament
in the scrutiny and development of defence policy",
In Canada, the different government departments involved in
peacekeeping operations use a set of guidelines when determining whether
Canada should participate in a particular operation.P In 1996, an Irish
Government White Paper on Foreign Policy, and a later White Paper on
Defence, identified a number of factors that are taken in account when
30 Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, Vol. 5, 'The Need for a
Vigilant Parliament', p.l. Available at <http.www.dnd.ca/somalia/somaliae.htm>.
31 Ibid.
32 Parliament of Canada, Senate and House of Commons, Special Joint
Committee, Security in a Changing World, Report of the Special Joint Committee on
Canada's Defence Policy (October 25, 1994), 57.
33 E. Reumiller, 'Security in a New World Order: A Canadian Perspective' and
'Canadian Perspectives and Experiences with Peacekeeping: General Policy
Considerations' in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking/Peacekeeping: the Irish and
Canadian Experience, P. 0 Gormaile, and R. Murphy, The Association for Canadian
Irish Studies(ACSI), (1997), 15-22 and 23-36, and White Paper on Defence, op. cit.,
59-70.
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considering requests for Irish participation in peacekeeping or similar
operations." When compared, the political criteria adopted by both countries
are remarkably similar. Furthermore, in both countries experience shows that
these guidelines or criteria are not applied in any strict sense. The respective
governments of Canada and Ireland retain discretion to decide if the armed
forces should participate in a UN or similar operation. The guidelines do
provide a benchmark by which to examine each proposal and they also
facilitate parliamentary control, albeit limited, over the decision by government
whether or not to participate.
In Ireland, the power of the Dail to monitor and scrutinise defence
policy, in particular, participation in UN forces is quite limited. Under the
provisions of Section 2 of the Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1960, ('the
1960 Act'), the Dail must first approve by means of a resolution the despatch of
a contingent of armed members of the Permanent Defence Force exceeding
twelve in number for service outside the State as part of an international UN
Force. Section 2 states:
2 (1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, a contingent ... may be
despatched for service outside the State as part of a particular International United
Nations Force if, but only if, a resolution has been passed by Dail Eireann
approving of the despatch .....
(2) A contingent ... may be despatched for service outside the State ...
without a resolution approving of such despatch having been passed by Dail
Eireann, if, but only if
(a) that International United Nations Force is unarmed, or
(b) the contingent consists of not more than twelve members of the
Permanent Defence Force, .....
(c) the contingent is intended to replace, in whole or in part, or
reinforce a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force serving
outside the State as part of that International United Nations Force and
34 O. MacDonald, 'The Irish Peacekeeping Experience and its Influence on
Doctrine', 0 Gormaile and Murphy, op. cit. 44-57; and supra, Chapter 2.
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consisting of more than twelve members of the Permanent Defence
Force.
This allows the Dail to discuss in detail the implications of Irish
participation in any UN force prior to giving its approval. This Section was
discussed at length during the Dail Debate of the Bill and reservations were
expressed regarding its exact implications. In response, the Minister for
Defence, Mr. K. Boland, pointed out that it would not be possible to reinforce
an unarmed force, which did not require Dail approval, by a contingent such as
would be sent to an armed force under Subsection(2)(1). 35 However, once the
Dail had passed a resolution approving the despatch of an armed contingent of
over twelve personnel, then it must be left to the government to determine the
size of the contingent and the duration of its mission. Similarly, the
government could replace the original contingent as necessary for the duration
of the UN mission. In this way, the government could continue sending
contingents to the Congo for the next forty years without ever coming back to
the Dail for any authority or discussion.
It was not surprising then, that in the circumstances, certain Deputies
opposed some of the provisions contained in Section 2.36 They considered that
the Dail was entitled to have a discussion on the merits or otherwise of sending
and maintaining troops abroad on a regular basis. The political situation in the
Congo during the 1960's alone, and more recently in Somalia, show that events
can develop in such a way that the original mandate of a UN force would have
to be modified or changed as a result of subsequent developments. This could
bring about a situation in which the contingent going to replace the troops
originally sent out with Dail approval could find themselves in totally different
circumstances than originally envisaged and planned for. They could also find
that the original mandate was so modified to meet these changed circumstances
that it amounted to a new mandate altogether. In this way, Section 2 of the
1960 Act gave the government more discretion than was probably required.
3S Dail Debates 185, (1133-1134), 14 December 1960.
36 Ibid., (1139).
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This situation has since been changed somewhat and under Section 4 of The
Defence (Amendment) Act, 1993 the Minister is required to make an annual
report to the Dail on the operation of Section 2 of the 1960 Act, and the Dail
may by resolution approve of the report. This provision was prompted by an
opposition amendment to the original bill after a number of deputies had
expressed misgivings about the lack of parliamentary control over Irish
involvement in UN forces.37 In reality it amounts to a minimalist parliamentary
control mechanism with which to monitor the activities of government and the
defence forces in this area, but it does at least provide for some debate and it
requires that the Minister apprise the Dail of all relevant matters at least once a
year.
While it appears an exaggeration to suggest the government may send
the entire Defence Forces to form part of an international UN force, it would be
empowered under Section 2 of the 1960 Act to do so. This is not to suggest
that the Dail should control the day-to-day movements of the contingent
abroad, or its tactical deployment. Nonetheless, it is an essential element of a
parliamentary democracy that the government should have to obtain the
approval of Parliament before taking certain action. It is difficult to sustain
Deputy Lionel Booth's claim that debates on such issues should be avoided as
'ill informed debate might prove a considerable embarrassment to our troops'r"
In any event, public statements by politicians outside the Dail have, on
occasion, caused embarrassment and even danger for Irish troops serving with
UN peacekeeping forcea." The situation in Ireland contrasts with that in the
Netherlands, where Parliament exercises greater control and supervision over
its armed forces serving with the UN.40 The continued participation in UNIFIL
37 osu Debates 433, (310),29 June 1993, (689, 718 and 722), 30 June 1993.
38 nsn Debates 185, (1149-1152), 14December 1960.
39 See R. Murphy, 'Background to the 1980 At-Tiri Incident - A Personal
Assessment', An Cosantoir (1988), 38.
40 J.O. de Lange, 'Peacekeeping Operations of the UN and Public International
Law - Some Legal Aspects in the Netherlands'(1981) 28 Netherlands International Law
Review, 182-187. See also the Netherlands SupremeCourt judgment on the despatch of
108
of troops from the Netherlands was reassessed regularly. This may be one
reason why, unlike the Irish government, the government of the Netherlands
withdrew its contingent due to the lack of support UNIFIL received from
parties to the conflict. The Netherlands armed forces are not made available to
the UN without constant re-examination of their role and their indefinite
involvement in a peacekeeping operation may not be taken for granted."
The scope of the 1960 Act was confined to matters concerning the
contribution of an Irish contingent to a UN force established by the Security
Council, or the General Assembly, for the performance of duties of a police
character only. There is no elaboration in the Act on what these police duties
involve. The most likely purpose for its use was to distinguish between
'peacekeeping' and 'enforcement action'. The term could be construed as
somewhat misleading when some of the events in which the UN Force in the
Congo were involved, particularly in the Katanga Province, are taken into
account.42 The term also reflects the ambiguous and compromised role in
which UN forces can find themselves, and was epitomised by the UN
peacekeeping forces in Lebanon during the 1982 Israeli invasion.
The 1960 Act does not provide any definition of 'contingent' either."
It was probably considered more expedient at the time to omit such a
definition. In military terms it can denote anything from the usually less than
twelve Irish personnel that form the Irish Contingent with the UN Force in
Cyprus, to the six hundred or more fanning the Irish Contingent with UNIFIL.
troops to UNIFIL, The State of the Netherlands V. A.l. Toonon, Supreme Court, 8
February 1980, reported in the Netherlands Yearbook of Iniemational Law, (1981), 353-
356.
41 Ibid.
42 R. Higgins, The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 1960-1964,
London: Royal Instituteof InternationalAffairs, (1980) and E.W. Lefever, Crisis in the
Congo - A United Nations Force in Action, WashingtonDC: Brookings Institute, (1965),
72-121.
43 Defence Force Regulations CS7 governing 'A Contingent of the Permanent
Defence Force serving with an InternationalUnited Nations Force' states in Para 1 that
'the word "contingent"means a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force dispatched
pursuant to the provisions of the Defence (Amendment)(No. 2) Act, 1960, for service
outside the State with a Force'.
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The Defence (Amendment) Act, 1993 has amended and extended the
1960 Act in significant respects. The principle amendment is contained in
Section 1 which by defining an 'International United Nations Force' as an
international force or body established by the Security Councilor General
Assembly of the UN, goes beyond the previous definition contained in the 1960
Act which had limited Defence Force participation to UN peacekeeping
operations. This brought about a radical change in Irish defence and foreign
policy that was not reflected in the level of public or parliamentary debate at
the time. Although the Dail debate indicated that at least some did appreciate
the wider ramifications of the change in Irish municipal law, it seemed that the
Dail as a whole did not." It is unlikely that the new legislation would have had
such an uncontroversial passage but for the humanitarian considerations in
sending an Irish army transport unit to Somalia and the presence of Irish aid
workers in that country.
There is no equivalent provisron In the National Defence Act,
although Section 33 provides that all regular forces are at all times liable to
perform any lawful duty. This is a very broad provision that, inter alia, permits
deployment in accordance with government policy to any country outside
Canada. It reflects Canadian history of involvement in major conflicts outside
of Canada, as well as the present commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. Looked
at in isolation it might appear that there is little or no control by Parliament
over the deployment of Canadian Forces at home and abroad. When one
examines the provisions of the National Defence Act as a whole, in particular
those relating to the issue of command and control, it is evident that this is not
the case. In this way the issue of command and control of the Canadian and
Irish Forces is also intrinsically linked to the matter of parliamentary control,
and this is addressed later.45
A significant means of achieving greater parliamentary control in both
Canada and Ireland would be the setting up of a special parliamentary
44 Dail Debates 433, (309, 363, 376), 29 June 1993.
45 Infra., Chapter 5.
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committee made up exclusively of elected members of the Dail and the
Canadian Parliament respectively. Although joint committees are established
from time to time in Canada, there is no permanent standing committee
composed of elected parliamentarians dealing exclusively with security and
defence issues in either country. A parliamentary committee of this nature
could build up considerable expertise over time and parliament would not have
to rely exclusively upon ad hoc committees, or military and other experts for
their information. Since its establishment in Ireland, the Joint Oireachtas
Committee on Foreign Affairs has functioned well, despite the limitations of its
mandate. The Standing Committees on National Defence and Veterinary
Affairs in Canada has also performed a worthwhile function, but the
establishment of a permanent committee could significantly improve the
current situation.
The power and influence of the Parliament could also be significantly
enhanced by adopting one of the proposals of the Commission, namely,
enacting legislation requiring that Parliament receive notice of Canadian Forces
deployments, which in any important context would be expected to provoke a
debate in Parliament." This would include situations when it is proposed to
place Canadian Forces on 'active service', or even whenever the government
contemplates deploying any sizeable unit or other element of the Canadian
Forces outside Canada. In such circumstances, the Chief of Defence Staff
could be required to make a report to Parliament on the effectiveness and
readiness of the Canadian Forces not simply to deploy overseas, but to
undertake the proposed mission in all respects." This would avoid what the
Commission identified as one of the major deficiencies in the pre- deployment
phase of the Somalia mission. No one seemed prepared to say that the
Canadian Forces were not ready to undertake such a mission." Parliamentary
46 Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, op. cit., (n.30), 'TheNeed for
aVigilantParliament',Vol.5, p.4.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid. 'The Failure of SeniorLeaders', in the ExecutiveSummaryof the
Commission Report.
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supervision of this nature would ensure greater accountability and transparency
at all levels of decision making in defence and security matters. This would
avoid ill-considered decisions being taken without proper debate and
consideration of the full implications of a particular course of action.
The policy of sending volunteers on UN operations and the implications of
'active service' status"
From the Irish Defence Forces' point of view, Section 3 of the 1960 Act is the
most significant. Under this Section, all officers and men who are appointed or
enlisted on or after the date of the passing of the Act shall be liable to serve
outside the State with a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force. There is a
similar provision contained in Section 2 of the Defence (Amendment) Act,
1993. Wherever practicable, the Defence Forces have adhered to a policy of
sending volunteers on UN service. In certain circumstances, however, this is
not always possible. Itmay happen, for example, that there is a limited number
of army personnel suitably qualified to fill specific appointments in a
contingent. 50 At the time of the debate on this Section, Deputy Sherwin and
others did not consider that anyone should be compelled to serve overseas."
His primary fear that army recruiting might be seriously affected did not
materialise. Nor did the more far fetched scenario painted by Mr. Sherwin, of
soldiers with left wing political leanings deserting to the other side in an
49 For an overview of the legal and disciplinary implications of participation in
UN operations, see P. Rowe, 'Maintaining Discipline in United Nations Peace Support
Operations: The Legal Quagmire for Military Contingents', 5(1) Journal of Conflict
and Security Law, (2000), 45-62.
so At the time of writing (late 2000), there are a number of Irish engineer and
specialist staff with UNIFIL as on a non voluntary basis owing to short term
requirements arising from the Israeli pull out and UNIFIL redeployment. In October
1984, an army medical doctor instituted proceedings in the High Court to restrain the
Minister for Defence from sending him to the Lebanon as part of the Irish contingent
with UNIFIL. He claimed his health would be damaged by such service. His action
was unsuccessful and Mr. Justice McMahon was satisfied he should not grant an
injunction. The Irish Times, 26 October 1984.
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'ideological clash between Russia and the West', come to pass.52 In the event,
this Section of the 1960 Act did not receive very much attention in the debate
and it merely brought Irish military law on overseas service into line with that
of most other countries, including Canada. Nevertheless, it is an emotive
subject in Ireland. Recent debates on Irish participation in some form of
European defence commitment have often raised the spectre of Irish soldiers
being conscripted to serve in or alongside foreign armies. 53 In the course of the
debate on the Defence (Amendment) Act, 1993 the question of sending
volunteers on UN service was considered once again. 54 The Minister for
Defence pointed out, however, that in practice overseas missions are heavily
oversubscribed and the question of compulsory UN service did not arise."
This, of course, was true at the time, but it did not change the fact that
personnel joining the Defence Forces after July 1993 are liable for service with
a UN force of an unspecified nature.
The reality is now that the volunteer list for missions abroad is no
longer heavily oversubscribed, though a fresh intake of recruits, or the
instigation of regular recruiting to the Defence Forces could change this
situation relatively quickly. It was reported recently that it might prove
necessary to recruit civilian staff, in particular para-medics, for service with the
Irish battalion in Lebanon. This is due to a shortage of personnel with
specialised skills. 56 The Minister for Defence conjured up an even more drastic
scenario when he said that Ireland would withdraw from participation in
51 nsn Debates 185, (892-896), 7 December 1960.
52 Ibid.
53 Personal interviews with serving Defence Forces personnel, Dublin and
Galway, 1998. See also E. Horgan, 'Committing our troops to EU force clear breach
of neutrality', The Irish Times, 1November 2000, 16.
54 Dail Debates 433, (309 and 363),29 June 1993.
55 Ibid., (373). Towards the end of Irish participation in UNIFIL, it was often
difficult to find sufficient volunteers from the ranks of the Defence Forces due to
shortage in numbers, and a degree of exhaustionand boredomwith the mission.
56 The Irish Times, 11 May 1998.
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UNIFIL if the shortage of volunteers became chronic. 57 This statement,
without any indication by the Minister of his intention to address and resolve
the problem, is unacceptable for a Minister with responsibility for the Defence
Forces and defence policy. It shows no appreciation of the causes of this
problem, and a total unwillingness to accept any responsibility for the situation
brought about by years of neglect.
The Canadian Forces and the Irish Defence Forces consist of
volunteers. Both forces are organised and divided into a regular full time
professional force and a reserve force of part time volunteers. Under Section
33 of the National Defence Act, regular force members are liable to be
deployed at any time and anywhere. Members of regular forces have also been
placed on 'active service', which in the context of Canadian military law means
they can be immediately deployed. This is in contrast to Irish Forces, who are
deemed to be on 'active service' when deployed on UN duties abroad, and for
whom the term has radically different legal consequences, and political
connotations. Section 4 of the 1960 Act lays down that members of the
Defence Forces serving with armed UN Forces shall be deemed to be on active
service. This is a status usually deemed appropriate for troops participating in
some kind of offensive military operation or involved in actual armed conflict.
One of the effects of this section under Irish military law is that it confers
unlimited jurisdiction on a court-martial, convened for the trial of an offence
alleged to have been committed by a person subject to military law, while
serving outside Ireland with an armed International UN Force." Section 126 of
the Defence Act, 1954, is also important in this regard. It lists a number of
Statement by the Minister of Defence at the annual PDFORRA (soldiers
representative association) conference, reported in The Irish Times, 5 November 1998.
57
58 Section 3 of the Defence (Amendment)Act, 1993 applies the provisions of
Section 4 of the 1960 Act to Defence Force units participating on peace enforcement
missions. See the comments by Finlay, C.J., Ryan v. Ireland, The Attorney General
and the Minister for Defence [1989] Irish Reports. 177 at 182 and M.N. Gill,
'Development of the Military Jurisdiction of the Irish Defence Forces'. Revue de Droit
Penal Militaire et De Droit De La Guerre, (1980), 427-433. For example a soldier
cannot be tried by court martial for the offences of treason, murder, manslaughter,
treason felony. rape or buggery, unless he was on active service at the time of allegedly
committing the offence. (Section 192, DefenceAct 1954)
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offences more severely punishable on 'active service' than at other times. This
means that Irish soldiers with UN Forces are subject to a stricter military code
of discipline due to the severe punishments for certain breaches of military law
while on active service. 59 The Canadian position is different in significant
respects as under Section 31 of the National Defence Act, the Governor in
Council, in effect the cabinet in Canada, has power to place Canadian Forces
on 'active service'. The question of placing forces on 'active service' in this
way is considered important. This is reflected in the requirement that if placed
on 'active service' when Parliament is not sitting, Parliament must meet within
ten days to consider the Governor in Council decision/" Under Section 31,
Canadian Forces may be placed on 'active service' 'when advisable' by reason
of an emergency, for the defence of Canada; or for action taken under the UN
Charter, or NATO. However, unlike the situation prevailing in Ireland, the
National Defence Act is permissive rather than mandatory, and Canadian
Forces do not have to be placed on 'active service' to participate in a UN
sponsored operation. In fact, there appear to be no circumstances where it is a
requirement or prerequisite for a particular course of action.
In practice, a somewhat unusual situation prevails with regard to
Canadian Regular Forces in that they have been placed on 'active service' on
what amounts to a permanent basis." This renders the concept of 'active
59 One other aspect of military law affecting persons subject to it while on
overseas service that is worth mentioning is that relating to military detention. Soldiers
may be awarded short periods of detention (usually 7 or 14 days) by either their
CommandingOfficers or Courts-Martial if found guilty of an offence under military law
(see Section 178 and Sections 209 to 212 of the Defence Act, 1954). This is quite
common both at home and on overseas service. When a soldier is awarded this
punishment he forfeits his pay for the period of his detention. However. when a soldier
is on UN overseas service he not only forfeits his pay for the period of detentionbut also
his overseas allowances for the same period. This anomaly has never been challenged.
It is surely unjust to withhold payment of overseas allowances while a soldier serves a
period of detention while overseas as he continues to be overseas during the period in
question. This almost amounts to a doublepunishment for the one offence.
60 Section 32 of the National Defence Act states in part: 'Whenever the
Governor in Council places the Canadian Forces or any component or any unit thereof
on active service, if Parliament is then separated by an adjournment or progoration that
will not expire within ten days, a proclamation shall be issued for a meeting of
Parliament within ten days....'
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service' for Canadian Forces somewhat meaningless, both legally and
politically. This issue can cause confusion, and this was evident during the
'Gulf War' when at the beginning of the crisis many observers thought the
Parliament would have to be recalled to allow the Canadian Forces go on
'active service' .62 No one in the public service or in the Department of
National Defence seemed to understand how Canada should actually participate
in an offensive military operation or Parliament's role in the decision. The then
Prime Minister, Mulroney, wanted to avoid recalling Parliament for domestic
political reasons.f' The Clerk of the Privy Council tried to maintain that
Parliament's role was only customary and not required. The Chief of Defence
Staff, De Chastelain, said that the Prime Minister was not required to refer the
matter to Parliament." This statement, though legally correct, was probably
not a politically astute observation at the time. In the event, Parliament was
recalled.
The episode shows the confusion surrounding the law, and the status
and implications of 'active service' for Canadian Forces. Canadian military
personnel might well argue that current commitments to the UN and NATO
entail large numbers of Canadian Forces being deployed outside Canada at any
given time, and the permanent state of 'active service' is reflects this. However,
what is the point of 'active service' if it is a permanent status and a mere
administrative convenience? This situation is unsatisfactory. The matter could
be clarified by amending the National Defence Act and making it a statutory
requirement to place Canadian Forces on 'active service' for any operation
under the UN Charter, the NATO, the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, or any similar organisation. A further amendment could
also make it a statutory requirement to refer the matter to Parliament before any
such decision is made. This would clear up the semantic and legal confusion
61 Personal interview, JAG officer, Canadian Forces, Ottawa, 21 June 1998.
Reserve forces are not placed on active service, and a formal Order in Council is
required for any such forces to be placed on active service.
62 Bland, op. cit., 203.
63 Ibid.
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surrounding the matter, and enhance Parliamentary control over the Canadian
Forces, and in particular over their deployment outside Canada.
The policy in Ireland reflected in the statutory requirement to place
troops involved in UN operations on an 'active service' footing does have
merit. While involvement in peacekeeping and similar operations should not
be equated with armed conflict, the unpredictable and volatile environment in
which such operations often take place may require resort to the use of force in
certain circumstances, albeit in a restrained and defensive manner. The need to
maintain discipline is of the utmost importance in such sensitive situations.
The situation under Irish law of enshrining this in the legislative framework
governing participation has been vindicated by the nature of such operations
since 1960. In this way, the legal position of Irish troops is clearer than that of
Canadian Forces, whose status depends on practice rather than a precise legal
provision.
The practical significance for Irish troops of Section 4 of the 1960 Act
became evident in 1983 when a court-martial tried a soldier for the murder of
three comrades in Lebanon." Under the Defence Act, 1954, a court-martial
does not have jurisdiction in such cases unless the offence was committed
while on 'active service'. In this way, Section 4 of the Act conferred
jurisdiction on the court-martial to try Private McAleavy for the murders in
question. Under the National Defence Act, 'active service' has no such legal
significance. Nevertheless, a similar situation prevails with regard to Canadian
Forces who commit an offence under military law while outside Canada.
Under Section 130 of the National Defence Act all federal Acts are
incorporated into military law, and unlimited jurisdiction is granted to courts
64 Ibid.
65 Private McAleavy was found guilty of all three murders on 27 September,
1983. He was sentenced to penal servitude for life and was discharged from the
Permanent Defence Force with ignominy. (The Irish Times, 28 September 1983). The
decision was appealed to the Courts-Martial Appeals Court that confirmed the finding
and sentence of the Court-Martial.. The court consisted of the Chief Justice, Mr.
O'Higgins, Mr. Justice Barrington and Mr. Justice Lynch. The judgment was
unreported. See the Order of the Courts-Martial Appeals Court dated 29 March 1984,
and The Irish Times, 30 March 1984.
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martial in respect of offences committed outside of Canada. Furthermore,
there is a different scale of punishment for offences committed outside Canada.
Although the means by which the Canadian and the Irish legislation
achieve this result is different, the net effect of the respective sections is much
the same. There is one potentially important distinction. In theory, a Canadian
Forces member may find himself or herselfliable to a stricter military code for
offences committed outside Canada in a private capacity. There is no
requirement that the offence relate to or be associated with official duty or
service outside of Canada. This is in contrast with the code of discipline
governing Defence Forces members, who must be deemed to be on 'active
service' before Section 126 of the Defence Act can be invoked. There is no
similarity between 'active service' under military law and what is often tenned
'emergency legislation' provisions under civil law. Some might argue that
'active service' and combat situations require strict discipline and a somewhat
harsher code of military law. This has not been the experience of the United
States military in Vietnam or elsewhere, nor has it been the experience of
Canadian Porces/" Such situations do not justify the suspension of any of the
rights or duties of an accused under military law, and neither Canadian nor
Irish military law provide for any derogation.
Legality of the arrest of Irish and Canadian personnel forming part of
international forces
The question of placing of Irish and Canadian Forces personnel serving with
UNIFIL and other UN forces under arrest also raises serious constitutional
questions. Although the problems can arise in respect of any international UN
force, it is convenient to focus on UNIFIL as a prime example.f" The
Regulations applied to a number of forces have expressly provided for powers
66 Personal interview, JAG officer, Ottawa, 21 June 1998.
67 Although Canadian Forces do not participate in this force at present.
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of arrest to be exercised by UN military police personnel'". At the time of
writing, UNIFIL' s standing operating procedures governing duties and
responsibilities of military police purport to grant powers of arrest over any
member of the peacekeeping Force.69 Once taken into custody, the arrested
person must be transferred as soon as practicable to the custody of his or her
own national contingent. In addition, Paragraph 41 of the UNIFIL Status of
Force Agreement provides as follows:
The military police of UNIFIL shall have the power of arrest over the
military members of UNIFIL. Military personnel placed under arrest
outside their own contingent areas shall be transferred to their
contingent Commander for appropriate disciplinary action .....
This appears to grant a power of arrest over and above that conferred by the
military law ofa Participating State upon a member of its forces over another."
Sections 171 and 172 of the Defence Act, 1954, govern the powers of arrest of
members of the Defence Forces. These provisions specify those authorised to
place under arrest persons subject to military law and those listed do not
include military police serving with UN forces that are not themselves
members of the Defence Forces.7l Furthermore, they do not authorise arrests
by Defence Forces personnel of persons not subject to Irish military law, i.e.
members of other contingents with UNIFIL.
According to the Constitution, no citizen shall be deprived of his or her
personal liberty, save in accordance with law.72 Itwould appear that there is no
statutory or common law basis for authorising the UN military police to arrest
68 See Article 15 of the UNFICYP Regulations and UNEF Regulation 14.
69 Personal interview, Comdt P. Murphy, Deputy Provost Marshal UNIFIL MP
Company 1989/1990, Galway, June 1997.
70 Draper, op. cit. 71.
71 Section 171 provides inter alia, that a provost marshal, an officer or non
commissionedofficer or any person subject to military law who is so authorised by any
commandingofficer may arrest a person subject to military law.
Article 40.4.10 of the Constitutionprovides 'No citizen shall be deprived of his
personal liberty save in accordancewith law' .
72
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members of the Defence Forces. In fact, the matter was covered by the Chief
of Staffs directive to the Irish contingent and unit commanders with UNIFIL.73
This directive purported to authorise such powers of arrest by UNIFIL military
police as may be defined by, or on behalf of, the Force Commander." These
were outlined in the UNIFIL standing operating procedures dealing with the
duties and responsibilities of the military police. The issue is whether the
purported granting of authority to military police personnel belonging to other
contingents with UNIFIL is in accordance with Irish municipal law." It would
appear that the Chief of Staffs directive in relation to powers of arrest has no
basis in law. Furthermore, the Minister for Defence has no authority to direct
the Chief of Staff to issue such a directive for reasons already outlined.
Furthermore, Paragraph 41 of the UNIFIL Status of Force Agreement has
significant potential to bring about a conflict between UN military
arrangements and the national military law of contributing states. This is not a
situation unique to Irish or Canadian military forces.76
Sections 171 and 172 of the Defence Act, 1954, are quite specific in
relation to the arrest and placing in custody of persons subject to military law.
These sections have not been amended to take account of the situation created
by Defence Forces participation in UN forces. In the case of The People
(Attorney General) v 0 'Callaghan, the Irish Supreme Court reinforced an
earlier suggestion that Acts of the Oireachtas delimiting personal liberty would
be scrutinised on general constitutional principles rather than accepted as
automatically validating their contents as being in 'accordance with law'."
The policy of UNIFIL military police is to ensure that persons carrying out an
73 Personal interview, former Irish Contingent Commander UNIFIL, November
1989.
74 Ibid.
75 This should not be confused with the question whether members of the
Defence Forces in a foreign jurisdiction may be lawfully deprived of liberty in
accordance with the law of that jurisdiction, which is a separate circumstance not in
issue in this case.
76 SeeMcCoubrey and White, op. cit., 179-181.
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arrest are from the same contingent as those being arrested. However, it is not
always possible to implement this policy." For this reason, certain arrests of
members of the Irish contingent with UNIFIL may be rendered unlawful and
unconstitutional, as it appears there is no constitutional or statutory authority
for extending the powers of arrest already lawfully in existence. While
the common law machinery for challenging the legality of a detention by way
of Habeas Corpus embodied in Article 40.4.2°-5° of the Constitution may be of
limited benefit to a soldier unlawfully detained in a remote area of south
Lebanon, according to the Supreme Court in The People (Director of Public
Prosecutions) v Conroy", the burden of proof in establishing the legality of
arrest and detention is on the military authorities. Furthermore, evidence
obtained from the accused during an unlawful detention will normally be
inadmissible at the trial. 80
The authority to arrest members of the Canadian Forces under
Canadian law is governed by Part IV, Sections 154 to 159 of the National
Defence Act. In this regard, Section 154( 1) provides:
Every person who has committed, is found committing or who is
believed on reasonable grounds to have committed a service offence,
or who is charged with having committed a service offence, may be
placed under arrest.
Sections 155,156 and 157 respectively outline the persons entitled to
arrest a members of the Canadian Forces subject to the Code of Service
Discipline. Those categories mentioned are Canadian Forces personnel of
specified ranks. However, Section 157(4) is a saving provision and it provides:
(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to be in derogation of the
authority that any person, including an officer or non commissioned
77 [1966] Irish Reports 501.
78 Personal interview, ComdtMurphy, op. cit., (n.69).
79 SupremeCourt, unreported, 31 July 1986.
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member, may have under other sections of this Act or otherwise under
the law of Canada to arrest any other person without a warrant.
The effect of this subsection is to permit any person to arrest a member of the
Canadian Forces in accordance with Canadian law. Even if a specific statutory
provision does not exist, there is a common law right of arrest recognised under
Canadian law. Unlike the situation prevailing in respect of Irish Defence
Forces, there is a right for non Canadian Forces personnel, and non-Canadian
nationals, to arrest a member of the Canadian Forces. This raises the question
regarding what law, rights and obligations are applicable at the time of the
arrest. Are they Canadian, in particular, does the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, which is part of the Constitution Act 1982, apply at the time of
the arrest or later? The Canadian Courts Martial Appeal Court has judicially
considered this matter in 1987. In the appeal case Bernaur v. The Queen, the
appellant appealed his conviction on a charge of operating his motor vehicle
while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded a certain level. 81 The
conviction was based on an analysis of a blood sample taken from the appellant
under German law after he has been brought to a hospital by police following a
collision. The analysis of that blood sample was the basis of his conviction by
Standing Court Martial of an offence punishable under Section 120 of the
National Defence Act.82 The record did not disclose that the appellant was
advised by the German police of a right to counsel, nor whether such a right
exists under German law. Neither did the record disclose that the various
requirements of Section 238 of the Canadian Criminal Code as to the taking of
blood samples were met nor whether German law imposes such requirements.
On the record, the Court assumed that German law was complied with.
The significant element in the judgement was the opinion of the Court
that Sections 8 and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms did not
80 The People (D.P.P.) v Shaw [1982], Irish Reports. 1. The People (D.P.P.) v
O'Loughlin [1979], Irish Reports 85. The People (D.P.P.) v O'Higgins (Supreme
Court, November 22, 1985). See generallyCasey, op. cit., at 381-383 and 414-422.
81 Bemaur v.The Queen, C.M.A.C. 287, Ottawa, Ontario, 16 September, 1988.
Namely, operating a motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in his
blood exceeded .08% contrary to 237(b) of the Criminal Code.
82
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Impose obligations on German police conducting an investigation into the
conduct of a member of the Canadian Forces in Germany. However, the Court
went on to say that a member of the Canadian Forces is entitled to his or her
Charter rights when being tried by a Canadian Court Martial in or outside
Canada. The law would therefore seem to be that any member of the Canadian
Forces may be arrested by a foreign national in accordance with the municipal
laws applicable in the arresting national's country. Evidence and the arrest
procedure is not tainted by any illegality under Canadian military or civil laws.
It follows from this that a member of a UN military police unit may also arrest
Canadian Forces personnel in accordance with UN standing operating
procedures, and still avoid the potential difficulties encountered by Irish
authorities in similar circumstances. Once the Canadian Forces member is
handed over to Canadian authorities, then the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, the Criminal Code and the National Defence Act, must be complied
with in every respect.
This would appear to render the whole process somewhat
straightforward and without legal impropriety under Canadian law.
Nonetheless, legal and constitutional issues could still arise where the
admission of evidence obtained by foreign authorities in compliance with their
domestic laws, or international organisations, could bring the administration of
Canadian justice into disrepute. This would be for a court to determine in
accordance with the facts in a particular case. In this way the court will
examine the arrest and any other relevant procedures prior to the handing over
of the accused to Canadian authorities. If there is a breach of a fundamental
personal right, for example, the subjecting of an accused to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment, then a Court Martial will not admit any evidence obtained
in such circumstances. The issue was not raised in the Bernaur case, but the
Court did state that it was satisfied that the admission of the evidence of the
blood sample taken could not bring the Canadian justice system into
diarepute.f It held, obiter, that it did not reject the possibility that a Court
Martial could refuse to admit evidence in such circumstances in the future.
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Conclusion
The Defence (Amendment)(No. 2) Act, 1960, made statutory provision for
service outside the State as part of an international UN police force. Under the
terms of this Act, the Dail must approve the initial dispatch of members of the
Defence Forces for UN peacekeeping, thereafter however, considerable
discretion is left to the government in determining the extent of Irish
involvement. The Act also provides that members of the Defence Forces shall
be liable to serve outside the State with the UN peacekeeping forces, and while
so serving, they are deemed to be on active service. In certain circumstances
this confers unlimited jurisdiction on a court martial and renders the accused
liable to a more severe punishment.
The 1960 Act was intended as a permanent piece of legislation to
provide for potential future participation by Ireland in UN peacekeeping forces.
It has been satisfactory to date and in this respect it will probably continue as
the statutory basis for Irish involvement in future peacekeeping missions. The
Defence (Amendment) Act, 1993 made provision for Irish involvement in UN
forces not of a peacekeeping nature. This is the most significant development
in the municipal legal basis for Irish involvement in UN forces to date. It
permits participation in any kind of UN operation and makes all Defence
Forces personnel joining after the 1 July 1993 liable to service on UN
enforcement missions. Yet in planning for future roles of this nature, it is not
possible to take everything into account or to provide a definitive legal criterion
of what this role must be on each occasion. The enabling legislation merely
provides the general legal framework for Irish involvement. While the term
police character may cause some confusion about the precise role of
peacekeeping forces, it has not in any way hindered Irish participation in such
forces to date. However, despite the recent legislation, there are still matters
pertaining to such participation that require urgent attention. In particular, the
question of command of members of the Defence Forces and the powers of
arrest of those who are not subject to Irish military law is in need of review. 84
83 Bernaur v.The Queen, op. cit., (n. 81), 571.
84 This issue of command and control is dealt with in Chapter 5, infra.
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There is no equivalent Act in Canada as the Canadian National
Defence Act is the source document and statutory legal basis for all Canadian
Forces activities. Unlike the Irish practice of enacting new laws and statutory
amendments to existing legislation in the form of Amendment Acts, the
Canadian practice is to revise and amend the National Defence Act as deemed
appropriate, without a whole new Act being enacted. The current National
Defence Act is a consolidating legislative enactment incorporating all
amendments since 1950.85 In this way, a single basic Act is a comprehensive
and effective way to keep legislation up to date, and preferable to the piecemeal
and confusing methodology prevailing in Ireland.
Under Canadian law, the National Defence Act does not require
formal parliamentary approval or consent to the despatch of Canadian Forces
for service abroad. There does not appear to be any constitutional requirement
to have the decision reviewed by the legislature either, although rules embodied
in certain 'constitutional practices' require that the parliament be consulted.
Unlike the situation under Irish military law, the distinction between
enforcement action and traditional police type peacekeeping duties is of little
legal relevance in respect of Canadian participation in UN operations. Military
service in Canada entails service with NATO and the UN as part of normal
military activities. Once declared lawful and part of Canadian policy, all
Canadian Forces are liable under the National Defence Act to service outside of
Canada. Though the deployment of Canadian Forces abroad without the
approval of Parliament is legally permissible, the reality is that Parliament must
be informed if the government wants to avoid a political storm. Nevertheless,
the 1997 Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry highlighted the need to
strengthen the control exercised by Parliament over the activities of Canadian
Forces, and reform of the law to provide for the mandatory approval of
Parliament for deployment of Canadian forces abroad would be preferable to
the current situation.
85 Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, c. N - 5. Although the current Act is
being reviewed and amendments proposed as a result of adopting certain of the Dixon
Committee report recommendations, which itself was a result of the Report of the
Somalia Commission of Inquiry.
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As all regular Canadian Forces are on a semi permanent 'active
service' footing, the status has little real significance. Under Section 31 of the
Act, the Governor in Council has power to place the Canadian Forces on
'active service' and despite the fact that there is no specific legal requirement,
there is a parliamentary tradition in existence since 1950 for the government to
reaffirm that Canadian Forces are on active service when specific operations
involving substantial numbers of troops are considered potentially hazardous.
Unlike the situation of Irish Defence Forces, Canadian Forces are neither
deemed nor required to be placed on active service to participate in an
operation. Under the National Defence Act, a Governor in Council decision is
all that is lawfully required to the place the Canadian Forces on active service.
There is a need to clarify the status and implications of 'active service' under
Canadian military law. This should be undertaken in a way that would clear up
the semantic and legal confusion over the issue and enhance rather than
diminish parliamentary control over Canadian Forces. The most significant
differences between the situation of Canadian Forces and the Defence Forces is
in the area of command and control. The legislative framework governing
Canadian Forces works well domestically and in the context of international
UN and similar forces.
The Defence (Amendment) Act, 1993 is the most recent piece of
enabling legislation passed in Ireland providing for participation in
international forces, and it is similar to the 1960 Act insofar as its terms are
permissive rather than mandatory. The 1993 Act does not outline nor define
the nature and kinds of operations envisaged under the Act. There is only the
definition of 'International United Nations Force' as 'a international force or
body established by the Security Council or General Assembly of the UN'.
There is no mention of duties of a police character, enforcement action or
'peace enforcement'. It is a very short piece of legislation that in effect permits
involvement in any kind of international UN force and leaves many issues
undetermined. Nonetheless, its significance should not be underestimated. It
provided the legal basis for participation in the UN sponsored, but NATO led
operations in the former Yugoslavia. The extent to which this expansion of the
municipal legal basis for Irish participation in UN forces will widen the
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parameters of Irish involvement in general remains to be seen. It is apparent
that Canada has conducted a more thorough consideration of all of the issues,
and Ireland could learn a significant amount from the Canadian experience to
date.
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Chapter 5
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES AND ISSUES OF
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Introduction
The question of command and control of UN and other multi-national operations is one
of the more serious issues confronting the formation of international forces. Command
of UN forces is fraught with difficulties arising from both subjective human factors,
and objective legal constraints. This chapter examines these and related issues as a
follow up to chapter 4, with particular reference to the UNIFIL and UNOSOM
operations. The problems encountered at an international level often have their origins
in municipal law and the national policy of contributing states. In this regard, the
municipal laws of Canada and Ireland are relevant. Under Canadian law, at no stage in
any international operation is national command! of Canadian Forces handed over to a
foreign commander. However, unity of command is axiomatic to any military force,
including international UN forces.' The problem of submission of national contingents
serving in UN forces to foreign command, where the Force Commander is drawn from
another contributing country, is unavoidable in multi-national UN forces.' In theory,
the command structure of such forces is straightforward, but in practice this is seldom
the case. A mechanism to overcome the difficulties so created has been described as
follows:
the multi-national character [of UN forces] introduces difficulties that
otherwise might not be encountered. Command is normally a national matter,
and some countries, in recognition of this basic fact, have specific
prohibitions precluding their military forces from taking orders from nationals
This and associated concepts are defined and discussed later, infra., 128-131. See
also M. H. MacDougall, 'UN Operations: Who Should Be In Charge?,' XXXIII Revue De
Droit Militaire Et De Droit De La Guerre, 1 to 4, (1994), 21-87 at 27.
2 See D.W. Bowett, UN Forces, London: Stevens ,(1964), MacDougall, op. cit., 45-
47, and The Preparedness Gap: Making Peace Operations Work in the 2Ft Century, A Policy
Report of the United Nations Association of the USA, 2001, 3 and 15.
of another country. Fortunately ... a modus vivendi [can] be found during
actual operations ... by using [national] ... officers on the Force Commander's
staff to transmit force directives."
In order to take account of this and to participate in international operations, Canadian
law and military custom allows for operational control to be vested in a Force
Commander or equivalent, but even then the operational command is retained by a
member of the Canadian Forces. This system seems to operate without any serious
difficulty for Canada, or the international forces to which Canada contributes forces.
The situation with regard to Ireland is more problematic. For example, in
spite of Ireland's significant contribution to the peacekeeping force in Lebanon, the
Force Commander of UNIFIL does not appear to have been vested with lawful
command over that portion of the Defence Forces forming part of the International UN
Peacekeeping Force. S The procedure whereby the Minister for Defence directs the
Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces to issue a directive to the Irish contingent
commander, purporting to place the unit under the operational command of the
UNIFIL Force Commander, has no statutory basis. In this way, the Minister's action
may be ultra vires, as he or she is not empowered to issue directives or make
regulations that in effect usurp the power of the Oireachtas (legislature). The matter
has certain constitutional implications, which do not appear to have been considered
either.
One of the fundamental characteristics of a UN peacekeeping force is its
international character, and as such, it neither represents the State contributing a
contingent, nor the host State." It follows logically from this that a peacekeeping force
H. McCoubrey & N. White, The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of UN Military
Operations, Aldershot: Dartmouth, (1996), 144.
4 1. M. Boyd, UN Peacekeeping Operatons: A Military and Political Appraisal, New
York: Praeger, (1971), 150. For example, German forces in Somalia remained under the full
command authority of the German Minister for Defence, but the forces did come under the
'operational control' of the US Commander of the Logistic Support Command, see Lt. Col.
Vogt, 'Experiences ofa German Legal Adviser to the UNOSOM II Mission', .xxu' (1-4) The
Military Law and Law of War Review, (1996), 219-227 at 220.
See infra.
6 D.W. Bowett, op. cit., 121.
should not take the side of any party to a conflict, in particular, where there has been a
breakdown in law and order to the extent that it is difficult to determine which, if any
forces represent the legitimate interests of the state concerned. The consent of the host
state to the presence of a peacekeeping force confers the legitimacy required for a
lawful presence in its territory, and it is normally specified in an agreement concerning
the rights and duties of the force.' In fact, the legality of a peacekeeping force on any
country's territory should be guaranteed in a legal instrument known as the SOFA.
Legal framework of UN operations and the SOFA
In order to understand the international legal context within which the municipal laws
of contributing states apply, it is necessary to examine the legal framework of UN
peacekeeping and similar forces." The main legal structure for the majority of
peacekeeping forces, including UNIFIL, was derived from the precedent of the first
ever such force established in 1956, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).9
Nonetheless, individual forces did possess their own distinctive legal characteristics.
Before a peacekeeping force commences operations it is necessary that some guidance
be given to the Force Commander. For this reason the Secretary-General must issue a
Directive to the Force Commander that is based on the mandate and provides the Force
Commander with his or her instructions for carrying out the tasks assigned. At the
same time it is necessary to negotiate with the host state a Status of Force Agreement
(SOFA) that will enable the Force to carry out its function within the area of
operations without undue interference from the host state. Based on these two
documents the Force Commander will issue his or her own instructions and standing
operating procedures. Ideally, both the Directive and the SOFA should be signed and
ready when the force is being deployed, but the reality is that this is seldom the case.
7 The Peacekeepers Handbook, New York: International Peace Academy, (1984), 362.
8 Lecture delivered by Col. P. Ghent, Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Defence
Forces to students of the Military College. From the lecture it was evident that the Office of the
Deputy Judge Advocate General was fully aware of the legal anomalies in regard to Irish
participation in UN forces, and that the need to update and amend the relevant legislation had
been highlightedby the Military authorities. See also P. Rowe, 'Maintaining Discipline in UN
Peace Support Operations: The Legal Quagmire for Military Contingents', 5(1) Journal of
Conflict and Security Law, (2000), 45-62.
9 See UN Document S/12611, Secretary-General's report to the Security Council on the
Implementationof Resolutions425, 19 March 1978, para 4.
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Most peacekeeping forces are rushed affairs, and tying up the loose administrative and
legal strings is not a priority. In this way the legal framework for UN peacekeeping
forces is usually made up of the following:
• the resolution of the Security Councilor the General Assembly;
• the SOFA between the UN and the host State;
• the agreement by exchange of letters between each of the participating States and
the UN; and
• the regulations for the force issued by the Secretary-General.
The need to define in advance the legal basis upon which the force relies for
carrying out its duties has been accepted for some time as most advisable given
difficulties that can be encountered.l" Whereas the mandate establishing a force
defines its purpose, a SOFA provides the more detailed principles under which a force
functions, and specifies its relationship with the host government and other countries
parties to the conflict. In this regard, it provides for special freedoms, privileges and
duties that are necessary to enable a peacekeeping force carry out its mission. I I The
general nature of SOFAs is described by Professor Kirgis as follows:
When peacekeeping forces are to be stationed on the territory of a state,
arrangements need to be made between the UN and the state regarding such
things as logistics, facilities, privileges, and immunities of persons from
property, dispute settlement etc. Beginning with the First UN Emergency
Force in Egypt, these arrangements have been embodied in formal
arrangements between the UN and host governments. Drawing on this
experience, in 1990 the Secretary-General (at the request of the General
10 There have been SOFAs in respect ofONUC, UNEF, UNFICYP, and more recently,
UNIFIL. For a dicussion of the NATO SOFA and British forces, see P. Rowe, Defence - The
Legal Implications, London: Brassey's, (1987), esp. Chapter 6.
11 These include, inter alia, freedom of movement, freedom to carry arms, unrestricted
communications in its area of operations, immunity of its members from criminal prosecution
so that they are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their national state, landing and
procurement facilities etc.
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Assembly) prepared a model agreement to serve as the basis for individual
agreements subject to modifications appropriate for particular cases.12
The obvious difficulty that can arise in situations like Lebanon and Somalia is who
represents the legitimate interests of the state? In Somalia, all semblance of normality
had disintegrated and there was no effective government with which to negotiate and
agree terms for deployment.':' In these circumstances, even if agreed, the SOFA would
be worthless on the ground.
The issue of the consent of the host government to the presence of a
peacekeeping force embodies one of the fundamental principles upon which traditional
peacekeeping is based. Despite this, the question is dealt with in the recently signed
UNIFIL SOFA in a remarkable fudged and ambiguous manner. The actual status of
the Force is dealt with in Article 5 of the Agreement, which states:
UNIFIL and its members shall refrain from any action or activity incompatible with
the impartial and international nature of their duties or inconsistent with the spirit of
the present arrangements. The Force Commander shall take all appropriate measures
to ensure the observance of those obligations.
For its part, the government of Lebanon undertakes to respect the exclusive
international nature of UNIFIL.14 The issue of freedom of movement is dealt with in
Article 12 which states 'UNIFIL and its members shall enjoy.... freedom of movement
throughout Lebanon'. These articles are based on a similar provision in the model
SOFA with the overriding consideration being to strike a balance between the
sovereign rights of a host state and the peacekeeping interests of the international
community. IS There is no specific provision governing revocation of consent and it
seems that the host state's consent is still imperative to ensure respect for sovereign
rights, and this consent may be withdrawn at any time. This is also linked to the
question of the duration of an operation, of which there is no mention in the UNIFIL
F. L. Kirgis, International Organizations in their Legal Setting, (2nd. ed.), Egan,
Minnesota: West Publishing Co. (1992), 722-733.
12
The UN and Somalia, 1992-1996, New York: UN, (1996); and The Blue Helmets,
(3rd. ed.) New York: UN, (1996), 287-318.
13
14 Article 6 of the UNIFIL SOFA.
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SOFA. The issue of duration and consent can be crucial, as the experience of the UN
Emergency Force (UNEF) prcved." The question of whether a peacekeeping force
must withdraw if there is a unilateral withdrawal of host state consent is still a
controversial issue which has become more problematic in the context of peace
enforcement operations of recent years.
Much could be gained from incorporating in the SOFA, or appending thereto,
a more detailed definition of the mandate of the force and the conditions thereof for its
execution. Its omission is almost certainly deliberate as most mandates are couched in
politically ambiguous terms in order to make them acceptable to the parties involved.
This can often give rise to serious difficulties for the peacekeeping force in the
subsequent interpretation and implementation of the mandate.
The case of UNIFIL
In the case of UNIFIL, no SOFA was concluded when the Force was established and
the Force had to rely on the principles of Articles 104 and IDS of the Charter. These
articles provide that UN organs will enjoy such privileges and immunities in the
territories of member states as are necessary for the independent exercise of their
functions.!" Reliance was also placed on The UN Convention on Privileges and
Immunities, and the practice and custom of peacekeeping forces reflected in
agreements concluded in respect of these forces. IS However, the above Convention
was inadequate in certain respects, most notably that criminal immunity only exists in
respect of acts in the course of official duties.
The absence of a formal agreement in respect of UNIFIL did not create as
serious a situation as it might initially seem. Agreements in respect of other
peacekeeping forces were still awaiting formal signature and promulgation over
IS H. McCoubrey & N. White, op. cit., (n.3), 73.
16 See A. Di Blase, 'The Role of Host State Consent with Regard to Non -Coercive
Actions by the UN, in A. Cassese,(ed.), UN Peacekeeping: Legal Essays, Dordrecht: Sijthoff
and Nordhoff, (1978), 55-94, esp. 67-73.
17 Article 104 and 105 of The UN Charter.
18 Personal Interview, Mr. Rosetti, Legal Advisor to the Force Commander UNIFIL,
Naquora, September 1989.
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eighteen months after their inception." The absence of a formal agreement did place
the Force in a vulnerable position so far as its rights and status were concerned, though
in most instances UNIFIL functioned adequately on the basis of a gentleman's
agreement.i" In any event, when Agreements were concluded almost immediately, as
in the case of the peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, they still contained weaknesses."
The reliance on a gentleman's agreement is only satisfactory as long as those parties to
it consider it to be to their advantage to respect its terms and negotiate amicably any
difference that may arise. Certain freedoms are axiomatic to the nature of
peacekeeping and without them the force's function would be so severely restricted as
to make the fulfilment of its mandate difficult, if not impossible. It may also
contribute to reluctance by member states to participate in peacekeeping duties. The
Secretary-General of the UN has wide powers in relation to the internal affairs of
peacekeeping forces." He may be authorised to issue appropriate regulations and
instructions to ensure the effective functioning of the force. The authority to issue
such regulations sterns from the Organization's exclusive competence in regard to the
direction and operation of a peacekeeping force. Such regulations, if issued, can also
constitute an important part of the legal framework of a force. Regulations usually
govern the issue of command orders and such questions as the powers and
responsibilities within the structure of the force.23
As no formal agreement was concluded with the Lebanese government until
December 1995, the status of UNIFIL, and that of its personnel, was based upon the
Security Council resolution establishing the Force. This could only be interpreted by
19 Peacekeepers Handbook, op. cit., 32-33.
20 Personal Interview, Rosetti, op. cit,.(n.l8).
21 The SOFA for UNFICYP took effect on 24 March 1964, three weeks after the
Security Council approved its creation. See G.I.A.D Draper, 'The UN Force in Cyprus',
Revue De Droit Penal Militaire et De Droit De La Guerre, (1967), 58-62.
22 Personal Intreviw, Rosetti, op. cit. (n.18).
23 They also govern administrative, executive and financial arrangements, and general
rights and duties of members of the Force. Such regulations were issued for UNEF, ONUC
and UNFICYP. Draper, op. cit.65-71 and Bowett, op. cit., 102-103,119-121 and 219-222.
Regulations in respect of ONUC are reproduced in their entirety in R. Higgins, The UN
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reference to the guidelines that were published for the Force.24 These provided, inter
alia, that the Force was under the command of the UN, vested in the Secretary-
General, under the authority of the Security Council. The command in the field was to
be exercised by the Force Commander, who was responsible to the Secretary-General.
As with the SOFAs concluded for the peacekeeping forces in Cyprus and the Congo,
the guidelines provide that the Force must enjoy freedom of movement and be granted
the relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the UN.25 The guidelines contained considerably less
detail than the SOFA for other peacekeeping forces. This reflects the hasty manner in
which UNIFIL was established and the fact that the authority of the government of
Lebanon did not extend to the area where the Force was deployed.i" In these
circumstances, guaranteeing the exclusion of the jurisdictional competence of the host
state was probably seen to have little practical value.
Certain matters not provided for in the UNIFIL guidelines laid down by the
Secretary-General, could have been included in Force or Staff Regulations that were issued for
all the other peacekeeping forces prior to UNIFIL. The authority to make force regulations
stems from that given the Secretary-General by the Security Council to establish a
peacekeeping force." However, no such regulations have been issued for UNIFIL. Instead
UNIFIL relies on a series of standing operating procedures (S.O.P.'s), which lay down the
guidelines and define the method by which the UNIFIL operation is conducted." They appear
to be issued on behalf of the Force Commander, though he does not sign them. Whiletheir legal
standing is consequently questionable, they have worked out primarily due to the
goodwill and the co-operation of the participating contingents.
Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 1960-1964, London: Oxford University Press, (1980) 68-77
and 207-209.
24 These are contained in UN Document S/12611, 19 March 1978 and they were
approved by the Security Council Resolution 426(1978), 19March 1978.
25 Ibid.
26 U. Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping, London: Hurst and Co.,
(1984), 100-113.
27 Rosetti,op. cit., (n.18)
28 Ibid., and personal interview, Defence Forces Legal Officer, 13March, 1998.
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Consequence for Irish and Canadian personnel in breach of UN regulation
The force regulations issued for previous peacekeeping forces, and the standing
operating procedures in respect of UNIFIL, are intended to be legally binding,
although in many instances they are general in nature and open to different
interpretations." In the circumstances, it is not clear what the consequences are if an
Irish or Canadian soldier or Commander at any level is in breach of UN regulations, or
other established procedures. Can such a breach be regarded as an offence under
military law? The mere fact that a state concluded an agreement to contribute troops to
UN peacekeeping does not mean it has automatically amended its municipal law, or
that it has a legal obligation to do so. It may well be the case that breaches of UN
regulations or procedures are also offences against military law, but if this is so, it is
not because of any UN regulation having municipal effect. In this way, the situation
of an Irish or Canadian soldier or officer who finds himself charged before the military
authorities with the violation of a specific UN regulation or similar instruction is
unclear. A potential defence that might be put forward is that there is no such offence
known to Irish or Canadian municipal or military law.
On the other hand, it could be argued that a breach of UN regulations is an
example of conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline contrary to
Section 168 of the Irish Defence Act, 1954; or Section 129 of the Canadian National
Defence Act.3o The military authorities often use section 168 and Section 129 as a
form of safety net in the event of a more specific charge being struck down, or when
there is uncertainty regarding the exact nature of the offence committed. A formal
charge under either section in Canadian or Irish military law while part of a UN
operation raises fundamental issues, namely, which military discipline is covered by
the Act, that of the relevant armed forces, or that of the UN? It is submitted that it
would not be possible to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that every act that
29 Ibid. On the issue of discipline and the legal framework governing contingents with
UN peace operations, see P. Rowe, 'Maintaining Discipline in UN Peace Support Operations:
The Legal Quagmire for Military Contingents', op. cit., 45-62.
30 Section 168 of the Defence Act, 1954provides inter alia, that every person subject to
military law who commits any act, conduct, disorder or neglect to the prejudice of good order
and discipline is guilty of an offence against military law. Section 129 of the National Defence
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violates UN regulations is per se prejudicial to the military discipline of either the
Defence Forces or Canadian Forces. This argument is all the greater in respect of UN
standing operating procedures. In order to overcome this difficulty, an amendment to
the Defence Act, 1954 and the National Defence Act is required, to the effect that any
conduct of a member of an Irish or Canadian contingent of a UN peacekeeping or other
force which breaches UN regulations or procedures, shall be considered to be conduct
to the prejudice of good order and discipline for the purpose of Section 168 or Section
129 respectively. This particular legal difficulty in relation to the binding effect of
regulations is also common to other contingents and peacekeeping forces." The
matter is made all the more difficult in UNIFIL owing to the fact there are no
regulations, and the standing operating procedures are unsigned and of dubious
authority.
Command and control
An even more serious difficulty than that outlined above arises In the case of
command, and the command of UN has always been 'a somewhat delicate issue'." In
this context there are three inter linked and essential features of the military system,
namely command, discipline and leadership. At the head of the system stands the
commander. The term commander is used generally to refer to any officers in positions
of command. In the Canadian Forces and the Defence Forces, the term commander can
be used generally to describe any officer who is appointed to a position of command of
a command.f unit or element of the armed forces." Traditionally, command is defined
Act states that 'any act, conduct, disorder, or neglect to the prejudice of good order and
discipline is an offence ... ' .
31 Draper, op. cit., 65-68.
32 H. McCoubrey, 'International Law and National Contingents in UN Forces', XII (3)
International Relations, 39-50, at 41. On the issue of command and international humanitarian
law, see C. Greenwood, Command and the Laws of Conflict, Pamphlet published by Strategic
and Combat Studies Institute for the Ministry for Defence, 1993
33 Command of a command in Ireland refers to a specific territorial area, whereas in
Canada it denotes a particular branch such as 'air', 'land'or 'maritime'command. For an
overall view of Canadian forces and command issues in peacekeeping, see S.M. Maloney,
'Insights into Canadian Peacekeeping Doctrine', 76 (2)Military Review, (1996), 12-23.
34 In the Canadian Forces and the Defence Forces, an officer commanding a command
is usually a general officer appointed by the Chief of Defence Staff in Canada, and the Minister
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as the legal authority to issue orders and to compel obedience. In this way, command
is the authority lawfully exercised by a commander over his or her subordinates by
virtue of the rank or appointment held. Command provides the authority and
responsibility for effectively planning and executing the employment of assigned
resources to accomplish the mission. Thus, command, decision and organization are
highly integrated."
Control, on the other hand, is the process through which a commander, assisted
by staff, organises, directs and co-ordinates the activities of the assigned forces. The
command and control process establishes how the commander and staff accomplish the
mission i.e. in the case of a UN force, fulfils the mandate. Command is a human
activity that involves procedures, methodologies and techniques used to understand the
prevailing situation, to decide what action to take, to issue instructions, and to
supervise the execution of orders. As it is a process involving options and judgement,
it also has an ethical dimension. Traditionally, commanders are held ethically
responsible for their acts or omissions. All members of the Canadian Forces and the
Defence Forces are ethically responsible for observing a code that is implicit in the
custom of the service and military regulations.f
Command and control issues are not new to the UN or multinational forces. In
1945, a collective security system was put in place to ensure that recalcitrant states
could be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. An essential
element in the collective security mechanism was the planned provision of national
contingents that together would comprise the UN armed forces." This never
materialised, but the signatories to the Charter agreed upon a model for the command
for Defence in Ireland. Officers are also appointed to command units, e.g. the 65 Infantry
Battalion, UNIFIL, or the Canadian Airborne Regiment. The major difference between
command appointments is that they all have graduated powers of punishment and other powers
drawn from the National Defence Act and the Defence Acts respectively.
35 H. Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy, New York: Rutgers University Press,
(1965), 118-119.
36 R. Gabriel, To Serve with Honour, Westport: Greenwood Press, (1982). These are
traditions and customs that, although unwritten, have come to be accepted aspects of military
practices and behaviour, Interview, Defence Forces Legal Officer, March 1998.
Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, Charter of the UN, (3rd. Ed.), New York: Columbia
University Press, (1969), 314-326.
37
138
and control of UN forces, but cold war political developments prevented its actual
adoption." This model is to some extent the benchmark by which to examine all
subsequent arrangements for command of international UN forces. In effect, the
Charter model was replaced by systems of command and control that evolved to meet
the needs of two quite distinct UN missions. The most common of these systems
evolved to cater for the unique nature of peacekeeping operations, but even this system
is not as straightforward as it first might appear. The other general system to emerge
was designed to cater for the more complex and controversial multinational
enforcement operations.
Like the concept of peacekeeping, these command and control systems
emerged outside the express constitutional framework of the UN Charter. They were a
response to the need to provide some workable alternative in the context of cold war
suspicion and mistrust. Nevertheless, even with the end of the cold war, the problems
surrounding this issue remain. In order to analyse the complexity of the problems
involving the concept of command and control, it is useful to outline some definitions
and historical background.
In order to understand how command and control of armed forces operates in
practice, it is necessary to examine what these concepts mean in practical military
terms, and the legal implications of the different categories and levels utilised in
national and international armed forces. The actual operation of the system of
command and control in Canadian Forces is outlined and defined in the Canadian
Forces Joint Doctrine Manual. Although this is a Canadian military document
intended primarily for North Atlantic Treaty Operations, and it is not a legal document
and possesses no legal status under either Canadian or international law, it does outline
what is internationally accepted as constituting the three levels of military command
i.e. full, operational and tactical commandr" These are defined in the Manual as
follows:
38 J. W. Houck, 'The Command and Control of UN Forces in the Era of 'Peace
Enforcement',4 (1) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, (1993), 1-69 at 11.
39 Department of National Defence, Joint Doctrine for the Canadian Forces Joint and
Combined Operations, pp.2-1 and 2-2.
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• Full command is the military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to
issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and
administration and exists only within national services. It is sometimes referred to as
national command. A UN Force Commander, or an alliance or coalition commander
does not have full command over forces assigned to him or her. It is the 'command'
referred to in the Irish Constitution and legislation governing command of all Defence
Force personnel."
• Operational command is the authority of a commander to assign missions or
tasks, redeploy forces, and reassign forces. It does not include responsibility for
administration or logistics.
• Tactical command is the authority of commander to assign tasks to forces under
their command. It is narrower in scope to operational command.
The concept of control is also and integral part of the overall command of
armed forces. It is the authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities
of subordinate organizations or other organizations not normally under command.
Control is also defined more specifically in military doctrine as operational, tactical,
administrative, or technical."
• Operational control is the authority of a commander to direct forces assigned so
that the commander can accomplish specific missions or tasks, which are usually
limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned ; and to retain or
assign tactical control of those units.
• Tactical control is the authority of a commander to give detailed direction and
control the movement of units necessary to accomplish a mission or task.
• Administrative control is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinates
regarding administrative matters.
40 See infra. 163-171.
41 Department of National Defence, Joint Doctrine for the Canadian Forces Joint and
Combined Operations, pp.2-1 and 2-2.
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• Technical control is control within specialised areas such as medical or legal
jurisdiction, parallel to but outside the chain of command, for purely technical issues.
Operational commanders can override this control if it is seen to jeopardise the
mISSIon.
Under the terms of the UN Charter, the Security Council has primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and UN member
states agreed to be bound by the decisions of the Security Council concerning such
matters. In accordance with this primary role, the Security Council was authorised to
establish a UN armed force under Article 43 of the Charter. Furthermore, Article 46
gave the Security Council responsibility for making plans for the application of the
armed forces under its control. In addition, the Security Council had a wide range of
powers under Charter to bring about the pacific settlement of disputes, or to authorise
the use of varying degrees of coercion and force. It is now a matter of historical record
that members of the UN have been prepared to support the establishment of a UN force
in situations of emergency when they considered that a force was called for, and when
they knew what its purpose and specific task would be. Although 'stand by'
arrangements have been agreed with a number of member states, they have not been
disposed to support the establishment of a permanent force. The Charter provided for
the establishment of a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security
Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements." It
envisioned an important role for the Military Staff Committee once UN forces became
involved in a conflict situation. It was to 'advise and assist' the Security Council on
the 'employment and command of forces placed at the disposal of the Security
Council' .43 In addition, it was to be to this Committee that the strategic direction of
any armed forced placed at the disposal of the Security Council was to be entrusted."
There is no definition of what strategic direction means in this context.
However, the Military Staff Committee was modelled on the function and structure of
the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff during World War 11.45 This operated on the basis
42 Article 47 of the UN Charter.
43 Ibid, para. 3.
44 Ibid.
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of regular consultation on the broad objectives of the war and after establishing a
common position in relation to an issue, the members would consult their respective
civilian leaders for approval.l" Then the crucial link in the chain of command
emerged, the military commanders would translate political direction received from the
civilian leadership into a military plan that was communicated to the subordinate
operational commanders on the ground for execution. In this way it appears that the
strategic direction referred to in the Charter meant in practice a system or process
whereby the Military Staff Committee would fulfil the vital link in the chain of
command from the Security Council to the operational commander of UN forces on the
ground. In practice this would mean that after considering the views of the operational
commander on the ground, the Military Staff Committee would advise the Security
Council of the military options available to it and the implications of any military plan
of action. Likewise, the Security Council would outline to the Military Staff
Committee the decision and objectives to be achieved, and these would be translated
into a military plan that would be communicated to the field commander(s) for their
action.
The Military Staff Committee was not intended to be involved in the day to day
operational or tactical command of UN forces. It was considered preferable to vest the
detailed operational and tactical decisions in a single commander. This was certainly
consistent with conventional military operations and practice. Interestingly, there
seemed to be a consensus about the meaning of command, and the problems relating to
command centred on agreeing a mechanism for selecting and appointing commanders.
In the event, this latter issue remained unresolved and it was agreed that the selection
of individual commanders would be determined on the basis of the requirements of
each case."
The Military Staff Committee did present a report to the Security Council on
the planned permanent UN force, but there were areas of insurmountable
45 Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, op. cit., 329.
46 W. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, The Second World War Series, Vol. 5, London:
Cassells, (1950),686-687.
47 R. C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the UN and the Search/or Post
War Security, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, (1990), 157-158.
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disagreement. 48 The question of command and control was not one of these areas, and
the report recommended that the UN force remain under exclusive national command
except when operating under the Security Council.49 When required by the Security
Council to act under the provisions of the Charter, the UN forces would then come
under the control of the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee would be
responsible under the Security Council, for their strategic direction. 50 There was also
agreement that national contingents would remain under the command of national
commanders, or be appointed by their respective Member States." More significantly,
the Security Council was to have the authority to appoint an overall supreme
commander or its equivalent, though there remained disagreement about the
appointment of subordinate commanders of air, sea and land forces.52
This, then, was the command and control model to be adopted for Chapter VII
operations. When the two major UN enforcement operations in Korea and the Persian
Gulf are examined, it is evident that the model envisioned under the Charter was not
followed. 53 In fact, Security Council involvement was marginal. After initial
authorisation, the Security Council had little political control over the operation,
largely due to the divisions within the Council itself and the military requirements of
each operation. In the circumstances, the one military power with the capacity to act
and fill the vacuum took the lead. In this way, de facto command and control of the
operations was in the hands of the United States. Despite this, the actual command and
control mechanism for each operation was significantly different.i" The current force
48 Report of the Military Staff Committee, General Principles Governing the
Organization of the Armed Forces Made Available to the Security Council by Member Nations
of the UN, UN Security Council Official Reports Supp. (no.l), UN Document.
S/336(1947), reprinted in the 1946147 UN Yearbook, New York, UN, 424-43.
49 Ibid., Article 36.
50 Ibid., Articles 37 and 38.
51 Ibid., Article 39.
52 Ibid., Article 41.
53 Houck,op. cit., 12 to 20.
54 Ibid.
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in Kosovo is UN mandated and 'deployed under UN auspices' .55 It represents the
reality of Chapter VII operations in the post cold war era and an emasculated UN. The
enabling resolution stipulated that the 'international security presence with a
substantial NATO participation must be deployed under a unified command and
control'. This means that it is NATO led under the North Atlantic Council and a
command structure incorporating SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe). Within SHAPE there is an Inter Co-ordination Centre (ICE) for Non NATO
Troop Contributors. But where is the real concentration of power? It is not with the
Secretary-General, and nor is it with the Security Council. This is a NATO led and de
Jacto NATO commanded operation. There is no strategic direction from the Military
Staff Committee or any other UN body, and the reality is that the Security Council is
merely kept informed.
Command and control of peacekeeping operations
The situation regarding the command and control of peacekeeping forces was
problematic for a number of years and linked to the constitutional difficulties
surrounding the establishment of peacekeeping operations. 56 The then Soviet Union
and its allies believed that any action by the UN involving the use of force should be
the primary responsibility of the Security Council, and that the Military Staff
Committee should be at the disposal of the Council. The majority of member states
took a different point of view. Peacekeeping operations were regarded as a special
kind of UN activity involving the consent of the states concerned and outside the scope
of Chapter VII enforcement provisions. In the circumstances, it was permissible and
even necessary, that the control of peacekeeping operations be vested in the Secretary-
General. Much of the early difficulties have been resolved since the establishment of
UNEF II. The then Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, proposed formally that the
Security Council have ultimate control over peacekeeping missions. This would
involve the Security Council authorising the operation initially and approving any
fundamental changes in its mandate. The Secretary-General exercised actual control
55 Resolution 1244 (1999), 10 June 1999,para. 5.
56 J.O.C Jonah,. 'The Management of UN Peacekeeping', I. J. Rikhye, & K.
Skjelsbaek, (eds.) The UNand Peacekeeping, New York: St. Martins Press (1991), 75, and
H. McCoubrey and N. White, op. cit. (n.B), 137-152.
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of the day-to-day operation. 57 This was intended to avoid the difficulties of involving
a potentially divided Committee in the detailed activities of an operation. This was a
valid cause of concern; as such a Committee was unlikely to be able to respond quickly
to critical situations on the ground. Even the system adopted was found to be seriously
wanting during the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, when General McKensie and
others were very critical of the lack of support and leadership from the UN
headquarters in New York.
The precedent established with UNEF II is now well established, and all
traditional peacekeeping operations, including UNIFIL, have followed this pattern. In
practice this meant that in the case of UNIFIL, the operation was authorised by the
Security Council, while the day to day supervision and responsibility for what happens
on the ground rests with the Secretary-General. This is an excellent model when there
is general agreement in the Security Council about the political and military goals of
the peacekeeping operation. In the case of UNIFIL, this consensus within the Security
Council was not always present and from the beginning it is questionable if it had the
full support of all the members of the Council that originally voted in favour of
adopting Resolution 425 (1978).58 This had left the Secretary-General in a difficult
and almost untenable position regarding UNIFIL on occasion. It shows that even this
model for relatively straightforward peacekeeping operations has limitations. These
limitations are not legal and do not reflect a bad system of command and control.
They are political difficulties caused by different political agendas and different
perceptions of the function of peacekeeping operations. Even the best system cannot
withstand the pressures created by ambiguous or divided leadership from the Security
Council.
An Under Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations and a military
advisor assist the Secretary-General. In theory, the military advisor should fulfil the
function intended for the Military Staff Committee and the position was created by
Dag Hammarskjold in late 1960 to assist in the management of peacekeeping
57 For a discussion of the delegation by the Security Council of powers to the
Secretary-General, see D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective
Security, Oxford: Clarendon, (1999), 50 -85, esp. 63.
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operates." It is essential that the Secretary-General have available to him or her
independent military advice relating to proposed or ongoing operations. The role of
the military advisor is, as the name suggests, purely advisory. A Force Commander in
fact exercises command of peacekeeping operations on behalf of the Secretary-
General. Not surprisingly in the circumstances, the Secretary-General, with the
approval of the Security Council, appoints the Force Commander. What the exact
criteria are for appointment to this position is not clear, but it is the most significant
link in the chain of command from the Secretary-General to the contingents on the
ground. As the Military Staff Committee is essentially out of the picture, the role of
the Force Commander and the military advisor is crucial to the Secretary-General. It is
often said that peacekeeping is more a political than a military mission, consequently, a
Force Commander must be as much a diplomat and politician, as a military
commander.P" Nonetheless, the inherently military nature of peacekeeping should not
be underestimated, even in the more complex multi-dimensional operations of recent
years.
Once deployed in the field, the Force Commander assumes the main
management functions, but it would be misleading to suggest that he or she is in
command in the sense understood in conventional military operations. A traditional
peacekeeping operation has a unique system of dual command, where the Force
Commander or equivalent reports directly to the Under Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations. The Force Commander usually has a Chief of Staff to assist
in the exercise of military command and authority in the field. However, all
peacekeeping operations have a significant civilian component under a Chief
Administrative Officer." The Chief Administrative Officer will report to the Force
Commander, but he or she also reports directly to Field Operations Division in New
58 Adopted 19 March 1978.
59 For general background on the role of the military advisor, see I.J. Rikhye, Military
Advisor to the Secretary-General: UN Peacekeeping and the Congo Crisis, London: Hurst and
Co., (1993).
60 Jonah,op. cit., 77.
61 This civilian component should not be confused with the humanitarian workers,
human rights and electoral monitors, and nation building civilians, part of the more recent
multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations.
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York. Given the logistical, administrative and financial aspects of any operation, and
the fact that the UN is a civilian, and not a military bureaucracy, this is a good idea.
Differences have arisen between Force Commanders and the Chief Administrative
Officer in the field, however, it is now well established that the Force Commander has
overall responsibility for the field management of peacekeeping.f In practice,
problems can still arise and there is a need for co-ordinating the military and civilian
staff responsibilities and efforts. A lot also depends on subjective factors such as
personality, but this does not excuse failure to address structural or organizational
deficiencies.
In UN peacekeeping and similar operations, as in other military operations,
no two situations are identical. The political situation and tactical considerations
appropriate to one mission will not necessarily prove relevant elsewhere. There are,
nonetheless, certain matters of principle that remain unchanged whenever an
international force is deployed. One of the most critical problems facing a senior
officer in a UN force is that of command, and the reality that troops under his or her
operational control will also remain loyal to their national governments. This potential
problem of duality of allegiance is common to all international forces and alliances,
but it may be more acute in what can often be an ad hoc and hastily established UN
force. The growing tendency of some national contingents within a UN force to
maintain a back channel communication link with their home governments is a
potential problem that may adversely affect effective management of peacekeeping
operations in the field.63 For practical reasons and being aware that it can do nothing
to prevent such communication, the UN has not discouraged links between national
governments and battalions. But it remains a threat to the operational functions and
effectiveness of a peacekeeping force.
It has happened that on occasion, national governments have become aware
of incidents and operational developments on the ground involving UNIFIL and other
62 Personal interviews, Lt. Gen. Walgren and Lt. Gen. Callaghan, former Force
Commanders, UNIFIL, 1989 and 1998 respectively.
63 Jonah, op. cit., 86. See also C. Brady and S. Daws, 'UN Operations: The Political-
Military Interface', 1 International Peacekeeping (F. Cass), (1994), 29-79, esp. 66,68 and 71.
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peacekeeping operations prior to UN headquarters in New York." While this may be
a reflection on the nature of communication within the Organization, it is especially
embarrassing when the government concerned seeks a response, and New York is still
not formally informed of all the facts. The most serious negative dimension to this
ability of contingents to stay in close touch with their respective national governments,
is when the same government gives what amounts to operational orders to the national
contingent that are inconsistent or even contrary to those of the Force Commander.f
This undermines the concept of integrated UN command, and it is serious threat to the
proper command and management of peacekeeping operations in the field.66
Command and control of UN forces in Somalia
Unlike the model prevailing with UNIFIL, the command and control mechanism for
the UNOSOM II operation in Somalia was not according to a well-established
precedent. The background to the establishment of the operation is outlined
elsewhere." Prior to the Somalia crisis, the Secretary-General had responded to a
Security Council request to report on ways the capacity of the UN could be improved
upon in the maintenance of international peace and security. In his report, An Agenda
for Peace'", the then Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, conducted a detailed
64 Personal Interviews, Walgren and 0 Callaghan, op. cit.
6S Jonah,op. cit ... 87 and MacDougall, op. cit., 63. The following quote illustrates the
point:
'Individual contingents remain, as they have been historically, extremely reluctant to accept
the chain of command within missions and have placed their loyalty to Force Commanders in
doubt by referring matters to national authorities..... the case of Italian 'insubordination' in
Somalia.. .is merely the most published case. It is well known that French and British soldiers
in he former Yugoslavia refer to Paris and London before, if at all, consulting with the UN
Secretariat in New York. Among officers serving in Bosnia, the Spanish battalion is known to
refer practically all operational issues that arise on the ground to authorities in Madrid.
Similarly, Indonesian force in Cambodia were notorious for their tendency to take directions
from the Indonesian Ambassador in Phnom Penh rather that from Lt. Gen. John Sanderson,
UNTAC's Force Commander.'(Mats R Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping, Adelphi Paper 281
(1993) at 42).
66 For recommendations to improve command and control of UN operations, and
enhance the military expertise available to the Depatment of Peacekeeping Operations, see The
Preparedness Gap: Making Peace Operations Work in the 21s1 Century, op. cit., 2-3 and 15-
18.
67 Infra. Chapter 6. See also, The UN in Somalia, op. cit., 3-29.
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examination of the full range of UN peace and security responsibilities, and the
mechanisms available. The Secretary-General envisaged a role for the moribund
Military Staff Committee in assisting to drawn up agreements with member states
under Article 43 of the Charter. One of the more intriguing aspects of the report
concerned traditional peacekeeping operations and enforcement action operations. In
an attempt to reflect the changing nature of maintaining international peace and
security, and the de facto situation emerging on the ground, the Secretary-General
called for the creation of 'peace enforcement' units. These were to be composed of
personnel from member states in accordance with agreements drawn up under Article
43 of the Charter. The concept was something of a half way house between traditional
peacekeeping and enforcement action. The units were to be heavily armed and would
be deployed with the authorisation of the Security Council and serve under the
'command' of the Secretary-General. 69
It is easy in hindsight to be critical of proposals the have since failed, but
given the history of command and control mechanisms within UN forces, it was at the
least overly optimistic to expect that this would be acceptable in practice.
Furthermore, once relations between Boutros-Ghali and the United States
Administration became strained, the actual difficulties were exacerbated." A
proposal of this kind required the active support of the United States, and a willingness
to agree to relinquish some degree of operational command and control to the
Secretary-General. This was never a likely prospect, despite the optimism of the time.
Identifying what amounted to a form of 'second generation' peacekeeping and clearing
up some of the semantic confusion surrounding the various concepts was useful.
Unfortunately, the issue and complexity of the command and control of these new so
called 'peace enforcement' operations was not appreciated. This soon became evident
after the UNOSOM I operation, which was a more traditional style peacekeeping
operation, was being wound down and replaced by the more robust and United States
led UNIT AF mission.
68 UN document: A/47/277 - S/24111, (June 1992).
69 For a discussion of the delegation by the Security Council of powers to the
Secretary-General, see D. Sarooshi, op.. cit., 50-85 andpassim.
70 See The Irish Times, 11 and 12October 1993.
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The actual idea for a countrywide enforcement operation in Somalia
originated with the United States." The Secretary-General favoured UN command of
any such operation, but he conceded it was not a realistic option at that time. In fact,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, and other military
leaders were insistent that the operation be under the command and control of the
United States. This was not surprising, and the most the Secretary-General could do
was attach as many conditions as possible to ensure some control over the operation by
the UN itself. Itwas the Security Council that ultimately decided the issue in what was
essentially a compromise. Security Council Resolution 794 (1992) implicitly accepted
the United States demand to command the operation that was to be known as UNIT AF.
The Security Council provided the new force with an expansive mandate which
included the usual euphemism for the use of force i.e. authorising 'all necessary
means' to establish a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid in
Somalia.
Despite agreeing to the fundamental demand for command by the United
States, the Resolution also authorised the Secretary-General to participate in the
necessary arrangements for command and control of the forces." The Security
Council also agreed to the establishment of an ad hoc commission to oversee the
operation as recommended by the Secretary-General. Furthermore, the Security
Council declined to place the existing small force, UNOSOM I, under the command of
the United States. Instead it opted to create a formal liaison mechanism between
UNOSOM I and the unified command.f The Security Council did, however, retain
one vital control mechanism. It reserved the right to phase out the UNIT AF part of the
operation and effectively terminate it in favour of a more traditional peacekeeping
operation."
71 Letter dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Session at 1,Document S/24868, 1992.
72 Ibid. para. 12.
73 Ibid. paras. 14-15.
74 Ibid. para. 18.
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The initial decision of the Security Council and its general policy regarding
UNIT AF are important in so far as they indicated a significant departure from previous
models for command and control. At a superficial glance, the model seems to
resemble the single state United States dominated system employed during the Korean
operation, and to a lesser extent the managed coalition model adopted during the 'Gulf
War.' In the debate leading to the adoption of Resolution 794 (1992), concern was
expressed on a number of occasions about the need to retain significant political
control of the Force by the Secretary-General and the Security Council, and this was
reflected in the limited but important control retained by them under the Resolution."
The fact that the United States did not get its own way entirely and the evident tension
that developed between the United States and the UN over the timing of the transition
to the second phase of the operation, UNOSOM II, indicated how effective this control
turned out to be." During the course of the UNIT AF phase of the Somalia operation,
the United States and the Secretary-General engaged in public debates in the media
that reflected in unambiguous terms the level of disagreement between them." In
particular, the United States accused the UN of being too slow to assume responsibility
for the operation, while the Secretary-General insisted that the United States needed to
do more to disarm the violent elements of the population before the UN could assume
control. This form of public airing of differences arose as much from the command
and control mechanism, as from the nature of the conflict in Somalia. Disagreements
of this nature, even if they did occur, were not aired publicly during the Korean
operation, or during the 'Gulf War. '
The establishment of the UNOSOM II force of twenty eight thousand
personnel in March 1993 had many similarities with that of a traditional peacekeeping
force. A Turkish General Cevic Bar commanded the force, and he had contingents
from a wide political spectrum under his control. The force was established under
75 Security Council Offcial Records, 47th. Sess., 3145 Mtg. at 17, UN Doc. SIPV.
3145(1992).
76 C. O'Cleary, 'US Public Grows Wary of Foreign Entanglements', The Irish Times,
12 October 1993, p.ll; J. Lancaster, 'United States Beginning Pullout form Somalia; Slow
Withdrawal Aimed partly at Forcing UN to Take Responsibility', Washington Post, 19 January
1993,p.Al.
77 Ibid.
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Resolution 814 (1993), which included a provision to the effect that the force would be
supervised closely by the Secretary-General and the Security Council. 78 More
importantly, Resolution 814 (1993) cited Chapter VII and the force was expressly
authorised to use force. This was the first such occasion since the ONUC operation in
the Congo prevented the attempted secession of the Katanga province that a UN
operation of this nature was authorised to use force in this way. In addition, the United
States agreed to allow a significant number of its armed forces participate in the
operation.P' This, not surprisingly, was made subject to a number of significant
conditions, none of which were conducive to a unified system of command and control
under the Security Council.
In the first instance, orders from the UN affecting United States forces were
transmitted from the UN Force Commander to the United States troops through the
UNOSOM II Deputy Commander, Major General Montgomery, who was a United
States army general. General Montgomery was the highest ranking United States
serving officer in the field, and in that capacity he was also the Commander of United
States Forces Somalia. so This was a convenient mechanism to allow the United States
ensure that one of its own officers retained full command of United States troops in
Somalia, as General Montgomery reported directly to the Commander in Chief, United
States Central Command. In fact, United States Central Command considered that it
retained command over United States Forces Somalia, and delegated 'operational,
tactical and/or administrative control of USFORSOM (United States Forces Somalia)
as required to support the Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command. ,81 It was no
surprise either that the Force Commander belonged to a member of NATO, and that
the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Somalia was from the United States,
retired Navy Admiral Howe. The Force Commander reported directly to the Special
78 SIRes/814 (1993), 26 March 1993,paras. 14 and 18.
79 Message from the President of the United States - A Report on the Military
Operation in Somalia, October 13, 1993, (US Government Printing Office, 1993).
80 Ibid. 9 and 18.
81 /bid. 18.
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Representative, who in turn reported to the Secretary-General. S2 This gave significant
influence to the United States, even if it did not formally command the mission.
The question with this system is what did it all mean in reality, and how
effective was it as a model for command and control in practice? The United States
was adamant that it retained full command of all its forces, and it did not even
relinquish operational control of combat forces to the Force Commander of UNOSOM
II. With regard to United States logistic units that were there to support the UN
operation, these were said to be assigned to the Force Commander through the
Commander of United States Forces in Somalia for 'operational contro1.,S3 That meant
that for purposes explicitly agreed in writing between the United States and the UN,
the Force Commander may provide them direction in their logistic mission of
supporting UN units.
This was a complex system that was made even more cumbersome by the
decision of the United States to establish a Quick Reaction Force. The justification for
this was the continuing presence of well armed private militias that 'thwarted the
original, lightly armed UN peacekeeping mission (UNOSOM I) as well as the UN's
inexperience in conducting a peace enforcement operations. ,84 However, this ignored
the United States own lack of experience in UN military operation. The Quick
Reaction Force was intended to respond to hostile threats and attacks that exceeded
UNOSOM's military force capabilities. When the security situation improved, it was
to move offshore from Somalia and out of the way. Like other United States combat
forces, these were not in the UN chain of command. They were under the direct
command of the United States Commander and Chief, Central Command. The Deputy
Commander ofUNOSOM IIcould have tactical control of the force delegated to him if
the situation within Somalia so required. This in effect amounted to the establishment
of a parallel United States chain of command that was intended to exist alongside, but
independent from, the UN command structure. How this was intended to operate in
times of crisis in the context of an already complex multi-dimensional operation
82 S/Res/814 (1993),26 March 1993,para. 14.
83 Messagefrom the President of the United States. op.cit .• (n.79), 18.
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involving around thirty nations and many non governmental organizations, IS a
question that must not have been addressed seriously by military planners In
Washington and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York.
It is difficult to describe this set up as other than a recipe for confusion and
ultimate disaster. It constituted the very antithesis of a unified system of command. It
was also a dangerous and deceptive system of command in that it created an illusion of
UN control. It would have been preferable to delegate command of the force to the
United States. At least this would have been closer to the reality. Instead, a system
was put in place that allowed the United States control key positions within
UNOSOM, while retaining full and operational command of all its combat forces in
Somalia. Furthermore, it permitted the United States to retain its special forces on call
should the Commander of United States Forces Somalia deem it necessary to deploy
them. In addition, the United States deployed a specially constituted Task Force
Ranger, which remained at all times under the direct command and control of the
commander in chief, United States special operations. In Sierra Leone, although
British Forces were also deployed outside the UN chain of command to, inter alia,
support the UN mission, these forces were not intended to adopt a combat role.85
When this was combined with different perceptions of what the actual mission
entailed among the troop contributing countries, including the United States, it was not
surprising that serious problems arose on the ground." This culminated in the United
States attempt to capture one of the 'warlords,' General Aided. It took place outside
the UN chain of command, and it was in fact a unilateral act by the United States using
the rangers that were part of the Quick Reaction Force. Among the many
consequences of this action, was the row between Italy and the UN, and the refusal by
84 Ibid.
85 Though in the case of British Forces in Sierra Leone, the primary task was to train
and support the armed forces of the government of Sierra Leone, and evacuate British
nationals. See Ministry of Defence Press Release No. 270/00, 10October 2000 and statement
to Parliament by Defence Secretary on Sierra Leone, 15 May 2000; Eight Report of the
Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNMASIL), S/2000/1199, 15
December 2000, paras. 30-32.
86 Ibid. 20-21. The United States President also stated at page 2 that 'the US military
mission is not now nor was it ever one of 'nation building'. It is difficult to reconcile this
statement with the provisions of Resolution 814 (1993), especially para. 4.
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Italy to replace its commander in Somalia.87 The United States and other contingents
could have learned something from the successful deployment of Italian armed forces
in and around Beirut as part of the Multi-National Force in the early 1980's.88 The
UN's primary complaint seemed to be that the Italian commander referred first to
Rome before carrying out UN orders. It was acknowledged that Italy had the right to
appoint its own general in Somalia, but the UN held the view that it had to right to
insist upon a unified disciplined command structure. This would have been a fair
argument if it was not for the fact that the UNOSOM II command structure was
anything but unified owing to the United States insistence on maintaining a parallel but
independent chain of command, and the problems with the Italians stemmed directly
from this situation.
Good relations between a Force Commander and subordinate national
contingents are vital. It has been said that officers selected for UN missions should
therefore when possible be in the Eisenhower rather than Montgomery or Patton
mould." It has been remarked elsewhere that,
A successful officer in command of a UN force must necessarily possess not
only a high measure of military skill, stricto sensu, but also well developed
diplomatic and political skills in dealing with what may be a diverse and
incohesive multi-national military force.9o
Ability to compromise and a disinclination to 'rock the boat' are essential qualities. In
the normal course of events, the orders of the Force Commander of a peacekeeping or
similarly constituted force will be loyally accepted and executed. National
contingents, nevertheless, retain a form of 'right of appeal' to their own governments
should a unit or contingent commander feel that the interests of the unit are being
87 The Irish Times, 16, 17 and 19 July 1993.
88 See generally R. Thakur, International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Boulder:
Westview Press, (1987), esp. 79-103; and N.A. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab Israeli
Fronts, Boulder: Westview Press, (1984), 31-68.
89 A.J. Wilson, Some Principles for Peacekeeping Operations - A Guide for Senior
Officers, Monograph No.2, International Information Centre on Peacekeeping Operations
(France), (June 1967),2.
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unfairly or improperly exploited. Moreover, a proposed strategy or deployment on the
ground may not be deemed to be in the best interests of the national government of the
unit involved. The command structure imposed by the United States in Somalia was
contrary to the concept of a unified command and inconsistent with the principles
established in previous operations. While not the sole cause of the problems
encountered by UNOSOM II, it was a major factor in the lack of cohesion and general
confusion associated with the operation.
The prospect of a subordinate officer disobeying a lawful order while serving
as part of an international force is always a possibility, and although this is not a
frequent occurrence, it does happen from time to time." When it does occur, it will
not always be associated with the high profile figures involved in controversy over the
attempted removal of the Italian commander in Somalia, and consequently it may not
receive much media attention. There may be a range of causes for insubordination, but
one potential defence to a charge of disobeying a lawful command is to challenge the
legality of the order itself on the basis that it was not consistent with the mandate, or
even that the Security Council was not competent to adopt a particular resolution in the
first place. The matter is most serious if it involves the unit or contingent commander.
Consider the situation where the Irish unit commander is ordered to extend his area of
operation and re-deploy the troops under his or her command by a certain date.92 He
or she declines to do so because it involves exposing the personnel to serious risk and
these are already over-stretched in the unit's area of operations. Furthermore, it may
involve using force against local armed elements in order to establish UNIFIL
authority in the new area. According to the unit commander's assessment of the
H. McCoubrey and N. White, op cit. (n.3), 143. See also by the same authors,
International Organizations and Civil Wars, Aldereshot: Dartmouth, (1995), 194-196.
90
91 In February 1998, an Irish commandant (major) was found guilty of disobeying a
lawful order of a superior officer in Lebanon. The incident was minor in nature and it
probably should never have got that far. See The Irish Times and the Irish Independent, 5
February 1998. For a more general discussion see L.C. Green, 'Superior Orders and
Command Responsibility', 27 Canadian Yearbook of International Law, (1989), 167-203; and
L.C. Green, 'Superior Orders and the Reasonable Man', 8 Canadian Yearbook of International
Law (1970),61-103, at 96 and passim.
92 Although this is a hypothetical example, it is based on an actual incident involving
the Irish battalion with UNIFIL in the 1980's.
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situation, this proposal might entail casualties and it would achieve little in the long
term.
What are the consequences for the unit commander concerned? The Force
Commander may decide to take no action." Sometimes a superior officer will weigh
up the pros and cons of any such action, and he or she may decide that it is in the best
overall interest of all concerned if the matter is allowed to rest. This may not always be
an option though, in particular if the authority and reputation of the commander
concerned is at stake. However, if he or she does take action, then the national
government or governments concerned will become involved. The national
government will either support the unit commander's actions, an option which could
ultimately lead to the withdrawal of the whole unit, or the commander will be replaced
pending disciplinary action. In the course of the UNOSOM II mission, when serious
differences arose between the commander of the Italian contingent and the overall
commander of the Force, the Italian government supported the contingent commanders
actions." The backing of the home government is not something the unit commander
could depend upon and in due course the charge could lead to a courts martial for
disobeying a lawful order. In such a case the unit commander could plead that the
order was impossible to carry out or that it was not a lawful order in the first instance.
In the case of UNIFIL, Resolution 426 (1978) lays down the guidelines and terms of
reference for the Force, one of which is that it will not use force except in self-
defence." The defence counsel acting on behalf of the officer charged could therefore
argue that the action proposed taking an initiative involving the use of force, which
was inconsistent with Resolution 426(1978), and for this reason, the order was
unlawful in the first place.
Another possible defence to a charge of disobeying a lawful order is that no
valid chain of command existed between the superior and subordinate officer
concerned. The chain of command is one of the essential features of military
93 This is in fact what happened in the real incident. It was unclear if the Force
Commander gave an actual order, in any event the order/instruction was not carried out as and
when it was intended.
94 The Irish Times, 14,16, 17 and 19 July 1993.
9S UN Document S/12611, op.cit.
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structures and organization. It is the military connection that joins a superior officer to
a subordinate for the legal transfer of orders and instructions. An established chain of
command is the hallmark of all organised military groups and organizations, and is a
prerequisite for the success of any military enterprise, in particular international UN
peacekeeping or similar operations. Once an order or instruction is given, the
appropriate legal authority is vested in the recipient to carry out those orders. The
chain of command is thus a military hierarchy that is common to all armed forces. It
is such an intrinsic part of every military organization that it is easy to take it for
granted, but in a multinational force of any nature, it is one of the more sensitive and
complex issues that needs to be addressed and agreed upon at an early stage.
In the armed forces of most democracies, it is relatively easy to determine the
chain of command from the legislation governing their establishment and operation. It
is not a subject that gives rise to difficulties when different elements of a national
armed force work together as a cohesive group. This is because it is laid down in civil
and military law, and emphasised at every level of training, and in the daily operational
and administrative functioning of the force. Matters can change quickly though, when
forces that do not usually share a combined and unified command structure become
involved in a common enterprise or mission. This can occur when police and military
units come together as part of an aid to the civil power operation, or when units from
different countries and different military traditions, form part of an international UN
force. One of the lessons from the UNOSOM II operation is that in such scenarios, the
issue of command and control is crucial to ensure the overall operational effectiveness
and cohesiveness of the combined operation or force. It was unfortunate the relearning
of this fundamental lesson was at such a price for all involved.
Command and control of Canadian forces
The organization of the military forces of Canada and Ireland is based on the British
regiment concept. There is, however, one important difference regarding participation
in international forces. In almost all cases, Canada deploys entire units on UN service,
while in the case of Ireland, special units are organised and established for
peacekeeping duties. Another important difference between Canadian and Irish force
participation is in the use of reserve forces for UN deployment. Since 1988, Canada
has applied a concept of 'total force', which structurally integrates regular and reserve
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units more and more. As a result, any major deployment of Canadian Forces will
inevitably involve the reserve forces. To date, Irish reserve units and forces have been
precluded from participation in UN operations.
Within the Canadian Forces, the chain of command is a line of authority
extending from the Chief of Defence Staff to the lowest ranking member of the Forces.
Under Canadian municipal and military law, its effect is to link a 'superior officer',
meaning 'any officer or non-commissioned member who, in relation to any other
officer or non-commissioned member, is by [the National Defence Act], or by
regulation or custom of the service, authorised to give lawful command to other officer
or non-commissioned members of the Canadian forces'." No other person, including
ministers and public servants, is part of the chain of military command within
Canadian Forces, nor does any other person have any command authority." From this
it can be seen that the chain of command is clearly delineated, and does not include
anyone outside the armed forces structure and hierarchy. A question that naturally
comes to mind then is, how does Canadian law and the Canadian Forces provide for
troops operating as part of an international UN force, or as part of the North Atlantic
Treaty Alliance?
Command and control, though intrinsically linked and an essential part of any
military organization or coalition of forces, are not synonymous. Command may be
defined as the authority vested in an individual member of the armed forces to direct,
co-ordinate and control military forces." Control is the authority exercised by a
commander over a part of the activities of subordinate organizations of other
organizations not normally under command. The matter of command and control is
much more clearly defined under Canadian law than under Irish law. At first glance it
96 Section 2, National Defence Act, 'Interpretations'. To paraphrase, an 'officer' is a
person who holds Her Majesty's commission in the Canadian Forces, and a 'non-
commissioned member' is any other person enrolled in the Canadian Forces.
97 Report of the Somalia Commission of Enquiry, Vol. 1, 'Structure and Organization of
the Canadian Forces', p.3 of 13.Available at <http.www.dnd.calsomalialsomaliae.html>
98 Department of National Defence[Canada], Joint Doctrine for the Canadian Forces
Joint and Combined Operations, 2-1 and 2-2. See also Report of the Somalia Commission of
Enquiry, Vol. 1, Structure and Organization of the Canadian Forces, op. cit. (n.97), 7 and 8.
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seems that the question of command of the Defence Forces is straightforward, and that
of the Canadian Forces is somewhat more complex. In fact the reality is quite
different. The Governor General of Canada, as the sovereign's representative, is the
overall Commander in Chief of the Canadian Forces. However, civil control of the
Canadian Forces is firmly rooted in the parliamentary system and the cabinet is
responsible to Parliament for, inter alia, formulating and implementing government
defence and security policy. Through the National Defence Act, Parliament has set out
the basic law governing command of the Canadian Forces. Primary authority rests
with the Governor in Council to implement the National Defence Act by regulations
for the organization, training, discipline, efficiency, administration and good
government of Canadian Forces." Under Section 12(2) of the National Defence Act,
the Minister of National Defence has the power to regulate the same matters, but
subject to any regulation made by the Governor in Council and Treasury Board. The
Minister does retain one of the key links within the command framework, Le. he or she
has the power to make regulations governing who commands what and whom, but the
'exercise' of command is then in the hands of the designated commanders subject to
law.
Under Section 18(1) of the National Defence Act, the Governor in Council
may appoint a Chief of the Defence Staff 'who shall subject to the regulations and
under the direction of the Minister, be charged with the control and administration of
the Canadian Forces'. Furthermore, 'command' of and in the Canadian Forces is
confirmed as a military activity that flows through commissioned and non
commissioned officers under Section 18(2):
Unless the Governor in Council otherwise directs, all orders and instructions
to the Canadian Forces that are required to give direction to the decisions and
to carry out the directions of the Government of Canada or the Minister, shall
be issued by or through the Chief of the Defence Staff.
The position of the Chief of Defence Staff is therefore quite powerful, and in
terms of actual command, bestows significant responsibility on the holder of the office.
Although he or she is subject to the Minister's direction in exercising general powers,
it is evident from the legislation that the responsibilities of the Chief of Defence Staff
99 Section 12, National Defence Act.
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are not delegated from the Minister. In fact, the Chief of Defence Staff has
responsibility exclusive of the Minister in three significant areas, the most important of
which in the context of service with international UN forces is the conduct of military
operations.l'" Although the Chief of Defence Staff may assign some command and
administrative responsibilities to subordinate officers, these are not to be confused with
a delegation in law that cannot be further delegated under the maxim delagatus non
potest delagare. The assignment of command is limited by regulation or custom of the
service.i'" One of the central pillars of the command structure and chain of command
is that commanding officers at every level are always responsible for the whole of the
organization they command, and they cannot delegate this overall responsibility to
subordinates.l'F Within these parameters and framework the military chain of
command is formed.
A significant difference in relation to military command and civil control of
the armed forces in Ireland and Canada is in the respective roles of the Canadian Chief
of Defence Staff and the Irish Chief of Staff. Under Canadian law, the minister has
responsibility for the 'management and direction' of the Canadian Forces, whereas the
Chief of Defence Staff has 'control and administration' of the Forces under the
direction of the minister.l'" The distinction between what is meant by management and
administration in this context is not clear, but it is evident that the Parliament chose to
vest 'control' of the Canadian Forces directly in the Chief of Defence Staff with just
one proviso, that it be subject to the direction of the minister.
The role of the Irish Chief of Staff under the Defence Acts is
circumscribed.P" Up to very recently he or she was the holder of a 'principal military
100 Report of the Somalia Commission of Enquiry, Vol. 1, Structure and Organization of
the Canadian Forces, op. cit., (n.97), p.2, The other two areas are in the promotion of members
below the rank of general and in all matters related to aid to the civil power.
101 Section 49, National Defence Act.
102 Queens Regulations and Orders, 4.20(3).
103 Section 3 and Section 4 of the National Defence Act govern the role of the Minister
for National Defence, while Section 18(1) clearly sets the Chief of Defence Staff apart from
the Minister.
104 Sections 11, 12 and 13of the Defence Act, 1954.
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office', and as such was the head of one of the three principal military branches,
namely the branch of the Chief of Staff. The 1954 Act provided that there be two other
branches, and the head of each branch 'shall be directly responsible to the Minister for
the performance of such duties as may from time to time be assigned to him' .105 The
purpose of this division of command was to ensure that no one person within the
Defence Forces was vested with overall command. The heads of all three branches
were directly responsible for the performance of such duties as could from time to time
be assigned to them by the Minister. The Defence (Amendment) Act, 1998 abolished
the old three tier command structure and put in its place a single streamlined system of
command which provided that the Chief of Staff would be accountable only to the
Minister.l'" It did nothing to address the problem of command within international
forces. Although the Minister may also delegate to the Chief of Staff such duties in
connection with the business of the Department of Defence as he or she may from time
to time determine, it is clear that the role of the Chief of Staff is of much less
significance than that of his or her counterpart in the Canadian Forces. Although the
Canadian system vests very significant power in the Chief of Defence Staff, the holder
of this office is directly answerable and responsible to the Parliament. This system
allows for greater Parliamentary supervision of the armed forces, and ensures that no
one minister of a political party in government will exercise too much control. This
system is superior to that operating in Ireland, and could be considered as a model in
the current debate on the reform of the structures and legislative framework governing
the Defence Forces. The enhanced parliamentary control that the Canadian system
provides would be particularly appropriate in Ireland owing to the lack of Dail
supervision in the role and commitments of the Defence Forces.
Canadian military personnel provided to UN controlled operations are put
under the operational control of the UN Force Commander, or it's equivalent, in the
field. He or she has authority to task the Canadian troops within the agreed terms for
which they were provided. Canada, however, retains operational command of its
forces at all times. In practice this does not appear to cause any difficulties, the
105 Ibid.
106 Section 4 of the Defence (Amendment) Act, 1998, which inserted a new Section 13
to the Defence Act, 1954.
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mission of the UN force will be determined by the relevant Security Council, or in
some instances, General Assembly resolution. The Force Commander retains the
authority to direct and deploy Canadian Forces within the parameters set by the overall
mission. Most importantly of all, the Force Commander has tactical control of the
forces on the ground. The concept of operational control is an accepted and convenient
concept to apply in multinational coalitions and international UN forces. It permits a
national government to retain overall operational command of its national armed
forces, while still placing them under the operational control and tactical management
of a military commander outside the national military chain of command.
This is in contrast to the case of Ireland, where troops are supposedly placed
under the command of the UN commander in the field. This is despite the fact that it
may be unconstitutional under Irish law to do so. The Canadian system operates
smoothly in practice. The relevant Canadian laws attach much more importance to the
distinction between operational command and operational control than does Irish law.
Furthermore, the constitutional difficulties that are present in the case of the command
ofIrish troops by non-Irish citizens do not arise in respect of Canadian forces.
Constitutional issues arising in the command of Irish Defence Force personnel
The potential problems in relation to the command of an international force outlined
above could arise in respect of a unit commander of any nationality.l'" The case of
Irish officers serving with UN forces is even more problematic. While the Regulations
of peacekeeping Forces in the Congo and Cyprus provided that in these Forces the
national contingents are under the operational command of the UN Commander, there
was no statutory provision in Irish legislation authorising this position. As a result, a
practice arose whereby the Chief of Staff issued a directive, on the authority of the
Minister for Defence, placing the relevant unit and contingent under the command of
the UN Commander of the Force.lOs There is no statutory basis for the issue of this
107 Draper, op cit., 67-70.
Personal Interview, Lt. Col. Liddy, former Defence Forces Judge Advocate and
Legal Officer, January 1990.
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directive. This is still the practice today with regard to Irish contingents with UN
forces and SFOR in the former Yugoslavia.l'"
The military authorities highlighted the matter when the provisions of the 1960
Act were being considered and drafted.llo The question whether specific provision
should be made in that Act placing the commander of an Irish contingent under the
command of the Commander of a UN Force was also considered. In the event, it was
decided not to include such a provision on the grounds that it could be controversial
and that the operational command referred to in UN regulations should be
distinguished from command in general.l!' The command referred to in the Defence
Act was considered much wider than operational command, and included the authority
to discipline and punish troops. Any provision for operational command would
therefore have to be worded carefully and circumscribed. Furthermore, at that time the
Irish authorities were examining the regulations governing the first UN Emergency
Force and there was no assurance that future peacekeeping forces would be similarly
regulated for.l12 Despite the complexities of providing a statutory basis in Irish law for
distinguishing between the overall command referred to in the Defence Act and
operational command within the context of a UN force, there is a responsibility on the
Irish government to introduce amending legislation. The example of Canada, which
provides for Canadian Forces to be placed under the operational control of a UN
commander in the field, is one model that could be considered. The Minister could
incorporate the different levels of command and control already outlined into Defence
Force Regulations, and the Defence Acts amended to provide for elements to be placed
under the operational command or the operational control of commanders of
international forces organised and established under the authority of the UN. This
would have the merit of reflecting the reality of what is an established current practice,
and giving it a basis in law. One possible disadvantage at present to such a proposal is
that it would be perceived by some groups in Ireland as a precursor to Irish
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
III Ibid.
112 Ibid.
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participation in some kind of European military or security alliance. This may seem
like a good reason for avoiding this potentially controversial issue, but it does not
excuse inaction by successive governments in relation to this fundamental matter of
command.
The command of the Defence Forces is governed by the Irish Constitution
and legislation and statutory regulations made in accordance therewith. The supreme
command of the Defence Forces is vested in the President by virtue of Section 4 of
Article 13 of the Constitution, which states:
4. The supreme command of the Defence Forces is
hereby vested in the President.
Were this to be the sole constitutional provision governing the command of the
Defence Forces, the President would clearly be the supreme commander, rather than a
titular or nominal commander similar to that of many other heads of state.!" However,
two further constitutional provisions are also relevant and qualify the power of the
President in regard to the Defence Forces. Article 13.5.1 states that:
5.1. The exercise of the supreme command shall be regulated by law.
and this is qualified by Article 13.9 which states:
9. The powers and functions conferred on the President by this Constitution
shall be exercisable and performable by him only on the advice of the
government, save where it is provided by this Constitution that he shall act in
his absolute discretion or after consultation with or in relation to the Council
of State, or on the advice or nomination of, or on receipt of any
communication from, any person or body.
In this regard Section 17 of the Defence Act, 1954 makes provision for the
exercise of the supreme command envisaged by Article 13.5.1 as follows:
1. Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland (3nd ed) Dublin: Sweet and Maxwell,
(2000), 79.
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17. (1) Under the direction of the President, and subject to the provisions of
this Act, the military command of, and all executive and administrative powers in
relation to, the Defence Forces, including the power to delegate command and
authority, shall be exercisable by the Government and subject to such exceptions
and limitations as the Government may from time to time determine, through and
by the Minister for Defence.
(2) (a) The delegation of command and authority by the Minister-
(i) may be made subject to such exceptions and limitations as he may from
time to time determine,
(ii) may be in relation to any area, place or state ship or any military body
organized under section 22 and may embrace different components of the
Defence Forces,
(iii) may, during a period of emergency, be in relation to the whole of the
Defence Forces.
(3) The Minister may make regulations, applying to officers, as the
persons to be invested, as officers, with military command over the Defence
Forces or any part thereof or any person belonging thereto and as to the mode in
which such command is to be exercised.
The position of the President in this context appears to be a purely ceremonial
one.'!" This titular position is not unlike that of the Queen under the Canadian
Constitution Act, 1867 which provides that the supreme command is vested in the
Queen as 'Commander-in- Chief ...ofall ...Military Forces.'115 It is evident from the Dail
debates in relation to the Constitution in 1937 that it was intended that the role of the
President be a purely nominal one.116 Nonetheless, the significance of the word 'direction'
114 J.M. Kelly, The Irish Constitution ,(3 rd. ed.) Hogan, G. and Whyte, G., Dublin:
Butterworths, (1994), 90-91. See also D. Gwynn Morgan, Constitutional Law of Ireland, (2nd
ed.), Dublin: Round Hall, (1990), 46-47.
115 Constitution Act, 1867, Part 111, Section 15.
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in Section 17 of the 1954 Act has never been judicially considered. When this is read in
conjunction with Article 13.9 of the Constitution, it would appear that any role over and
above the ceremonial shall be exercised and performed on the advice of the government.
This is the only reasonable interpretation of the role of the President under the
Constitution, and is similar to that of other heads of state, or in the case of commonwealth
countries like Canada, the Sovereign or her representative. In this way the position of the
President as commander is circumscribed by the Constitution as a whole.. It would make
no sense, legally or otherwise, if the President was to play an active part in the command
and control of the Defence Forces on an every day basis. While the 1954 Act gives the
government command and all its concomitant powers, these too must be exercised in
accordance with the Constitution and any laws made there under.
Section 17(3) of the Defence Act, 1954 empowers the Minister for Defence to
make regulations in relation to the exercise of military command by officers. Section 2 of
Act defines the expression 'non commissioned officer' and the word 'officer,' when
used without qualification, as referring exclusively to a man of the Defence Forces and
a person holding commissioned rank in the Defence Forces respectively. The Force
Commander of a UN force is not normally a member of the Defence Forces, although
from time to time Irish officers have held such a position. Section 17(3) refers
exclusively to officers of the Defence Forces. This Section empowers the Minister for
Defence to make regulations in relation to the exercise of military command by
officers.'!" It does not empower the Minister to issue directives or make regulations
authorising persons who are not members of the Defence Forces, to exercise command
over any part thereof, or persons belonging thereto. Neither the Constitution, nor the
Defence Act, distinguishes operational command from military command. Although
the matter has not been judicially considered, there is a strong case to be made that the
'military command' referred to in the Act is an all embracing concept which includes,
inter alia, national command and operational command as generally understood
116 Mr. de Valera said on 26 May 1937: 'In regard to the position here that the supreme
command of the Defence Forces should be vested in the President, it is quite clear that it is
only nominal. It could only be nominal. Any powers that he might exercise there will have to
be exercised under the Constitution, and, therefore, any power that he might exercise in virtue
of that vesting will have to be exercised on the direct advice of the Government'. Dail Debates
67, (1222), 26 May 1937.
111 These are in the form of Defence Force Regulations or General Routine Orders.
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internationally. If it were otherwise, then 'military command' under the Act would
have little practical significance.
The Constitution also states that all commissioned officers of the Defence
Forces shall hold their commissions from the President.!" The form of commission
issued to an officer upon appointment refers to 'such lawful orders and directions as
you shall from time to time receive from the Minister for Defence, or from any of your
superior officers'. 119 Furthermore, Section 131 of the Defence Act, 1954, which deals
with the offence of disobedience to a superior officer, refers to 'a lawful command of a
superior officer' .120 The words 'superior officer' and 'lawful' are very significant in
these provisions. An officer of any other national or international force who is not a
member of the Defence Forces is not a superior officer for the purposes of the Act and
is therefore not vested with any statutory authority to issue a lawful command to
Defence Forces personnel. In order to enable the Force Commander of UNIFIL or a
similar UN force exercise lawful command over that portion of the Defence Forces
forming part of the peacekeeping Force, it is essential that he or she be vested with
lawful command. The current procedure, whereby the Minister for Defence directs the
Chief of Staff to issue a directive to a unit commander purporting to place the unit
under the operational command of the Force Commander, is ultra vires the Minister,
without, at the very least, a statutory basis on which to authorise it. It seems that the
Minister has, as a matter of convenience, presumed to define 'military command' in
such a way as to delimit its scope and significance.
It is self evident that any Minister who acts in an unconstitutional fashion will
thereby exceed jurisdiction and authority.V' Even ifit was found by the Courts that the
Minister was not acting unconstitutionally, a result that would be by no means certain,
the question arises whether the Minister is acting within powers conferred by statute
118 Article 13.5.2°of Bunreachtna hEireann (The Irish Constitutionof 1937).
119 This is set out in the Fifth Schedule to the DefenceAct, 1954.
120 Section 131 states: 'Every person subject to military law who disobeys a lawful
commandof a superior officer is guilty of an offence againstmilitary law ..... '.
121 See the commentsof Henchy, J. in The State (Holland) v Kennedy [1977]Irish Reports
193,201 and The State (Byrne) v Frawley [1978] Irish Reports 326, 345 and those of Walsh, J.
inShelley v Malum [1990]Irish Reports. 36, 45.
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i.e. the Defence Acts. There have been a number of cases in recent years where the
courts have set aside decisions by Ministers on the grounds that they were not
authorised.F' Section 17 of the Act does not empower the Minister to issue directives
or to make regulations authorising persons who are not members of the Defence
Forces, to exercise command over any part thereof, or persons belonging thereto.
Furthermore, the administrative act in question does not appear to be reasonably
incidental to or within an implicit powers conferred by the ACt.123
The Minister's action in directing the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces to
issue a command directive as outlined may also infringe the principle delegatus non
potest delegare, Le. a power may only be delegated to a body or persons other than that
designated by the Oireachtas if this is authorised, expressly or by implication, by the
legislation in question.i'" It cannot be transferred to any other person or body. In
relation to this rule of statutory construction it has been said that:
Whether a person other than that named in the empowering statute is
empowered to act will be dependent upon the entire statutory context, taking
into account the nature of the subject matter, the degree of control retained by
the person delegating and the types of person or body to whom the power is
delegated.125
The question of the command of the Defence Forces must be examined in the
context of the Defence Act, 1954 as a whole. When the nature and importance of
command of the Defence Forces is considered along with the lack of control exercised
by the Minister over those elements of the Forces placed under the command of the
122 Meade v Cork County Council, Supreme Court, July 31, 1974. Reidy v Minister for
Agriculture & Food, High Court, June 9, 1989. Devitt v Minister for Education [1989] Irish
LawReports Monthly 696.
See G. Hogan and D. Morgan, Administrative Law in Ireland, (3 rd Ed), Dublin:
RoundHall Sweet and Maxwell, (1998), 394.
123
For an example of the principle see O'Neill v Beaumont Hospital Board [1990] Irish
LawReports Monthly 419. See generallyHogan and Morgan, op. cit., 328-330and 396-400.
124
125 P. Craig, Administrative Law, (3rd. ed.), London: Sweet and Maxwell, (1989), 386.
See also H. Wade & C. Forsyth, Administrative Law, (7 tho ed), Oxford: Clarendon, (1994),
884
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UN, it follows that neither the Minister nor the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces,
have any right to delegate command in the manner currently prescribed.
The question of command is rendered more uncertain in the case of UNIFIL
owing to the fact that there have been no Regulations published for that force to date.
In 1981, the directive issued by the Chief of Staff was amended to take account of this,
however, the fundamental problem outlined remains.l'" It cannot be circumvented or
resolved by what amounts to little more than tinkering with the words The directive
depends, to some extent, for its validity on the existence of a parallel UN instrument
regulating the designation of the chain of command from the Force Commander. In
the absence of this link, it is difficult to see how an identifiable command structure can
be maintained. When the matter was queried, the opinion of the UN Secretariat was
that the delegation of command within UNIFIL in general is in accordance with the
normal military custom as applicable to an integrated command.F' It was considered
that power to determine chain of command was inherent in the Force Commander's
exercise of command in the field in accordance with the guidelines laid down, and it
did not require further elaboration.I"
In fact, the guidelines merely stipulate that a Force Commander will exercise
command in the field.129 It therefore appears that in the absence of UN regulations for
UNIFIL empowering the Force Commander to designate the chain of command and to
delegate his authority, the command structure within the Force has not been formally
established.P" The fact that this has not caused any particular difficulty in the
operation of the Force to date is due to the professionalism and commitment of those
who have served in UNIFIL. A 'gentleman's agreement' or 'understanding' is surely
not a sufficient legal basis for the exercise of command in an international UN force.
In the circumstances, it is desirable that the Secretary-General issue UNIFIL
126 Personal interview, senior Irish amy officer, Anny Headquarters, October 1997.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 UN Document S/12611, op. cit., para 4(a).
130 Bowett, op. cit., 115-117.
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regulations governing the designation of the chain of command and empowering the
Force Commander to delegate his authority.
The question of command of a UN force as envisaged under the Defence
(Amendment) Act, 1993 may be even more problematic than that of a traditional
peacekeeping force. In the course of the Dim Debate on the new legislation Deputy
Taylor-Quinn put the question succinctly when she enquired ' ... what the command
structure and rules of engagement will be [for the UN force in Somalia, UNOSOM II]
who will be giving the orders?,131 These matters have been the subject of considerable
controversy. The issue was most recently evaded and fudged in the debate regarding
participation in KFOR, with a statement by the Minister that the command and control
arrangements were analogous to that of SFOR in Bosnia-Hertzgovinia.P'' What exactly
are the arrangements for SFOR? This is the kind of question to which a clear and
satisfactory answer is not possible in the present circumstances. The question of
command of multinational forces has been a difficult issue for major powers
participating in such forces. While the broader issues of command of international
forces are outside the scope and competence of Irish municipal law, the overall
uncertainty regarding the command of UN forces is exacerbated in respect of Defence
Forces personnel by the failure of successive governments to attempt any resolution of
the potential difficulties outlined.
Conclusion
In the case of UNIFIL, no formal SOFA was concluded until late 1995, and the
Secretary-General has not issued any Force Regulations. The status of the Force and
other matters relating to its operation and establishment initially had to be interpreted
by reference to the terms of reference, general considerations and guidelines for
UNIFIL laid down by the Secretary-General and approved by the Security Council in
Resolution 426 (1978).133 This contained considerable less detail than formal
agreements concluded for other peacekeeping forces. Instead, UNIFIL relied on a
series of standing operating procedures that lay down guidelines and define the method
131 DAil Debates 433, (600-601), 1 July 1993.
132 nsn Debates 507, (852-869 at 857), 1 July 1999.
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by which the operation is conducted. Although issued on behalf of the Force
Commander, their legal basis is questionable. In practice, reference was made to the
SOFA and Regulations governing the UN Force in CypruS.134 The SOFA has resolved
much of the initial legal uncertainty. But the legal obligation on members of the Irish
Defence Forces to obey the UNIFIL standing operating procedures remains uncertain,
as they have no status under Irish military law, and they do not form part of the
municipal law of Ireland. A similar situation pertains with regard to UN standing
operating procedures under Canadian law, they have no legal status and Canadian
forces are not obliged to obey them.
One relatively simple method of resolving the legal difficulties created by
these standing operating procedures is for contingent or unit commanders concerned to
examine their content and effect. If there is nothing illegal or contrary to the municipal
law of the contributing state, then the commanding officer should sign them, and in
this way incorporate them into contingent or unit regulations. Few legal problems are
amenable to such simple solutions, and when they are not illegal, there seems to be
little reason not to incorporate them into unit regulations.
Arising from a number of incidents that occurred during Canadian
participation in the UN operation in Somalia, Canada established a major federal
Commission of Inquiry into all aspects of its involvement in this mission. The
recommendations and conclusions were very critical of certain personnel, and the
overall 'system' in operation at the time. Some of these criticisms may have been
unduly harsh. In any event, countries like Ireland could take many of the
recommendations on board. Somalia remains one of the most controversial UN
missions in recent times. Ireland was fortunate to remain unscathed by the
controversies that have also involved Belgian, Italian and United States armed forces.
The reality for all countries involved is that Somalia proved a mission impossible.
Despite the complexities of providing a statutory basis in Irish law for
distinguishing between the overall command referred to in the Defence Act and
operational command and/or within the context of a UN force, there is a responsibility
on the Irish government to revise existing legislation. The example of Canada, which
133 See UN Document S/12611, op. cit. and Resolution 426, 19March 1978.
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provides for Canadian Forces to be placed under the operational control of a UN
commander in the field, is one model that could be considered. Defence Force
Regulations could be introduced by the Minister providing for different levels of
command and control, and the Defence Acts amended to provide for elements to be
placed under the operational command or the operational control of commanders of
international forces organised and established under the authority of the UN.
The Canadian experience can also be relevant to Ireland in other apparently
less significant contexts. For example, Canadian Forces doctrine has consistently
stated that any major deployment of Canadian Forces will include a legal officer to
advise the Canadian Commander on all legal matters, including the application of
international humanitarian law. In recent years, the practice of sending an Irish legal
officer to accompany units with the UNIFIL has been discontinued. This was done
without proper consultation, and without considering all of the implications.P'' In
particular, the level of human rights and humanitarian law training and education in the
Canadian Forces is greater than that in the Defence Forces. In Ireland, operational,
financial and political considerations have been paramount, but these should not be
allowed to deflect from other areas.
In the final analysis, it may be that the problem confronting Canadian and
Irish participation in the more pro-active peacekeeping and enforcement action
missions of today is capability and capacity to participate. The current rationalisation
and 'downsizing' of armed forces throughout the developed world will undoubtedly
impact on the capacity of countries to participate in UN forces. This may be an even
more important determiner of mission success than the nature of the conflict for which
intervention is being considered. Canada, despite membership of NATO, does not
appear to have compromised its status as a 'middle power.' As the European Union
moves closer to some form of security and defence arrangements, and Ireland opts to
join the NATO sponsored Partnership for Peace, Ireland must look to countries like
Canada in assessing the political and legal implications of such changes.
From the point of vies of Ireland; the issue of command and control is even
more complex in the context of the recent SFOR and KFOR missions. At the time of
134 Rosetti, op. cit. (n.l8.)
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writing, the highest-ranking Defence Force officer in Kosovo is currently a Lieutenant
Colonel; there is no staff or other officer in the headquarters.Y" The chain of
command is directly from the Force Commander to the Irish contingent commander on
the ground. This may be unconstitutional, and lor contrary to military law, as the
Force Commander is neither a 'superior officer' nor a member of the Defence Forces
as required by the Defence Act, 1954. In any event, this is an unsatisfactory situation.
Command and control issues are also foremost in the minds of NATO political and
military leaders. For this reason NATO is alert to the need to 'be careful not to
subordinate NATO to any other international body or compromise the integrity of its
command structure,.m The current force in Kosovo is UN mandated. If the NATO led
operation is not subordinate to the UN, then what is its relationship with the Security
Council? This depends on where the real concentration of power is based? It is not
with the Secretary-General, and nor is it with the Security Council. This is a NATO
led and de facto NATO commanded operation. There is no strategic direction from the
Military Staff Committee, and the reality is that the Security Council is merely kept
informed.
Revision of the legal framework of UN peacekeeping operations is long
overdue. The ad hoc and improvised structures and procedures are a source of concern
and potential difficulty. Usually these forces have enough to contend with on the
ground besides the ineptness of their own organization. In all of the Western armed
forces, unity of command is axiomatic.138 While it may be difficult to appreciate the
full significance of this principle, there is a strong argument to be made that as long as
the UN Organization wishes to use a military force as a peacekeeping or peace
135 Personal interview, Defence Forces Legal Officer, March, 1998.
November 1999. In fact, the officer commanding is Commandant M. Gibson, who
has been promoted acting Lieutenant Colonel for the duration of his tour of duty with KFOR.
136
137 See Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott on NATO's future 'Stategic Concept',
in B. Simma, 'NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects', 10 European Journal of
International Law, (1999) 1-22, 15. See also A. Cassesse, 'Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We
Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the
World Community?', 10 European Journal of International Law, (1999), 23-30; and K.
Ambos, 'NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects. A comment on Sirnma and
Cassese', Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Humanitares Volkderrecht, No.2, (1999),114-115.
138 Bowett, op. cit., 341
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enforcement mechanism, the principle must be maintained. It is essential to the
success of a military operation that a valid chain of command be authorised. For this
reason, there is an onus on the UN Secretariat and the Irish government to resolve the
question of command, especially in regard to UNIFIL where over six hundred troops
currently serve. The situation prevailing for Canadian Forces has much merit and is a
pragmatic attempt to balance the needs of the mission with that of the Canadian
requirement to retain overall national command of the armed forces. In general, the
record in this area with peacekeeping forces seems to have been excellent. This owes
much to the professionalism and commitment of those involved. However, events in
the Congo operation, and more recently in Somalia, show that the consensus required
to maintain this may not always be present.i"
139 Ibid., 343.
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Chapter 6
THE POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND TO THE
ESTABISHMENT OF UNIFIL IN LEBANON, AND THE UNITAF AND
UNOSOM MISSIONS IN SOMALIA.
Introduction
The chapter examines the background to the establishment of the UN mandated
military forces in Lebanon and Somalia. Its purpose is to explain how the
background influenced the outcome of the operations, and the central role played
by the United States throughout, the primary contention being that the lack of
support from the permanent members of the Security Council, especially the
United States, undermined the political base and viability of the operations from
the beginning. Apart from the loss of life on all sides, the real tragedy of the
United States and UN intervention in Somalia was the failure to learn the right
lessons. Events in Somalia should not be used to discredit UN led peace support
operations, or to deny the imperative to respond that global human rights crises
such as that of Rwanda will present.
There are as many contrasts as there are comparisons in the form of
peacekeeping adopted to deal with the conflicts that arose in Lebanon and
Somalia. In the case of Lebanon, the mandate adopted was controversial and it
was considered to be deficient in a number of respects. UNIFIL emerged from
difficult negotiations that required a compromise by the parties to the conflict.
While it was deployed with undue haste against the advice of many commentators
at the time, its survival in what were often very difficulty circumstances is
testimony to the wisdom and astuteness of those charged with implementing the
mandate. However, this should not be seen as a reflection on the appropriateness
of the UNIFIL mission and mandate.
The UN operations in Somalia were more ambitious in comparison, and
they involved significantly more resources. Initially at least, they were also less
controversial. The consensus and enthusiasm for involvement in Somalia
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changed quickly as 'mission creep' set in and doubts were expressed about the
efficacy of UN policy there. In order to analyze and appreciate the way events
unfolded in respect of each mission, it is necessary to start at the beginning and
examine the background to the establishment and deployment of the respective
UN forces. It was at this stage that the foundation and overall policies were
adopted that determined the response to the sometimes almost impossible
scenarios presented in each mission area.
In his first report to the Security Council on UNIFIL, the Secretary-
General outlined the three essential conditions that needed to be met for the Force
to be effective. First, it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of
the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full co-operation of all
the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and
efficient military unit.!" In 1983, the now retired Under Secretary-General of the
UN with special responsibility for peacekeeping operations, Mr. Brian Urquhart,
elaborated upon this when writing about the Multi National Force in Beirut and
stated that successful peacekeeping depends, inter alia, on a sound political base,
a well defined mandate and objectives, and the co-operation of the parties
concerned.177 The requirement of a well defined mandate and objectives was a
somewhat glaring omission from the Secretary-General's otherwise pragmatic
report.!" Using these factors as criteria, the chapter focuses on the political and
diplomatic background to the establishment and deployment of the UN forces in
Lebanon and Somalia. It examines the challenges and dilemmas that confronted
the UN forces, especially when the parties to the conflict failed to provide the
176 Document S/12611, 19March 1978,para 3.
177 The New York Times, 19December 1983.
178 The recently published Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations,
UN, 23 August 2000 (Brahimi Report, A/55/305-S/2000/809 available from
<http.www.un.org.», recommendedthat UN peacekeepers have, inter alia, 'clear, credible
and achievable mandates'. The Secretary-General urged world leaders to join him in
implementing the far-reaching changes in the structures and management of UN peace
operationsrecommended,Press Release,UN, 23 August 2000.
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required level of support, and the deficiencies in the organization and structure of
those forces.
Factors influencing the decision to deploy UN forces in Lebanon and Somalia
When the Lebanese civil war was at its height during 1975 and 1976, serious
efforts were made to determine the feasibility and value of establishing a UN
peacekeeping force there. However, no such force was established after strong
reservations were expressed regarding its practicality in what was essentially a
civil war situation.F" There were similar reservations with regard to any form of
UN intervention in Somalia on the same grounds, with the added dimension that
Somalia was of no strategic or other significance to the members of the Security
Council. There were also financial considerations to be taken into account, and
there was substantial resistance at first from the United States and Russia to plans
for a more proactive UN policy in Somalia as both countries were in substantial
arrears in peacekeeping accounts even before the operation began.l" In both
Lebanon and Somalia, the actual decision to intervene was taken against a
background of ongoing civil war and a state imploding on itself. In the case of
Lebanon, the decisive factor was that of third party intervention, namely the
Israeli invasion of south Lebanon in 1978. 181 At that time there was no real
effective government, and the south of the country was dominated by Palestinian
Lecture delivered by Maj. Gen. E. A. Erskine on UNIFIL and UNDOF at the
International Peace Academy Seminar, Lagos, April 1979, 7.
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180 Hence they insisted that early involvement be limited to humanitarian
operations, which are financed within the regular UN budget. H. Cohen, 'Intervention in
Somalia', in A. E. Goodman, (ed.), The Diplomatic Record, 1992-1993, Boulder:
Westview Press, (1994), 54.
181 Security Council document S/12600, 15 May 1978. The Israeli invasion did not
come as a surprise and many commentators had predicted some form of large scale Israeli
military action against the PLO. See K. Whittingham's report in 81 Middle East
International, (March 1978), 16-18. The raid had been the subject of considerable adverse
comment in the Israeli media, see Time magazine, 27 March 1978.
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forces in and around the old city of Tyre, in an area often referred to as the 'Iron
Triangle' .182
In common with most problems of this nature brought before the
Security Council, the parties to the conflict in Lebanon only sought a solution to
the problem within the framework of the UN when the problem otherwise proved
insoluble. In this context, the major player not a direct party to the conflict was
the United States. Yet its role in the conflict in both Lebanon and Somalia was
crucial, but in each case for different reasons. In the case of Lebanon, the real
agenda was the Middle East peace process, but in Somalia it is difficult to discern
any ulterior motive apart from recognizing and living up to its responsibilities as
a major power, and a desire to rebuild the institutions of state in a war torn
society. Though the policy of replicating western democratic values in east
Africa should not be underestimated, humanitarian disaster was the primary
motivation for the UN and the United States major post cold war intervention in
Somalia.l'" The situation in Somalia was not some unresolved international
problem deriving from the cold war. But the cold war had helped shape the crisis
that led to UN intervention in 1992. The aftermath of the inter clan fighting had
left it without any semblance of a state, and with no one party or clan that could
conveniently be treated as the legitimate government and provide the UN with the
'consent' required for the deployment of a peacekeeping force. This left the
Organization with a number of serious dilemmas, one of the more significant of
which was with whom to negotiate in the circumstances.
In any event, after the attempt to deploy an effective peacekeeping force
failed, the consequent intervention planned for Somalia had no clear precedent in
182 See E. A. Erskine,Mission with UNIFIL, London:Hurst, (1989), 117.
183 See J. Mayall (ed.), The new interventionism 1991- 1994; UN experience in
Cambodia. former Yugoslavia. and Somalia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
(1996), 9; R. Thakur, 'From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: the UN Operation in
Somalia', 39 (3) The Journal of Modern African Studies, (1994), 387-410 at 388; J.
Hirsch and R. Oakley, op. cit., xviii and A. Natsios, 'Humanitarian Relief Interventions in
Somalia: the Economics of Chaos', 3(1) International Peacekeeping, (Spring, 1996), 68-
91. For an alternativepoint of view, and in many ways a more compelling arguement, see
Mohamed Diriye Abdullahi, Fiasco in Somalia: US-UN intervention. Africa Institute of
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UN peacekeeping practice. The force could not be deployed at the request or the
consent of a host government, or on the bases of an agreement between the
parties. For that reason, the Security Council had to invoke the enforcement
provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN for the United States led
multinational force (UNIT AF) and for UNOSOM II.184 This was the first
occasion this was done in order to deal with a conflict within a state's borders. It
took place in the slipstream of success generated by the dramatic result of
Operation Desert Storm. A fundamental matter that did not seem to be
appreciated in full was the fact that the situation in Somalia was nothing like that
of the Gulf War. The latter conflict had arisen from a classical act of aggression
by one state against another and it constituted a text book example of the illegal
use of force against the territorial integrity of Kuwait. It was against this
background of optimism and hope for the effective functioning of the UN that the
decision to launch one of the most complex and challenging UN operations in the
post cold war era was taken.
The decision to intervene and deploy a UN military force, like the nature
of the actual force ultimately established, was very different in the case of
Lebanon in 1978 and Somalia in 1992. Neither crisis had developed overnight,
and there had been many calls for assistance on the basis of the threat posed to the
respective regions by the civil wars and the humanitarian disaster unfolding in
Somalia in particular. Both crisis also shared a common handicap from the
beginning, in that the real focus of attention was elsewhere when it was decided
to deploy UN military personnel. In the case of Lebanon, the United States
administration was primarily concerned with the Egyptian Israeli peace treaty and
the Camp David Accords. In the early 1990's on the other hand, the Somalia
crisis happened at a time when the world's attention was drawn to the break up of
the Soviet Union and the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia. By the
time the international media brought attention to bear on the plight of the people
SouthAfrica, OccasionalPaper No. 61, (1995), 12-15.
See The UN and Somalia 1992-1996, UN Blue Book Series, Vol. VIII, New
York:UN, (1996), 4.
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of Somalia in 1992, the Somali state had ceased to exist and the people there
sought the only security they could find from the clan system.l'"
The UN was often blamed for failing to resolve an intractable problem not
of its making in Lebanon, and for failing to fulfill its ambitious programme in
Somalia. It is all too easy place the blame on an international organization that
even its strongest defenders accepted had weaknesses. However, the UN can only
succeed if it given the support and the means to do so. When it appears to fail,
the permanent members of the Security Council are quick to point the finger at
the Organization itself and thereby deflect attention away from themselves.!"
But it was the Security Council, in particular the United States, that originally
sponsored the initiative to establish UNIFIL, and failed to give the Force the
support it both deserved and needed to be effective. Furthermore, neither the
United States nor the Soviet Union put sufficient pressure on their respective
allies in the Middle East region to co-operate with UNIFIL. From the outset it
was clear the Force required that certain essential conditions be fulfilled before it
could be effective.l'" In particular, it required the co-operation of the parties
concerned. The actual fulfillment of these conditions was largely outside either
the Secretary-General's or the Force's control. This was one of the primary
reasons for the apparent inability of UNIFIL to carry out its mandate. In Somalia,
after initial hesitancy, the United States became one of the main backers of the
operation. But the American aspirations for UN involvement were not matched
by willingness to take the necessary risks or commit more resources than was
deemed necessary to fulfill what were defined and limited objectives. In the end,
the United States effectively terminated the operation having hijacked aspects of
the mission when its own unilateral actions backfired. The Clinton
J. Hirsch and R Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, Washington: US
Institute of Peace, (1995), 9.
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186 See Simon Jenkins, 'Out of the Valley of Death', The Times, 20 April 1994.
187 Security Council document S/12611, 19 March 1978, para. 3.
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administration, in a classic damage limitation and deflection exercise, blamed the
UN for what amounted to deficiencies in American policies.l'"
Security Council considerations and the decision to intervene.
The case of Somalia
Peacekeeping in Somalia, if that is the correct term, was complex and difficult. In
effect it was a mixture of peacekeeping, peace making, peace enforcement and
nation building, There were so many changes of direction and strategic goals that
it is not possible to generalize. Initially, policy directions decided by the Bush
Administration were changed by the Clinton Administration. Somalia brought
the terms 'mission creep' and crossing the 'Mogadishu line' into the everyday
vernacular of commentators and observers.l'" With the full backing of the United
States, the Secretary-General and the Security Council embarked on an expansive
and ambitious programme which many in Somali perceived as an attempt to
establish a de [acto trusteeship.l'" The result of these series of UN military
engagements in Somalia was to bequeath a legacy that profoundly affected United
States and UN policy on peacekeeping and related matters thereafter."!
See Boutros Boutros-Ghali,Unvanquished: A US -UN Saga, New York: Random
House, (1999),105,107 and 119-120.
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189 The phrase 'crossing the Mogadishu line' was reputedly coined by Lt. Gen.
Michael Rose, former British commander of UNPROFOR. It refers to when a
peacekeeping force adopts robust rules of engagement, loses its impartiality and becomes
more of a peace enforcement operation. See generally W. Shawcross, Deliver Us from
Evil, London: Bloomsbury, (2000), 65-124and 189-221.
190 J. Hirsch andR. Oakley, op. cit., xix.
16 See generally, I. Daalder, 'Knowing when to Say No: The Development of US
Policy for Peacekeepers', and W. Durch 'Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the
1990's'in W. Durch (ed.), Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars a/the
1990's, London: Macmillan, (1997), 1-34and 35-68 respectively; also T. Farrell, 'Sliding
into War: The Somalia Imbroglio and US Army Peace Operations Doctrine', 2 (2)
International Peacekeeping (F. Cass), (Summer 1995),194-214.
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The UN was deeply involved III Somalia, particularly in the field of
humanitarian assistance, well before it ever considered deploying military
observers and peacekeepers in 1992.192 Although there is a long history to the
conflict, it was the overthrow of the regime of Said Barre in January 1991 that
marked a significant stage in the deterioration of the overall situation there.193 The
withdrawal of UN relief agencies in early 1991 was a fatal decision for the people
of Somalia. At this stage, although lawlessness and anarchy were rampant,
famine was not widespread. The necessity for some form of non coercive
intervention by the UN to prevent the humanitarian situation worsening was
obvious.l'"
The slow response of the UN inevitable meant lost opportunities for
mediation and preventive diplomacy at an earlier stage. Such approaches have a
fairly good chance of success without great expense and the need for a large
military presence. 195 However, the lack of an early and effective response must
be considered in the context of other events happening at that time. Despite the
end of the cold war, the UN still faced crippling financial difficulties, and its
peacekeeping role was over stretched dealing with, among others, major events in
the former Yugoslavia and in Cambodia. At first the deployment of UN military
192 The UN and Somalia 1992-1996, op. cit., 15.
193 For a good general background seeM.D. Abdullahi,op. cit., 1-11. See also The
UN and Somalia, op. cit. 9-13; HumanRightsWatch/Africa,7 (2) Somalia Faces the
Future - Human Rights in a Fragmented Society, (April 1995), 13-16; Lee V. Cassanelli,
'Somali Land Resources Issues in HistoricalPerspective', in W. Clarke and J. Herbst,
Learning From Somalia, Boulder:WestviewPress, (1997), 67-7.6;andM. H. Brons,
Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State: From Statelessness to Statelessness?, Utrecht:
InternationalBooks, (2001).
See T. Deagle, 'Famine threatens Somali capital as thousands of refugees flock
in', The Times (London), 23 May 1991, 11. See alsoM. D. Abdullahi,op. cit., 8-9.
194
195 For three instances where early interventionmight have been successful, see M.
Sahnoun, Somalia - The Missed Opportunities, United States Institute of Peace,
Washington DC, (1994), 5-11. See also T. Mockaitis, 'Civil Conflict Intervention:
Peacekeeping or Enforcement?', in A. Morrison, D. Fraser & J. Kiras (eds.) Peacekeeping
With Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution, Cornwallis:Canadian
PeacekeepingPress, (1997), 31-50 at 37.
183
forces in Somalia was somewhat more subtle than that of Lebanon. Intervention
in a civil war or internal conflict situation presents special difficulties, and this
explained in large part the view of those at UN headquarters that the response
should be limited to the delivering humanitarian aid. This view was also
significantly influenced by the United States and Russian reluctance to become
involved.!" This was not unlike the policy and reluctance of the UN with regard
to intervention in Lebanon also.!" In fact, the possibility of a peacekeeping or
similar initiative by the UN was not even considered at first. The issue of state
sovereignty hampered efforts to decide on a plan of action as there was no
government to request assistance or give its consent, and intervention was not
favoured by the Organization of African Unity.
In early 1992, in a somewhat belated attempt to respond to the crisis, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 733(1992) which imposed a mandatory arms
embargo and strongly urged the various armed factions to observe a cease fire.198
It still amounted to a less than enthusiastic response from the Security Council to
the situation in Somalia, and the resolution was little more than an expanded
humanitarian and diplomatic effort. In a country awash with weaponry of all
kinds, such a resolution was bound to have little practical effect, but it did create
the impression that the international community was responding to the crisis.
Early mediation efforts had limited success but did secure agreement on a
cease-fire between the leaders of two major factions, General Aided and Ali
Mahdi, and the deployment of a UN technical team. Although any agreement on
a cease fire was welcome, it was vague in some crucial respects. In particular, it
was not evident which of the warring factions was included, and it left most of the
country unaffected.!" It also had the unintended effect of focusing on Mogadishu
196 Cohen, loe. cit. n. 2.
197 Interview, Sahnoun,op. cit.
198 Resolution 733 of23 January 1992, paras. 4 and 5.
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to the detriment of the remainder of the country. It may even have intensified the
rivalry for control between Aided and Mhadi in the city, and it allowed each in
tum to claim legitimacy through dealing with the UN. Local clan leaders and
elders felt excluded from the process, and that the problems of the remainder of
the country were not recognized.i'" This factors complicated the task later
undertaken by the UN of rebuilding the state and involving all the parties in the
negotiations to achieve this.
Although the policy of dealing with leaders like Aided and Mhadi was
based on pragmatic considerations, it ignored their record as leaders of groups
that were responsible for gave breaches of human rights and humanitarian law
during the conflict.'?' The UN emphasis on the importance of a good working
relationship with all the parties may be a barrier to confronting recalcitrant
leaders effectively.202 Even worse was the fact that the policy was inconsistent
throughout the period and 'wavered between identification of the war leaders as
the primary decision-makers in Somali political life, and dubbing them mere
terrorists. ,203Such policy shifts did little to inspire confidence among traditional
Somali leaders and elders, and it must of been somewhat bewildering for the 'war
199 This cease-fire was signed in New York on 14 February 1992. Signatories
represented the 'Interim Government of Somalia'and the Central Committee of the United
SomaliCongress, SecurityCouncil documentS/23693, II March 1992.
200 Personal interview, Ambassador Sahnoun, Dublin, November, 1993.Aided also
manipulated Jonah's visit so that no contact was made with neutral clans such as the
Murasade who had played a central role in resolving earlier fighting. Jonah may also
have compromisedUN neutrality by declaring Aided the greatest obstacle to cease-fire in
the war AfricaWatch, 'A Fight to the Death?" 13February 1993,7-10.
See Human Rights Watch/Africa, 7 (2) Somalia Faces the Future - Human
Rights in a Fragmented Society, (ApriI1995), 17-32.
201
202 According to Stedman and Rothchild, in Angola, Cambodia and Rwanda
appeasementwas an inefficient and morally bankrupt policy. Appeasement cannot work if
the targeted party interprets it as weakness, S. Stedman and D. Rothchild, 'Peace
Operations: From Short -Term to Long-Term Commitment', in Jeremy Ginifer (ed.),
Beyond Emergencies - Development Within Peacekeeping Missions, 3 (2) International
Peacekeeping, (Summer 1996), 17-35at 24. See also Ratner, op. cit., 200-202.
203 Ibid. 6.
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leaders' also. There were other less obvious factors at play in the lead up to UN
intervention. Aided was opposed to any deployment of UN personnel and to a
cease fire.204 He perceived this as a means of freezing the status quo and
preventing him from defeating Madhi, which he considered he was in a position
to do in a relatively short time. There was also significant animosity between
Aided and the new Secretary-General.i'" This went back to the time when
Boutros-Ghali was the Egyptian minister responsible for foreign policy at a time
when the Egyptian government supported the Siad Barre regime. This 'baggage',
or personality factor, was to significantly influence events throughout the period
of UN involvement.
The case of Lebanon
The controversy surrounding the actual adoption of Resolution 425( 1978)
establishing UNIFIL provides important clues to understanding the problems
confronted by the Force on the ground. 206 In addition, the mandate given the
Force by the Security Council has not changed since 1978, and this is in stark
contrast to the changes in the mandates and actual forces deployed in Somalia.
Again, it was the United States that did the work behind the scenes and then made
204 See 1. Drysdale, 'Foreign Military Intervention in Somalia: The Root Cause of
the Shift fromUN Peacekeeping to Peacemakingand Its Consequences', W. Clarke and 1.
Herbst, op. cit., 118-134at 121.
20S Interview, Sahnoun, op. cit. and J. Hirsch and R. Oakley, op. cit., 19. See also
M. D. Abdullahi,op. cit., 21. Egyptian geopolitical policies sought, inter alia, a unitary
Somali state as a counterweight to Ethiopian power in the region. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
refers to false stories circulated about him, especially regarding an alleged confiscation of a
farm in Somalia by Aided, but he makes no reference to this old animosity, Boutros
Boutros-Ghali,op.cit.
206 This demanded strict respect for Lebanon's territorial integrity and called upon
Israel immediately to cease its military activity and withdraw its troops. It also
authorised the establishment of UNIFIL for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of
Israeli forces; restoring international peace and security; and assisting the Government
of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. For the full text of
SecurityCouncil Resolution425 (1978) seeAppendixA.
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the formal proposal to establish a peacekeeping force.207
The Lebanese government's strategy at this time was to internationalise
and highlight the problem and thereby extricate itself from the regional conflict
taking place in Lebanon between Israel, the Palestinians and Syria.208 With this
in mind it successfully obtained UN support for the establishment of a
peacekeeping force in the south. The various contributions to the debate in the
Security Council showed that while there was general support for the
establishment of a peacekeeping force, there was no general consensus on what
the mandate of such a Force should be or how the Force should carry out this
mandate. Furthermore, all parties involved were critical of various aspects of
Resolution 425 (1978) itself. Even at this very early stage in the creation of the
Force, the lack of political consensus within the Security Council, which was to
hinder the effective functioning of the Force thereafter, was already apparent.i'"
UNIFIL's mandate looked good on paper, but had remarkable little to do with the
cruel realities of the presence of the PLO in southern Lebanon and the Israeli
determination to occupy part of this by proxy.i'"
The fact that the whole debate and Resolution 425 (1978) ignored the
central element of the crisis in the Middle East, a resolution of the Palestinian
problem and the need for a comprehensive settlement of the overall Middle East
question, caused many members to vacillate in their express support for the
establishment of the Force. In the event, the establishment of a peacekeeping
207 S.C.O.R., 33 year 2074 Mtg. , 19 March 1978. For general background on
United States policy in the UN, see D. Puchala,. 'American Interests and the UN', 97 (4)
Political Science Quarterly, (Winter 1982/83), 571-588; and G. L. Sherry, 'The UN,
InternationalConflict and American Security', 101 (5) Political Science Quarterly, (1986),
753-771.
208 See G. Tueni, Une guerre pour les autres, Paris: Jean Claude Lattes, (1985), 200-
204. Mr. Tueni was Lebanon'sAmbassadorto the U.N. at the time.
209
s.c.a.R., 2074Mtg., op. cit.
210 See B. Urquhart,A Life in Peace and War, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
(1987),289.
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force with ambiguous and unrealistic objectives and terms of reference was
agreed to hastily in order to solve the immediate crisis.211
The urgency of reaching some agreement on the crisis precluded the
Security Council from considering a more long term solution. It is hardly
surprising therefore, that UNIFIL has encountered major difficulties in
implementing its mandate. This same urgency was also the main determinant in
deciding the extent to which the United States consulted the other members of the
Security Council and the parties involved in the conflict. The exact extent of the
consultations with Israel is not known. However, it is almost certain that as the
United States strongest and most reliable ally in the region, it was both informed
and consulted on the initiative. It is also evident that Israel was not happy with
all its aspects but was forced to succumb to American pressure, as a result
Resolution 425 was greatly resented in Israe1.212
At this time the United States' primary concern in the Middle East was
the Camp David Accords and concluding the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.213
The Lebanese government had requested the United States to sponsor the
peacekeeping initiative as it realised that America was the only country likely to
211 In this regard, the Secretary-General had this to say; 'when a peacekeeping
operation is firmly based on a detailed agreement between the parties in conflict and they
are prepared to abide by that agreement, it is relatively easy to maintain ... (e.g. UNEF
and UNDOF) ... when, however, an operation is mounted in an emergency with
ambiguous or controversial objectives and terms of reference, and on assumptions which
are not wholly realistic, it is likely to present far greater difficulties. This is undoubtedly
the case with UNIFIL'. K. Waldheim, Building the Future Order, Robert 1.Schiffer (Ed),
London: Collier Macmillan, (1980),45.
212 See C. Cruise O'Brien, The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism, London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, (1986), 584. See also N. A. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-
Israeli Fronts, Boulder and London: Westview PresslForeign Policy Institute, School of
Advanced International Studies, (1984), 18.
213 President Carter was later to identify this as his most significant foreign policy
achievement; J. Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, New York & London:
Bantam Books, (1982). See also B. Reich, and R. Hollis, 'Peacekeeping in the Reagan
Administration'in Peace Making in the Middle East - Problems and Prospects, P.Marantz
and lO. Stein, (Eds). London: Croom Helm, (1985), 133-155.
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be able to bring about sufficient Israeli co-operation. This premise was certainly
true, however, they seem to have overlooked the dilemma that the United States
would face in the Security Council, as guardian both of Israel's and of Lebanon's
interests. The Lebanese appeared to have exaggerated their own importance to
the United States and Lebanon's significance in American foreign policy.
American policy, regarding Lebanon was rooted in domestic, regional and global
considerations, which did not always coincide with Lebanese interests.i'" Even
though relations between Israel and the United States were often turbulent, the
Lebanese government may also have under-estimated the influence of the Jewish
community in the United States.2lS In many instances it appeared as if the Israel
tail was wagging the American dog.216
The early years of UNIFIL's deployment and abortive attempts to carry
out its mandate, also coincided with a series of crises in American foreign policy.
First the Iranian Revolution took place. Then the seizure of the American
hostages in Teheran occurred. This series of related events, along with the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, preoccupied the final fourteen months of President
Carter's term in office, much to the detriment of other significant foreign policy
issues.217 In particular, it meant that little attention was paid to the peacekeeping
214 See E.E Azar and K Shnayerson,. 'United States - Lebanese Relations: A
Pocketful of Paradoxes'in The Emergence 0/ a New Lebanon. Fantasy or Reality, New
York: Praeger, (1984), 219-275.
21S See H. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson, (1982),
792 and PassimC. Cruise O'Brien, op. cit., 400-403 and Passim.
216 See for example the forced resignation of the US representative at the UN, V
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 22956, 2 November 1979 The following year, the
United States was forced to do a complete turnaround on a positive vote by it in the
Security Council criticising Israeli settlement policy in the occupied Arab territories, VII
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 30874, 22 May 1981. The influence of the American
Jewish community and the domestic importance to an American President of United
States policy towards Israel and the Middle East in general, was further demonstrated by
the repeated congressional resistance to, or actual blocking of, certain proposed arms
sales to Jordan, see XXXIX Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 32412, (September 1983);
XXXI, 33691, June 1985; XXXI, 34074-34079, (December 1985), and International
Herald Tribune, 14/15 February 1987, 1 and 5.
217 See H. Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency, New York: G.P.
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Force in Lebanon except during the debates in the Security Council on the
renewal of the mandate. Consultation with certain parties was also difficult.
While Resolution 425 (1978) specifically mentioned Israel and Lebanon, it did
not refer to the PLO as it was not recognised as an official party to the conflict.
However, the co-operation of the PLO was necessary to ensure the success of
UNIFIL. The PLO's initial reaction to the Resolution was strongly critical of its
failure to tackle what it perceived as the real problem in the Middle East, namely
the question of Palestine.i" Nonetheless, the leadership did give certain
assurances but serious problems arose later when PLO elements refused to co-
operate and clashes occurred when UNIFIL attempted to deploy in and around
areas controlled by the PLO.219
When the proposal to establish UNIFIL was made, the situation was not
unlike that of Somalia in that some senior UN officials expressed strong
reservations regarding the Organization assuming such a role.220 There was grave
concern at some of the assumptions that United States policy was based upon. An
Israeli withdrawal from all of south Lebanon was central to the success of
UNIFIL's mission, yet it was not clear that Israel would co-operate fully. How
was a peacekeeping force to restore Lebanese government authority to an area
where it was non existent, when the Lebanese army was divided and the
government concerned probably couldn't maintain control for very long anyway?
There was no clear policy either on how the peacekeeping Force would deal with
the various armed elements in and around its area of operation, or what action the
Putman's Sons, (1982). B. Reich and R. Hollis, op. cit., 133-134.
218 Personal interview, Lt Gen Erskine, Dublin, July 1986. Since the conclusion of
the so called Cairo Agreement in 1969between the PLO and the Lebanese army, the PLO
had certain military rights in Lebanon. The text of the Agreement is given by W. Khalidi,
Conflict and Violence in the Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East, Harvard Studies
in InternationalAffairsNo. 39, (Harvard, 1979), 185-187.
219 Document S/12620/Add 4,05 May 1978.
220 See U. Rikbye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping, London: Hurst and
Company, (1984),109.
190
Force would take if the Israelis did not withdraw completely. In the end, the
urgent necessity to do something to alleviate the immediate crisis while there was
some broad consensus in the Security Council meant that such misgivings had to
be put aside. A resolution establishing a peacekeeping force in a region of such
conflicting American and Soviet interests had to be a delicate balance of political
pressure and persuasion. A minor change in emphasis risked causing either
superpower to exercise its right of veto. Further prolonged discussion could
therefore have jeopardised the whole initiative.221
Response to the deployment of UN forces in Somalia and Lebanon
Deployment of UNOSOM I
As the situation in Somalia during early 1992 continued to deteriorate, the need
for some form of intervention to improve the security situation became even more
imperative. Aid workers and the general population were being harassed and
terrorized, and there were reports of crop failures in the agriculturally rich region
to the south.222 It was against this background that Mohamed Sahnoun was
appointed the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Somalia, and soon
afterwards the first UNOSOM (UNOSOM I) mission was established.r'''
Resolution 751(1992) was the legal basis for the UN attempt to deploy a small
number of cease-fire observers and a small force of security personnel for the
protection of humanitarian relief operations in the capita1.224 This deployment
221 See The Blue Helmets, A Review of UN Peacekeeping, (3rd. ed.),New York:
UN, (1996), 88-89
222 The relief effort had begun to generate its own pernicious dynamic and food
had become the main item of commerce, see J. L. Woods, 'US DecisionmakingDuring
Operations in Somalia', in W. Clarke and J. Herbst, op. cit.,ISl-I72 at 154.
223 Security Council Resolution 751 (1992), 24 April 1992. It is referred to as
UNOSOM I to distinguish it from the later UNOSOM II mission. Sahnoun was an
experiencedAlgerian diplomat. See also XXIX (3), UN Chronicle, (September 1992),14.
224 Resolution 751,24 April 1992, para. 4. See also Report of the Secretary-General
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was based on traditional peacekeeping premises i.e. the consent of the parties.225
However, this was a failed state and the application of conventional thinking and
methods was not appropriate. Not surprisingly, there was poor cooperation from
the factions and outright opposition from others, which led to long delays in the
deployment of these units and a consensus that it was completely ineffective.i"
The linking of action to the agreement of the warlords at a time when Somalis
were starving damaged the credibility of the Organization in the eyes of Somali
people. It was also an abdication by the Security Council of its responsibility, and
a lost opportunity for early intervention. Agreement and consensus is preferable,
but given the humanitarian crisis, a deadline should have been set for intervention
to impose a cease-fire and secure humanitarian aid.
The Bush administration had initially opposed the deployment of 500
armed troops as it was concerned at the escalating cost of peacekeeping in an
election year, despite the fact that the overall cost was small in comparison with
other operations.F' This was an untenable position to adopt and in the
circumstances, it was not surprising that the Secretary-General grew frustrated at
what he saw as the West's preoccupation with 'a rich man's war' in the Balkans,
while it was prepared to ignore the plight of the people of Somalia.228 In the
event, Resolution 751(1992) approved in principle the Secretary-General's plan
to deploy as soon as possible a 500 person armed security force to escort
deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centers.229 Though such a
on the situation in Somalia, S/23829, 21 April 1992,esp. paras. 22-33, and 62-63.
225 The UN and Somalia 1992-1996, op. cit., 17.
226 T. Farrell, op. cit., 194-214at 195.
227 The operation was to be established for an initial period of six months, at an
estimated cost of $23.1million (S/23829 and Add. 1 and 2). See also The Globe and Mail,
'If Sarajevo, Why not Somalia?', 22 July 1992, A18. Bush was also concerned at his
perception as having more interest in foreign than domestic policy in an electionyear, New
York Times, 26 Apri11992.
See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, op. cit. 55 and E. Sciolino, 'UN chief has to direct
peace efforts at US, too', The New York Times, 16October 1993, A. 1.
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move was certainly warranted, it was likely to be considered threatening by Aided
and it had not been endorsed by him.23o
In July, the Secretary-General reported that while the cease-fire had held
reasonably well, banditry and looting had become more widespread in
Mogadishu, and attacks on UN and non governmental personnel were on the
increase.231 The maintenance of the cease fire was largely a result of Sahnoun's
considerable diplomatic effort, but the UN machinery and bureaucracy could not
keep up with the pace of the humanitarian disaster.232 It was evident from the
Secretary-General's report that the situation continued to be critical, and in an
effort to begin the process of rebuilding the Somali state, the Special
Representative had begun negotiations with traditional elders and political
leaders.233 Sahnoun' s delegation pursued a strategy of putting the clan system to
work for Somalia.234 Agreements among local elders gradually helped reduce the
fighting and allowed food deliveries into the interior of the country. This bottom
up approach had much to recommend it and it bore all the hallmarks of
229 See XXIX (3) UN Chronicle, (September 1992), 13. Sahnoun was appointed
head of UNOSOM and its purpose was to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, to
provide security for UN personnel and supplies, and to escort humanitarian supplies to
distribution centers.
230 In the Secretary-General report (S/23929, para. 23), he noted 'that under the
Agreements [withAidid] the UN is to consult the parties before determining the number of
securitypersonnel required for the protection function'.
231 Report of the Secretary-Generalon the situation in Somalia, S/24343, 22 July
1992,paras. 21, 22 and 63.
232 See J. L. Woods, op. cit., inW. Clarke and J. Herbst, op. cit., 151-172at 154.
233 For general background on the situation see Report of the Secretary-General on
the situation in Somalia, S/24343, 22 July 1992, esp. paras. 21,22 and 63. The sheer scale
of the crisis was evident from Sahnoun's Report to donors' conference convened in
Geneva on 12 October, 1992, quoted in M. Sahnoun, Somalia, the Missed Opportunities,
op. cit., 27-29.
234 See S. Normak, 'Building Local Political Institutions: District and Regional
Councils', paper to the Comprehensive Seminar on Lessons Learned from the UN
Operation in Somalia, Lessons Learned Unit, Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations,
Plainsboro, NJ, 13-15 September 1995, 3 and W. Clarke, 'Failed Visions and Uncertain
Mandates in Somalia', inW. Clarke and 1. Herbst, op. cit., 3-19 at 7.
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Ambassador Sahnouri's overall strategy to deal with the situation on the ground.
It was a means of restoring the political balance in favour of more traditional
leadership which had been consistently urged on UNOSOM by the Uppsala
Advisory Group.235
The slow response of the UN may indeed have been the result of structural
rigidity and bureaucracy.F" But the scale and complexity of the problem did not
have a precedent for the Organization to follow. Do you deal with the warlords,
and if so in what way? There were no political structures, and the physical
infrastructure was almost not existent. In Resolution 767(1992), the Security
Council approved the establishment of four operational zones in Somalia with the
hope that UN involvement would adapt to the complexity of the situation in the
country and enhance the effectiveness of humanitarian operations.F" This
decentralized system made UNOSOM and the relief agencies less dependent on
the conditions prevailing in Mogadishu and promoted the new regionalleadership
which was badly needed by Somalia. Another technical team was sent to assess
how best to use UN security guards to protect aid workers, and to convene a
conference of national reconciliation. Whether it was strictly necessary to
dispatch this additional team is a moot question now, but it is strange that the
Secretary-General did not rely more on his own Special Representative in
Somalia at this time. Sahnoun had by this time gained the confidence of the non
governmental organizations (NGO's) and local elders, though in doing so he was
earning the ire of the UN bureaucracy.i"
235 This was based in the Hom of Africa Centre of the Life and Peace Institute of
Uppsala. Itwas comprised of a number social scientistswith expertise on Somalia drawn
froma number of countries. It consistently urged UNOSOM to adopt a bottom up
approach and encourageas much decentralizationas possible.
236 Interview, Sahnoun,26 November 1993, Dublin.
237 Resolution 767(1992), adopted 24 July 1992. The four zones were Bossaso,
Berbera, Kismayu and Mogadishu. It also called for cooperation in the deployment of
the 500 person security force agreed to in Resolution 751 (1992), paras 4-5.
238 Personal interview, InternationalConcernworker in Somalia at the time, Galway,
Ireland, January 1999. Sahnounwas particularlycritical of the UN relief agency efforts and
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The actual plan to establish a traditional peacekeeping operation with the
mandate to use force if necessary to protect the food convoys was well conceived.
The decentralized concept and the engagement of regional organizations and all
Somali factions in control of territory had much merit. Had it been successful it
would have cost very little in comparison with what was to follow. The truth was
that UNOSOM 1 was never really given a chance to succeed. Several serious
problem were created by wrong and unjustified moves of the UN management,
both at headquarters and by some agencies' representative in the field.239 These
hampered Sahnoun's efforts which led to strains in relations, but his primary sin
in the eyes of the UN hierarchy was to make his views known publicly. After
'arduous negotiations', and with the help of local elders, Sahnoun obtained the
consent of Aided, Mhadi and other faction leaders to the deployment of the 500
armed UN 'security personnel' to protect aid coming through Mogadishu port.240
However, before these even touched down in Somalia, the Security Council
agreed to increase the size of the force to 3,500 at the request of the Secretary-
General.i"
There had been an inexcusable delay in deploying the 500 troops agreed in
the first instance, and the security environment had worsened as a result.
Unfortunately, Sahnoun was neither consulted nor informed of the decision in
advance.i" This undermined his authority and made him appear duplicitous in
he believed that not done enough had been done to establish the necessary distribution
networks. As a result, those who cooperated with his reconciliation efforts could see no
tangible improvementsin their living conditions, see W. Durch, 'Introduction to Anarchy,
HumanitarianInterventionand "State Building" in Somalia'inW. Durch (ed.), op cit., 310-
565 at 316.
239 See M. Sahnoun, 'Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia', 5
Irish Studies in International Affairs, (1994), 5-13, 10. See also S. M. Makinda, Seeking
Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia. International Peace Academy,
(1993),68-69.
240 Interview, Sahnoun, 26 November 1993, Dublin. Aided had argued that his
forces shouldbe mandatedto carry out this and similar tasks.
241 Resolution775 (1992), 28 August 1992,para. 3.
242 Interview,Sahnoun,November 1993,Dublin; andM. Sahnoun,op. cit., 38-39.
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the eyes of Aided. From the point of view of the Secretary-General, it was a
logical progression given the deteriorating security and general situation in
Somalia. Aided was enraged at the lack of any consultation, and it added to his
sense of grievance and insecurity at the growing UN involvement. Furthermore,
the leaders of the neighbouring countries, who had been supportive to date and
kept informed of events by Sahnoun, were also ignored.i" This was probably the
most significant example of the bureaucratic approach of UN headquarters, and
its tendency to ignore UNOSOM's advice in regard to sensitive matters,
especially related to security.
One other incident that occurred was also to have a profound impact on
the trust gained by UNOSOM and the UN up to that point. It became known that
a Russian plane with UN markings and chartered by a UN agency had delivered
currency and military equipment to Aided's major rival in the north, Mhadi.244
The agencies concerned were unable to explain how this had happened in the
circumstances. It later transpired that the plane was doing some unauthorized
moonlighting. A proper investigation should have been held into the incident and
appropriate action taken. This added to the difficulties of the UN personnel on
the ground. The incident rekindled all the earlier fears about a partisan United
Nation's approach to the conflict, and, although false, the rumors and
circumstantial evidence were not rebutted in the proper way. The delivery of
arms was also in direct contravention of a UN resolution, which imposed a
'general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military
equipment to Somalia' .245 Unfortunately, the criticism of the UN by Sahnoun did
not help his already troubled relationship with headquarters.r" The episode was
another example of the ineptness of the UN policy at the time.
243 Ibid.
244 Ibid. 39. There was some confusion as to whether the plane was still under lease
to the World Food Program. The UN Office for Legal Affairs concluded that the lease
contract remained in force at the time of the flight.
245 Resolution 733 of 23 January 1992.
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At around the same time the United States was beginning to take a more
active interest in Somalia and this was reflected in the Department of State public
statement in favour of dispatching armed UN security elements. This was the
first indication of American approval of the need for a more proactive security
policy since the crisis began.247 The Bush administration and public opinion were
beginning to come around to the point of view that something radical needed to
be done. The sequence of events leading to the first dramatic humanitarian
intervention led by the United States in Somalia was set in motion.
Options facing the Secretary-General and the Deployment of UN/TAF
UN intervention in Somalia arose from the urgent need to respond to the famine and
appalling suffering of the Somali people in their war-ravaged country. The response
was slow and deliberate; each Security Council resolution expanded and modified the
role of UNOSOM. As the situation deteriorated and the operation floundered in late
1992, the Secretary-General faced up to the dilemma and outlined five options.248
The first was to continue with a peacekeeping, i.e. consensual and non-forceful
mission. This option did not seem viable, given the nature and scale of the problems
confronting the UN in Somalia. A second option was to withdraw, but this would
have been an unacceptable public admission of failure by the UN, the Secretary-
General and the international community. A further option was to be more assertive
and forceful in the capital, in the hope that this would have an influence in the country
as a whole. Alternatively, a UN enforcement mission could be launched under its
own command and control. However, it is unlikely that the UN possessed either the
capability or capacity to do so, then or now. Not surprisingly, when the United States
indicated that it would be prepared to spearhead a UN sanctioned forceful mission to
246 Sahnoun resigned after losing the confidence and support of the Secretary-
General, Personal interview, Sahnoun, 26 November 1993, Dublin. See also M. Sahnoun,
op. cit .. 40. For a less sympatheticperspectivesee BoutrosBoutros-Ghali, op. cit., 56.
247 H. Cohen, op. cit., 60.
248 Document S124868 dated 30November 1992.
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establish a secure environment for humanitarian operations, the Security Council
agreed.
At first the United States was reluctant to become involved. Then American
public opinion changed to favour intervention. The Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali
also put pressure on President Bush pointing out, among other things, the growing
perception among the countries of the South that the United States manipulated the
UN only when it served United States interests, as in the Gulf War.249 While the
United States was prepared to act unilaterally, they were understandably anxious to
have international support on the ground and in the Security Council. 250 As there was
to be no dilution of United States command and control of the operation, the
Secretary-General declined to permit the forces deployed wear the 'blue helmets'
traditionally worn by peacekeepers, and the troops that participated in the Korean war.
It seems that the actual decision to intervene was taken by the President Bush. No
doubt this decision was influenced by criticism from non-governmental agencies,
Capitol Hill and the Clinton camp. But it was probably a conclusion by the military
that they could 'do the job' if called upon that had most influence on the Presidenr."'
The decision was generally popular with the American public and with Congress, and
President-elect Clinton endorsed it.252 Nevertheless, even before the operation was
mounted there were those who questioned whether it was appropriate or necessary.i"
249 Brent Snowcroft, National Security Advisor to President Bush, 'Mission
Impossible', Assignment, BBC 2, 15March 1994.
250 I. Lewis and J. Mayall, 'Somalia', in J. Mayall(ed.), op. cit., 94-225 at III.
251 J. Hirsch and R. Oakley,op. cit., 43.
252 James L. Woods, 'US Decision making During Operations in Somalia', in W.
Clarke and J. Herbst, op. cit., 158.
253 Africa Rights, Operation Restore Hope: a Preliminary Assessment, London, May
1993. OXFAM - America, OXFAM - UK, and CONCERN Worldwide supported it, while
Medecins Sans Frontier and Save the Children opposed it-see STC press release 'Imposing
troops could destroy the effort', 26 November 1992; interview, Concern Worldwide worker in
Somalia at the time, Dublin, 1999.
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In any event, it should have been evident from the beginning that the conflict in
Somalia was not going to be of the short, sharp, overwhelming kind that politicians
and military planners, especially in the United States, believe is vital to sustain a
public consensus for involvement.
In December 1992, acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 794( 1992) and determined that 'the magnitude of the
human tragedy [mass starvation] caused by the conflict in Somalia, further
exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of human assistance,
constituted a threat to international peace and security' .254In authorising UNIT AF, a
large multinational force led by the United States, to use 'all necessary means to
establish as soon as possible' a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations,
the Security Council took an important step in redefining its role in the maintenance
of international peace and security.255 This was a familiar UN euphemism for
authorising the use of force and it was in stark contrast to the UN intervention in
Lebanon, which occurred along traditional peacekeeping lines and for which there
were established precedents. According to the preamble to Resolution 794(1992), the
scale and complexity of the situation in Somalia was unique, and it required an
immediate and exceptional response. Implicit in the resolution was a recognition that
the situation was beyond that to which the normal rules of peacekeeping would apply.
Its adoption reflected a new consensus on what constituted a 'threat to peace'
justifying military enforcement action under Article 42. Article 39 was interpreted as
including a humanitarian disaster caused by mass starvation. This was a significant
precedent from the more traditional approach to the use of force under Article 42.256
254 Security Council Resolution 794, 3 December 1992, third paragraph of the
preamble. See also T. Mockaitis, op. cit., 36-42.
255 N.D. White and O. Ulgen, 'The Security Council and the Decentralized Military
Option: Constitutionality and Function', XLIV (3) Netherlands International Law Review,
(1997),378 - 413 at 398; see also M.R. Hutchinson, 'Restoring Hope: UN Security Council
Resolutions for Somalia and an Expanded Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention', 34
Harvard International Law Journal, (1993), 624-640.
256 Although the resolution was adopted by a unanimous vote, there was not the same
unanimity among the members regarding the significance of the vote. Some seemed reluctant
to recognise that they were creating a precedent that could be followed in the future. They
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Like the enabling resolution in respect of UNIFIL, Resolution 794( 1992)
was the result of both political and pragmatic considerations, and as such it was not a
perfectly crafted document. It would have been preferable if the objectives of the
mandate had been precisely defined and limited in time in order to prepare the way for
a return to peacekeeping and post conflict peace building_257 It was ambiguous in
certain important respects, but it was clear that like Resolution 42S( 1978), it also
required the co-operation of the parties in Somalia in order to be effective. It was also
evident from correspondence from the Secretary-General to the Security Council and
to President Bush, that he perceived one of the primary objectives as being to
neutralise the heavy arms of the regular forces of the factions, and to disarm irregular
forces.258 In the final draft of the resolution this objective was dropped in favour of
more neutral language, which was more acceptable to all members of the Security
Council. 259 This was a significant omission that subsequently contributed to the most
important difference in interpretation of the objectives of the mandate by the United
States and the Secretary-General i.e. the issue of disarming the factions.
The Secretary-General had also recommended that the mandate be defined to
include a country wide intervention to be carried out under UN command and control;
and a specific time limitation within which disarmament would take place, after which
the operation would be handed over to UN peacekeeping forces.26o The Security
Council instead opted to authorise a 'unified command and control system' that would
reflect the offer made by the United States to manage the operation. In this regard the
Council had little option, as the United States would not accept UN command in
stressedthe uniquenatureof the situationin Somalia,and specialemphasiswas placed on the
lackof any government SeeS.C.O.R.,47th Session,3 December1992.
See the Secretary-General's recommendation, Document S/24868 dated 30
November 1992.
257
258 Document S/24868 dated 30 November 1992; and letter from the Secretary-
General to President Bush dated 8 December 1992, reproduced in The UN and Somalia
1992-1996, op. cit., p216.
259 Hutchinson,loc. cit., 632.
260 Document S/24868 dated 30 November 1992
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almost any circumstances, and certainly not when leading enforcement operations
under Chapter VII.261 For this reason, despite the fact that the UN approved the
UNITAF mandate, the Organization neither organised nor commanded the troops that
were sent to fulfil it.262 This was one of the most significant differences between
UNITAF and the UNOSOM I and II missions. Itwas also a feature that distinguished
it from the traditional model of command and control adopted for UNIFIL and other
peacekeeping operations.P'
Although there was liaison between the existing UNOSOM force and the
Secretary-General's representative on the one hand, and UNITAF, it was evident that
the United States was in the driving seat and it would determine policy and strategy.
This was not as unreasonable an arrangement as first might appear. The United States
was supplying the majority of the troops and the bulk of the military hardware at its
own expense. Furthermore, there had been no misrepresentation by the United States
of the terms under which it would command the operation. Resolution 794(1992)
placed emphasis on establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Security
Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued
peacekeeping operations, and there was no mention of a plan or terms of reference as
to how this could be achieved_264In this regard the long term strategic goals of both
the UNlFIL and UNITAF operations were anything but clear from their respective
enabling resolutions.
The process of implementation was bound to give rise to varying
interpretations that inevitably lead to political difficulties at the highest level and
261 See J. Hirsch and R. Oakley, op. cit., esp. 45-49; and generally, I. Daalder,
'Knowing when to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeepers', and W.
Durch 'Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990's'in W. Durch (ed.), op. cit.,
1-34and 35-68 respectively.
262 The UN and Somalia 1992-1996, op. cit. 33 and Makinda, op. cit., 72.
263 It is also noteworthy that the costs of the operation were borne by the countries
supplying troops and by the countries that contributed to a voluntary trust fund set up by
the SecurityCouncil.
264 Resolution 794(1993),para. 18.
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military dilemmas on the ground. The difference between the approach adopted by
the United States, and that proposed by the Secretary-General, were all too apparent in
the latter's first report on UNITAF to the Council.i'" These constituted fundamental
differences that could not be glossed over at a later stage. The United States did not
seem to appreciate the nature of UN peacekeeping operations, and the political and
military constraints under which any UN led operation must function. Nor did it
appreciate that a force cannot operate under a peace enforcement mandate, even if
motivated by humanitarian considerations, and later revert to a traditional
peacekeeping role with the consent of the parties. This was even more evident during
the offensive operations conducted by the United States troops as part of the
UNOSOM II mission.f"
As part of a strategy to alleviate the fears of developing states about major
powers interference in the internal affairs of other states, the United States was not
mentioned by name in Resolution 794(1992).267 While this was indicative of the level
of political compromise, it amounted too little more than a cosmetic exercise that
could only prove counter productive in the long term. Itwas also contrary to an open
and transparent system of decision making. As 'Operation Restore Hope' was getting
into full swing, Boutros-Ghali promised the people of Somalia that the Force would
'feed the starving, protect the defenceless and prepare the way for political economic
and social reconstruction' .268 The Security Council also authorised the United States
to deputise on its behalf, and significantly, linked human rights issues to a threat to
international peace and security. Expectations of what might be achieved by
American involvement were high in New York and on the ground in Somalia, but
though successful in ensuring delivery of foodstuffs to the starving, UNITAF failed to
265 S/24992, 19December 1992.
266 See infra., Chapter 7. For an excellentdiscussionof the deficiencies in US Army
peacekeepingdoctrine at the timeT. Farrell, op. cit., 194-214.
267 Hutchinson, loco cit., 632.
268 UN PressReleaseSG/SMl4874, 8 December1992,and UN Chronicle, New York:
UN, (March,1993),16.
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seize the opportunity to achieve much more at the time.
The dilemma of disarmament and the creation of a safe environment in Somalia269
The UNIT AF stage of the overall Somalia operation was generally considered
successful.I'? Despite UNITAF's Chapter VII mandate, the United States relied
heavily on traditional peacekeeping principles. This would have been admirable in
another context, but neutralising the clan's heavy weapons and disarmament was
essential to creating a secure environment, and achieving the long-term strategy of
handing over to a peacekeeping force. It is easy to portray an operation that sets itself
limited goals as an unqualified success when it fulfils these limited objectives. The
reality may be somewhat different, especially if the force has the capability to achieve
much more. UNIT AF was such an operation and in its execution of the mandate it
avoided the main obstacles to a long-term restoration of peace. 271
The American refusal to live up to the consequences of its intervention was
especially damaging to this critical issue.272 With around 30,000 troops, under a
unified system of command, UNIT AF certainly had the capacity to disarm the
warlords.273 But the political rhetoric did not translate into effective action on the
269 For a general discussion on disarmament and demobilisation in Africa see C.
Alden, 'The Issue of the Military: UN Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration in
Southern Africa', in J. Ginifer (ed.), op. cit., 51-69.
270 See J. Hirsch and R. Oakley, op. cit. esp. 149-173; The UN and Somalia 1992-
1996, op. cit., 35; and James L. Woods, 'US Decision making During Operations in
Somalia', in W. Clarke and J. Herbst, op. cit., 151-172 at 159; W. Durch, 'Introduction to
Anarchy, Humanitarian Intervention and "State Building" in Somalia'in W. Durch (ed.),
op. cit., 310-565 at 325; and T. Farrell, op. cit., (n.15), 194 and Makinda, op. cit., 74.
271 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., 59-60. Boutros-Ghali believed that three critical
steps were needed; disarming the warring groups, establishing a secure environment and
creating a working division of labour between the US and UN on the ground.
272 See W. Clarke and J. Herbst, 'Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian
Intervention', Foreign Affairs, (Marchi April 1996), 70-85 at 75 and Clarke and Herbst,
op.cit., 239-253.
273 It had a number of well trained and 'elite' units from European armies such as
the French Foreign Legion, Belgian Para Commandos, and Italian paratroopers.
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ground. In President Bush's own words 'Our mission is humanitarian, but we will not
tolerate armed gangs ripping off their own people ...[troops] have the authority to take
whatever military action is necessary to safeguard the lives of our troops and the lives
of Somalia's people. ,274Instead,it chose to evade this difficult task by requesting that
weapons be moved out of the areas 'controlled' by UNITAF to other locations. This
was a fatal error as a concentrated effort to remove and destroy the Somalis' heavy
weapons was an achievable goal that would have laid the ground rules for the
subsequent UN operation that was planned to follow. Itwould also have been an ideal
way of showing serious intent to restore order. The UN and the Somalis themselves
had expected disarmament to take place. UNITAF could also have used the clan
leader's agreement to disarm in the Addis Ababa Accords of March 1993 to argue that
it was an impartial force facilitating this agreement. While it is fair to argue that
Mogadishu could no more be disarmed than urban areas in Western countries, in order
to create a secure environment in which some degree of normality was restored, it was
necessary to confiscate weapons carried openly and seize the infamous 'technicals'. 275
Failure to do so ultimately ensured that those with the most weapons retained the
power.
One of the main determinants of how United States military operations
abroad are conducted is the avoidance of incurring casualties at almost any cost, and
as a matter of policy the United States decided not to disarm the factions as this may
have led to exposure to risk. In fact, the United States may be said to operate a zero
casualty policy.276 The United States marines commanded the operation, and the
experience with the Multi National Force in Lebanon was an important influence on
274 See G. Bush, 'Humanitarian Mission to Somalia: Address to the Nation,
Washington DC, December 4, 1992', US Dept. of State Dispatch 3(49). (December 7,
1992).
275 Ambassador Oakley makes this point with regard to Mogadishu, see J. Hirsch
and R. Oakley, op. cit., 105.
276 Interview,Michael Sharf, formerAttorneyAdvisor to the UN, US Dept. of State,
with special responsibilityfor, inter alia, Somalia 1991-93, Yale, USA, July 1999.
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their thinking.i" Such a policy would not have been possible if Resolution 794( 1993)
had not been the result of political compromise and ambiguous in regard to the crucial
issue of disarmament. It may be the case that the United States considered that this
issue could be dealt with by the planned UN force intended to succeed UNITAF, but
it is hard to accept that they could have been that naive. The warlords, in particular
Aided, realised that they would not face a serious challenge from UNITAF and that by
biding their time, it would be replaced by a militarily weaker UN force. There were
no long-term strategic or political objectives that might threaten the warlords
supremacy, and it soon became apparent that adopting a wait and see policy was the
most prudent response until UNITAF left. By the time the United States formally
acknowledged that disarmament of the clans was necessary, it was too late_278Of the
false promises made by UNITAF, it was the claim that it had created a secure
environment that really angered the aid agencies_279 It seemed that despite pleas by
the UN to remain longer, UNITAF wanted to ensure the mission was deemed a
success and that the situation was ripe for a handover to UNOSOM II in May 1993.
Although a much less militarily capable force, the mandate of UNOSOM II was much
wider and sufficiently imprecise to 'offer many hostages to fortune' .280Acting under
Chapter VII, the new force would not be constrained by the issues of consent or the
use of force in self-defence. The 'demands' on disarmament, and 'requests' for
national reconciliation and the 'consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure
environment throughout Somalia' contained in Resolution 814(1993) were easy to
make but later proved impossible to achieve in the circumstances."!
One of the main problems with disarmament was the related issue of
277 For background to the MNF mission see R. Thakur, International Peacekeeping
in Lebanon, Boulder:WestviewPress, 1987,esp.79-107.
278 See W. Clarke and J. Herbst, 'Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian
Intervention', in W. Clarke and J. Herbst, op. cit., 244.
279 Interview,ConcernWorldwideworker, Dublin 1999.
280 Resolution 814, 26 March 1993. The quote is from I. Lewis and 1. Mayall,
'Somalia', in 1.Mayal1(ed.),op. cit., 94-225 at 94.
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consent and confrontation. Any task of this nature is a delicate balance between
cooperation and confrontation.F" The risks are high, and there is the added
dimension of national contingent interpretation of the rules of engagement and
differing contributing states' policy. UNOSOM II showed that some national
contingents are not prepared to take part in enforcement operations.i'" Later, delay
in weapons control implementations eroded the trust between UNOSOM II and the
parties, and led to increased boldness of the warring factions.i'" There are many
potential pitfalls in the use of limited force, the most obvious being the likelihood
of escalation and loss of any real control. The Somalia case illustrates how quickly
a UN force can slide into combat when enforcing compliance.i'" The more strict
rules regarding disarmament enforced by UNOSOM II led to tense relations
between UN and the clans, especially when contrasted with the more lax policy of
UNITAF. Insecurity and suspicion replaced consent and trust, and when to the
organizational confusion surrounding the handover from UNITAF to UNOSOM
was added to the overall situation, the 'Somalia cease-fire disarmament concept
declined rapidly. 286
Security Council fails to support UNIFIL
When the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report on the
implementation of Resolution 425(1978), the response was almost immediate as
281 Resolution 814, 26 March 1993,SectionA, para 4 and section S, paras 7-14.
282 See F. Tanner, 'Weapons Control in Semi-permissiveEnvironments:A Case for
Compellance', in M. Pugh, 3 (4) The UN, Peace and Force, International Peacekeeping,
(Winter 1996), 126-145atl40.
283 See G. Anderson, 'UNOSOM II: Not Failure: Not Success', D. Daniel, & F.
Hayes, (eds), Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, New York: St. Martins press, (1995),
274.
284 See questionnaireson Somalia,analyzedby J. W. Potgieter in ManagingArms in
Peace Processes: Somalia,DCR - Project,UNIDIR, (1995), 135-231.
28S F. Tanner, op. cit., 140.
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most of the groundwork was already completed.P? In addition to setting out the
terms of reference of UNIFIL, the Secretary-General outlined the three essential
conditions which must be met for the Force to be effective.r" These could be said
to be essential conditions for any peacekeeping force, whether in Somalia or
Lebanon. The fact that the Secretary-General felt constrained to expressly state
them in this manner indicates that he was concerned that some of the conditions
might not be fulfilled in respect of UNIFIL.
The most important of the conditions to the Secretary-General is that the
Force receive the full backing of the members of the Security Council at all times,
but in particular the permanent members who proposed or supported its
establishment. S/he is responsible for the implementation of the decisions of the
Security Council. Once a Force is established and deployed, the overall direction
of the operation is also the Secretary-General's responsibility, acting on behalf of
and being answerable to the Security Council. 289 The importance to the
Secretary-General of proper support and guidance from the Security Council
cannot be overestimated. This support has not always been forthcoming and is
often too ambivalent in its nature. The serious problems that this can cause were
evident during the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo(ONUC).290 Within
three months of the establishment of ONUC, the consensus among the permanent
286 Ibid., 140-141.
287 The Council then met to approve the report and authorise the establishment of
UNIFIL in accordance with its provisions. Document S/12611, 19 March 1978, was
approvedby SecurityCouncil Resolution426 (1978), 19 March 1978.
288 Ibid., para 3. First, it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of
the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full co-operation of all the
parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient
military unit
289 See The Peacekeeping Handbook, New York: International Peace Academy,
(1984), Chapters 2 and 3, esp.33-35.
290 See D.W. Bowett, UNForces, London:Stevens, (1964), 160.
207
members of the Security Council had disintegrated.i"
Fortunately, the Secretary-General has not found himself placed in such
an untenable position with regard to UNIFIL to date. Nonetheless, he did not
receive the degree of support needed from the Security Council. As late as 1986,
he declared that this condition identified in 1978 as essential for the Force to be
effective, i.e. the full confidence and backing of the Security Council, had not
been fully met.292 This unusual step of openly criticising the organ to which he
himself is responsible, indicates the despair and frustration felt after so many
years of trying to make UNIFIL more effective, particularly when the reasons for
the failure lie outside his control.f"
The Secretary-General has refrained from criticising any particular
member of the Security Council by name. However, the Soviet Union abstained
from voting on every resolution concerning UNIFIL from 1978 until April
1986.294 From the beginning the Soviet Union stated that it was not satisfied with
the mandate. It disagreed with UNIFIL's function in assisting the return of
effective Lebanese government authority in the area and the absence of a time
limit on the Force's stay in Lebanon.i'" However in an attempt to regain some of
its lost credibility, the Soviet Union did a U-turn in the Security Council in 1986
291 At one stage, in answer to criticism of his handling of ONUC, he reminded the
Security Council that it was their responsibility to 'indicate what you want to be done ...
but if no advice is forthcoming ... then I have no choice but to follow my own
conviction'. G.A.O.R.,15thSession, 871stPlenaryMtg,p.96.
292 Report of the Secretary-Generalon UNIFIL, S/17965,09 April 1986.para 51.
293 Ibid.
294 The Soviet Union voted in favour of Resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 512
(1982),513 (1982), 515 (1982), 516 (1982),517 (1982),518 (1982), 520 (1982) and 521
(1982) which condemned Israel and called for a withdrawal from Lebanon. However, it
continued to abstain on the vote for a renewal of the UNIFIL mandate during this period
when Resolutions 511 (1982),519 (1982) and 523 (1982)were adopted.
295 S.C.O.R., 2074 Mtg., op. cit. The Soviet Union also consistently refused to
contribute to the financing of the Force, as it considered this 'should be defrayed by the
aggressor - Israel'.
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and announced that the Force had an important role to play in confirming the
Israeli withdrawal. 296 It saw an opportunity to playa more meaningful role since
the decline in United States fortunes in Lebanon and the Middle East. The United
States support for the Israeli Lebanon Agreement of 1983 and the debacle of its
involvement in Lebanon, weakened the American position.i" The key to United
States influence in the area, especially since 1973, had been the American role as
mediator in the Arab-Israeli peace process. A central element in the Soviet
Union's policy at the time was the reconvening of an international conference in
Geneva, where it could occupy a position equal to the United States, and all
parties to the Middle East conflict, including the PLO, could attend.298
The Soviet Union's influence in the region had been in decline for some
time, and it declined even further as a result of the 1982 Israeli invasion of
Lebanon, when its credibility was undermined by the failure to respond to appeals
from the PLO and Syria for aid. 299 Its warnings to the United States not to
commit its forces had been ignored and Soviet weaponry once more proved
qualitatively inferior to its American equivalent. In a lame response during this
period, the Soviet Union attempted to exploit the propaganda value of resorting to
the Security Council to bring pressure upon the Israelis to withdraw. In this way,
they achieved the optimum result. They avoided the danger of direct
involvement, while at the same time drawing attention to American support for
296 S.C.O.R., SIPV.268l, 18 Apr 1986, pp.6-l0. Furthermore, the Soviet Union
declared its willingness henceforth to take part in the financing of the Force.
See K. Nakhleh, and C.A Wright,After the Palestine Israel War - Limits to U.S.
and Israeli Policy, Instituteof Arab Studies,U.S.A., (1983).
297
298 The three basis elements in the Soviet peace plan for the Middle East were: the
total withdrawal of all Israeli forces from territories captured since June 1967, the
establishment of a Palestinian State on the West Bank and Gaza strip, and the
acknowledgement of the right to exist of all states in the region, including Israel. R.O
Freedman,. Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, (3rd Ed), New York:
Praeger, (1982), and by the same author 'The Soviet Union and a Middle East Peace
Settlement: A Case Study of Soviet Policy during the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon and its
Aftermath' in B. Reich, and R. Hillis, (eds), op. cit.,156-168.
299 Ibid.
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Israel and United States vetoes of certain resolutions in the Security Council. 300
The situation after the Israeli redeployment in 1986 could have allowed
the Soviet Union further erode the role of the United States in the region, and
thereby enhance its own prestige and influence. However, Soviet policy in the
Middle East has been overtaken by events in Eastern Europe and what is now
Russia. It is probable that the Soviet Union's conversion to the cause of UNIFIL
in 1986 did not stem from a genuine interest in the plight of Lebanon. In this
regard, its policy was similar to that of the United States. Lebanon was perceived
by both superpowers not as an end in itself, but as a means to gaining influence
and power in the region as a whole. The American attitude within the Security
Council and its Middle East policy has been no less opportunistic than that of the
Soviet Union. The constraints on United States policy were already outlined.
Even if the political will existed to bring pressure to bear on the Israelis to co-
operate with UNIFIL, it is doubtful that the backlash from the American Jewish
community could have been endured by any United States President for a
sufficient period to allow this pressure to be effective.
Lack of co-operation from the parties in Lebanon
In regard to the second of the conditions identified by the Secretary-General as
being essential for the effective operation of the Force i.e. that it receive the full
co-operation of the parties concerned, unfortunately, many of the parties did not
co-operate as anticipated or as promised in some cases. In particular, the Israelis
and their allies in south Lebanon, known generally as the de Jacto forces and
more recently referred to as the 'South Lebanon Army', have not only failed to
co-operate, but have deliberately harassed UNIFIL and prevented it from carrying
out its mandate. Some of the problems that have arisen in this regard are directly
300 Ibid. and R. O. Freedman, 'Soviet Middle East Policy After the Invasion of
Lebanon'in R.O. Freedman, (ed), The Middle East After the Invasion of Lebanon, Syracuse
University Press, (1986), 3-68.
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related to other assumptions made concerning the deployment of the Force. The
ill defined reference to an area of operation was the most serious such flaw.30)
However, it was impossible to be more specific at the time, as discussions in the
Security Council and consultations with the governments of Israel and Lebanon
revealed profound disagreement on the subject.302 It caused major problems
when the Force attempted to deploy in certain areas where the PLO maintained
strongholds and in areas where the Israeli Defence Forces withdrew from without
handing over to UNIFIL.
The dangers of not defining the precise area of operation became all too
evident when UNIFIL troops from the French contingent attempted to deploy
around key PLO strongholds.l'" The PLO put up strong resistance to the French
presence in this area and this was combined with a diplomatic campaign in New
York by Arab States on their behalf. The PLO objected to UNIFIL's deployment
in these areas because they had never been occupied by the Israeli Defence
Forces. During the invasion this area known as the 'Tyre pocket' was bypassed
by the Israelis. The PLO therefore considered that UNIFIL should not be
deployed there either. The matter was complicated by the so called 'Cairo
Agreement' which legitimised the PLO's presence in Lebanon and supposedly
governed its activities there.'?'
At the time, the Force Commander and the Lebanese government were in
favour of taking stronger action against the PLO within UNIFIL's area of
operation.t" However, UNIFIL was not a combat or enforcement mission, and
301 Personal interview,Lt Gen Erskine,op. cit.
302 Ibid. The Force Commander at the time was later to identify this as one of the
basic and fundamental flaws in the deployment of VNIFIL.
Document S/12845, 13 September 1978,paras 36-38 and The Blue Helmets. op.
cit., 88- 89.
303
304 The text of the Agreementis givenby Khalidi,op. cit.• 185-187.
305 Personal interview, Lt Gen Erskine, op. cit. See also O. Tueni, op. cit., 203-204
and S/12620IAdd.5, 13June 1978,para 13.
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the PLO stronghold had been bypassed by the much more militarily capable
Israeli Defence Forces. Furthermore, UNIFIL was a very precarious political
creation and it is almost certain that the Soviet Union, and the pro-Palestinian
lobby at the UN, would have strenuously objected. The Soviet Union had the
power to veto any further mandate renewals. UNIFIL was a peacekeeping
mission, not a peace enforcement mission. It relied totally upon the co-operation
of the parties concerned. Any problem of this nature which arose had to be
solved by negotiation, however unsatisfactory a subsequent agreement arrived at
in his manner turned out to be. It is no surprise that deployment in the area 'was
not pressed' .306 Later, the Secretary-General was able to report that relations with
the PLO in the area had not created major problems.i'" But the agreement did
have its drawbacks and propaganda value to those opposed to UNIFIL. It also
provided the de facto forces with an ideal excuse for refusing to allow UNIFIL to
deploy in the area under their control.
In the circumstances the Secretary-General had no option but to reach
some negotiated settlement with the PLO. If a firm stance had been taken against
the PLO at this stage, it would have been equally important to take similar action
against the de facto forces. It is probable that neither the United States, nor the
Soviet Union, would have been willing to support such a policy in the Security
Council. Many of the contributing countries, including Ireland, would have been
unwilling to continue supporting and supplying troops to a Force suffering the
numbers of casualties that offensive action of this nature would entail. It would
also be incompatible with the respective foreign policies of certain of the troop
contributing countries, as well as being clearly outside the terms of reference of
the Force that it would only act in self-defence.?"
Initially it appeared that Israel would withdraw fully from Lebanon and
that some kind of working relationship could be established with the de facto
306 Document S/12845, op. cit., para 37.
307 Document S/12929. 18 November 1978, para 18.
308 Document S/12611, op. cit., para 4.
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forces of Major Haddad. It quickly became apparent to Irish officers serving with
UNIFIL that these forces were armed, trained and financed by the Israelis. There
was also a suspicion that the Israelis would not co-operate with UNIFIL in their
final withdrawal, despite the smooth execution of the first three phases.l'"
Unfortunately, the Lebanese government and the UN then made a major error in
judgement when Major Haddad was provisionally recognised as de facto
Commander of the Lebanese forces in his area for the purpose of facilitating
UNIFIL's mission.I'" This put UNIFIL in a difficult position and compromised
the effort to implement the Security Council mandate.
As events unfolded, it became clear that the Israelis and Major Haddad's
Forces would not co-operate with UNIFIL. There were strong objections to the
agreements concluded with the PLO.31I If the UN did not take full control of the
PLO territory, then it would not be permitted to deploy in the areas controlled by
the de facto forces.312 From their perspective, UNIFIL was allowing the PLO re-
establish itself in its area. This was not true, but having backed down from
confronting the PLO, it was not unreasonable to assume it would do so again in
this case.
By the time the Lebanese government decided to revoke the provisional
recognition given to Haddad, much valuable time and ground had been IOSt.313 As
far as Israel was concerned, it had fulfilled its part in the implementation of
309 The fourth and final phase took place on 13June 1978.
310 Document S/12620, Add 5, op. cit., paras. 15-17.The Lebanese army command
was to issue instructions to Major Haddad to facilitate UNIFIL's mission and
deployment.
311 The situation 'bodes ill for the future', letter dated 13 June 1978, from the
representative of Israel to the Secretary-General,Document S/12736. For the Secretary-
General's description of the 'accommodation' reached with the PLO see Document
S/12845 dated l3 September 1978,paras 39-42.
312 See the reports in The Irish Times, 8 June 1978and 19June 1978.
313 Personal interview, senior Irish officer with UNIFIL at the time, Galway, March
1999.
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Resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), which, it was claimed, did not require
control of any area to be turned over to UNIFIL.314 This was a narrow and
erroneous interpretation of the resolutions in question and was not even supported
by the United States. In reality Israel had used all means possible to oppose
deployment.i" The scene was now set for further hostilities and confrontation.
Over the next number of years, Israeli backed de facto forces not only harassed
UNIFIL, but also indiscriminately shelled and fired on its positions. They also
attempted to seize UN positions, and were indifferent to the safety of both UN
and civilian personnel.t"
Problems of military effectiveness in UNIFIL and UNOSOM II
Problems of command and control
The establishment of the UNOSOM II force had many similarities with that of a
traditional peacekeeping force such as UNIFIL. A Turkish General Cevic Bar
commanded the force, and he had contingents from a wide political spectrum under
his control. The force was established under Resolution 814 (1993), which
included a provision to the effect that the force would be supervised closely by the
Secretary-General and the Security Council.'!' More importantly, it cited Chapter
VII, which expressly authorised UNOSOM II to use force. This was the first such
occasion since the ONUC operation in the Congo prevented the attempted
314 Document S/12840, letter dated 8 September 1978, from the representative of
Israel to the Secretary-General.
315 The Lebanese Government rightly complained 'that Israel was actively
opposing the deployment of both the Lebanese army and UNIFIL by military, political
and diplomatic action, DocumentS/12834, 5 September 1978, para. 5
316 Major Haddad militia also strongly resisted attempts to deploy elements of the
Lebanese army in the UNIFIL area of operation, The Blue Helmets, op. cit., 97-98.
317 Resolution 814(1993), 26March 1993, paras. 14 and 18.
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secession of the Katanga province that a UN operation of this nature was authorised
to use force in this way.
UNOSOM II took over formally from UNITAFIUNOSOM I on 4 May
1993.318 This was not as early as had originally been planned, but there had been
no major crises in the mean time and the United States could claim to be handing
over the ship in good shape. A new United States administration was now at the
helm, and one of the primary concerns was ensuring President Clinton was not
exposed to risk in a foreign intervention handed on from the Bush administration.
But the United States had invested a lot of energy and prestige in Somalia and it
could not now slip away quietly. Nor could it be seen to allow the follow up
operation fail, and in these circumstances the United States continued to play a
leading role in every facet ofUNOSOM II's organization and mandate.!" In many
ways this suited the UN Secretariat and Boutros-Ghali, who realised that the
operation depended on American military and political support. The United States
agreed to provide logistical and tactical support under a complex command and
control arrangement, but this among other things was later to cause a serious rift
between the Clinton administration and the Secretariat 320
While in theory the United States had handed back control of the
operation to the UN, the reality was much different. A convenient mechanism to
allow the United States ensure that one of its own officers retained full command of
318 In accordance with Resolution 814, 26 March 1993. It provided for a
multinational force of 20,000 troops, 8000 logistical and 3000 civilian support staff. The
US also agreed to provide a tacticalquick reaction force.
319 Ultimately this caused seriousdifferencesbetween the Secretary-Generaland the
Clinton administration, see Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., esp. 92-102. For an overview of the
experience of the larger European armies involved in Somalia, see G. Prunier, 'The
Experience of EuropeanArmies in OperationRestoreHope', in Clarke and Herbst, op. cit.,
135-147. See also Message from the President of the United States - A Report on the
Military Operation in Somalia, (October 13, 1993), (US Government Printing Office,
1993) for US conditions on participation.
320 See Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., 93-94, and Jonathan T. Howe, 'Relations Between
the United States and the UN in Dealing with Somalia', and H. Johnson and T. Dagne,
'Congress and the Somalia Crisis', Clarke and Herbst, op. cit., 173-190, esp. 179-184 and
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United States troops in Somalia was put in place by the appointment of General
Montgomery as Deputy Force Commander. It was no coincidence either that an
experienced NATO officer would command this 'strange and fragmented
operation', or that retired American Admiral Howe would act as the Secretary-
General's special representative.t" The Force Commander reported directly to the
Special Representative, who in tum reported to the Secretary-General.V' This gave
significant influence to the United States, even if it did not formally command the
mission. In addition, this complex system was made even more cumbersome by
the decision of the United States to establish a Quick Reaction Force outside the
UN chain of command.f" This amounted to the establishment of a parallel United
States chain of command that was intended to exist alongside, but independent
from, the UN command structure. How this was intended to operate in times of
crisis in the context of an already complex multi-dimensional operation involving
around thirty nations and many non governmental organizations, is a question that
must not have been addressed seriously by military planners in Washington and the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York. The continued American
domination proved to be a mixed blessing for UNOSOM II, and events showed that
the structures put in place proved unable to maintain cohesion under pressure and
ultimately contributed to the demise of the force.324
The issue of command and control was closely linked to the final
condition that the Secretary-General considered essential for the effective
191-204.
321 This was the descriptionused by Boutros-Ghali,see Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., 93.
322 SecurityCouncil Resolution814, 26 March 1993,para. 14.
323 The United States also deployed a specially constituted Task Force Ranger,
which remained at all times under the direct command and control of the commander in
chief,United States special operations.
324 See Chapter 5 on Command and Control and R. Murphy, 'Legal Framework of
UN Forces and Issues of Command and Control of Canadian and Irish Forces', 4(1)
Journal of Armed Conflict Law, (June 1999), 41-73, at 56-62; and the Report of the
Commissionof Inquiry established pursuant to Resolution 885(1993) to investigate armed
attacks on UNOSOM IIpersonnel, S/1994/653, (1 June 1994),esp. part v-vii.
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operation of UNIFIL i.e. that it function as an integrated and efficient military
unit. Many officers who served with UNIFIL since 1978 consider that this
condition has not been met, and it is the consensus among participants and
commentators that this was not the case with UNOSOM II either.m While it
would be futile to argue to the contrary in respect of UNOSOM II, the situation of
UNIFIL is worthy of further analysis. The Secretary-General's own choice of
words were unfortunate in that they may create the impression that the Force
established was to be a conventional military unit properly constituted for
traditional military operations. This is not the case. The UNIFIL mission, even if
unclear in certain respects, was a peacekeeping mission based on well established
principles and precedents.P" Even today, peacekeeping is a relatively novel
military concept and the mounting and conduct of such missions is very different
from conventional military operations.
Deficiencies in the UN organization and structures
The UN Organization does not have a military branch.i" Despite the
establishment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations(DPKO), problems
remain at Secretariat levee28, and the Brahimi Report recommended that a
number of structural adjustments be made to address current problems.329 The
conduct of peacekeeping operations has been on an ad hoc basis to date, and due
325 This view is based on interviewswith personnel associatedwith both missions.
326 SeeD. W. Bowett, op. cit. and The Peacekeepers Handbook, op. cit. 22.
327 While the Secretary-General has a Military Adviser, he does not have sufficient
military staff employed in the Headquarters for the planning and organization of
operations. Article 47 of the UN Charter provides for the establishment of a military staff
committee. No agreements have been concluded to place armed forces at the disposal of
the Security Council under Article 43 to date. Nor has the committee been involved in
peacekeepingoperations. See Bowett, op. cit., 12-18andpassim.
328
1993),
See Mats R. Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping, Adelphi Paper 281, (October
52-61.
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to the inability of members to agree to a comprehensive set of guidelines to
govern all UN operations, this is likely to remain the status quo.330 The omission
of military personnel from the Secretariat stems from the deliberate policy to
maintain the strictest possible control over the military."! However, the potential
political ramifications of all decisions made by the Force Commander or by any
of his subordinates on the ground has also been a major factor in determining the
UN reluctance to relinquish any part of its overall control and responsibility for
peacekeeping operations. Much more so than in conventional military operations,
almost every move in peacekeeping is liable to have political consequences. A
seemingly inconsequential initiative in the field may precipitate an international
incident. This may cause frustration among the military involved in a
peacekeeping force and lead a limited number to conclude that it is not
functioning effectively as a military unit. The problem is often exacerbated by
the political necessity of implementing a deliberately vague mandate.
In order that the Force be acceptable to the Security Council, to the
parties involved and to the international community, it is necessary to ensure that
there is a wide geographic distribution and a political balance among the
contributing states. This is often detrimental to the smooth operation of the Force
as an integrated military unit. There were large differences in training,
experience, culture and political background among the states that have
contributed to the UN forces in Somalia, and UNIFIL. When these disparities are
taken into account, it is remarkable that a peacekeeping Force like UNIFIL does
in fact work so well, and this is a reflection of the high standards and
professionalism of its officers and men.
329 SeeBrahimi report, op. cit., esp. Summaryof Recommendations,paras. 9-18.
330 In 1965 the General Assembly decided to establish a Special Committee on
Peacekeeping. Much progress has been made in drawing up an agreed set of principles to
govern peacekeeping operations, however disagreementremains in certain key areas. See
Comprehensive review of the whole question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their
aspects. New York,UN, (1976), (DocN31/337) and supra., 29.
This is not unlike what is required in a democratic state and there are various
techniques of control used, see Bowett,op. cit., 359.
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There were more serious problems in respect of UNOSOM II. The
command and control mechanism was complex.332 When this was applied to a
multinational force with a difficult mandate in a failed state like Somalia, the
overall effect was a recipe for disaster. The problem of double allegiance has
arisen in respect ofUNIFIL and the UNOSOM II mission. However, it was much
more acute in the case of UNOSOM.333 The Commander of a peacekeeping
Force has both civilian and military functions, and the troops are usually
considered international civil servants for the duration of their UN service.
Nevertheless, they continue to remain part of the armed forces of their respective
countries. It is now accepted that contingents will consult their national armies
and governments on decisions which may not conform to national defence or
foreign policy directives back home.334 Serious problems did arise in the course
of the operation in the Congo, when contributing states disagreed with UN policy,
in particular its apparent reluctance to take stronger action to resolve the situation
in Katanga.i" In the case of UNIFIL, no similar problems have arisen and the
successive Force Commanders do not appear to have been unduly hindered by
this factor in the proper exercise of command and control over the Force.336
Unfortunately, one of the practical lessons from UN involvement in Somalia is
that the organization 'cannot manage complex-political military operations'. 337
This is confirmed by involvement in other war tom societies in the former
332 SeeBoutros-Ghali,op. cit., 93-94 and R.Murphy, op.cit. and Chapter 5 supra.
333 See C. Brady and S. Daws, 'UN Operations:The Political- Military Interface', 1
(1) International Peacekeeping, (Spring 1994),59-79 at 68-71.
334 Personal interviews, Lt Gen Walghren, Naqoura, October 1989 and Lt Gen.
Callaghen,Dublin 1986, UNIFIL Force Commanders.
335 R. Higgins, The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 1960 -1964. London:
Royal Institute of International Affairs (1980), Chapter 8, 'Relations with Contributing
States', 97-124.
336 Personal interview,Lt GenW. Callaghan,Dublin, January 1987.
337 See Chester A. Crocker, 'The Lessonsof Somalia:Not EverythingWentWrong',
74 (3), Foreign Affairs, (May/June 1995),5.
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Yugoslavia.
However, the well publicised differences between the commander of the
Italian contingent and the UNOSOM II force commander show how serious this
problem was in Somalia.338 It caused serious operational difficulties on the
ground and seriously hindered the effectiveness of the Force at a critical period.
Other contingents had less publicised difficulties in this regard also. As
contingents are usually placed under the operational control, and not under the
full command of a force commander of multi-national forces, this is a problem
that will inevitable reoccur.339 One possible solution is to involve all nations, but
especially the larger powers, in some form of committee or group for the purpose
of resolving differences over political and strategic direction."? Itwill be argued
that this will undermine the integrity and command system. But it must be
preferable to a the situation that arose in Somalia, and which led to some
contingents accusing others of not responding to calls for assistance when needed,
and thereby contributing to the casualties sustained. Such events pose a far
greater risk to the integrity of any force than a consultative system designed to
minimise differences and misunderstandings.
There have still been occasions when national governments, most
notably the French, have interfered in the operational affairs of UNIFIL. The
most serious occasion for the Irish contingent occurred in 1989 when the French
government prevented members of the French contingent assisting in the search
for three Irish soldiers who had been kidnapped.?" The French were probably
338 The Secretary-Generalconsidered that the Italians were a 'mistake'and that as a
former colonial power they pursued their own agenda, see Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., 96. See
also ChristopherBrady and SamDaws, op. cit., 59-79 at 68-71. See supra. Chapter 5 and
R.Murphy, op. cit.
339 SeeChapter 5 supra., and R.Murphy,op.cit., 48-55.
340 See also J. Whitman and I. Bartholomew, 'Collective Control of UN Peace
Support Operations:A Policy Proposal', 25 (1) Security Dialogue, (1994), 72-92.
341 Personal interview, senior UNIFIL Staff Officer, Naqoura, Lebanon, October,
1989.
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afraid of becoming embroiled in another clash with Shiite fundamentalists similar
to that which occurred in 1986.342 Whatever the reason behind the French
decision, it indicates the problems which can arise in an international UN Force.
The military effectiveness of UNIFIL was also hampered by the location of its
headquarters, which was situated in the enclave controlled-by the de facto forces.
The need for a comprehensive political and military briefing for all
personnel prior to commencing duty with a peacekeeping force is of vital
importance. Many regular officers, in particular those from large countries
accustomed to a more aggressive conventional military role, must be given the
opportunity to adjust to such restrictions as the use of force only in self-defence
and the lack of a proper military intelligence network. Taking into account the
essential nature of UNIFIL and the many constraints under which it must operate,
its success as an integrated and efficient military unit has been remarkable. In
any event, a peacekeeping mission must be judged primarily by how it fulfils its
political purpose and not solely on its military efficiency. If this is applied to the
Somalia operations. then the intervention in all its manifestations must be judged
a failure. Although financial concerns should not be allowed to dictate the pace
or scale of intervention, the reality is otherwise. For this reason it is worth
keeping in mind that the Operation Restore Hope component of the operation cost
six or seven times more than the total United States development assistance to
Somalia for three decades and more than the total assistance to sub Saharan
Africa in 1994_95.343
Reconciliation and mediation efforts in Somalia and Lebanon
A criticism sometimes made of UN peacekeeping and military intervention is that it
'freezes' the problem but does not solve the underlying causes of conflict. In
342 S/18348. 18 September 1996. See R. Murphy. 'UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon
and the Use of Force', 6 (2) International Peacekeeping. (Summer 1999),38-63 at 52-55.
343 This piece of information is cited in T. Weiss, 'Rekindling Hope in UN
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recent times operations tend to be multi-dimensional in nature, and may include a
nation building and national reconciliation policy. In this regard the mandate(s)
governing the UNOSOM mission in Somalia was significantly different from
UNIFIL.344 UNOSOM II was, as Boutros-Ghali had pointed out, the first operation
of its kind. Itwas not constrained by the issue of consent, or by the rules governing
the use of force in peacekeeping operations. The mandate for fostering national
reconciliation was contained in Resolution 814(1993) that authorised UNOSOM II,
under Chapter VII, 'to assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance
political reconciliation. ,345 In fact, national reconciliation was an integral part of
UNOSOM'S mandate from the beginning.l'" There was no similar mandate in
respect of Lebanon, and while assisting the government there in restoring its
authority in the area could be interpreted broadly, it did not mean nation building or
even facilitating national reconciliation.
The conflict in Lebanon also had to be seen in a regional context, and it
was inextricably linked to the wider security and geopolitical concerns in the
Middle East. This made finding a resolution to the conflict very difficult and it
prevented the UN from playing a significant role in a resolution of the underlying
causes of the conflict. For this reason the UN was effectively excluded from the
negotiations leading to the first serious attempt to resolve the conflict since the
establishment of UNIFIL i.e. the Israeli-Lebanon Agreement of 1983. Not
surprisingly, the military and other concessions granted to Israel were inconsistent
HumanitarianIntervention', inW. Clarkeand J. Herbst, op. cit., 207-228, at 216.
344 See generally Omar Halim, 'A Peacekeepers Perspective of Peacebuilding in
Somlia', in Jeremy (ed.), op. cit., 70-86 andJ. Drysdale,op. cit., 133-134.
345 Resolution 814, 26 March 199, para. 4(c). This was a broad mandate which
included: political reconciliation; the building of political and administrative structures;
disarmamentand demobilizationof fighters;enforcementof the arms embargo from within
Somalia; the re-establishment of the Somali police and justice system; the return of
refugees and internally displaced persons; demining and rehabilitation and reconstruction.
See generally O. Halim, 'A PeacekeepersPerspective of Peacebuilding in Somalia', in J.
Ginifer (ed.), op. cit., 70-86.
346 Resolution 751, 24 AprilI992 amd The UN in Somalia, op. cit., 9-20 andpassim;
and S/23693, 11March 1992,paras. 43-54.
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with UNIFIL's mandate and continued presence in the south. 347 By assigning a
very minor role to UNIFIL, it appeared to grant a significant victory to Israel.348
Israeli policy was consistent and well known, but what was surprising and difficult
to understand was the role of the United States in the whole affair. The United
States representative at the UN had supported UNIFIL's continued existence in
January.r" Now it appeared to playa major part in an Agreement that effectively
excluded the UN from any real role in southern Lebanon.
A proposal to ensure the safety of Palestinians in camps was fraught with
difficulty and had the potential to involve UNIFIL in Lebanon's factional war in a
similar way to that of the Multi National Force.3SO What would UNIFIL do in the
event of rival Palestinian factions fighting one another in the camps to gain control?
Would UNIFIL be responsible for ensuring that no militant groups operated from
the camps, and who would protect those outside the camps? Any request to protect
the camps would first have to be made by the Lebanese government. UNIFIL
would be there at the behest of the government, but it could lead to the absurd
situation where UNIFIL might well be protecting the camps from attacks by
legitimate Lebanese Forces or forces allied to the government. The plan and
agreement in general was not properly thought out, and the exclusion of Syria was
bound to backfire on the United States by precipitating a Soviet veto of any
mandate change in the Security Council.
The United States believed it could convince Syria to accept the
347 The full text of the agreement was published in XII (567) Monday Morning,
week of May 23-29, 1983. An abridged version was printed in XXIX Keesing's, 32409-
32410. See also N. A. Pelcovits, op. cit.• 142-153. Para 4 of the Annex on Security
arrangementsprovided for a minor role for one battalion in the Sidon area.
348 Israel had repeatedly called for the withdrawal of UNIFIL in the months leading
up to the agreement.H. Goodman, The Jerusalem Post, 8 May 1993. The Israelis let it be
known that they wanted the Netherlands and/or Norway to supply troops for the Sidon
area. See also SecurityCouncil OfficialRecords, 2411Mtg., 18January 1983.
349 SecurityCouncilOfficialRecords, 2411Mtg., 18January 1983
350 Opposition to the MultiNational Force grew during 1983, see N.A. Pelcovits, op.
cit. 44-66 and R. Thakur ,op. cit.,79-106 and 171.
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agreement, an optimism not shared by UN personnel. 351 The Agreement called for
the withdrawal of all foreign forces, thus linking Israeli withdrawal with that of
Palestinian and Syrian forces. Syria objected to having its forces equated with
those of Israel, and probably feared the Agreement would diminish in some way its
chances of recovering the Golan Heights.352 The Agreement came to symbolise for
Syria and the Lebanese opposition the political advantages gained by the
Phalangists as a result of the Israeli invasion.f" In this way, the failure to
acknowledge Syria's vital interests was naive and amounted to a rebuke to the
Syrians. Many of the preconditions set for its implementation were unrealistic. 354
The minimum price Syria would have demanded for co-operation was similar
concessions in the Bekaa valley to those given Israel in the south and the
withdrawal of Israel from the Golan Heights. Syria's co-operation was essential to
the success of the Agreement, but unlike Israel, it was under no pressure to comply.
Its lines of supply in Lebanon were relatively short, its army was not suffering
casualties from hostile forces behind enemy lines, there was no strong domestic or
international pressure to withdraw, and other states such as Saudi Arabia continued
to give financial support.l"
The United States regarded the conclusion of the Agreement as an
351 Interview, Lt. Gen. Callaghan, Force Commander UNIFIL, Dublin, January
1987.
352 J. W. Jabbra and N. W. Jabbra, 'Lebanon, Gateway to Peace?', 38 International
Journal, (Autumn 1983), 606 and D. Gilmore,Lebanon-the Fractured Country, London:
Sphere Books, (1984), 188. Itwas also suggested that Syria could only be induced to leave
if the United States gave a commitment to persuade the Israelis to withdraw from the
Golan Heights and theWest Bank.
353 Pelcovits,op. cit., 39.
354 Israel required the prior withdrawal of Syria, the return of prisoners held by
Syria, and the return of Israeli soldiers buried in Syria. Israel was also given rights of
intervention and flights over Lebanese territory while these were specifically denied to
Syria. The Syrian representativeat the UN stated that the 'agreement must be overturned'
since it was imposedunder the shadow of occupation. G.A.O.R. N38IPV9 28 September
1983and S.C.O.R., 2496Mtg., 11November 1983.
355 For the pressures on Israel at the time see C. Herzog, The Arab Israeli Wars,
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important aspect of its policy in Lebanon, while Syria saw its failure as an
opportunity to embarrass the Americans and as a means of achieving a diplomatic
victory over them. A combination of factors worked against the Agreement from
the start. In the course of 'national reconciliation' talks held in Geneva later that
year, it was agreed to 'freeze' the Agreement.l" United States efforts in tatters, the
UN was permitted to play a more central role in the second significant round of
negotiations to secure an Israeli withdrawal which were convoked by the Secretary-
General in late 1984 and early 1985.357
The Israeli position during the 'Naqoura talks' can be summarised as
attempting to gain advantages through negotiations that they were unable to gain
militarily, a strategy that was not acceptable to other parties. The Lebanese
position was unrealistic and even irresponsible given the obvious consequences of a
unilateral Israeli withdrawal.i" The outbreak of communal violence would lessen
the capability of any factions to attack Israel, and might even reduce pressure on
them to withdraw from all of Lebanon. An influx of pro-Israeli Christians to the
south could also help Israel's security along the frontier in the predominantly Shia
south. In addition to war reparations, the Lebanese insisted on an unconditional
Israeli withdrawal. There were to be no arrangements for Israel's security apart
from UNIFIL and the Lebanese arrny.359 Israel accepted UNIFIL had a role to play
after the withdrawal, but this was not the same as agreeing to rely exclusively on
the UN to secure Israel's northern frontier.
In the event, neither the Naqoura talks nor the 1983 Agreement produced
London:Arms & Armour, (1985), 356-359.
356 See :xxx Keesing's, 32646. This eventually led to President Gemayel
announcing in February 1994 that he had agreed to its abrogation.
357 See The Blue Helmets, op. cit., 104-105. SecurityCouncil Resolution555(1984),
12 October 1984 and Resolution 549(1994), 19 April 1984, had contained a paragraph
requesting the Secretary-Generalto continueconsultationswith the parties concerned.
358 The outbreak of communalviolencewas widely predicted at the time, Interview,
Capt. G. Humphries, Military Information Officer 1984, UNIFIL Headquarters, Dublin,
July 1999.
359 Ibid.
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any agreement on an Israeli withdrawal acceptable to all parties. While the failure
of UN efforts can be attributed in part to unrealistic demands made by the Lebanese
at the behest of Syria, certain of the Israeli conditions were inconsistent with
Security Council resolutions since 1978. These conditions amounted to a demand
for approval by the UN for the continued occupation of part of Lebanon and
recognition of their surrogate militia there. This would have made a mockery of
UNIFIL's original purpose and the intentions of the Security Council, in particular
the proposal to deploy around Sidon. Such a move would have shifted
responsibility from the Israelis to the UN for inter communal violence. It seemed
the Secretary-General was misled by the parties prior to the negotiations and that
from the beginning there was little hope of finding agreement.
The UN efforts at reconciliation in Somalia were more proactive than
those in Lebanon, but they too failed to achieve any long-term success.i'" Among
the factors militating against success was the initial controversy such efforts
generated, not least because they failed to take cognisance of the post Barre
Somalia and they found support among those who no longer held power and
influence in the country.l" Conventional analyses at the time tended to blame
deficiencies in policies and personalities within the United States and the UN, and
the Somali body politic.362 These may have underestimated the complexity of the
factors adversely affecting efforts at reconciliation, but the policies and mistakes of
the UN exacerbated this situation. UNOSOM I might have succeeded if the
360 The UN sponsored several major peace conferences and a number of national
reconciliation meetings, but despite two significant national accords, the Somali parties
failed to honour the commitmentsthey had made. See The UN and Somalia. 1992-1996,
New York: UN, 1996,6-7.
361 The leader of the major faction,Aided, was suspicions and antagonistic from the
beginning. On the other hand, Ali Mhadi saw an opportunity for self advancementand he
supported the UN presence. See alsoM.D. Abdullahi,op. cit., 31-32.
362 For a comprehensiveoverviewof this aspectof the UNOSOMoperationsee
K. Menkhaus 'International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National
Reconciliation in Somalia', 3 (1) International Peacekeeping (F.Cass), Spring 1996, 42-67
and also published inW. Clarkeand J. Herbst, op. cit.• 42-63.
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intervention had been earlier and the strategy advocated by the Secretary-General's
special representative, Sahnoun, was pursued. He had succeeded in gaining the
confidence and co-operation of all parties, and his efforts should have been allowed
time to bear fruit.
The approach of rebuilding a society from the 'bottom up' had much to
recommend it. If it had been combined with an even handed and firm policy on
disarmament from an early stage, and the resources were applied to restoring the
police and justice system in particular, then matters might have worked out quite
differently. As it turned out, Sahnoun's term was short-lived and ultimately
overtaken by events.
Later, the focus of what UNOSOM termed the 'bottom up' approach for
political reconstruction was the district council.363 While the idea was good, the
implementation was not well thought out. There were criticisms that it was too neo-
colonial in style.364 There was also criticism of the haste with which each council
was established and the lack of consultation with traditional authorities in each
district. 365 Part of this was due to the fact that insufficient attention was paid to
demographic changes, and in some places the warlords ensured that their person
was selected. A counter argument could be made that the assessment of the crisis
was so serious that it required rapid and drastic measures immediately to prevent
matters worsening. The result was that the regional councils, from which it was
intended to select representatives for the Transitional National Council, were
seriously flawed.366 There were differences in the UNOSOM II and Somali
363 See Ghali, op. cit., 94. This modelwas intended to permit a form of proportional
representation so that councils reflected the composition and interests of the local
population.
364 See J. Hirsch and R. Oakley,op. cit., 158.
See Human Rights/Africa, 7 (2), Somalia Faces the Future-Human Rights in a
Fragmented Society, (Apri11995) and 32-33.
365
366 An example of the insensitiveapproach of the UN was provided at the third UN
coordinationmeeting held in Addis Ababa and signed on 27 March 1993. The agreement
provided for a 'transitional system of governance' which included a TransitionalNational
Council that was to be 'the repository of Somali sovereignty'. This was offensive to the
representativesof the self-proclaimedSomalilandRepublic in the relatively peaceful north
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interpretations of how to form some of the proposed political institutions, and a
lack of resources to support them that proved crucial. 367 The attempt to adopt the
policies of Sahnoun were ill conceived, and indicated the inconsistencies in the
overall UN policy of nation building in Somalia in which warlords vacillated in
stature from national leaders with whom the UN could work, to international war
criminals and terrorists deserving the odium of the international community.
Closely linked to the reconciliation process was the need to rebuild the
Somali police and justice system. But this was handicapped from the beginning by
the requirement that resources for this programme be obtained from voluntary
contributions.P'' This was almost certain to assure its failure and showed the lack
of commitment to a comprehensive strategic plan to achieve nation building. In
recent years the international community has been actively engaged in promoting
the rule of law in many countries emerging from internal conflicts and complex
political emergencies through a range of international organizations, bilateral
agencies and non-governmental organizations.i'" One of the consequences of the
involvement of so many actors is that there has been a serious lack of co-ordination
and harmonisation between actors and programmes. In addition, there has been
inadequate sensitivity to the political context and a failure to recognise that it must
be built on indigenous traditions and involve the local population.F?
west who had left the conference before the agreement was signed and who subsequently
disassociated themselves from this provision.
367 See O. Halim, 'A Peacekeepers Perspective of Peacebuilding in Somalia', in J.
Ginifer (ed.), op. cit., 70-86 at 73.
368 Resolution 865, 22 September 1993, paras. 9,12 and 13. See also W. Clarke,
'Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia', in W. Clarke and J. Herbst, op. cit.,
3-19at9.
369 The empirical evidence emerging from a range of post conflict countries strongly
suggests that an essential startingpoint for the proper establishmentof the rule of law is the
society itself, both its people and its culture. See R. Mani, 'Conflict Resolution, Justice
and the Law: Rebuilding the Rule of Law in the Aftermath of Complex Political
Emergencies',5 (3) International Peacekeeping (F. Cass), (Autumn 1998), 1-25at 16.
370 See W. Clarke, 'Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia', in W.
Clarke and J. Herbst, op. cit., 3-19 at 14-15.
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In regard to Somalia, problems in re-establishing the police and justice
system derived primarily from the failure of the UN to treat the matter with
urgency'?', ensure proper consultation and funding, and implement a UNOSOM
Justice Division's programme.Y" This was despite the urgent need to prioritise
civil affairs and re-establish the rule of law. Because of the security situation, re-
establishing a viable police force was one of the key elements to restoring
normalcy. Unfortunately, even Sahnoun failed to capitalise on what every report on
the police noted, i.e. that the Somali police were well trained, disciplined and non-
tribal.373 It is also worth noting that there was no proposal for the establishment of
an International Criminal Tribunal for Somalia. Somalis expected that the United
States would call for a war crimes tribunal, especially given the evidence of, inter
alia, crimes against humanity by the Siad Barre regime.?" One interpretation of
this is that the political will did not exist to do so, and that African lives were not
equated with European lives. A less benign interpretation is that independent
investigation might point to United States and European and regional powers
complicity with the Barre regime and others in Somalia.375
Resolution 814(1993) placed the UN at the centre of reconciliation in
371 It is noteworthy that the Brahimi report emphasized the importance of civilian
police personnel and civilian specialists in peace support operations, and recommended a
'doctrinal shift' in their use, Brahimi, op.cit., esp. Recommendations, paras.2, 9, 10 and 16.
372 See M. Ganzglass, 'The Restoration of the Somali Justice System,'3 (1),
International Peacekeeping (F.Cass), (Spring 1996), 113-138 and also published in W.
Clarke and J. Herbst, op. cit., 20-41. See also O. Halim, 'A Peacekeepers Perspective of
Peacebuilding in Somalia', in J. Ginifer (ed.), op. cit., 70-86 at 81. For general background
see The Irish Times, 17 February 1994.
373 See Ganzglass, op. cit., 115. After the fall of Siad Barre, the police numbered
about 15,000. They were poorly equipped, and with the outbreak of hostilities many
returned to their own clan areas for safety. But they had remained relatively independent,
and as such they constituted a potential resource for rebuilding the institution of the state.
For other problems restoring the police and judicial system, see O. Halim, op. cit., 70-86 at
74-76.
374 M. D. Abdullahi,op. cit., 18.
375 Ibid. The US had supported the Barre regime for over a decade before its fall.
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Somalia+" But Somalia was crowded for a time with those interested in peace
building, and not all the camps agreed among themselves or with each other what
the appropriate strategy should be. Given the lack of any central government or
administration, it is not surprising that a survey of numerous reconciliation
strategies in Somalia found the most successful were at local level, using traditional
Somali social mechanisms.i" This was also the view of NGO's working in the
country.378The one important exception to this general finding concerned areas that
had been conquered by clans during the conflict. It was predictable that local
reconciliation was bound to have most impact. In essence, all politics is local. Any
observer with experience of conflict situations will testify to the relevance of the
local situation to the detriment ofthe national. It is difficult for villagers to identify
with national efforts if these efforts do not translate into meaningful gains in
personal security and well being on the ground. None of the reconciliation
conferences had any long-term impact on the causes of the conflict. It may be that
many factions did not want to compromise and reach a negotiated solution, but the
'gravy train' of expenses associated with participation gave the process an
artificially extended lifespan.i" In the end, any consideration of the efforts at
national reconciliation in Somalia must take cognisance of many factors, but
especially be aware of the centrifugal social, economic and political forces
prevalent in Somalia that undermined the process at every level.
Conclusion
The UN has been criticised for its failure to fulfil the mandate in Lebanon, and for
376 During the period from 1991 until early 1995, there were 17 know national level
and 20 known local level initiatives. Not all of these were sponsored by UNOSOM, and
regional actors as well as the US played a significantrole.
377 K. Menkhaus,op. cit., 47-54.
378 Personal interviewswithConcernWorldwideand GOAL workers, Ireland, 1999.
379 K. Menkhaus,op. cit., W. Clarke and J. Herbst, 46-47.
230
the failure of the operations in Somalia. An often overlooked factor in this
criticism is the fact that the Organization is resorted to by states most often when
it suited their purposes and the problem otherwise seems insoluble. This is not to
say the organizational failures such as those identified by the Brahimi Report did
not contribute to the difficulties, but this was just part of the problem.l" The
situation created by the 1978 invasion of Lebanon was such an instance. The
establishment of UNIFIL was primarily sponsored by the United States to
facilitate a speedy withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon in 1978, and to ensure that
the so called Camp David Accords were not further jeopardised by Israeli actions.
The Force would also help prevent the outbreak of another major conflict between
Syria and Israel. Israel and the United States, despite their otherwise strong links,
did not always share perceptions as to what constituted a common threat in the
Middle East region. Co-operation from the Israelis was vital to the success of
UNIFIL. When it became clear that it was not forthcoming, the United States
never brought sufficient pressure to bear on the Israelis to ensure that they would
succumb. In the Security Council, the normal political divisions underlying any
agreement of this nature to establish a peacekeeping force were temporarily put
aside by its members due to the urgency of the crises. Nonetheless, the mandate
agreed upon for UNIFIL was unrealistic and lent itself to different interpretations
by opposite parties. Many elements of the overall plan for the deployment of
UNIFIL had obvious deficiencies. In this way, its success has remained dependent
on factors outside its control.
A number of recent multinational interventions, whether under the banner
of the UN or an independent coalition, have often failed to make a long-term
improvement in the crisis situation.l" There has been a tendency to rely on short-
term political expediency to the detriment of long-term strategic policies at the
380 SeeBrahimi, op. cit., n. 3.
381 See J. MacKinlay & R. Kent,' A New Approach to Complex Emergencies', 4 (4)
International Peacekeeping, (Winter 1997), 31-49 at 36. For an analysis of the neglect of
developmental components of peace operations, see J. David Whaley, 'Improving UN
DevelopmentalCoordinationwithin PeaceMissions'. in J. Ginifer, op. cit., 107-122.
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operational level. In general, the military component of multi-dimensional
operations have developed a doctrinal approach that largely ignored the realities of
the crisis environment and instead sought to rely on the limited version of the
problem that could be resolved by military means.382 This is a natural response
from conventional military that perceives its role as essentially limited to the
provision of security, and even then, its first priority will always be its own security
The Somalia experience shows that military establishments need to re-
examine their role in complex political and humanitarian emergencies. In
particular, there is considerable mistrust between civil and military components,
and each must rethink its relationship with the other and co-ordinate their functions
for the common good.383 The humanitarian agencies felt increasingly marginalized
as the chain of command and decision making became predominantly military and
political. For a multi-dimensional peace operation to be effective, humanitarian and
developmental aspect must be accorded equal statuS.384 Attempts at co-ordination
by the military were interpreted as attempts at control. There is a need for the
military to expand its concept of security to consider much more than 'keeping the
lid' on things and embrace the security of the local population, reconstruction and
rehabilitation. The failure to disarm the clans was a serious flaw in the
382 See J.MacKinlay& R. Kent, op. cit. 45 & 46. See also A. de Waal & R. Omaar,
'Can Military Intervention Be 'Humanitarian"? Middle East Report, (March-June 1994),
at 5-8; and T. Weiss, 'Military -Civilian Humanitarianism: The 'Age'of Innocence is
Over' ,2 (2) International Peacekeeping,(Summer 1995),157-174. For a military
perspective see S.L. Amold,'Somalia: An operation Other Than War', Military Review,
December 1993, pp. 26-35 and W.D. Freeman, 'Operation Restore Hope - A US Centcom
Perspective',Military Review, (September 1993), 61-72.
383 See P. Diehl, 'With the Best of Intentions: Lessons from UNOSOM I and
UNOSOM II', 19 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, (1996), 153-157 at 159-161. See also
Kevin M. Kennedy, 'The Relationship between the Military and Humanitarian
Organizations in Operation Restore Hope,' 3 International Peacekeeping, (Spring, 1996),
92-112 and also published in W. Clarke and J. Herbst, op. cit., 99-117. For a report on
ways to improve this relationship see George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker,
Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention oj Deadly Conflict, a report to the
Carnegie Commissionon PreventionDeadlyConflict,New York, (December 1998.)
384 See H. Slim, 'The Stretcher and the Drum: Civilian Military Relations in Peace
Support Operations', in J. Ginifer, op. cit., 123-140 at 134.
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implementation phase of the UN operations, but even this would have been
insufficient without the creation of a safe environment. If you want to create a
secure environment, then peace must be made with all the parties. The narrow
focus on the humanitarian and military issues meant the underlying political
problems did not receive sufficient attention. One of the primary causes of this was
an ambiguous mandate and objectives.i"
Somalia was certainly a war tom society, but despite media and other
reports to the contrary, it was not anarchic. Nor were the Somali people
warmongers with a predisposition to violence and self-destruction.I" The long-
term strategy was unclear at the time of inception, but by the end of the operation it
was non-existent. What efforts were made at rebuilding the war tom society were
inept and imposed without sufficient attention to indigenous political, cultural and
social traditions. Instead of seeking to marginalize all the major warlords, the UN
targeted Aided. The problem was essentially political and not a result of the
phenomena associated with the end of the cold war, and lessons learned in the
Congo during the ONUC operation in the 1960's and elsewhere were ignored. It
was the neo-colonial attempts to shape and mould future Somali political
arrangements that led to disaster. The unfolding events showed that the United
States and the UN forces failed to appreciate the contradictions and inconsistencies
in their confused roles of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement.
When this was combined with United States domination, and key positions held by
difficult personalities, it was hardly surprising that UNOSOM II became a major
protagonist in a conflict it was supposed to help resolve. Nor is it true to say that
the UN broadened the mandate against the wishes of the United States, in fact the
United States drafted many of the resolutions, especially Resolution 814(1993) on
385 For a comparisonwith Mozambiqueand Angola, see A. Malaquias, 'The UN in
Mozambique andAngola: LessonsLearned', in 1.Ginifer,op. cit., 87-103.
386 See the handbook produced for the US military, 'Somalia: Hopeful Handbook,'
34 (8), Africa Confidential, 16 April 1993. For an alternative view see I. M. Lewis,
'Priorities in SomaliActions', Guardian Weekly, 13 December 1992, 2 and I.M. Lewis, A
Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. London: Longmans,
(1980).
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nation building, and presented them to the UN for implementation.Y'
These issues did not arise in the case of UNIFIL, as this was an operation
with an almost exclusive military focus. The political objectives were clear, but
they were never intended to be the responsibility of UNIFIL, the Force would
merely facilitate their achievement by international diplomacy. Nor was there a
civil component to the mission. In the case of both missions, the Security Council
acted as if the mandate would be self-executing once the troops were deployed.
When the UNIFIL mandate proved impractical, the de facto mission of the force
became the provision of a secure environment for the local population. This it did
except on those occasions when the parties to the conflict decided to flout the will
of the international community, and disregard the safety of the UN personnel and
the local population.i'" It took nearly twenty-three year for UNIFIL to implement
the mandate, but its ultimate success in achieving this may be said to have
vindicated the role or traditional peacekeeping. The same may not be said of the
intervention in Somalia. Apart from the loss of life on all sides, the tragedy of
Somalia is the failure to learn the right lessons from a situation where the UN was
called upon to do a range of impossible and confused tasks. Unfortunately, the
response to the crises in Kosovo and East Timor are the most recent examples of
the application of this flawed analysis.
387 Sharf, interview,op. cit. andClarke and Herbst, op. cit., 241.
388 There are many documented incidents when this occurred, one of the most
serious occasions in recent years was during 'Operation Grapes of Wrath' in April 1996,
and again in June 1999. See also The Irish Times, 22 & 23 June 1999where shelling of
Irish and otherUNIFIL positionswas reported.
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Chapter 7
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING IN LEBANON AND SOMALIA, AND
THE USE OF FORCE
Introduction
The principles governing the use of force are fundamental to peacekeeping forces, and
one of the characteristics that distinguish peacekeeping from enforcement operations. I
Although the UN Charter does not specifically provide for peacekeeping operations,
their establishment and development is now based upon a number of fundamental
principles, adherence to which may well determine the success or otherwise of a
peacekeeping mission.! One of these, the prohibition on the use of force except in self-
defence is an essential characteristic of traditional peacekeeping operations that is
based on practical and doctrinal considerations.' The publication of the Brahimi
For a historical overview of the use of force by states see A. Clark Arend & R. J.
Beck, International Law and the Use of Force, Rutledge, (1993); I. Brownlie, International
Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1963); C. Greenwood,
'The International Court and the Use of Force' in A. Lowe & M. Fitzmaurice,(eds.), Fifty
Years of the International Court of Justice. (1996), 373-388; and 1. E. Fink, 'From
Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Blurring of the Mandate for the Use of Force in
Maintaining International Peace and Security', 19Maryland Journal of International Law and
Trade, (1995), 1-46. See also C. Greenwood, 'Self-defence and the Conduct of International
Armed Conflict' in Y. Dinstein (ed.), International Law at the Time of Perplexity, Dordrecht:
Kluwer, (1989); P. Rowe, Defence - The Legal Implications, London: Brassey's, (1987),
Chapter 7; Right v. Might - International Law and the Use of Force, Council on Foreign
Relations Press, (1989), esp. L. Henkin, 'The Use of Force: Law and US Policy', 37-70; and 1.
Mrazek, 'Prohibition of the Use and Threat of Force: Self-Defence and Self-Help in
International Law, The Canadian Yearbook of International Law, (1989), 81-111.
2 See the Peacekeepers Handbook, New York: International Peace Academy, (1984),
55. The principles include the following:
(a) negotiation is the primary means of finding solutions;
(b) suggestion, advice and objective response to courses of action taken by the parties to
the dispute rather than direction, imposition and coercion;
(c) non-use of force except in self-defence, or as a last resort in carrying out the
mandate;
(d) impartiality; and
(e) recognition of the authority of the host country(s).
See M. Goulding, 'The Use of Force by the United Nations', 3 (1) International
Peacekeeping. (1996), 1-18, F. T. Liu, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of
Force, New York, International Peace Academy, (1992), 11 and G. van Hegelsom, 'The Law
of Armed Conflict and UN Peace-Keeping and Peace-Enforcement Operations', 6 Hague
Yearbook of International Law, (1993), 45-58.
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Report'; and the report on events that led to the fall of Srebrenica, have questioned the
traditional response of UN forces to the use of force and advocated the formulation of a
more robust doctrine. The experience of UN forces in Somalia and Lebanon show that
the non-use of force except in self-defence principle has proved controversial and
difficult to apply in practice, not least because of its correlation to the other
characteristics, especially the need to maintain impartiality/'
The basic rules for the use of force were established during the first stages of
the UNEF I in 1956 and these set a precedent for several later peacekeeping
operations' The Secretary-General originally envisaged that the basic precept of UN
operations would always include 'a prohibition against any initiative in the use of
armed force'.s After the controversy surrounding the operation in the Congo (ONUC),
there was a lot of discussion about the use of force." However, there was a significant
4 See the Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations, UN, 23 August 2000
iBrahimi Report, AJ55/305-S/2000/809 available from <http.www.un.org.».
5 See 'Lessons for the future', in Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General
Assembly resolution 53/35 - The fall ofSrebrenica, General Assembly AJ54/49, 15November
1999, esp. paras. 502 and 505.
6 See generally, M. von Grunigen, 'Neutrality in Peacekeeping', in A. Cassesse (ed.),
United Nations Peacekeeping - Legal Essays, Dordrecht: Sijthoff and Nordhoff, 125 -153 esp.
137-138, (1978).
5 H. Wiseman, 'United Nations Peacekeeping: An Historical Overview', in Wiseman,
(ed.) Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals, New York/Oxford: Pergamon Press, (1983),
19- 58, esp. 33. For a more general discussion on the use of force see A. James, The Role of
Force in International Order and United Nations Peacekeeping. Report of a Conference at
Ditchley Park, (16-19 May 1969), Ditchley Paper No.20, Ditchley Foundation, Oxfordshire.
8 Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of
the Force, UN Doc. AJ3943 of 9 October 1958,para. 179- see R. Siekmann, Basic Documents
on United Nations and Related Peace-Keeping Forces, 2nd enlarged ed, Dordrecht: Martinus
Nijhoff, (1989),53.
9 See for example, A. James, 'The Congo Controversies', 1 International
Peacekeeping (F. Cass), (1994), 44-58, esp.5I-52; D. W. Bowett, United Nations Forces,
London: Stevens, (1964), 200-205; M. Harrington Gagnon, 'Peace Forces and the Veto: The
Relevance of Consent', 21 (4) International Organization, (1967), 812-836; A. Eide, 'United
Nations Forces in Domestic Conflicts' in P. Frydenberg (ed.), Peacekeeping: Experience and
Evaluation - the Oslo Papers, Oslo, NUPI, (1964) 251-252; N. T. Kassar, 'The Legal Limits
to the Use oflnternational Force Through the United Nations Practice', 35 Revue Egyptienne
de Droit International, (1979), 163-234 esp. 195-218, and C. F. Amerasinghe, 'The Use of
Armed Force by the United Nations in the Charter Travaux Preparatoires', 5 Indian Journal of
International Law, (1965), 305-333.
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evolution of the guidelines since UNEF 110, and it was the arrangements for UNEF II
that marked a turning point in the official UN language," where the authority to use
force in self-defence was said to include resistance to attempts by forceful means to
prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate. This significantly broadened
definition of self-defence gave considerable latitude to Force Commanders than
previously was the case, and it became the precedent for all major UN peacekeeping
operations, including UNIFIL, thereafter.F It also allowed the Security Council give
almost any task, however ill thought out or unrealistic, to a peacekeeping force, in the
expectation that it could use force under the guise of self-defence and still retain its
peacekeeping status.
There are two aspects to the use of force in peacekeeping doctrine. The first
is minimum use of force, and the second is the use of force for self-defence only."
These are not synonymous, in that the first permits the use of force to achieve the
military mission or mandate, while the latter restricts the use of force to protection of
persons or property. Most of the debate has focused on the use of force for other than
reasons of self-defence. This is one of the more problematic and controversial issues
associated with UN military operations, and it proved especially so in Somalia and
Bosnia. It is noteworthy that none of the public statements or documents refers to the
duty of UN forces to protect persons or property entrusted to their care.l" In fact,
10 T. Findlay, 'The Use of Force in Self-Defence. Theory and Practice', in A. Morrison,
D. Fraser & J. Kiras (eds.) Peacekeeping With Muscle: The Use of Force in International
Conflict Resolution, Clementsport Nova Scotia: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, (1997),51-75 at
55.
II Hegelsom, op. cit., 50.
12 S112611, 19 March 1978, para 4. The paragraph dealing with the use of force stated:
'The Force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character. It will not use force except
in self -defence. Self -defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to
prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council (Italics
added). The Force will proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict will take the
necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Council', and T. Findlay, op. cit., at
55.
D. Last, Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping
Operations, Clementsport Nova Scotia: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, (1997), 46.
13
14 For discussion on this and related issues under international humanitarian law,
See Chapter 8, infra and R. Marx, 'A Non-Governmental Human Rights Strategy for
Peacekeeping, 14 (2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, (June 1996), 126-145. Brahimi
Report, op. cit., n.4, recommended that UN peacekeepers -troops or police - be authorized to
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during the Bosnian war, the political imperative to be seen to do something led to the
creation of 'safe havens', but ignored the wider military implications of the duty to
protect those havens.v It was not a role that lightly armed peacekeepers could
realistically undertake. Although Resolution 836 (1993) delegated to member states,
acting individually or through regional arrangement, the power to take military action
in Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect safe areas, it remained unclear who should decide
when force should be used and for what purpose." The UN will only acknowledge
such a duty if member states agree to provide the support and means to fulfil this duty.
The experience of UNIFIL shows that this has also been a difficult problem for
traditional peacekeeping operaticns." In the case of Somalia, the dynamic nature of
the humanitarian assistance mandate gradually expanded the authority to use force. As
the objectives changed and the authority to use force altered, the mission became
increasingly less impartial.
Since the establishment ofUNIFIL in 1978, this Force has been involved in a
number of confrontations involving the use of force. 18 Guidelines governing the use
of force have usually been very general in nature leaving considerable room for
interpretation." This is necessary in the operational environment in which a
peacekeeping mission must perform its sometimes unclear and unrealistic tasks.
Recent UN military operations have blurred the distinction between peacekeeping and
stop violence against civilians, within their means, in support of basic UN principles.
IS Y. Akashi, 'The Use of Force in a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation: Lessons
Learnt from the Safe Areas Mandate', 19 Fordham International Law Journal, (1995), 312-
323. See also Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35
- The fall ofSrebrenica, General Assembly Al54/549,15 November 1999.
See D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, (1999), esp., 72-7583-85 and 254-263.
16
17 See R. Murphy, 'UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon and the Use of Force', 6 (2)
International Peacekeeping 2 (F. Cass), (1999), 38-63 and N. D. White, The United Nations
and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, (2nd• Ed.), Manchester: Manchester
University Press, (1997), 241.
18 Liu,op. cit., 27-35. For the background to the establishment ofUNIFIL see Chapter
6 and A. James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, (1990), 339-351 and E A. Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL, An African
Soldiers Reflections, London: Hurst, (1989), 5-30.
N.J. Weinberger, 'Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon', 37 (3) The Middle East
Journal, Summer (1983),341 to 369, esp. 344.
19
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enforcement, and a broad interpretation of self-defence may amount to permitting
enforcement of the mandate, even when the operation is authorised under Chapter VI
rather than Chapter VII of the Charter.i" If a peacekeeping force is denied limited de
facto enforcement powers, this could have the effect of rendering it ineffective for the
purpose of fulfilling the mandate. This was especially evident in the case of UNIFIL,
and the instances where the use of force or enforcement measures were resorted to
were, for the most part, as a last resort to prevent the Force being rendered completely
ineffective in the face of lack of cooperation from the parties to the conflict.
This chapter examines the experience of UNIFIL21 and UNOSOM II. The
premise of the analysis is that strict adherence to the principle of the use of force in
self-defence is the only option available on traditional peacekeeping operations, and
that the nature of the UNOSOM II mission meant that the coercive enforcement
measures adopted inevitably led to its role as third party UN force being converted to
that of factional participant. The identification of one of the factions as an enemy, and
the use of force in pursuit of limited military goals designed to neutralize this enemy,
will ultimately escalate rather than decrease the level of conflict. In general a
peacekeeping force should not rely on the use of force to achieve its ends.22 If it does
so it will loose its status as a peacekeeping mission and cease to be above the conflict it
was intended to resolve." However, when a party to the conflict fails to give the
required level of co-operation, a decision must be made regarding what degree of
force, if any, may be resorted to in the circumstances. In this way, peacekeeping
involves novel approaches to crisis resolution that can be difficult for regular soldiers
recruited from conventional armies to understand and apply."
20 N.D. White, op. cit. 224-244 and Fink, op. cit., 37-44.
21 For a list of incidents involving UNIFIL and the use of force, see Liu, op. cit., 25-35.
22 B. Urquhart, 'Peacekeeping: A view from the Operational Centre' in H. Wiseman,
op. cit., 165.
23 Ibid.
24 This was particularly true of the French contingent, see infra. 237-238. Irish troops
serving at home are governed by similar rules on the use of force in self-defence as U.N.
peacekeepers. For this reason they have little difficulty accepting and applying the rules in
Lebanon. See The Irish Times, 31 May 1985 for a comment to this effect by an official anny
spokesman.
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The establishment of peace support operations in Lebanon and Somalia
In the case of the initial peace enforcement mission to Somalia, the authorisation to use
force was quite novel as the operation was not in response to an act of aggression.f
There was no clear precedent for the type of operations envisaged and the non-
consensual intervention by the UN in the affairs of Somalia. The Security Council
determined that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security,
and express reference was made to action under Chapter VII to establish a secure
environment to secure humanitarian relief.26 Similar to other Chapter VII resolutions,
Resolution 794 (1992) did not make express reference to the use of 'force', but referred
to the right to 'use all necessary means'v" Nevertheless, it was clear that the intent
was to permit states to use force if necessary to ensure that the relief efforts were
successful. 28 The actual wording of the resolution is remarkably vague in this and other
respects. In contrast to Resolution 84 (1950) in respect of the Korea operationj" although
unified command is mentioned in paragraph 12, it seems that the Security Council gave
blanket approval for whatever the Secretary-General and the United States subsequently
agreed to.
The authorization to use all necessary means is a typical UN euphemism for the
use of force. Despite this, it is still not clear what it means in practice. A great deal of
authority seems to have been delegated to very few to act on behalf of the international
25 For background on the deployment of UNOSOM I, which was based on traditional
peacekeeping premises, see Chapter 6, supra and XXIX (3) UN Chronicle, September 1992,
and Resolution 751 of24 April 1992, para. 4. See also Report of the Secretary-general on the
situation in Somalia, S/23829, 21 April 1992, esp. paras. 22-33, and 62-63 and VIII The United
Nations and Somalia 1992-1996, (3 edn.), United Nations Blue Book Series, New York:
United Nations, (1996), 4.
26 Ibid., and Resolution 794 (1992), para. 7. For a discussion of Chapter VII and
Article 39, see generally L. Goodrich, E. Hambro and A. Simmons, Charter of the United
Nations, (3rd. ed.), London: Columbia University Press, (1969), 290-353 esp. 293-302, and B.
Simma (ed.), The Charter of the UN, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1995), 605-678.
27 Resolution 794 (1992), para. 10 (Appendix B). See for example, Resolution 678
(1990), discussed in Chapter 3, supra. 64-69.
28 Arend and Beck, op. cit., 56.
29 Adopted 7 July 1950.
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community in a way that required little or no accountability.l" One of the consequences
of the language used was that it led to uncertainty regarding the UN objectives under the
resolution." This was immediately evident from the Secretary-General's letter to
President Bush, when he referred to the need for disarming the factions. A more detailed
resolution with clearer aims and objectives, setting down definite parameters for the use
of force, and clarifying the nature and extent of United States command, would have been
preferable.
Although UNITAF did adopt a fairly aggressive stance towards disarming
various factions and opening up humanitarian aid routes32, there was no concerted or
evenhanded policy." The situation varied from area to area, depending on the national
origin of UN forces. This restrained policy was to change with the deployment of
UNOSOM II in March 1993. Somalia then became the testing ground for new
peacekeeping and peacemaking by the UN, acting under enforcement powers under
Chapter VII. 34 In contrast with UNITAF, UNOSOM II interpreted the mandate as not
merely authorizing but requiring it to disarm the factions.35 This involved the selective
use of force against one of the factions, Aided's Somali National Alliance. In adopting
such a policy, UNOSOM II broke the cardinal rule when resorting to the use of force
when it failed to maintain an even-handed and impartial approach to the factions
involved, and in so doing it relinquished any pretence of impartiality.
In the case of UNIFIL, one of the major problems confronting the Force was
the fact that the deployment was based on a number of assumptions, many of which
30 For a comprehensive overview of the delegation by the Security Council of its
Chapter VII powers, see D. Sarooshi, op. cit., esp., 81-82, 187 - 191 andpassim.
31 For general background see Chapter 6, supra., esp. 181-187, and Sarooshi, op. cit.,
214.
32 White, op. cit., 120.
33 7 (2) Human Rights/Africa Watch, 'Somalia Faces the Future', (April 1995),58. In
fact many weapons were moved from the presence of UN troops, with a consequent rise in
violence in areas remote from the capital.
34 Makinda, op. cit., 76.
35 See Report oj the Commission oj Inquiry established pursuant to Resolution 885
(1993) to investigate attacks on UNOSOM II personnel, S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, reprinted in
The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, New York, United Nations, (1996), 368, esp.
376-377 (hereafter' UN Commission of Inquiry ,), para. 193.
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were never fulfilled.36 In particular, the necessary co-operation of the parties was far
from forthcoming." Any decisive action against one of these was liable to escalate and
draw UNIFIL into the Lebanese conflict itself. This is in fact what happened to
UNOSOM II, and not surprisingly, the volunteer contributor states withdrew their
contingents and by March 1995 the Force ceased to exist.
In the early years of UNIFIL's existence, the Lebanese government looked for
a stronger show of force and suggested it be armed with medium and heavy weapons.
This was despite the fact that it possessed a number of heavy weapons that were
sufficient to meet the threat from the de facto forces and other armed elementsr''' These
proposals were not supported by the troop contributing countries." In these
circumstances, it was not surprising that the Secretary-General chose a cautious policy
and adopted guidelines on the use of force applied to previous peacekeeping operations
in the region. 40 It is unlikely that the guidelines would have been any different had
they been the subject of critical examination and debate as the Secretary-General had
little choice in this matter owing to the urgency of getting UNIFIL deployed in the first
place."
36 S/13026, 12January 1979, para 34.
37 A. James, 'Painful Peacekeeping: the United Nations in Lebanon, 1978-1982', 38
International Journal, (Autumn 1983), 613-634, esp. 624; J. F. Murphy, The United Nations
and the Control of Violence, Manchester: Manchester University Press, (1983), 106 and 57-60,
and N.J. Weinberger., op. cit., 344.
38 UNIFIL already possessed a range of 120mrn mortars up to 120mm. The Irish
battalion and the French had a number of 90mm cannons mounted on armoured cars, and the
Dutch had T.O.W. missiles.
39 J.O.C.Jonah, 'Peacekeeping in the Middle East', 31 International Journal,(1976),
100-122, esp..155-166. In any event UNIFIL already possessed a number of relatively heavy
weapons such as 90mrn guns mounted on armoured cars and 120mrnmortars.
40 S/12611, 19 March 1978, para 4. See also N.T. Kassar, op. cit., 163-236, esp.214-
218. The Secretary-Generals outline of the principles of Force were more comprehensive for
UNFICYP, S/5653, 11 April, 1964. The guidelines for UNEF 11 are outlined in The Blue
Helmets, (3 Edn.), (UN 1996),60-61. The principles and guidelines for UNEF (S/11052IRev 1)
were approved by the Security Council on 27 October 1973 (Resolution 341 of 1973).
41 Personal interview, Lt. Gen. Erskine, former Force Commander of UNIFIL, Dublin,
July 1986.
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Standing Operating Procedures and Rules of Engagement (ROE)42
Despite the fact that the principle of non-use of force is a long established element of
peacekeeping operations, it is still couched in very general terms.43 This can sometimes
give rise to controversy regarding its interpretation, although its use under the mandate
is subject to the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality." The guidelines
for UNIFIL contained no definition of force or of self-defence, but the UN has taken a
broad view and self-defence was said to include resistance to attempts by forceful
means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate." This was open to
conflicting interpretations, and a great deal of responsibility was placed on the Force
Commander in deciding what degree of force to use when presented with obstacles to
implementing the mandate.
In order to overcome the difficulties of applying the guidelines to the everyday
situation on the ground, a set of standing operating procedures was compiled for
UNIFIL that covered, inter alia, the use of force." These provided detailed guidelines
for the conduct of day-to-day peacekeeping operations, and also normally granted the
military commander on the ground a wide degree of flexibility and discretion in this
regard." The policy is to demonstrate maximum show of force to ensure a minimum
42 See generally, 'Peace Support Operations', Model Manual of the Law of Armed
Conflict, Geneva: ICRC, paras. 2024-2027; G. Bowens, Legal Guide to Peace Support
Operations, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, (1998), 185-202,1. Simpson, Law Applicable to
Canadian Forces in Somalia 1992193 - a study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into
the Deployment of Canadian Forces in Somalia, Public Works and Government Services
Canada, (1997), 35-39; P. Rowe, 'Maintaining Discipline in United Nations Peace Support
Operations: The Legal Quagmire for Military Contingents', 5 (1) Journal of Conflict and
Security Law, (2000),45-62 at 59; and T. Findlay, op. cit., 51-75 at 52 and 55.
43 SI12611, 19March 1978,para4.
44 Model Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, op.cit., para. 2022.
4S
Ibid. See the results of a survey of Irish personnel with UNIFIL in 1998 in Appendix
C, which found that 55% of the troops considered the UNIFIL ROE as clear as could be in the
circumstances.
46 For a discussion on Standing Operating Procedures see The Peacekeepers Handbook,
op. cit., 81. For a copy of the 'Guide to the Use of Force by UNIFIL Personnel', see D.
Loomis, The Somalia Affair - Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Ottawa: DGL
Publications, (1996), at 340-342.
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use of weapons." In conflict resolution terms this could be described as a combat or
management technique intended to control a violent situation.Y
From a legal perspective, the early guidelines provided were incomplete and
deficient in many regards. They contained inherent ambiguities and did not define
certain vital concepts such as 'force' or what constitutes 'an immediate threat to life' .50
In order to address these deficiencies, the UNIFIL ROE were modified as follows:
'Use of Armed Force
3. The use of armed force is authorized only:
(a) in self-defence; or
(b) in resisting attempts by forceful means to prevent UNIFIL from
discharging its duties,
Circumstances under which force may be used
4. Only minimum force necessary is to be used. The only circumstances
under which fire may be opened are:
a. Self-defence, including defence against attempts by force to disarm
UNIFIL personnel or to prevent it by forceful means from carrying out its
47 Personal interviews with senior UNIFIL civilian and military officers from April to
October 1989, and personal experience of writer during a tour of duty with UNIFIL at that
time. UNIFIL standing operating procedures on the use of force do not define what is meant
by armed or unarmed force. There is, however, a brief description of self-defence that repeats
part of the guideline laid down by the Secretary-general in 1978. This goes on to say UNIFIL
personnel are authorised to use their weapons to defend themselves against direct attacks or
threats on their lives, to resist attempts at being disarmed, forcing of UNIFIL positions or
forceful entry of the UNIFIL area. The paragraph describing the general guidelines states,
inter alia, that when fired upon UNIFIL should as a rule, return fire immediately, though
whenever possible inflicting casualties should be avoided. However, weapons should not be
used unless no other means are available or they have been exhausted. See also, Lt. Col. Vogt,
'Experiences of a German Legal Adviser to the UNOSOM IIMission, XXXV Military Law
and Law of War Review, (1996), 219 at 223-225.
48 Personal interview, Lt. Gen. Walgren, Force Commander UNIFIL, October 1989.
The standing operating procedures are continuously being examined and re-assessed in the
light of experience and changing circumstances.
49 C. Dobbie, 'A Concept for Post Cold War Peacekeeping', 36 (3) Survival, (Autumn,
1994).
50 Personal experience of writer from two six month tours of duty in 1981182 and 1989
respectively. On the other hand, vague concepts such as the 'minimum force', 'flexible
response' and 'the emergency situation' have been omitted. These latter concepts were
referred to in the 1980 Standing Operating Procedures and Guidelines on the use of force. The
1990 Guidelines also avoided earlier unrealistic instructions to the effect that fire should be
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tasks;
b. In the defence of UNIFIL posts, premises or vehicles under armed
attack; and
c. In support of other troops ofUNIFIL under armed attack'.
These were relatively simple and direct guidelines, and they were much less
restrictive than those adopted in respect of UNPORFOR, which for their part
stated:
'UNPROFOR personnel may use their weapons:
• To defend themselves, other UN personnel, or persons and areas under
their protection against direct attack, acting always under the order of the
senior office/soldier at the scene: (emphasis added)
• To resist attempts by forceful means to prevent the Force from
discharging its duties, acting under the personal authority of the Force
Commander only; and
• To resist deliberate military and non-military incursions into the
United Nations,.51
In the case of UNIFIL, the standing operating procedures were similar to the
Secretary-General's guidelines, as their general nature allowed the respective
contingent commanders considerable latitude in deciding what is an appropriate
response to a situation. 52 Not surprisingly, it was difficult to ensure their uniform
interpretation and application, and practice indicated that these depended very much
upon the contingent involved. 53 For this reason, subjective factors such as the
personality and training of individual commanders are also of importance when
examining responses to operational situations involving the use of force. 54
directed low at the legs of the attackers, or that 'minimum casualties and minimum injury to
casualties will be called' .
51 Loomis, loe. cit.
52 Personal interviews with a number of former UNIFIL battalion commanders. All
operational personnel are briefed on the policy regarding the use of force to resolve any
misunderstandings or ambiguities arisen from the general nature of the guidelines.
53 Personal interview, Lt. Col. P. Keogh, Chief Operations Officer UNIFIL, August
1989.
54 An examination of the responses of different Irish battalions to harassment and acts
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In the case of UNOSOM II, the ROE governing the use of force were contained
m an operation plan for the force." Their purpose was to provide guidance and
instructions to military commanders, within the framework of political directives. 56
ROE define the degree and manner in which force may be applied and are designed so
that the application of force is carefully controlled. They are tantamount to orders, but
unless carefully drafted they are prone to varying interpretations. ROE are not law or
laws in themselves, and to be lawful they must comply with applicable national and
international law, including international humanitarian law.57 The interpretation of the
ROE changed substantially during the operations in Somalia, due in part to their
inherent ambiguity and incompleteness. 58 When the security situation changed in May
1993, the Force Commander broadened the ROE, in effect giving UNOSOM II forces
a 'blank cheque'r" The new rules under Fragmentary Order 39 allowed UNOSOM II
to engage without provocation 'any armed militias, technicals and crew served
weapons that were considered a threat'.
Peacetime and wartime ROE are mutually exclusive, and apply to different
scenarios. When the United States engages in 'non-traditional' operations, these are
governed by peacetime rules, or rules derived from peacetime ROE. But if the
of hostility between 1978 and 1990 indicates that the interpretation of the guidelines on the use
of force can differ from battalion to battalion. 'Human and institutional' failings were also
considered important factors in the failure of the UN to protect Srebrenica, see 'Lessons for the
future', in Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35 -
The fall ofSrebrenica, General Assembly AlS4/49, 15November 1999, para. 485.
55 The Commission of Inquiry concluded that no terms of reference or standing
operation procedures were to be found in UNOSOM II. The main reason for this critical
deficiency seemed to be the almost total lack of peacekeeping experience among UNOSOM II
ranks and the understaffing of UNOSOM II Headquarters during the initial period - UN
Commission of Inquiry, op. cit., para. 258.
56 See D. Loomis, op cit." Annex A-F, 644-681 and J. T. Dworken, 'Rules of
Engagements: Lessons from Restore Hope', Military Review, (September, 1994),27-28.
57 Simpson, op. cit., 39. The ROE for the Canadian Joint Force Somalia - Operation
Deliverance, can be found from 73-80.
58 Interview, Capt. A. 0 Murchu, Irish platoon commander with UNOSOM II at the
time, August 2000. See also C. Clep and D. Winslow, 'Learning Lessons the Hard Way:
Somalia and Srebrenica Compared', in E. Schmidl, Peace Operations Between War and
Peace, London: Frank Cass, (2000), 93-137 at 103.
59 Ibid. See also F. Tanner, 'Weapons Control in Semi-permissive Environments: A
Case for Compellance', in M. Pugh (ed), The UN, Peace and Force, (F. Cass, 1996), 126-145
at 140.
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underlying legal foundation is ambiguous, it may make determining the appropriate
action under the applicable ROE difficult to determine." In the circumstances, UN
forces in general appeared unsure about what their guidelines allowed in response to
Somali actions, and disputes about interpretation were inevitable." At one stage there
was a serious dispute between United States and Pakistani troops, when the latter
accused the United States marines of being too aggressive and taking too many risks,
and thereby violating UN ROE.62
Despite the fundamental difference in the nature of UNIFIL and UNOSOM II
operations, the general nature of the ROE's governing the use of force were very
similar. In fact, the UN Under-Secretary-general Marrack Goulding referred to the
UNIFIL guidelines in correspondence relating to ROE for UNOSOM, and to 'the
overriding principle that force can only be used by a UN operation as a last resort and
when all peaceful means have failed' .63 Ultimately, ROE are interpreted by the
commanders on the ground, and it seems that the overall strategic direction and
policies adopted at a senior level can have a significant bearing on this. In the case of
Somalia, once the operation was approved under Chapter VII of the Charter, this had a
significant impact on how UNOSOM commanders and officials viewed their role.
This in tum influenced the application of the ROE, which by their very nature lent
themselves to either restrictive or expansive interpretations.
The terms of reference of the Canadian Report of the Somalia Commission of
Inquiry required an evaluation of 'the extent to which the Task Force Rules of
Engagement were effectively interpreted, understood and applied at all levels of the
60 S. Turley, 'Keeping the Peace: Do the Laws of War Apply, 73 Texas Law Review,
(1994), 139 at 166-167
61 In R. v. Mathieu, CMAC 379, November 6, 1995, the commander of the Canadian
Airborne Brigade in Somalia was charged with negligently performing his military duty in
issuing an order to subordinates to fire on looters/thieves fleeing Canadian camps, and thereby
failing to comply with ROE. See also Chapter 38, Dishonoured Legacy, Report of the
Commission of Enquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Canadian
Government Publishing, (Ottawa, 1997), also available at <http://www.dnd.ca.somaliae.htm>
(english version).
62 This arose after an incident where US snipers wounded a medical orderly on the roof
of a hospital and apparently killed a pregnant Somali tea seller, see 'US pulls Somalia snipers
in dispute with Pakistan', Chicago Tribune, 13 January, 1994, 1.
63 D. Loomis, op. cit., 340.
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Canadian Force chain of comrnand'c'" Canadian troops were involved in a number of
incidents involving loss of Somali lives.65 Prior to departure, a government minister
was said to have boasted that that soldiers going to Somalia had been provided with
ROE that permitted them to shoot first and ask question later." To reinforce
instructions from higher ranks and to render the ROE more comprehensible, soldiers
on duty in operational theatre normally carry a condensed version of the ROE.67 There
was more than one version of these 'soldiers cards' circulating in Somalia, and they
contained a number of discrepancies/" The provisions concerning the resort to force
were described differently and yielded significantly dissimilar logical interpretations
depending on the phraseology in a given version/" Typically, the ROE were framed in
an abstract manner, with no practical examples of situations to assist soldiers in
evaluating the degree of force to use. Several contingents had their own ideas on ROE
and quickly established themselves as being trigger happy; a danger to friend and foe
alike."
A critical element in the ROE's was the treatment of the phrase 'hostile
intent', which was defined as 'the threat of imminent use of force'. Any
misinterpretation and misapplication of the rules was likely to have serious
consequences as the rules authorised the Canadian Forces to use 'deadly force' in
64 See 'Rules of Engagement: Confusion and Misinterpretation', Dishonoured Legacy,
Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia op.
cit., vol. 2, p. 1of 13, and Vol. 5, Chapter 22 'Rules of Engagement'.
Ibid., vols 4 & 5. See also L. C. Green, 'Peacekeeping and War Crimes', XXXIV
Military Law and Law of War Review, 247-255 at 253.
6S
66 This was a reference to Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Trade
and International Trade, Canadian Commission of Inquiry, op. cit., 5 of 13
67 It is normally referred to as an aide-memoir, soldiers card, or 'yellow card' in respect
of British Forces in Northern Ireland, see F. Ni Aolain, The Politics of Force, Belfast:
Blackstaff, Belfast, (2000), 84-85, and 129-130.
68 On 7 August 1993, Lt. Col. Battisti, SSO Current Ops, wrote to all contingent
commanders expressing concern that soldiers on duty were 'not clear about ROE as given in
theOPLAN'.
69 For example, one version affirmed the application of force depended on necessity
and proportionality, while other versions did not mention these elements, stating less clearly
the preconditions for using force, Canadian Commission of Inquiry, op. cit., p.3 of 13
70 D. Loomis, op. cit., 470.
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responding to a 'hostile act' or when confronting a 'hostile intent' .71 Thus there
appeared to be no difference between a hostile act and a hostile intent, and many
soldiers accepted that this was the case.72 Furthermore, the issue of level of threat and
the need for a graduated response depending on the severity of the threat encountered
was not addressed adequately. The Irish contingent issues its own 'Scale of Force'
document.F It specified the following graduated response, but with the rider that there
may be circumstances when the firing of Ball Ammunition for effect will have to be
undertaken as a first reaction:
'Scale of Force (In Ascending Order)
a. Physically pushing person(s) away.
b. Use of Batons.
c. Use ofCS Gas
d. Firing of warning shots
(1) In front of the feet (where there is soft ground).
(2) Over the head (where there is no soft ground)
e. Firing for Effect
(1) Firing of ball ammunition for effect (aimed to inflict injury, not death where
possible) '
The UNOSOM II ROE left the impression that the response to unarmed
harassment could be the exact same as that envisaged for an armed threat i.e. deadly
force." Not surprisingly, a policy of shooting thieves was adopted, and this ultimately
had tragic consequences." The role of junior non commissioned officers in the
71 See generally R. Crabbe, 'Rules of Engagement', in Morrison, Fraser and Kiras, op.
cit., 123-126 at 125 and the testimony of former Deputy Minister Fowler, Canadian
Department of National Defence, published by D. Loomis, op. cit., at 332-335.
72 This is in fact the US position, see Col. C. Dunlap, 'US Legal Issues in Coalition
Operations', Peacekeeping and International Relations, (September/October 1996),3-4.
73 This was a 'Restricted' document dated June 1993.
74 The ROE were also silent on the issue of disengagement, and what was an
appropriate response when an intruder breaks off an incursion, and the implications for
handling detainees were equally uncertain.
Members of the German contingent also had to use 'their hand held weapons to
prevent unknown native persons from breaking into the German compound secretly', see Lt.
7S
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execution of drills and ROE is vital, as it is they that must first react to a problem. As
strategic goals were to be achieved by use of force, it became essential to have specific
and clear orders available at every level to exercise control over its application. This
did not happen."
It is noteworthy that several officers of the First Marine Expeditionary Force
(MNF I) felt that shows of force in which ringleaders were shot by snipers had a
salutary effect on reducing incidents of violence." But shows of force of this nature
did nothing to deter unarmed civilians, who were quick to appreciate their immunity
and take advantage of the situation. It is submitted that random acts of violence or
theft can never justify firing live ammunition. It is the responsibility of commanders to
establish appropriate standing operating procedures, such as the use of sticks or batons.
ROE's and the use of force are intended to deescalate and contain the situation", but
often, if not clear and resorted to in an undisciplined manner, it can have the opposite
effect.
The UN must shoulder some of the responsibility for the confused state of
affairs. The difficulties associated with the military integration of multinational forces
are enormous. But no real effort was made to ensure uniform adoption and application
of ROE among UNOSOM II contingents. Sometimes, differences in interpretation of
ROE are more semantic than substantive.i'' The UN should formulate generic rules of
engagement for all operations based on international law, especially international
humanitarian law, and operational considerations. so This is all the more important as
Col. Vogt, op. cit., 219-227 at 223. See also The Public Prosecutors Department and 104
Korad Kalid Omar, resident in Kismayo, Somalia v. Paracommando, available inM. Sassoli &
A. Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War?, Geneva: ICRC, (1999), 1062-1067.
76 For a detailed account to the background on the adoption of ROE for all three
operations in Somalia, see D. Loomis, Chapter 10, op. cit., 330-382. The US ROE for
Operation Restore Hope are at 349-350.
77 Last, op. cit., 85.
78 Ibid.
79 See Col. C. Dunlap, op. cit., 3-4.
80 A possible example of how this might be done is report on The Basic Principles on
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officers, adopted by the Eight Congress
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 28 August to 7
September 1990. See also Report of the Secretary-General on the implementations of the
recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/ac.121/43, 23
250
the Brahimi Report has advocated the adoption of a more 'robust doctrine and realistic
mandates', that 'should specify an operation's authority to use force' .81 Mission
specific rules should then be drawn up as the need arises. These should be tested and
verified, and disseminated to contributing states, the acceptance of which would be
mandatory for participation. At DPKO, the Lessons Learned unit should monitor each
operation, and propose modifications or amendments based on practical experience in
the field. ROE must be accompanied by scenario based training in the pre or early
deployment stages of an operation. A database of ROE from other countries would
assist in this process.
The dilemma of when to use force to implement the UNIFIL mandate
The most controversial element of the guidelines laid down by the Secretary-General
was that self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent
it from discharging its duties under the mandate.f However, the mandate of UNIFIL
was itself ambiguous and unrealistic from the beginning.P It was therefore very
difficult to state with certainty what the duties of the Force were under Resolution 425
(1978). For this reason, deciding when UNIFIL was being prevented from carrying out
its mandate was not always a straightforward task either. Closely linked to these
problems was the question of consent to the presence of the Force in Lebanon, the lack
of any clear definition of the UNIFIL area of operation, and the need to establish
freedom of movement. These and other problems were highlighted in the first major
confrontation involving UNIFIL and Palestinian forces/" In addition to showing up the
lack of planning and preparedness in the deployment of UNIFIL, and major
February 1999,paras. 9 and 63.
81 Brahimi Report, op. cit., nA.
82 SI12611, 17March 1978,para 4
83 B. Urquhart, 'United Nations Peacekeeping in the Middle East', The World Today,
(March 1980), 88-93 and 'Peacekeeping: A View from the Operational Centre', by the same
author in H. Wiseman, op. cit., 163-174, esp.l64.
84 A group of armed PLO were challenged by French soldiers when they tried to
infiltrate a French position. They opened fire on the French who responded by returning fire in
self-defence. Two infiltrators were killed and in subsequent clashes three UNIFIL soldiers
were killed and fourteen wounded. SI12620lAdd 4, 5 May 1978 and Chapter 6, supra., 190-
193.
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weaknesses in the mandate, the confrontation established an important precedent for
the future.f
It was at this early stage that it became evident the guidelines of the
Secretary- General relating to the use of force were to be restrictively interpreted and
applied. The question arose whether UNIFIL was entitled to confront the PLO and to
use force to deploy in the Tyre area." A literal interpretation of the relevant guidelines
indicated that they would" However, there were sound political and military reasons
against such action being taken." It was not surprising either that the Lebanese
government supported the deployment of UNIFIL in the region as for sometime the
PLO were the only real authority in this area.89 It wanted UNIFIL to adopt a more
aggressive policy in order to implement the mandate, especially in relation to assisting
the restoration of its authority in the area." There were also calls from members of the
Security Council for a firmer stand by UNIFIL and a change in the nature of the
mission from one of peacekeeping to peace enforcement," but this was not supported
by the majority of the members.f The Lebanese interpretation of what constituted
85 Immediately following the confrontation, the Secretary-General emphasised the
basic principle that the Force was provided only with weapons of a defensive character. They
were authorised to use force only in self-defence when attacked or when attempts are made to
prevent them performing their duties under the mandate. Ibid. para 24. However, at least two
force commanders had looked for more offensive weapons i.e. tanks, Liu, op. cit., 41.
86 The initial plan was for the French contingent to deploy and take control in the Tyre
region. Personal interview, French officer who served with UNIFIL at the time, Naqoura,
Lebanon, August 1989.
87 The Secretary-General stated self-defence would include resistance to attempts by
forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate. (SI12611).
88 See Chapter 6, supra.
89 Personal interview, Lt. Gen. Erskine, op. cit. The Lebanese resented the presence of
the PLO in the south and had agreed to this because there was no real alternative, see W.
Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East, Harvard:
Harvard University Press, (1979), 41.
90 See for example S.C.O.R., 2113 MTG., 19 January 1979, paras 185, 208 and 209,
S/13359, 28 August 1979 and S/12384, 5 September 1978.
91 See, for example, the statements from the representatives of Bangladesh, S.C. o.R.
2113 MTG, 19 January 1979, para 104; Kuwait, S.C.o.R. 2147 MTG, 12 June 1979, para. 57,
and Syria, S.C.o.R. 2148MTG, 14 June 1979,para 110.
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resistance to attempts to implement the mandate was broader than any interpretation
made by the different Force Commanders ofUNIFIL.93 Their assessment of the role of
UNIFIL was flawed, and indicated a failure to appreciate the political and military
constraints under which it operated.
In the context of a traditional peacekeeping operation, it was important that the
Force should not become involved in functions and duties related to the maintenance of
internal law and order. While UNOSOM II had little option due to the complete
breakdown of normal state functions, this was not the case with UNIFIL. Such
involvement could have had serious repercussions on the impartiality of the Force by
involving it in the internal conflict taking place alongside the international crisis
caused by the Israeli invasion. In fact, UNIFIL was already bound to be partial to the
wishes of the Lebanese government owing to its role in the restoration of the authority
of the government in the south." The matter of the PLO presence in the Tyre area was
linked to this issue. It appeared the Lebanese wanted UNIFIL to confront the PLO on
their behalf while unwilling and unable to do so themselves. 9S Such action was not
authorised under the mandate, and would have precipitated a crisis in UN
peacekeeping not experienced since the controversy in the Congo. As a peacekeeping
force, the strategic use of force to implement the mandate was never considered, but
the early attempts to deploy also showed that there was no stomach for the tactical use
of force to ensure deployment as planned and required by the mandate. An obvious
downside to the approach adopted was that it had a significant effect on the attitude of
the Israeli backed de facto forces to the deployment of UNIFIL in areas occupied by
them.
92 Personal interview, Department of Foreign Affairs Official, August 2000. The
Fijians, the Dutch and, to a lesser extent the French, supported a stronger response by UNIFIL
to threats and harassment.
93 Personal interviews, Lt. Gen. Erskine and Lt. Gen. Callaghan, both former Force
Commanders ofUNIFIL.
94 This was required by Resolution 425 (1978).
95 The attitude of the Lebanese led to exasperation among certain UN officials, see B.
Urquhart,A Life in Peace and War, New York: Harper and Row, (1987), 301.
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Escalating the response and the tactical use of force
The next senous test of the creditability of the Force occurred soon after the
confrontation, or more accurately, lack of it, with the PLO. Despite concern being
expressed regarding Major Haddad's de facto forces prior to the deployment of
UNIFIL, there was no contingency plan should these fears tum out to be well founded.
96 The terms of reference for UNIFIL and the guidelines on the use of force were too
vague to be of much use in the hostile environment that confronted the Force. The
matter was complicated by the provisional recognition given Major Haddad's forces by
the Lebanese government."
The effect of this was to deny UNIFIL freedom of movement in a large area
that was intended to be part of its area of operation. 98 It appeared to have been lured
into this situation by the fact that various parties believed it should only be deployed in
areas that the parties themselves occupied and subsequently withdrew from." Because
UNIFIL could only deploy with the agreement of the parties, there was no realistic
alternative but to accept this situation.l'" Again, a strict literal interpretation of this
would seem to justify UNIFIL resorting to whatever limited force was necessary to
fulfil the mandate, but this ignores the political and military realities of the situation in
which UNIFIL found itself.
Having decided not to confront the PLO and press for the deployment of
UNIFIL in the Tyre area, UNIFIL was effectively precluded from confronting the de
facto forces and deploying in the enclave. The use of force to implement the mandate
in this instance would have been interpreted by the Israelis as a hostile and non-
96 I. J. Rikhye, Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping, London: Hurst, (1984), 104.
97 The Blue Helmets, op. cit., 91. When Major Haddad refused to co-operate with the
Lebanese Government and UNIFIL, this recognition was withdrawn, S/12834, 5 September
1978,para 6. See also The Irish Times, 6,8, 10and 13 June 1978.
98 After the 1982 invasion the Israelis extended this area and it was referred to as the
Security Zone. In 1978 the 'enclave' included and area around the town of Marjuyoun that
caused a serious gap in the deployment of UNIFIL and separated the battalion deployed in the
north eastern sector from the remainder of the force.
99 Rikhye, op. cit., 121.
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impartial policy, and would also have been objected to by the United States. Had
UNIFIL forced the issue at the time it would not have succeeded. The co-operation of
the de facto forces, albeit very limited at times, was essential for the continued
existence of the Force. Again it was political and military factors that determined the
response adopted by UNIFIL, and not the standing operating procedures and guidelines
on the use of force.
The de facto forces interpreted UNIFIL's failure to take action as an
indication of weakness. tOt They made a number of successful attempts to set up
positions within the UNIFIL area, and in particular, in the Irish area.t02 The standing
operating procedures and guidelines on the use of force were of limited use in the
circumstances.l'" Resort to the use of force was significantly constrained due to the
fact that there were a number of vulnerable positions occupied by Irish UNIFIL troops
in the 'enclave' controlled by Major Haddad.104 By using these as hostages in a manner
not unlike the situation UN personnel found themselves in Bosnia some years later, the
defacto forces could prevent the use of force by UNIFIL to stop encroachments. tOS
A number of other factors contributed to the apparent ineffectiveness of
UNIFIL and its reluctance to use force. In the case of the Irish battalion, its strength
was inadequate for the tasks assigned to it. The boundary with the defacto forces was
twenty-two kilometres in length. There were seven towns situated within a kilometre
and a half of that. All were potential targets for a de facto forces incursion and
takeover. At the same time the area had to be 'adequately' patrolled and observed to
100 According to its terms of reference 'self-defence would include resistance to attempts
by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate', SI12611, 19
March 1978,para 4.
There was constant harassment of UNIFIL, and a number of serious incidents
occurred, see SI13384, 8 June 1979,para 25, and The Blue Helmets, op. cit., 94.
101
102 Personal interview, senior Irish officer serving with UNIFIL at the time, April 1984,
see also J. Theodorides, 'The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon', The Military Law and
Law of War Review, (Belgium, 1981),309-331, esp. 316-317.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 The official UNIFIL policy was also to resolve problems by negotiation. The
dilemma facing the Irish UNIFIL troops was evident when the de facto forces established a
position in a strategic village that was located well within the UNIFIL area. See S/13691,14
December 1979,paras 40-45. The village was known as Bayt Yahoun.
255
prevent armed elements attempting to infiltrate south towards the Israeli border.l'" This
situation permitted the de facto forces to pick the time and place of any incursion in the
knowledge that UNIFIL did not have sufficient troops to patrol adequately the entire
'front'. Protecting the villages themselves was also difficult. According to a strict
interpretation of the mandate, it was not the responsibility of UNIFIL. This
interpretation was the only realistic and reasonable policy under the circumstances
because it was not possible, in any case, to defend the large number of villages in the
area.I07 Despite this, many observers and Irish politicians were critical of UNIFIL and
its apparent impotence. IDS
The tactical use of force by UNIFIL and the adoption of Resolution 467 (1980)
As the intensity of the harassment by de facto forces increased, they became
progressively more aggressive and efforts to expand their area culminated in the
attempted take over of the village of At-Tiri in 1980.109 This led to the most serious
confrontation between the de facto forces and UNIFIL to date. It would have been a
serious political and military setback to UNIFIL if these forces gained control of the
village and crossroads. In the words of one Irish officer at the time, had the de facto
forces taken over the village 'then Irishbatt and the rest of UNIFIL might as well have
106 In a conventional situation a brigade level commitment would be required to cover
such a large area. The normal level of commitment in a conventional war is a battalion for
every one and a half kilometers of front. This would mean that fifteen battalions would have
been required to guard the Irish area of responsibility against a full scale Israeli/de facto forces
invasion. At the time the strength of the whole UNIFIL Force was roughly that of a brigade
(Le. 5,800).
107 There were just seventy soldiers available to patrol and observe a front of ten
kilometers. Within this area there were numerous rocky hills, valleys, tracts and roads. The
villages and crossroads required patrols or fixed checkpoints. The de facto forces were quick
to exploit the weakness in such a situation.
108 The Irish Times and The Irish Press, 1 May 1979. The Irish Times, 14 July 1979,
Sunday Independent, 15 July 1979, p.4. See also 315 Dail Debates, 14, 12 July 1979,2261-
2268.
109 S113888, 11April 1980 and Add 1-3, 16 April and 18April 1980 respectively. The
village at At-Tiri is situated alongside a strategic crossroads. Control of this would have given
access to high ground to the north and would have allowed Major Haddad to dominate the
whole Irish area.
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packed up and gone home' .110 In reality, Major Haddad already controlled a larger area
than the UN cared to admit. In an effort not to legitimise this situation, the official
maps published did not reflect the reality on the ground. III UNIFIL had never taken
control of the full area intended for its deployment in 1978. Instead of gradually
gaining ground since then, it in fact lost territory to the de facto forces. The situation
was now reached where UNIFIL could afford to loose control of no further ground. A
firm stance had to be taken if the authority of the peacekeeping force was to have any
significance there. The situation that arose in At-Tiri is well documented and reported
upon.1l2 The level of harassment and shootings escalated to a situation of almost open
warfare between UNIFIL and Haddad's forces. Small arms, heavy machine gun,
mortar and tank fire was used against the Irish and other UNIFIL troops. UNIFIL
returned fire in a restrained and disciplined fashion. There were casualties and many
injuries on both sides.1l3 At the end of the day, a firm and resolute stand by UNIFIL
troops led to the withdrawal of the de facto forces from the village and the area
immediately around it.
As a result of the confrontation at At- Tiri and the shelling of UNIFIL
headquarters by de facto forces, the Security Council adopted Resolution 467
(1980).114 The Resolution commended the Force for its great restraint in very adverse
circumstances and called attention to the provisions of the mandate that would allow
110 Personal interview with Irish officer serving with UNIFIL at that time.
III See the reports by R. Fisk in The Times, 23 and 24 May 1980. In particular, a sketch
map in the latter edition reflects the situation at the time. The then Irish Army Chief of Staff is
also reported to have commented that the situation on the ground bore little resemblance to 'the
maps which look good in New York', The Irish Times, 2 May 1980.
112
'At-Tiri remembered - 6 April to 13April 1980' ,An Cosantoir, (April 1990), 31-36.
SI13888, dated 11 April 1980 and Add 1-3 dated 16 April 1981 and 18 April 1980
respectively. See also Erskine, op. cit., 71-87; SI13994, 12 June 1980, esp. paras 44-52; R.
Smith, Under the Blue Flag, Dublin: Aherlow, (1980), 218-216. See also 319 Dail Debates, 7,
16Apri11980, 1257-1274 and XXVII Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 30919-30922.
113 One Irish soldier, Pte Stephen Griffin, and one Fijian soldier was killed and several
wounded. One militia man was also killed and at least three wounded. There was no similar
incident involving Irish troops in Somalia, though in one confrontation involving Indian troops
and an Irish resupply convoy in March 1994, at least twelve Somalis were killed, see Capt. A.
oMurhu, 'Learning from Somalia', An Cosantoir, (September 1999), 7-11.
114 Resolution 467 (1980) was adopted on 24 April 1980. For general background to
this resolution and the At-Tiri incident see R. Murphy, 'Background to the 1980 'Battle of At-
Tiri' - A Personal Assessment', An Cosantoir, (October 1988),38-44.
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UNIPIL use its right to self- defence. I IS This was a very significant provision. It was
the first occasion the Security Council found it necessary to make direct reference to
the Force's right of self-defence. It constituted retrospective approval of the action
taken in At-Tiri. It supported the tactical use of force by the Irish troops and it
constituted a reminder to all concerned that this was the appropriate action in the
circumstances. It also suggested that a more flexible interpretation of the right to use
force in self- defence could be considered.i"
Resolution 467(1980) could have brought a change in UNIPIL's policy
towards the de facto forces and armed elements by the Security Council and Secretary-
General. The resolution differed from those that had previously been adopted in that
the specific reference to UNIPIL's right to use force in self-defence could have
provided it with the authority to adopt a more robust policy.117 However, the apparent
authority to use force to implement the mandate was not backed up with the political
will to do so. Despite the reaffirmation of this right in Resolution 467( 1980), and its
potentially broad interpretation, the Secretary-General was constrained by the political
realities of a sometimes-ambivalent Security Council.l'Iand a clear message from a
meeting of the contributing countries that they would not support a stronger show of
force.'!"
In 1986, a serious confrontation between French UNIPIL troops and members
of the Shiite movement AMAL highlighted the precarious nature of peacekeeping and
how even the use of force can create serious problems for the unit concerned. 120On 11
August 1986, a French sentry shot and killed a local AMAL leader and his bodyguard
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid, para 6.
117 Ibid.
118 See S113994, 12 June 1980, para 69, where the Secretary-General found it necessary
to refer to UNIFIL's right to use force in self-defence. In 1986 he was openly critical of the
lack of support for UNIFIL by the Security Council, see SI] 7965, 9 April, 1986, para 51.
119 SI1392], 2 May 1980. Prior to the meeting of troop contributing countries, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that Ireland intended to rely on diplomatic pressure to
persuade the Israelis to cease supporting Major Haddad's militia. The communique confirmed
this policy.
For background to AMAL see R. Wright, Sacred Rage - The Crusade of Is/am,
LondonlNew York: Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, (1985), 66-110 andpassim.
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at a checkpoint.l" Prior to this UNIFIL had numerous confrontations with local armed
elements. These were diffused by negotiation and compromise. The August 1986
incident can be differentiated from others in a number of respects. The French made no
real attempt to diffuse the situation. The French sentry that shot the two local AMAL
militia followed French and not UNIFIL standing operating procedures.l= The French
always maintained that their own national military doctrine, ethos and training should
not become diluted because they were part of a UN peacekeeping operation.i'"
Arguably the problem at the time would not have become so serious had it arisen in
another battalion area. The French have a professional and well-trained army,
However, such a conventional army is not always well suited to peacekeeping. The fact
that France was involved politically and historically in the affairs of Lebanon and that
it is a major power militates against its suitability for peacekeeping there.124 It also
meant the French were targets for certain Lebanese groups. They were therefore
required to take extra security precautions and adopt a more aggressive military
posture, though such a posture came naturally to French soldiers anyway. This led to
resentment from the local population and a perception that the French were behaving
like an occupying force.125
Attempts to negotiate a compromise were impeded by the French who appeared
unable to admit they made a mistake.126 UNIFIL's investigation of the incident was
also delayed because of French objections. The initial French reaction to the incident
and the follow up action illustrate what can happen when the principles normally
121 S118348, 18 September 1986, para 5, Liu, op. cit., 31 and C. Brady and S. Daws,
'UN Operations: The Political-Military Interface', 1 International Peacekeeping (F. Cass),
(1994),29-79, at 67.
122 Personal interview, French officer serving with UNIFIL, Naqoura, July 1989.
123 Ibid.
See the report by R. Fisk, 'Will the UN be forced out of Lebanon', The Times, 6
October 1986,p.12.
124
Personal interviews, Lt Col P. Keogh, Chief Operations Officer, UNIFIL, July-
September 1989.
125
126 Personal interview, senior officer at UNIFIL HQ, October 1989. At one stage they
investigated the possibility of using an aircraft carrier, air support and heavy armour to
extricate them from the predicament in which they found themselves. This was confirmed by
French UNIFIL officers also.
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adhered to in peacekeeping operations were not followed. The situation would not have
become so serious if a smaller world power had been involved, as it would be more
likely to seek a genuine resolution of the crisis and be less concerned with loss of face
and national pride. In attempting to diffuse potentially violent situations by using
maximum restraint and negotiation, UNIFIL risked being accused of backing down
and not enforcing the mandate effectively. Such solutions were preferable to becoming
embroiled in the civil strife taking place in Lebanon similar to what happened to
UNOSOM II, and then being forced to withdraw.
As a result of the clashes the Force Commander took measures to improve the
security of UNIFIL troops.127Many of these measures should have been taken after the
first few months of its deployment when it became evident that the parties to the
conflict were not going to cooperate. The incident showed how a peacekeeping force is
at a distinct military disadvantage in such a situation. UNIFIL did not have the
equipment, mobility and supplies to engage in any prolonged hostile action. In simple
military terms it showed that a peacekeeping force is not suitable for offensive action.
After the serious clashes that occurred, the Secretary-General investigated the
question of changing the UNIFIL mandate and/or the means provided to the Force to
carry it out. In a special report he repeated the basic principles that a peacekeeping
force must rely upon:
UNIFIL cannot use force except in self-defence and is not therefore in a position to
enforce the Security Council's will ... its effectiveness depends on the voluntary co-
operation and consent of the parties to the conflict and of the troop contributing
governments, the importance of whose role cannot be overemphasised ... the [Security
Council] could in theory revise the Force's mandate or terms of reference. In practice,
however, the possibilities are very limited.128
This particular report is one of the most realistic assessments of the
predicament of the Force and the options available to it in the circumstances. The
Force Commander made certain recommendations that centred upon a tactical concept
127 These measures included, inter alia, a crash programme to provide reinforced
shelters, the closure of certain vulnerable and exposed positions, redeployment and special
precautions against attack. S118348, 18 September 1986, paras 16-18.
128 Ibid., para 24.
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of avoiding violence by being able to deploy superior forces if threatened.':" A number
of checkpoints and positions which were of limited operational value and difficult to
defend were also closed. This allowed each battalion concentrate its forces into more
easily defended posts that were less vulnerable to attack and harassment by armed
elements.P'' It also meant the problem of having to man vulnerable positions that could
be isolated and threatened during periods of tension was reduced as far as possible.
Such positions had impeded seriously the response of Irish battalions to harassment in
the early years of UNIFIL's deployment. However, such a plan could not be
completely effective, as peacekeeping duty by its very nature required a certain amount
of exposure to risk. The crisis also led to the setting up of a Force Mobile Reserve, a
sort of rapid deployment force, whose mission is to demonstrate an international
willingness to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent UNIFIL from discharging
its duties.'!' Having a large reserve, much bigger than usually retained in conventional
military operations, is now recognised as a pre-requisite for keeping the peace with
force.132 It may also reduce the incidents involving confrontation, as an immediate
show of strength may deter parties from further provocative action. Most of all, the
1986 incident showed up the dangers in even limited use of force on traditional
peacekeeping operations. While the tactical use of force at At-Tiri in 1980 may have
been the appropriate response then, the experience overall is that lightly armed
peacekeepers are not in a position to resort to force except in very rare circumstances.
Somalia and the strategic use of force
UNOSOM II has been described as the first peacekeeping operation in UN history that
was given the mandate to use force not only in self-defence but to pursue its
mission.l" While this may not be factually accurate, it does show the degree of
confusion surrounding the nature of the operation. It seemed that a peacekeeping force
129 Ibid, paras 25-26.
130 Ibid.
131 Personal interview, Lt. Gen. Walgren, Force Commander UNIFIL, October 1989.
This was to be the primary means to enable UNIFIL deploy superior forces quickly when
threatened.
L. MacKenzie, 'Peacekeeping With Muscle: An Oxymoron?' in Morrison, Fraser
and Kiras, op. cit., 133-137 at 136.
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with peace enforcement powers was envisaged, along the lines proposed by the
Secretary-General in Agenda for Peace.134 The nature and size of the force reflected
the complex and unpredictable nature of the mission.l " The Secretary-General had
looked for combat units from countries that had supplied troops to UNIT AF.
Countries like the United States and Australia, declined to do so. But the United States
ensured it had people in key positions to retain control, and it maintained combat ready
troops outside the UN chain of command. 136
The use of force by UN forces in Somalia was a contentious issue before the
more publicized confrontations involving UNOSOM II occurred. UNITAF forces
were accused of indiscriminate shooting, while the policy pertaining to the use of force
by UNITAF forces was described by a United States spokesman as follows: 'American
forces ...are trained to shoot to kill, not wound, whenever they judge there is a
threat' .137 A United States General also described UNIT AF ROE as the 'most liberal'
he had ever seen for an UN-sponsored operation since the Korean conflict.138 What
was remarkable is that there was no attempt to introduce a uniform policy of escalation
in degrees of force, and the use of weapons in a 'shoot-to-death' policy seemed the
reflex action to anything deemed a threat. In an unfamiliar and perceived hostile
environment, this was a far from ideal crowd control procedure, and determining what
constituted a legitimate threat was fraught with difficulty.
The ROE, as interpreted and applied by the Irish contingent part of UNOSOM
II provide an interesting contrast. Although fulfilling a support role to the Indian
Brigade, convoys were heavily armed. Stringent guidelines were placed on the use of
weapons, and deterrence through high visibility with weapons and unarmed restraint
133 Makinda,op. cit., 76.
134 Agenda for Peace, op. cit., 26.
135 Resolution 814 (1993) approved a 20,000 force with a logistical element of about
8000.
136 Chapter 6, supra.
137 Quoted in M. D. Abdullahi, 'Fiasco in Somalia: US-UN intervention', Africa
Institute of South Africa, Occasional Paper No. 61, 1995, 18-19. See also Beyond the
Warlords: the Need for a Verdict on Human Rights Abuses, 5 Human Rights/Africa Watch 2,
at 17-18.
138 Maj. Gen. L.S. Arnold, 'Somalia: An Operation Other Than War', Military Review,
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by weight of numbers being the first line of defence. If this did not work, warning or
containing shots were to be fired first, then fire at the 'legs and extremities', lastly,
'shoot to kill'. 139 In a reflection of US dominance of the overall operation, the US
UNIT AF ROE were accepted, with minor modifications, by all participating countries,
and later they played 'a significant part in the transition to UN-led operations' .140 But
UNOSOM II did not have the cohesion, strength or fire-power of its US led
predecessor, and there was no critical assessment of the suitability of the transfer of
one set of rules for this mission, to that of a wholly different operation supposedly
under UN control.v"
As the situation UNOSOM II found itself in deteriorated, the Force had no
alternative but to move beyond humanitarian concerns and this was bound to bring it
into conflict with local parties if not managed carefully. Disarmament was to be one of
the keys to success but to be effective; the disarmament process would have to be
enforceable.lf It was against an atmosphere of rising tension that the first ever
inspection of a SNA weapon site was effected on 5 June 1993, despite strong
objections and warnings by the SNA, who considered it provocative.l" The size and
military strength of the inspection teams left no doubt that UNOSOM II had decided to
use force if necessary to impose its will. The attempted inspection precipitated a
concerted attack against UNOSOM II in Mogadishu that left 24 killed, and many
wounded and missing.I'" Lack of coordination between the military and political
divisions, and inappropriate political advice contributed to the misjudgements of the
(December 1993), 26-35 at 32.
139 Commandant D. Conway, Officer Commanding Irish Transport Company UNOSOM
II, quoted by C. Sears, 'Somalia: Faith. Hope and Charity', in 19 In Dublin, (May 11-24,
1994),8-13 at 12.
Maj. Gen. W. Freeman, Capt. R. Lambert and Lt. Col. 1. Mims, 'Operation Restore
Hope - A US Centcom Perspective', MilitaryReview, (September, 1993),61-72 at 65.
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142 Security Council Document S/25354, 3 March 1993.
143 Though the Pakistani contingent were not informed of these warnings. UN
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sensitivity and timing of the inspections.i" The ensuing confrontation was a sobering
experience that focused on the enormity of the challenge facing the UN in its efforts to
forcibly disarm the factions. It also showed the limitations of increased fire-power and
heavy weapons. Italian tanks did not come to the rescue as anticipated, and helicopters
proved a blunt instrument with which to deal with an urban situation.l'" The
inadequacy of the equipment and the lack of preparedness of UNOSOM II was
startling. One of the main problems with disarmament was the related issue of consent
and confrontation.l'" The risks are high, and there is the added dimension of national
contingent interpretation of the ROE and differing contributing states' policy. Somalia
illustrated the many potential pitfalls that can befall a UN force in the use of limited
force, the most obvious being the likelihood of escalation and loss of any real control,
and how easily a situation can slide into combat.l'" It also reiterated many lessons
learned in the Congo, and some new ones as well.!"
Conflicting interpretations of the concept of operations and the slide into combat
The UN responded to the attack upon UNOSOM II forces by the adoption of
Resolution 837 (1993). This prepared the ground for a massive demonstration offorce
by UNOSOM II, and in what amounted to a direct targeting of the SNA's leadership,
the resolution requested the Secretary-General 'to inquire into the incident, with
particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders.' Conclusions were drawn
without proper investigation. The Security Council reaffirmed the authority of the
Secretary-General 'to use all necessary measures against all those responsible' to
implement agreements reached, and to arrest, detain, try and punish those who
attempted to hinder the realisation of the mandate.P" Although Aided was not
Watch 2, supra., 60-65, Makinda, op. cit., 80
145 UN Commission of Inquiry, op. cit., para. 221.
Italian helicopters, unable to locate the precise position of machine gun fire, opened
fire and injured three UN soldiers. UN Commission of Inquiry, para.116.
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149 See T. Mockaitis, op. cit., at 41.
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mentioned, it was clearly directed against him. The effect of this resolution was to
authorise punitive action against the SNA militia, which in tum would have the effect
of precipitating a 'war' with UNOSOM.151 This was not a drift into the reprisal, such
as occurred with US forces in Beirut a decade before,152 but a conscious decision to go
after Aided.
Aided's reaction to the conflict with the Pakistani troops is hard to assess. He
adopted a conciliatory posture and called for an impartial inquiry into the causes of the
attacks. Whether this was opportunism or a sincere effort at reconciliation is
somewhat academic, as UNOSOM II subsequently launched an all out military
operation against Aided and his followers. This in tum brought to a head simmering
tensions between the Italian contingent commander and UNOSOM officials.l'? The
row involving the Italians is most instructive, and highlighted a fundamental difference
of opinion in respect of UNOSOM II's policy regarding the use of force.154 The
Italians favoured a more restrained approach, and sought the approval of the Italian
government before taking any significant military initiative. ISS In this way cultural
differences between contributing states, or the personality of a particular commander,
can be important variables in determining the mode of operation of various missions.':"
Similar differences of policy had occurred with the Italian contingent part of the MNF
150 Resolution 837, 6 June 1993.
151 UN Commission of Inquiry, op. cit., para. 124-261. A comprehensive list compiled
by UNOSOM II showing the military action of both sides was given as annex 4, and a synopsis
of the main incidents is contained in annex 5 to the report.
R. Thakur, International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Boulder and London: Westview
Press, (1987), 181.
152
153 See C. 0 Cleary, The Irish Times, 15 July 1993. See also the New York Times, and
Washington Post, 14 July 1993, the New York Times backed the Italians and called for a
suspension of military operations to allow the international community reassess its goal.
154 See D. Lorch, 'Rifts Among Forces in Somalia Hamper UN Military Effort', New
York Times, 12 July 1993, 1 and 6; R. Bernstein, 'Italian General to Leave Somalia', New York
Times, 15 July 1993, 4; and A. Cowell, 'Italy, In UN Rift, Threatens Recall of Somalia
Troops', New York Times, 16 July 1993, 1,2. It is noteworthy that the Italian general
concerned, General Loi, was also commander of the Italian contingent part of the MNF II
operation in Beirut a decade before.
ISS Personal interview, senior Italian army officer with UNOSOM II, Pisa, July 1997.
See also Paddy Agnew, reporting from Rome in The Irish Times, 16 and 17 July 1993, and C.
Brady and S. Daws, op. cit., 69.
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in Beirut in the 1980's, and the Italians certainly considered that their approach proved
the most successful on that occasion, especially after the attacks on the US and French
contingents there.157 The Italians ultimately refused to go along with the concept of
operations as proposed, and this led to an international incident with recriminations on
both sides. Of particular interest was the Italian reoccupation of Strong Point 42 in
Mogadishu that they had previously vacated under pressure. Now, contrary to what
was envisaged, they negotiated with the SNA instead of taking the position by force.
The Italians understood the role of a peacekeeping force, and the continuum
from low-level conflict to armed conflict that exists when such a force adopts a peace
enforcement role. It seemed that senior UNOSOM personnel did not understand this,
and other fundamental principles of peacekeeping operations. Nor was there someone
to teach the basics of peacekeeping to them,IS8 though it is noteworthy that there was
little support for the policy of restraint proposed by the Italians. Among the
deficiencies identified as contributing to this state of affairs was the fact that there were
no seasoned peacekeepers among UNOSOM military leadership to advise on the
modalities for UN disarmament inspections and other useful practices. This was a
crucial deficit as the transition from professional soldier to peacekeeper can be
difficult, especially for those trained for offensive operations as part of large-scale
military forces. The use of force to achieve the objective is central to the ethos of
professional soldiering, but in peacekeeping this should only be resorted to after all
peaceful means have been exhausted.
The Italians had to receive permission from Rome to use military force. This
often caused delays, and was inconsistent with proper command and control
doctrine.P" However, it was hard to blame the Italians for adopting such a policy in
the circumstances, and while adding to the multiplicity of chains in the command
structure, it did prevent Italy being dragged into a serious confrontation without
adequate consideration of the issues or consequences.
Resolution 837 (1993) was interpreted as authorizing the use of force to hunt
156 See T. Findlay, op. cit., 56.
157 Interview, senior Italian military officer, op. cit., and R. Thakur, op. cit. 175-202.
158 UN Commission ofInquiry, op. cit., para. 225.
See P. Diehl, 'With the Best of Intentions: Lessons from UNOSOM I and II', 19
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 153-177 at 161, (1996).
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for the SNA leadership, destroy its power sources, radio base and weapons stores. This
was in contrast with the restrained response by UNIFIL to the adoption of Resolution
467 (1980). There was a planned build up to an offensive operation surpassing any
similar UN commanded operation up to then.160 As with all such military operations,
once action was initiated the conflict tended to take on a life of its own. This was not
the ideal environment for the conduct of such operations. Tanks, helicopters and
planes are not weapons for the containment of urban conflict, or the conduct of urban
warfare. Attempts to reduce collateral damage were bound to be problematic. 161 When
all these factors are combined with the use of special forces under a separate chain of
command, it was only a matter of time before this led to catastrophe.l'f
An analysis of the period following the attack on Pakistani UNOSOM forces
indicates that the UN initiated almost all the military action, and all casualties occurred
as a result of UNOSOM operations. Such a situation could not last indefinitely. From
early July, UNOSOM II fragmental orders referred to 'enemy forces', and a watershed
in UNOSOM tactics occurred with the attack on the Abdi house on 12 July. 163 Unlike
previous such operations, no warnings were given, and there were significant
casualties.l'" US helicopters under separate US command attacked the house with
missiles and rockets on the grounds that it was a command centre of Aided. 165 This
160 Tanks, attack planes, attack helicopters and armored personnel earners had to be
brought in to facilitate this operation. UN personnel had to be relocated to safer areas, UN
Commission of Inquiry, op. cit., para. 229.
161 In one well-publicised incident, Pakistani soldiers shot unarmed demonstrators, and
the official version of events was contradicted by eyewitness accounts. The Secretary-General
expressed regret, but defended the UN role. See Abdullahi, op. cit., 24. See also U. Mac
Dubhgaill and P. Smyth, The Irish Times, 14 June 1993; J. Clayton, The Irish Times, 15 June
1993, and David Chazan, The Irish Times, 8 June 1993.
See Chapter 5 on Command and Control issues, supra. And UN Commission of
Inquiry,op. cit., paras. 254-247.
162
163 See J. Cusack, 'Airborne strike in Somalia endangered Irish aid workers', The Irish
Times, 13 July 1993, 1, and editorial comment at 13.
164 UNOSOM estimated the number of dead at 20; the JCRC had figures of 54 killed
and 161 injured while SNA put the number of those killed at 73. UN Commission of Inquiry,
op. cit., para. 154.
165 It was reported that 16 anti-tank missiles and 2000 rounds of 20mrn canon were fired
at the house, which was destroyed. Keith Richburg, 'UN helicopters assault in Somalia
targeted Aideed's top commanders', The Washington Post, 16 July 1993
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attack was criticised as breaching the laws of war and the rules of proportionality in
humanitarian law by attacking the house without having confirmed that it was other
than it appeared, a civilian villa and not a military command centre.166 There certainly
was a clear alternative to its destruction without warning, a decision that would
inevitably cause maximum civilian casualties. The problems with the principle of
proportionality and the use of force relate to their practical application to situations of
conflict. It is easy to state that there must be an acceptable relation between the
legitimate destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects.167
The attack was also a major political mistake. It was widely regarded as having
targeted civilians, and more significantly, many of who were advocates of
reconciliation. An unpublished report by the UN Justice Division was very critical of
UNOSOM tactics.l'" It was symptomatic of a change in the level of hostilities; attacks
became more systematic and involved the use of heavy weapons. In a later incident in
September, US forces may have used disproportionate force in responding to an attack
on Pakistani forces. There is evidence that militias used women and children to shield
them from attack. A UNOSOM spokesperson is reported to have said '[i]n an ambush
there are no sidelines or spectator seats. The individuals on the ground were
considered combatants' .169 Again, this phase of the conflict ended with controversy
surrounding the Italian contingent. This centred on the policy in relation to the use of
force and the resort to a military solution without exhausting other possibilities. When
taking over the Italian position at Strong Point 42, the Nigerian forces were confronted
with Somali protestors. The Nigerian response was to open fire, while the Italians
166 Human Rights Watch/Africa, op. cit., 63.
167 See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, (8 June, 2000), paras.
48-52.
168 K. Richburg, 'UN report criticizes military tactics of Somalia Peace Keepers',
Washington Post, 5 August 1993 and personal interview, Irish UNOSOM official, July 2000.
When asked to comment on the attack, Mohamed Sahnoun stated: 'How can you shoot from
the air at a villa where people are sitting and meeting, even if they were Aided's people? ...Its
absolutely incomprehensible. There were elders at the meeting who might have been doing
something useful. The attack was excessive and unjust. You can't explain it to the Somali
people or the international community', quoted in Abdullahi, op. cit., 25.
169 US army spokesman, Maj. D. Stockwell, UPI, 10 September 1993. Aided claimed
125were killed, including women and children. This could not be confirmed, but UNOSOM
sources accepted that at least sixty people died, 7 Human Rights/Africa Watch 2, op. cit., 65.
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began conducting negotiations.!" The overall picture that emerges from these and
other incidents is of a sometimes nervous and even 'trigger-happy' force. UNOSOM
found itself in a hostile and confusing environment, and its leadership seemed intent on
finding a solution by resort to ever increasing degrees of force. The policies adopted
were at variance with those applied in the case ofUNIFIL, where successive Secretary-
Generals eschewed resort to the use of force and the military option.
The significance of Resolution 837 (1993) cannot be overstated. Nevertheless,
it is arguable whether it justified the nature and intensity of the military campaign
pursued by UNOSOM II forces in its aftermath. The attack by US commanded forces
culminated in an operation on 3 October that led directly to the US decision to
withdraw from Somalia.V' This was the turning point for US involvement, and it
ultimately led to the break up of UNOSOM II as other countries followed suit. The
outcome of the attack was not as surprising as an intelligence assessment in July 1994
noted that operational control of the guerrilla war had passed from the militia leaders to
professional soldiers, many of who had been trained abroad.l72 Aided's strategy against
UNOSOM II forces had been to use isolated attacks around the capital to pin down
troops and discourage UN patrolling. Targets tended to be opportunistic, the overall
strategy being to put pressure on individual contingents to prevent UNOSOM II
launching a cohesive reaction to SNA actions. The US policy left itself open to being
depicted as the root cause of all problems in Somalia, and to being responsible for
punitive attacks on other contingents part ofUNOSOM II.
170 UN Commission a/Inquiry, op. cit., paras. 163-165.
171 The debacle of 3 & 4 October is well documented, see Human Rights Watch/Africa,
op. cit., 66/67 and M. Bowden, Blackhawk Down, New York: Penguin, (1999). Over 200
Somalis were reported killed, and another 700 or so injured. Eighteen US Rangers died, 84 US
troops were injured, and one captured. Two helicopters were shot down and three damaged,
and a number of armoured vehicles were destroyed. See also reports by E. 0 Loughlin in The
Irish Times, 29 August and 12 September, 1994; and R. Athkinson in the Washington Post,
January 30 and 31,1994.
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Assessment of tactics and concept of operations adopted by UNIFIL and
UNOSOMII.
While the Security Council had no hesitation in grving UNOSOM II a peace
enforcement mandate and granting the Secretary-General overall control, in contrast,
the Council and the Secretary-General were at all time clear that UNIFIL was a
peacekeeping mission. And as such, it would not be permitted to adopt a peace
enforcement role, incrementally or otherwise. The adoption of resolutions invoking
Chapter VII and phrased in such overtly militaristic terms had the potential to escalate
the level of violence unless strictly controlled. This is what happened in Somalia. In
operating outside the formal UN chain of command, it could be said that the US
'hijacked' the mission, and pursued an agenda not always consistent with the UN
objectives.I" The abandonment of impartiality, and the consequent loss of credibility
by both the US and the UN (it being increasingly difficult to distinguish between
them), proved a recipe for disaster. More recently, and by way of contrast, British
forces in Sierra Leone were also deployed outside the UN chain of command to, inter
alia, support the UN mission, however, these forces were not intended to adopt a
combat role.174
By January 1994, in the eyes of most Somalis, Aided had won the battle for
Mogadishu and he was then free to concentrate on outlying areas. In February, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 897 (1994)175, after which UNOSOM II was no
longer permitted to use force to disarm the factions. The pursuit of a robust peace
enforcement strategy had not worked, and the price of this lesson was very high for the
large numbers of Somalis and UN personnel killed, and the damage done to the
concept of UN peace support operations was enormous. The strategy had also left
soldiers who alway draw the tough assignments on the ground', Time, 26 July, 1993,36.
173
130.
See J. Cox, 'Watershed in Somalia', Morrison, Fraser and Kiras, op. cit., 127-132 at
174 Though in the case of British Forces in Sierra Leone, the primary task was to train
and support the armed forces of the government of Sierra Leone, and evacuate British
nationals. See Ministry of Defence Press Release No. 270100, 10 October 2000 and statement
to Parliament by Defence Secretary on Sierra Leone, 15 May 2000; Eight Report of the
Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/1199, 15December 2000, paras.
30-32.
175 Adopted 15-0-0,4 February 1994.
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many nations with troops in Somalia exhausted, dismayed and even alarmed.!" Not
surprisingly, when a large number of countries were asked to contribute to the reduced
UN operation, the Secretary-General received no positive responses.177 The adoption
of Resolution 897 (1994) marked a retreat from the aggressive and sometimes
combative peacemaking operation under Boutros Boutros-Ghali. It was ironic that
UNOSOM II now adopted a more cautious impartial role similar to that of UNIFIL,
which permitted the use force in self-defence only, and closely resembled that of
UNOSOM I in the first instance. Unfortunately, by this time it was too late as
UNOSOM II forces were regarded as responsible for offences and errors arising from
the excessive use of force that thereafter rendered them unacceptable in the eyes of
Somalis.I"
A clear lesson from the Somalia experience is that UN peacekeeping or peace
enforcement operations alone cannot end a war, nor will the robust interpretation of a
mandate provide the solution to intra state conflict. The use of force by the UN must
be resorted to in the context of an overall political strategy with clearly defined
political goals. While military force is the best way to achieve exclusively military
objectives, using force to obtain a mix of military and political objectives is more
problematic. Military elites usually identify narrow concrete objectives that may serve
as the focal point for operations 179, but the situation in Somalia was not amenable to
narrowly defined goals. It has been said that disarmament can never be a military
option; it must be a voluntary affair.Iso But this argument misses the point somewhat.
Itwas not the use of force that brought the demise of the UN operation in Somalia, but
a combination of factors, one of which was the selective and excessive use of force. lSI
While it would be a serious misrepresentation to suggest that the Irish
See J. Preston, 'UN Scales Down Mission', International Herald Tribune, 7
February 1994, 7.
176
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178 See Abdullahi, op. cit., 26.
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Levite et al (eds.), Foreign Military Intervention, New York: Columbia University Press,
(1992),249.
180 Ambassador Jesus of Cape Verde, quoted in and C. Brady and S. Daws, op. cit., 77.
181 For general background to the operation, see Chapter 6, supra.
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contribution to UNOSOM II was anything other than miniscule, the contrast between
the culture of the US and that of the Irish personnel was startling.182 On a visit to
Baidoa in the weeks prior to the US withdrawal, the US personnel were astounded to
find the Irish organising football matches with locals, helping in a local orphanage, and
providing welfare services to the local hospital.183 The difference in approach was
obvious, especially to the Americans themselves. They considered the most dangerous
part of the mission to be the short drive between various compounds in Mogadishu,
and they were openly astonished to learn of the Irish company's weekly convoy
schedule to outlying areas. Most US soldiers admitted to never having engaged an
ordinary Somali in conversation, not to mind a game of football. The Irish pursued a
similar policy in Lebanon, and while it did not bestow any immunity from attack on
Irish solders, it did facilitate the building of relationships with local community
leaders. In Somalia, this helped foster a 'certain grudging tolerance' of the Irish UN
presence, as the UN was still regarded by many as just another colonial power.!" It
also meant that in times of crises or confrontation, a basic relationship existed with
limited lines of communication. Likewise with the Canadian contingent, who despite
the crimes of a few, not all of which were committed in Somalia, performed a difficult
task in a restrained manner without engaging in enforcement action and 'over the top'
military engagements.l'"
While criticisms regarding earlier incursions by de facto forces were
valid, 186 the defence of At- Tiri marked a turning point for Irish troops with UNIFIL.
The so-called 'kid gloves' approach reportedly favoured by the Irish led to timid
182 Irish troops did not play any significant role in any combat activities, their purpose
being to support the Indian brigade. In March 1994,No.2 Transport Company was involved in
a major incident in which 9 Somalis were killed by Indian troops escorting the Irish re-supply
convoy fromMogadishu to Baidoa.
183 Personal interview, Capt. A. 0 Murchii, September 2000, and Capt. A. 0 Murchu,
'Learning from Somalia', An Cosantoir, (September 1999), 7-11.
184 Ibid.
185 See D. Loomis, op. cit., Chapter 17, 608-634.
186 F. McDonald, The Irish Times, 23 April 1980;R. Fisk, The Times, 28 May 1980, The
Irish Times, 26 May 1980 and Hibernian, 3 July 1980. See also the leading article in The Irish
Press, 2 May 1980.
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responses to encroachments.l'" The provision of the UNIFIL mandate that allowed the
force to use its right to self-defence gave each member of the force sufficient scope to
use force when he or she considered it necessary to do so. 188 It was up to each
commander to assess every situation and decide what was the appropriate action in the
circumstances. Observers, even with the benefit of hindsight, may not be in possession
of all the facts. Furthermore, they have no responsibility and will seldom have
experienced the circumstances in which a decision is made at first hand.
The de facto forces obviously believed there would be no real resistance to their
attempted takeover of the village. They took full advantage of the presence of isolated
Irish UNIFIL troops in observation posts inside the 'enclave'. The Secretary-General's
report of the incident is misleading in regard to the use of force. It states that often,
during intense small arms fire on Irish positions, the Force Commander 'gave
permission to return controlled fire' .189 In fact, the Irish commander in the area was
well aware that he could return flre."" He refrained from doing so until his troops were
in reasonable positions from which they could return fire and when it became evident
there would not be a negotiated solution to the impasse. Then restrained small arms fire
was resorted to in self-defence. This escalated to the use of heavy weapons and these
187 See A. Verrier, International Peacekeeping, Harmondsworth: Middlesex, (1981),
118-144. F. McDonald, The Irish Times, 23 April 1980. There were other criticisms of the
tactics employed by UNIFIL. For example, there was a tendency early on in the mission to
rely on fixed positions and firepower and to minimise the value of resolute and constant
patrolling. The conventional military deployment on high ground and hills was not always the
most appropriate method of preventing encroachments. The occupation of such key terrain did
not guarantee control of the ground dominated in the conventional manner by these posts. It
was often more effective to deploy troops on open flat and vulnerable ground with the primary
purpose of preventing any incursion by the defacto forces.
188 The Secretary-General had stated in the terms of reference that self-defence would
include attempts by forceful means to prevent UNIFIL from discharging its duties under the
mandate. SI12611, 19March 1978, para. 4{d). When debating the events in south Lebanon in
the Dail, certain Deputies had expressed concern regarding the UNIFIL guide to the use of
force and were reassured by the Minister for Defence as follows:
... the guide to the use of force by UNlFIL personnel issued by the Force Commander, gives
ample power to local commanders to deal with any situation with which they may be
confronted. The circumstances in which unarmed or armed force may be used are well defined,
and the decision to use force ... always rests with the Commander on the spot, see 320 DaB
Debates, No.7, 8 May 1980, 1144.
189 SI13888, 11April 1980,para 12.
190 Personal interview, Irish officer serving with UNIFIL at the time, October 1997.
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too were fired on the order of the local commander.'?'
Conclusion
The litmus test for determining the nature of a UN operation i.e. peacekeeping or peace
enforcement remains the ability and willingness to resort to the use of force. Despite
this, the dividing line between the use of force in self-defence on traditional
peacekeeping operations, and that on peace enforcement operations is not so clear cut
in practice. Much will depend on subjective variables that are difficult to predict, and
these may influence the way in which a mandate is interpreted and applied. Who, for
example, has the authority to determine what defence of the mandate or mission means
in practice? For this reason, it is more than a coincidence that the commanders of
traditional peacekeeping forces are more often than not selected from neutral or non-
aligned nations, and that the first commander of UNOSOM II was a general from a
NATO member country.
International law relating to the use of force under the authority of the UN has
evolved with the practice of the Security Council during recent conflicts, and the norm
for non-intervention under Article 2(7) had been diminished by the intervention in,
inter alia, Somalia.192 There was no clear precedent for the type of operations
envisaged and the non-consensual intervention by the UN in the affairs of Somalia. An
Agenda for Peace193 provided some doctrinal clarity, but it failed to deal with the
situation where the peacekeepers right to use force extends beyond the accepted
boundaries of self-defence and strays into the realm of peace enforcement. Allowing a
force to take positive action in defence of its purpose is little different from allowing it
to enforce them.194
In a more contrite view in the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, the
Ibid. The heavy weapons in question were the Dutch T.O.W. missiles and the 90mm
cannon mounted on a number of Irish armoured cars.
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Secretary-General noted that in some cases peacekeeping forces are delegated tasks
that 'can on occasion exceed the mission of peacekeeping forces and the expectations
of peacekeeping force contributors' .195 It would appear that the Secretary-General's
analysis that peace enforcement is a viable option for coalitions of the willing, but not
UN controlled missions, is a realistic assessment of the political and military reality of
UN peace support operations.l'" The need for the formulation of a doctrinal basis for
robust peacekeeping operations is more imperative than ever if the UN is to implement
the recommendations of the Brahimi Report'[', and still have a future in the terrain
between traditional peacekeeping and war fighting.!" Action taken by the UN in
Somalia could not be considered defensive in nature.!" It is sometimes claimed that
soldiers are not always concerned with legal niceties surrounding the use of force, and
the whole debate may be somewhat 'academic', but such assertions miss the point. 200
Although UNIFIL's right to use force in defence of the mandate allowed for flexible
ROE, one of the lessons to be drawn from the UNIFIL and UNOSOM II experiences is
that the tactical use of force by UNIFIL in self-defence or to defend the mandate was
significantly different from the strategic use of force employed by UNOSOM II.
Furthermore, permitting one country to determine the nature and extent of the use of
force is not always in the best interests of the UN, and it allows a degree of limited
liability for that country in the event of things going wrong. 201 When this happened in
195 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, New York: United Nations, (1995), para. 35.
For an analysis, see M. Reisman, 'Peacemaking', 18 Yale Journal of International Law,
(1993),415.
D. Daniel, 'Wandering Out of the Void? Conceptualizing Practicable Peace
Enforcement', in A. Morrison, D. Fraser& J. Kiras (eds.), op. cit., 1-15 at 10.
196
197 Brahimi Report, op. cit., n.4.
198 J. G. Ruggie, 'The UN and the Collective Use of Force: Whither or Whether?' in M.
Pugh (ed.), op. cit., 1-20 at 11.
John Ho
P. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
(1993), 188.
199
200 See T. Mockaitis, op. cit., at 47. Such claims also do not take account of potential
criminal liability for breaches of international humanitarian law, see infra., Chapter 8.
201 The term was first used with reference to 'superpower' support for peacekeeping by
N. A. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts - Lessons from the Lebanon and Sinai,
Boulder Co: Westview, (1984), 84.
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Somalia, the US could extricate itself with relative ease while the UN was used as a
scapegoat for how events unfolded.
Consent and co-operation of all parties to a conflict remains a fundamental
characteristic of traditional peacekeeping operations. Linked to this is the need for
impartiality. The British 'Wider Peacekeeping' concept is one of the more lucid
explanations on the use of force and it permits its initiation in circumstances other than
in self-defence.P'' However, it must be proportional, applied impartially, and have the
consent of a majority of the significant parties.203 It must also contribute to the
accomplishment of the mandate in the longer term. The resolutions in respect of
UNIT AF and UNOSOM II expressly referred to Chapter VII, and while the use of
force was not mentioned specifically, the implication of 'all necessary means' to carry
out the mandate was clear. It permitted the use of force without further authorisation
and it was quasi-enforcement in nature. Even though such action may be legal, it often
involves controversy and the foreign policies of contributing states must be taken into
account. This is especially so when peacekeepers adopt peace enforcement roles. It
also has serious training, operational and logistical implications.i?' The Lebanon and
Somalia operations show the need for support from the members of the Security
Council, irrespective of the nature of the operation. Both operations also illustrate that
problems arise when missions are ill defined, and this uncertainty was compounded in
the case of Somalia by a dispute about the authority to use force. What was an
acceptable level of force to remain within the parameters set by 'all necessary means'?
This may be an impossible question to answer in the abstract, but this does not excuse
clearly articulated ROE and authority to use force.2os
In the course of the UN operation in the Congo, the principle of the non- use of
force except in self-defence was also applied.206 In that instance, some commentators
202
1994).
See United Kingdom Army Field Manual, Wider Peacekeeping, (5th Draft Rev.
203 See Last, op. cit., 50-54.
204 Fink, op. cit., 42.
20S Ibid.,46.
206
R. Higgins, The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 1960-1964,
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, (1980), 44-53, 57-61, 348, 384-387 and
passim.
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concluded that the emphasis on self-defence was too rigid in view of the functions that
it had to assume, and that in practice it could not be adhered to.207 The broad terms of
the resolutions dealing with the Congo were somewhat similar to that of UNOSOM II
and UNIFIL, in so far as they too gave rise to conflicting interpretations. However, in
the case of the Congo and Somalia missions, the lack of clarity as to the specific
functions of the Force also gave rise to a serious dispute_2°8The ground rules for the
use of force in the Congo changed as the mission progressed and in this way it could be
described as the first instance of 'mission creep'. The right to use force was extended
but the exact limitations were unclear. However, despite authorisation to use force in
the prevention of civil war 'as a last resort', and in the apprehension of foreign
mercenaries, the UN still considered itself bound by the provisions relating to domestic
jurisdiction."? Moreover, unlike UNOSOM II, it was not interpreted or applied as a
sanction against the Congolese people. It also allowed the Security Council give almost
any task, however ill thought out or unrealistic, to a peacekeeping force, in the
expectation that it could use force under the guise of self-defence and still retain its
peacekeeping status. The situation with regard to UNIFIL was more straightforward,
and the fundamental principle that the only use of force permitted in peacekeeping
action is that of self-defence was not altered.
During the Congo operation, the Secretary-General was criticised for his failure
to appreciate the essential link between the right of self-defence and the right of
freedom of movement.+" The same criticism might be made in relation to UNIFIL.
When the 1978 Israeli redeployment plan was completed, each party either restricted or
blocked UNIFIL's movements, sometimes sufficiently serious to jeopardise the
mandate.t" In order to be successful, UNIFIL needed freedom of movement and to
207 D. W. Bowett, op. cit., 200-205. a.LA.D. Draper, 'The Legal Limitation upon the
employment of weapons by the United Nations Force in the Congo' 12 International
Comparative Legal Quarterly, (1963).
208 R. Higgins, op. cit., and by the same author, The Development of International Law
through the Political Organs of the United Nations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1963),
228-235.
209 Kassar, op. cit., 208.
210 Bowett, supra., 203.
211 Rikhye,op. cit., 107.
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achieve this it was entitled to use the minimum force required.212 This would not have
involved taking the military initiative and adopting an offensive strategy. It was said
there were a number of occasions when UNIFIL troops sustained punishment, and did
not resist violations and thereby proved its weakness.i" Such criticism did not always
take into account the constraints under which the Force as a whole operated. Restraint
in the use of force and measured self-protection will generally prevent a situation
escalating further.i'" In the circumstances it is easy to understand why UNIFIL
headquarters did not encourage an aggressive military posture.i"
Not all of the criticism of UNIFIL in regard to the use of force is without
foundation. There were occasions when UNIFIL threatened and used force as a last
resort in self- defence.i" There are other occasions when it failed to do so and invited
further harassment, a situation compounded by different reactions of the various
battalions. This highlighted the differences in attitude, policy and training among the
contingents participating in UNIFIL. The experience of UNIFIL demonstrated that a
peacekeeping force encounters great difficulty when operating in a conflict where the
political consensus that marks most frontier peacekeeping operations is absent.i" This
was exacerbated by ambiguities in the mandate, an ambivalent Security Council, and
problematic terms of'reference.i"
212 See SI12611, 19March 1978.
213 Rikhye,op. cit.,IIO.
214 M. Heilberg, and J.J.Holst, 'Keeping the Peace in Lebanon: Assessing International
and Multinational Peacekeeping', Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, NU?] NOTAT
No.357, (June 1986),3.
215 The Force Commander and his staff are well aware that some battalions actually
disregard the guidelines on the use of force at times. This is another reason for lack of support
from UNIFIL HQ. M. Heiberg, 'Observations on UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon', Norwegian
Institute ofInternational Affairs,NUPI NOTAT No. 305, (September 1984),34.
216 UNIFIL used a limited amount of force on a number of occasions e.g, in the Tyre
area in 1978 and to prevent the de facto forces incursion in At-Tiri in 1980. The Force also
threatened the use of force on a number of occasions e.g. when a number of Finnish soldiers
were kidnapped in 1985 the UN Under-Secretary-general, Mr. Urquhart, warned that UNIFIL
could consider resorting to 'a military option' to secure the release of the men. XXXII
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (January 1986),34129.
217 M. Boerma, 'The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, Peacekeeping in a
Domestic Conflict', 8 (1)Millennium: Journal of International Studies, (Spring, 1979), 51-63.
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Much of the criticism of the Lebanon and Somalia operations has arisen from
unrealistic expectations over what a UN military operation, whether traditional
peacekeeping or peace enforcement, can achieve in the context of ongoing hostilities.
The UN Secretary-General had overall responsibility for the conduct of the
peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, and overall 'command' of UNOSOM II, and in that
capacity he had to be mindful of the views of the troop contributing states.i" Without
their support in the first instance, it would not be possible to field or maintain a UN
force on the ground. In Somalia, when the US decided to withdraw, this had a knock
on effect on the whole operation, and there was little the Secretary-General could do to
retrieve the situation.
In 1986 the Secretary-General considered various alternatives in respect of
UNIFIL.22o One of these would have required the Force to control the movement of
heavy weapons only, while another was to reduce the Force's area of operation in order
to eliminate the overlap between it and the security zone, or converting the Force into
an observer groUp?21 These proposals, if implemented, would have reduced the risks of
confrontation with armed elements. They would also have curtailed the role and ability
of the Force in exercising control over the level of hostilities in the area. Reducing the
size of the area of operation was likely to be perceived as a victory for the Israelis and
their proxy forces in Lebanon. It would also have been inconsistent with Resolution
425(1978) and therefore was unacceptable to the Lebanese and others. When these
factors are taken into account, there was little prospect of such changes taking place.
After the 1982 Israeli invasion, the Lebanese government again called for a
re-examination of the mandate following the failure to stem the Israeli advance.222 In
the circumstances, UNIFIL had no alternative but to show token resistance as any
218 See the Secretary-general's criticism of the Security Council in S117965,
9 April 1986, para 51 and V. Yorke, 'Retaliation and International Peacekeeping in Lebanon',
XX (5) Survival, (September/October 1978).
219 Ibid. See also B. Skogmo, International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-1988,
Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, (1989), 131-162 and Sarooshi, op. cit., 69.
220 S118348, 18 September 1986, paras. 23-28.
221 Ibid.
222 XI (523) Monday Morning, Beirut, 28 June-4 July, 1982. In 1985 the Lebanese
Government appeared to accept that UNIFIL's role and policy would not be changed S117063,
27 March 1985.
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show of force would have been crushed by the overwhelming superiority in numbers
and equipment of the Israeli Defence Forces_223The question of UNIFIL's freedom of
movement was never solved satisfactorily until the Israeli withdrawal in 2001. This
indicates that it was not essential in the first place. In the field of UN peacekeeping,
there are few absolute rules. The Lebanese government was not alone in calling for
firmer action by UNIFIL. However, it wanted action taken against the Israeli backed de
facto forces, while the Israelis sought action against the PLO.224 Both were selective
and partial assessments of the role of UNIFIL. The Lebanese position was difficult to
understand as it expected UNIFIL to take action against those it was unwilling and
unable to confront itself.
Peacekeeping operations can be a frustrating experience for the military
personnel involved.225 There are political ramifications to all decisions made by them.
Issues are seldom black and white. The Force Commander must ensure his or her
interpretation of the mandate and the guidelines on the use of force conform to that of
the Secretary-General. The lack of consensus in the Security Council hampered the
degree of support given to UNIFIL. This meant the Secretary-General was allowed
greater discretion in the day-to-day running of the Force than should have been the
case. In this regard, the difficulty of implementing a deliberately vague mandate added
to the problem of political control. It was not surprising that the Secretary-General did
not undertake any bold or radical initiatives in relation to UNIFIL, and in this regard
the policy differed from that adopted in respect of UNOSOM II. But the failed attempt
at enforcement through peacekeeping was predictable.226
The incidents involving UNIFIL show that the principle of non- use of force
has been controversial and difficult to apply in practice. It places an onerous
responsibility on military commanders involved in peacekeeping operations to
223 B. Skogmo, op. cit., 95-100.
224 Personal interview, Lt. Gen Erskine, op. cit.
225 M. Heilberg, and 1. 1. Holst, 'Peacekeeping in Lebanon - Comparing UNIFIL and
the MNF', Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, NUPI NOTAT, (1986), 399-421, esp.
414-415. The extreme restraint that UNIFIL has generally exercised has often resulted in
frustration and bitterness among soldiers who are trained in the offensive spirit of traditional
military operations.
226 1. Ciechanski, 'Enforcement Measures under Chapter VII of the UN Chater: UN
Practice after the Cold War', in Pugh, op. cit., 82-104 at 90.
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appreciate the wider political and other ramifications of their actions, and shows that
the most important considerations can frequently be non-military in nature.227In theory,
military weakness should be non-threatening and an asset during traditional
peacekeeping, in practice, this may not be the case. At an early stage it was decided
that operational effectiveness would be curtailed in order to adhere to the principle of
non-use of force. This reflected sound judgement by those responsible and derived
from the experience of the limitations of the use of force in international peacekeeping.
In this regard, the At- Tiri incident involving the use of force in 1980 is best regarded as
sui generis. In a situation as volatile as Lebanon, the continued existence of the
peacekeeping force reflected the realism and political astuteness of the Secretary-
General and military commanders on the ground. The debacle of the Multi National
Force's (MNF) involvement in Beirut during 1983228, and the failure of the more
recent robust peacekeeping in Somalia, has vindicated this policy.
The Brahimi Report called for more robust ROE in operations involving intra-
state/transnational conflicts.229 While the report acknowledged that this would involve
'bigger forces, better equipped and more costly', it did not seem to take full cognisance
of the fact that the use of force must be accompanied by real political will, a
willingness to accept casualties (UN and civilian), and a need for an effective
command and control mechanism to ensure cohesion and uniform application. It also
failed to address the issues raised by regional peacekeepers or coalitions of the willing
acting under the authority of the UN. Regular military officers without previous
experience of UN peacekeeping tend instinctively to expect and demand maximum
freedom to use force_23o Somalia shows that robust ROE and increased size are not
enough, and while it is imperative not to employ an emasculated UN force, it is
important to have a clear military and political strategy agreed at the outset. Given the
political difficulties that this may encounter, such a policy may prove impossible to
R W. Nelson, 'Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United
Nations Model', 61 (1) International Affairs, (1985), 67-89.
227
228 See R. Thakur,op. cit., esp. 175-202.
229 Brahimi Report, op. cit., n.4.
230 A. J. Wilson, Some Principles for Peacekeeping Operations - A Guide for Senior
Officers, International Information Center on Peacekeeping Operations, (Paris, 1967), 6.
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implement, even if the Report's recommended structural reforms are implementcd.r"
The recommendations of the Report make interesting reading, but UN controlled
forces generally are not given adequate capabilities to intimidate or enforce. Another
UN report is unlikely to change this historical fact.
In analysing the respective roles of UNIFIL and UNOSOM it must be borne in
mind that the purpose of UNIFIL was not to create a military obstacle to the aims of
belligerent parties, but to facilitate a peaceful resolution of an international crisis. This
contrasted with that envisaged for UNOSOM II, which all sides acknowledged would
involve peace enforcement based on express reference to Chapter VII. While the non
confrontational nature of peacekeeping is well established, it is not so clear where
peace enforcement fits in the context of traditional peacekeeping and enforcement
action, and no clear parameters were set as to when and to what extent the use of force
was permissible. In this way, the real controversy in Somalia was not about the right to
use force, but how this was interpreted and applied in practice. The US interpreted the
UNITAF mission restrictively, and declined to disarm the factions or engage in any
significant form of enforcement measures_232 Later, UNOSOM II embarked upon
enforcement measures, but the indiscriminate use of force even in Chapter VII
operations can result in crossing the line from that which is acceptable to achieve the
mandate, and that which is indistinguishable from all out war.
UNOSOM II's experience provides a salutary lesson on the limits of the use of
force, and a willingness to accept the responsibilities arising from such action. While
some countries are not prepared to take part in enforcement operations, 233it is also
evident from Somalia that unless the vital interests of the US are at stake, there is little
point in committing US forces to combat roles abroad.i" Most of all, UNOSOM II
showed the need to set clear objectives when resorting to the use of force, and for the
US and UN, there were lessons on what could or what would work in the future.23S In
231 Brahimi Report, op. cit. and D. Daniel and B. Hayes, 'Securing Observance of UN
Mandates' in M. Pugh, op. cit., 105- 125.
232 See Chapter 6, supra.
233 See G. Anderson, 'UNOSOM II: Not Failure: Not Success', in D. Daniel &
F.Hayes, (eds), Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, New York: St. Martins Press, (1995), 274.
234 Thakur,op. cit., 191.
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some ways the lessons to be had are contradictory. The use of force by the US was
excessive for the nature of any UN peace support operation, but inadequate for the
purposes of waging war, and although limited in nature, this ultimately is what the US
embarked upon against Aided.
The UN report on the fall of Srebrenica concluded that the cardinal lesson of
that awful sequence of events is that 'a deliberate and systematic attempt to terrorize,
expel or murder an entire people must be met decisively with all necessary means', and
it accused the UN of 'pervasive ambivalence ... regarding the role of force in the
pursuit of peace; [and] an institutional ideology of impartiality when confronted with
an attempted genocide' .236 This view is consistent with the robust doctrine advocated
in the Brahimi Report. 237 However, the UN Commission of Inquiry on events in
Somalia recommended that the UN refrain from taking peace enforcement actions
within the internal conflicts of states.i" Are these conclusions contradictory? The
answer must surely be no. When confronted with crimes of the magnitude of what
took place at Srebrenica, there can be no room for ambivalence. This raises the
question whether the UN should undertake peacekeeping and peace enforcement as
part of the one mission. UNIFIL shows that it is possible to use force in self-defence
and retain impartiality. But enforcement action of any kind is inconsistent with the
principles of peacekeeping, and Chapter VI operations should not have elements of
enforcement in the mandate that could lead to the incremental adoption of a Chapter
VII strategy. The quasi-enforcement approach in peacekeeping does not work; apart
from its poor track record due to weak judgement and inadequate resources, it is
inherently flawed. In this way, when not to use force is as crucial a question as when
to use it.
Deploying lightly armed peacekeepers like UNPROFOR creates expectations
that cannot be fulfilled. It is also risky for the peacekeepers themselves, and for those
that seek their protection. In Bosnia, Serb war aims were ultimately repulsed on the
235 R. Oakley, 'Somalia, Lessons of a Rescue', International Herald Tribune, 22 March
1994.
236 See 'Lessons for the future', in Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General
Assembly resolution 53/35 - The fall ofSrebrenica, General Assembly A/S4/49, 15November
1999,paras. 502 and 505.
237 Brahimi Report, op. cit., n.4.
238 UN Commission of Inquiry, op. cit., para. 270.
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battlefield.i'" Yet the UN Secretariat had convinced itself early on that this was not an
option. Writing about the predicament ofUNPROFOR, Yasushi Akashi remarked that
a peacekeeping force will face serious constraints on what it will be able to achieve if it
takes place in an area where the interests of the Security Council members (especially
the permanent members) are engaged and when there is not a consensus among those
members.I" Somalia, on the other hand, illustrated that a UN force engaged in robust
peacekeeping will face serious constraints on what can be achieved if the national
interests of the major contributors are not engaged, and the required political will to
persevere is not there.
239 Report on Srebrenica, op. cit., para. 497.
240 Akashi, op. cit., 313.
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Chapter 8
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND PEACE SUPPORT
OPERATIONS
Introduction
Here is hand to hand struggle in all its horror and frightfulness:
Austrians and Allies trampling each other under foot, killing one
another on piles of bleeding corpses, felling their enemies with
their rifle butts, crushing skulls, ripping bellies open with sabre and
bayonet. No quarter is given; it is sheer butchery, a struggle
between maddened beasts with blood and fury. Even the wounded
fight to the last gasp. When they have no weapons left, they seize
their enemies by the throat and they tear them with their teeth.
(Henry Dunant, A Memory of Solferino ).1
This quote may seem at first to be somewhat out of place in a chapter
dealing with peacekeeping and other military action undertaken by or on behalf
of the UN. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN's willingness to pursue its
role in the maintenance of international peace and security by the adoption of
military solutions has increased significantly. Recent UN operations have had
more in common with the operation conducted in Korea, or the enforcement
measures carried out in the Congo during the 1960's, than with the more
traditional peacekeeping forces prevalent during the 1970's and 1980's.2 When
one looks at the actual combat engaged in by the United States rangers in
Mogadishu during their attempt to capture one of the leading warlords, General
Aided; or the coalition forces during the Gulf war of 1991, then Dunant's
scenario may not be so far from the reality for the soldiers involved at first
hand.
This chapter sets out to examine the applicability and relevance of
international humanitarian law (humanitarian law) to all types of military action
H. Dunant, A Memory of Solferino, Geneva: JCRC, (1986), 19.
2 For an overview of peacekeeping see B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the
UN, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1995), 566-603.
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undertaken by or on behalf of the UN.3 Owing to the controversy surrounding
action by UNOSOM forces in Somalia, the question of respect for the
principles of humanitarian law by UN peacekeeping forces has been the subject
of controversy and debate." Although the reasons for this turn of events are a
source of regret, the actual result in heightened awareness is welcome. The
situation that UNIFIL found itself in after the Israeli invasion in 1982 also
raised issues regarding peacekeeping forces and humanitarian law. One of the
major stumbling blocks for peacekeeping troops is the relevant principles are
enshrined in international instruments governing the conduct of combatants
engaged in armed conflict of an international or non-international character. To
use a military metaphor, the target of these rules is the combatant or
participator, not the peacekeeper or observer.
Although originally there was some doubt about the applicability of
humanitarian law to UN forces, it is now generally accepted that UN forces are
bound by humanitarian law, whether performing duties of a peacekeeping or
enforcement nature. S The UN has declared its commitment to the application of
humanitarian law to peacekeeping operations, but it has consistently taken the
position that UN forces act on behalf of the international community, and
therefore they cannot be considered a 'party' to the conflict, nor a 'Power'
Humanitarian law denotes the whole body of law applicable during armed
conflict, often referred to as the law of armed conflict (jus in bello). See C.
Greenwood, 'Historical Development and Legal Basis', in D. Fleck (ed.), Handbook 0/
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1995), 8-
12.
4 See for example, Symposium on Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping
Operations Report, Geneva: ICRC, (1994) (hereafter 'Symposium); Martin Meijer,
Notes on the Conference on 'The UN and International Humanitarian Law', Geneva,
19-20 October 1995, 2 (6) International Peacekeeping (Kluwer), (1995), 136-138 at
137; and report on the International Workshop: 'Towards a Future for Peacekeeping:
Perspectives of a new ItalianiGennan Co-operation', Pisa, 17-18 November 1995,
2(6) International Peacekeeping (Kluwer), (1995), 138.
C. Greenwood, 'Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law', in D. Fleck,
op. cit., 39-49 at 46. This is not just a practical necessity, but may arise from
obligations of states 'to respect and ensure respect' for the Geneva Conventions and
Protocols 'in all circumstances'. See also B.Tittemore, 'Belligerants in BlueHelmets:
Applying InternationalHumanitarianLaw to United Nations Peace Operations', 33
Stanford Journal of Intemational Law, (1997),61-117, at 107
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within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions.? To accept that peacekeepers
were parties to a conflict would at the very least mean a loss of impartiality.
The mere presence of UN peacekeeping soldiers in an area of conflict or a
theatre of war, while performing a humanitarian or diplomatic mission, does
not necessarily mean that humanitarian law binds these troops.' The UN, as an
international organization, is not in a position to become a party to the Geneva
Conventions or Additional Protocols. This would entail binding the
Organization to detailed provisions that are aimed at states, and do not fit the
role and function of an international organization. Notwithstanding its
international legal personality, the UN is not itself a state and thus, it does not
possess the juridical or administrative powers to discharge many of the
obligations laid down in the Conventions." It also lacks the legal and other
structures for dealing with violations of humanitarian law. Nor does it possess
the competence to recognise that an armed conflict invoking the application of
the Geneva Conventions exists." However, this does not mean that the conduct
of hostilities by UN forces will be free from humanitarian constraint or that
humanitarian law considerations do not apply. to
In addition to the above, another serious obstacle confronting those
charged with ensuring compliance with humanitarian law norms is to make the
rules establishing such norms accessible and relevant to those most responsible
6 See infra.
This position has not altered with the Secretary-General's Bulletin on
Observance by UN forces of international humanitarian law, ST/SGB/1993/3 of 6
August 1999. See Section 1(1) discussed infra.
Reparations Case [1949] IC] Rep., 174. From a formal point of view, the
UN cannot become a party to the Conventions because their final clauses do not
provide for participation of international organizations, such as the UN, Symposium,
op. cit., 43. In addition, 'The UN, as such, had no judiciary system, no legal basis on
which it could try individuals', Mr. B. Miyet, Under-Secretary-General for
peacekeeping Operations, quoted in the XXXIV UN Chronicle 3, (1997), at 39. As a
result, UN soldiers involved in child prostitution while part of the UN operation in
Mozambique, were repatriated.
S. Turley, 'Keeping the Peace', 73 Texas Law Review, (1994), 158.
10 It is widely accepted that the 'laws of war remain directly relevant to such
forces', A. Roberts and R. Guelff, (eds), Documents on the Laws of War, (3 rd. ed.),
Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2000), 721.
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for their implementation i.e. the soldiers on the ground. The language of the
international instruments in question is often obtuse and unintelligible. The
principles enshrined in these instruments, when combined with a 'dumb down'
approach for classroom instruction, are often presented in a half hearted and
'touchy feely' way that makes the instructors and principles involved appear
out of touch with reality. Best has described the situation as follows:
It cannot be said that books in this field are lacking. The international
law of war ...has become something of a boom industry in the legal realm
and raises a regiment of professional experts. The way in which those
experts write about it and debate it among themselves, however, is not
often directly communicable to all the others who also have pressing
interests of their own in the subject and who, some of them, also write
and confer increasingly about it, conscious that, beyond the legal experts
they may happily have contact, are many from whom they are cut off. II
In considering the applicability of humanitarian law to UN operations, a
number of questions arise for consideration: (i) What international law applies
to the conflict or situation in the country where the UN force is deployed? (ii)
What international law regulates the conduct of the UN force itself and how is
this determined? (iii) And what can or should the UN force do when it becomes
aware that parties in the country where it is deployed are violating applicable
international law? (The answer to this question will be dependent in part on the
mandate of the force). The question may also be posed as to whether there is
any useful purpose served in applying humanitarian law to peacekeeping and
similar forces whose mission is to restore or maintain a peaceful environment
in a crisis area? And if these principles of law have a role, how can this be
evaluated and improved to make it an accepted part of the conduct of all those
involved, even if not actually participating in, armed conflict that may be either
international and non international in character. The answer to these questions
is of direct relevance to Irish, Canadian and other troops as it will determine the
11 G. Best, War and Law since 1945, Oxford, Oxford University Press, (1994),
10. An example of a more accessible read is the Rogers text, 'Fighting it Right',
Model Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict for Armed Forces, Geneva: IeRe,
(1999).
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standards that they will be required to uphold in order to comply with the
relevant international obligations.V There is also the issue of the appropriate
use of force and rules of engagement, and in what circumstances could the use
of force constitute a grave or other breach of the Geneva Conventions and/or
Additional Protocols. These are real issues confronting today's peacekeepers,
but especially those participating in the so-called 'robust' peacekeeping
operations similar to that ofUNOSOM II in Somalia. A failure to comply with
applicable humanitarian law could result in an Irish or Canadian soldier being
tried by an appropriate national court, a foreign national court or an
international tribunal on criminal charges or for war crimes, irrespective of the
categorisation of the conflict as internal or international in character.l''
Human rights and humanitarian law
Human rights and humanitarian law have different historical and doctrinal
origins." Previously, scholars assumed that in conflict situations, one or other
regimes was applicable, depending on the categorisation. IS However, Meron
has pointed to a dangerous lacuna that may exist if and when the applicability
of both regimes is denied.i" Although humanitarian law was originally intended
12 See J. Simpson, Law Applicable to Canadian Forces in Somalia 1992193, a
study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces
to Somalia, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, (1997), at 23,
(hereafter Simpson Study).
13 See Institute of International Law, 'The application of international
humanitarian law and fundamental human rights, in armed conflicts in which non-state
entities are parties', Fourteenth Commission, Berlin Session 1999, (25 August 1999),
3.
14 See T. Meron, 'The protection of the human person under human rights and
humanitarian law', UN Bulletin of Human Rights 9111, UN, (1992), 33-45. See also L.
Doswald-Beck and S. Vite, 'International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law',
293 International Review of the Red Cross, (1993), and Minimum Humanitarian
Standards, Report of the Secretary-General, Doc. E/CN.4/1998/8, (5 January 1998).
IS See T. Meron, 'On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human
Rights Law and the Need for a New Instrument', 77 (3) Ameriacan Journal of
International Law, (1983),580-606, at 602.
16 Ibid., see also T. Meron, Human Rights in Internal Strife: Their
International Protection, Cambridge: Grotius, (1987), 3-49; T.Meron and A. Rosas, 'A
Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards' , 85 American Journal of
International Law, (1991), 375-381 and Commission on Human Rights, 'Minimum
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to govern situations of armed conflict between states, it has become
increasingly important in the regulation of internal armed conflict." Human
rights, on the other hand, originated in the intra-state relationship between the
government and the governed, and are intended to protect the latter against the
former, regardless of nationality.P But humanitarian law is also concerned
with protecting basic human rights in armed conflict and other situations of
violence. Humanitarian law does not just bind state armed groups, other armed
groups and individuals belonging to them are also bound by its provisions.i"
The application of such principles in non-international armed conflicts in not
linked to the legitimacy of armed groups." The IeRC position is that
humanitarian law principles, recognised as part of customary international law,
are binding upon all states and all armed forces present in situations of armed
conflicts." In recent years various Security Council resolutions have called
humanitarian standards - Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities', UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/87, ( 5 January
1998).
17 On the issue of internal and international armed conflict, see infra. See also
C. Greenwood, 'Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law', op. cit., 39-49 and D.
Schindler, 'The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols, 163Recueil des cours, Hague Academy, (1979), 153-156.
T. Meron, Human Rights in Internal Strife: Their International Protection,
op. cit., 29.
18
19 See 'Armed conflicts linked to the disintegration of State structures',
Preparatory document for the first periodical meeting on international humanitarian
law, Geneva: ICRC, (19-23 January 1998), 8. See Infra. 280, and C. Greenwood,
'International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations', 1 Yearbook
of International Humanitarian Law, Dordrecht: Kluwer, (1998), 3-34 esp. 7-9.
20 It is the identification of the relevant legal prescription in the given context
that is of central concern, see H. McCoubrey and N. White, International
Organizations and Civil Wars, Aldershot: Dartmouth, (1995), 67.
21 D. Shagra and R. Zacklin, 'The Applicability of International Humanitarian
Law to United Nations Peacekeeping Operation: Conceptual. Legal and Practical
Issues', Symposium, op. cit., 40. The ICRC view is discussed in detail infra.312. See
also F. Kalshoven, 'The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in all
Circumstances: From Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit', 2 Yearbook of International
Humanitarian Law, Dordrecht: Kluwer, (1999), 3-66, esp. 38 onwards; and ICRC
Resolution XXXVII of the XXth International Red Cross Conference (Vienna, 1965)
in D. Schindler and 1. Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, A Collection of
Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents, (3 ed.), Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
(1988),259.
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upon 'all the parties to the conflict' to respect humanitarian law.22 The UN
Secretary-General has also issued a Bulletin to the effect that the fundamental
principles and rules of humanitarian law are applicable to UN forces when in
situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants.v'
However, in situations where that law does not apply, pending the
establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the international
accountability of such groups for human rights abuses remains unclear (though
such acts would be criminalized under domestic criminal lawj.i"
The International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear
Weapons looked at the relationship between humanitarian law and human
rights Iaw.25 The Court affirmed that they are two distinct bodies of law, and
that human rights law continues to apply in time of war unless a party has
lawfully derogated from them. It went on to state the relevance of
humanitarian law:
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies
also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life,
however, then falls to be determined by the appropriate lex specialis,
namely, the law applicable in armed conflict. 26
The effect of this is that humanitarian law is to be used to interpret a human
rights rule, and, conversely in the context of the conduct of hostilities, human
22 For example, see Resolution 814, 26 March 1993, para. 13 (Somalia), and
Resolution 788, 19 November 1992, para. 5 (Liberia).
23 Secretary-General's Bulletin on Observance by UN forces of international
humanitarian law, ST/SGB/1993/3 of6 August 1999, infra.
24 For a discussion of the ICC and related issues, see infra. 346; and also D.
Robinson and H. von Hebel, 'War Crimes in Internal Conflicts: Article 8 of the ICC
Statute', in 2 Yearbookof International Humanitarian Law (1999), op. cit., 193-209.
25 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8
July 1996, ICJ Reports 226 (1996). See generally L. Boisson de Chazournes & P.
Sands (eds.), International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear
Weapons, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1999) and a number of articles in
International Review of the Red Cross, No. 316, (1997), esp. C. Greenwood, 'The
Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons and the contribution of the International Court
of Justice to international humanitarian law', 65-75.
26 Ibid., para. 25
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rights law may not be interpreted differently from humanitarian law. 27 In this
way there has been a significant overlap and convergence in humanitarian and
human rights law, and the strict separation of the two is not always conducive
to providing the maximum protection to victims.
Unfortunately, there is now ample evidence that UN forces in Somalia
did perpetrate or engage in conduct and practices that were contrary to
humanitarian law.28 Up to the debacle of events in Somalia, Canada had an
excellent reputation as a contributor to peacekeeping operations. Although
Ireland remains untarnished by its involvement in Somalia and elsewhere, there
is an urgent need to highlight this area of intemationallaw and ensure that the
record remains as is in the future. Human rights are a key issue in guaranteeing
consistent and effective peacekeeping." Nothing can be more contradictory
that a UN force transgressing international humanitarian law standards that
have been gradually and painstakingly agreed upon during the last sixty years.
I
27 1.Doswald-Beck, 'International humanitarian law and the Advisory Opinion
of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons', 316 International Review of the Red Cross, (1997) 35-55 esp. 45.
28 SeeDishonoured Legacy, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the
Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Canadian Government Publishing,
(Ottawa, 1997), also available at <http://www.dnd.ca.somaliae.htm> (english
version); andAfrica Rights Report, 'Somalia - Human Rights Abuses by the UN
Forces', London, (July 1993) and Mark Huband, Guardian. 31 December 1993, at 6.
The Africa Rights report documents a number of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions by a number of contingents in Somalia. Most disturbing is the conclusion
that these were 'not cases of undisciplined actions by individual soldiers, but stem
from the highest echelons of the command structure' (p.i). Italy and Belgium also
established inquiries into the conduct of their respective armed forces in Somalia - see
Amnesty International, 'AI Concerns in Europe: January-June 1997', AI Index EUR
01106/97 (1997) 1; 'Italy: A Briefing for the UN Committee Against Torture', AI
Index EUR 30/02/99, (May 1995) 10;and Brons, M. H., Society. Security. Sovereignty
and the State: From Statelessness to Statelessness?, Utrecht: International Books,
(2001) esp. pp. 238-240.
29 D. Garcia-Sayan, 'Human Rights and Peace-Keeping Operations', 29
University of Richmond Law Review, (1995), 41-65 at 45. This article deals primarily
with the UN mission to El Salvador (ONUSAL). See also D. Forsythe, 'Human Rights
and International Security: United Nations Field Operations Redux', in Castermans,
van Hoof and Smith (eds.), The Role of the Nation State in the 21'1 Century. Dordrecht:
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Humanitarian law and armed conflicts
The status of a UN or similar force depends on the underlying authority upon
which the force is present in the receiving state, and on the nature and mission
of the force.r" Under existing law, a UN peacekeeping operation is considered
a subsidiary organ of the UN, established pursuant to a resolution of the
Security Councilor General Assembly. As such it enjoys the status, privileges
and immunities of the Organisation provided for in Article 105 of the UN
Charter, and the UN Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN of
13 February 1946.31 The legal framework for UN forces is usually made up of
the following:
- The resolution of the Security Councilor the General Assembly;
- The Status of Force Agreement between the UN and the host state;
- The agreement by exchange of letters between each of the
participating states and the UN;
- The regulations for the force issued by the Secretary-General.
However, as UN forces are more often than not deployed in situations of
conflict, determining what situations constitute 'conflict' under international
law, and the laws governing UN and other forces present or participating as
combatants in such situations is a vital issue. Humanitarian law will also
provide a certain level of protection to UN forces, depending on the degree of
involvement and the nature of the conflict."
Kluwer, (1998), 265-276.
30 See W. G. Sharp, 'Protecting the Avatars ofInternational Peace and
Security', 7 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, (1996), 92-183 at
112-143.
31 In addition, the Secretary-General endeavours to conclude Status of Force
Agreements with the host State governments. This is not always possible e.g. none
was concluded in Somalia, and it took nearly twenty years to conclude a SOFA in
respect ofUNIFIL. See generally D. Fleck and M. Saalfeld, 'Combining efforts to
improve the legal status of UN peacekeeping forces and their effective protection', 1
(3) International Peacekeeping (Kluwer), (1994), 82-84.
32 This is outlined by Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law and United
Nations Military Operations', op. cit., 30-31, also see Roberts and Guelff, (eds),
Documents on the Laws of War, 3 rd. ed., Oxford, (2000),623. Article 8, para. 2 (d),
iii, of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) also prohibits attacks on
293
The norms regulating the conduct of combatants in times of conflict are
not only of ancient origin but they are also found in diverse cultures on many
continents.f This is important when considering the notion of 'customary'
legal norms in intemationallaw, and the concept of 'universal jurisdiction' over
certain violations of humanitarian law. After the piecemeal development of
humanitarian law at the end of the 19th century and the start of the 20th
century.i" the experience of the Second World War made the shortcomings in
the legal regulation of this field all too apparent. This realisation lead to the
adoption in 1949 of four conventions in which most of Geneva law is now
codified." The adoption of the 1949 Conventions, coupled with the well
developed body of Hague law meant that traditional inter-state wars or 'armed
conflicts' to use the language of the Geneva Conventions, were now well-
regulated, in theory at least." The phrase 'armed conflict' was employed to
peacekeepers 'so long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian
objects under the international law of armed conflict', see O. Triffterer (ed.),
Commentary on the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, Baden-Baden:
Nomos Verl.-Ges., (1999), 277-278; and ICRC reference document to assist
Preparatory Commission to assist in its work on elements of crimes for the ICC, Droit
international humanitaire, 1.3 Cour penale internationale, 1.3.3.4General points
common to the offences under Article 8 (2) (e) of the ICC Statute, (1999).
.~
33 Simpson Study, op. cit., at 13. See also C. Greenwood, 'The Relationship of
Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello', 9 Review of International Studies, (1983); Hans-Peter
Gasser, International Humanitarian Law - An Introduction, (trans. from German by S.
Fitzgerald and S. Mutti, Haupt, Henri Dunant Centre, (1993); S. Nahlik, 'A Brief
Outline of International Humanitarian Law', International Review of the Red Cross,
(July-August 1984) and F. Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War, Geneva:
ICRC, (1987), 8ff.
34 1899 saw the adoption of a treaty that made the principles of the 1864 treaty
applicable to the wounded and shipwrecked at sea. In 1906 the 1864 treaty was
revised, and in the following year the 1899 treaty was amended along the same lines.
In 1926 a convention on the treatment of prisoners of war was adopted. See
Kalshoven,op. cit., (1987), 9 - 10.
35 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 1949 (Geneva I), Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea 1949 ('Geneva II), Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War 1949 ('Geneva III'), and Geneva Convention Relative tro the
Protection of Civilian Person in Time of War 1949 ('Geneva IV').
36 Art. 2 common to all four Geneva Conventions of 1949., The Geneva
Conventions of 12August 1949 - Commentary: IV Geneva Convention, Geneva: IeRC,
(1958),20-21.
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make it clear that the Conventions applied once a conflict between states
employing the use of arms had begun, whether or not there had been a formal
declaration of war.37 The Conventions did not provide for the situation where
there might be an armed conflict involving the UN and a state, or organised
groups within a state.
The UN system was designed carefully to make war illegal and
unnecessary." Nowhere in the UN Charter is the concept of war mentioned. If
force is used or threatened against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state contrary to the Charter, then there are two possible
military options permitted in response i.e. self-defence and police or
enforcement action.39 However, self-defence under Article 51 is only permitted
until such time as the Security Council responds and takes the necessary
measures to maintain international peace and security." Either response is
likely to lead to full-scale conflagration. The system reflects the reality that the
advent of the UN did not mean an end to war and international conflict. In
particular, the old system of wars of self-defence will remain until the system
for global collective action and policing becomes a universal reality. Having
rendered the concept of the classical 'war' redundant, it might have seemed
unduly pessimistic for the UN to set about regulating that which no longer
37 See C. Greenwood, 'Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law', op. cit.,
42-43.
38 T. Franck and F. Patel, 'Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign
Relations Law: UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth," 85
American Journal of International Law 63, 63. See also C. Greenwood, 'The Concept
of War in Modern International Law', 36 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly, (1987). For general background on the UN and humanitarian law, see
C.Bourloyannis, 'The Security Council of the United Nations and the Implementation
of International Humanitarian Law, 20 (2) Denver Journal of Internatioal Law and
Policy, (1992), 335-355 and G. Abi-Saab, 'The United Nations and International
Humanitarian Law- Conclusions', Actes du Co/loque International de I 'Un iversite de
Geneve, (1996).
39 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force, while
Article 51 provides for individual or collective self-defence. See Goodrich, Hambro
and Simons, Charter of the United Nations, (3rd. ed.), London: Columbia University
Press, (1969),43-55 and 342-353 and B. Simma (ed.), op. cit., 106-128 and 661-678
and 605-616.
40 Article 39 of the UN Charter. Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, op. cit., 293-
302 and Simma, op. cit., 605-616.
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existed. It was not surprising then that the International Law Commission of
the UN declined to do so when it came to considering the codification of
humanitarian law in 1949. It was believed that if the Commission at the very
beginning of its work were to undertake this study, public opinion might
interpret its action as showing lack of confidence in the efficiency of the means
at the disposal of the UN for maintaining peace." In this way, the responsibility
to codify and improve the principles of humanitarian law fell upon the
International Committee of the Red Cross ('ICRC').
As the majority of armed conflicts in the Cold War period did not
approximate to inter-state wars of the kind envisaged by traditional
humanitarian law, certain obvious gaps in the legal regulation governing armed
conflicts remained.f The adoption of the Conventions marked a break with the
past in that Article 3 which was common to all four Conventions sought to
establish certain minimum standards of behaviour 'in the case of armed conflict
not of an international character' which reached a certain (undefined) level of
intensity. While of modest scope, this was a radical development.Y
Unfortunately, limitations to its application remain as states often deny that
internal problems have risen to the required level of 'armed conflict', which
term Article 3 does not attempt to define, or that the conflict in question was
not intended to be governed by the Conventions." In an attempt to address
these and other issues, Additional Protocol I and II were adopted in 1977.
These were intended to address some of the more apparent deficiencies in the
41 S. D. Bailey, Prohibitions and Restraints on War, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, (1972), 92.
42 The 1999 Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in
Armed Conflict makes depressing reading, see UN Secretary-General's Report on the
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/1999/9S7 of8 September 1999.
43 G. Aldrich, 'The Laws of War on Land', 94 American Journal of
International Law, (2000),42-59 at 59.
44 See G. Aldrich, 'Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Conflicting Views', 67
ASIL Proc. 141, 142 (1973) and R. Baxter, 'Some Existing Problems of Humanitarian
Law', The Concept of International Armed Conflict: Further Outlook },2 Proceedings
of the International Symposium on Humanitarian Law, Brussels, (1974).
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current system, but they too did not take into account the deployment of UN
forces and multinational forces authorised by the Security Counci1.45
Protocol I brought what was often referred to as 'wars of national
liberation' within the definition of international conflicts." Protocol II, on the
other hand, did not apply to all non-international armed conflicts, but only to
those that met a new and relatively high threshold test." Despite the time and
effort that was involved in drafting and agreeing the Protocols, the result was
less than satisfactory, especially from the point of view of classifying armed
conflicts to determine which Protocol, if any, applies in a given case. The
applicability of Protocol II is far too narrow, and this helps explain in part why
so many states are party to it. Whereas prior to 1977, only common Article 3
governed guerrilla or non-conventional wars, after the adoption of the Protocols
they might fall into one of three (partly overlapping) categories. Struggles
against colonialism, against racist regimes and against alien occupation, as
defined in Protocol I, were now subject to the rules of international armed
conflict. Other conflicts which met the high threshold of Protocol II were
governed both by that Protocol and by common Article 3, while conflicts which
reached a certain level of intensity but fell below the Protocol IIthreshold, were
governed solely by common Article 3.
A fourth category can be noted, that of 'internal disturbances or
tensions' which was mentioned, though not substantively legislated for in
Protocol II.48 This category covers situations involving significant political
4S See generally Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1946, Geneva: ICRC, (1987) at 33.
46 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), art.
1(4). This saved captured guerrilla fighters who met certain conditions from trial and
potential execution for actions committed in the course of liberation wars, by granting
such captives prisoner of war status. See generally C. Greenwood, 'Terrorism and
Protocol!" 19 Israel Yearbook of Human Rights, (1989).
47 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
II), art. 1(1). See B. De Schutter and C. Van De Wyngaert, 'Coping With Non-
International Armed Conflicts: The Borderline Between National and International
Law' 13 Ga. 1. Int'l & CompoL. 279 (1983), 285.
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violence such as occurred in Albania", where the threshold of common Article
3 is not reached. Many have considered that a dangerous lacuna can exist in
such circumstances where human rights law may be extensively derogated
from, and which fall beyond the reach of humanitarian law.5o In an attempt to
address the issue a number of declarations and codes of conduct have been
mooted."
If the broader picture of the development of humanitarian law over the
last two decades is examined, it is evident that, in addition to their contribution
to the regulation of non-conventional warfare, the 1977 Protocols are
significant in two other respects. Firstly Protocol I represent the flowing
together of Hague law and Geneva law in that it not only includes provisions
designed to protect the civilian population and those hors de combat,52 but also
sets out new rules on the conduct of hostilities based on the principle of
proportionality. 53 Secondly, both protocols represent a degree of merger of
humanitarian law with its younger cousin, international human rights law, in
that they incorporate detailed and explicit human rights guarantees, drawn
48 Protocol II
49 See D. Kritsiotis, 'Security Council Resolution 1101 (1997) and the Multi-
national Protection Force of Operation Alba in Albania', J2 Leiden Journal of
International Law, (1999),511-547.
50 See T. Meron, 'On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human
Rights Law and the Need for a New Instrument', op cit., 589.
51 See, for example, H.P. Gasser, 'A Measure of Humanity in Internal
Disturbances and Tensions: Proposals for a Code of Conduct', 38 International Review
of the Red Cross (1988), 262. See also the 'Oslo Statement on Norms and procedures
in Times of Public Emergency or Internal Violence'(l987) and the adoption of the
'Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards' at TurkulAbo, Finland (1990)
(sometimes referred to as the 'TurkulAbo Declaration'). The text of the Oslo
Statement is included in the pamphlet Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian
Standards, Abo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights (1991), at 13 - 16.
The text of the Declaration is appended to T. Meron & A. Rosas, 'A Declaration of
Minimum Humanitarian Standards', 85 American Journal of International Law, 375,
(1991). In 1994 an amended version of the Turku/Abo document was adopted, which
received a degree of validation from both UN and OSCE mechanisms. The text of the
document is appended to A. Eide, A. Rosas & T. Meron, 'Combating Lawlessness in
Gray Zone Conflicts Through Minimum Humanitarian Standards' 89 American
Journal of International Law, (1995), 215.
52 See for instance, arts. 52 - 56.
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directly in some instances from the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights." As a result, the Additional Protocols have blurred the
distinction between what was traditionally seen as humanitarian law that
emphasised generic rights determined according to the status of certain
participants or other groups caught up in an armed conflict, and the more
individual based rights, which form the core of international human rights law.
None of the existing Conventions or Protocols addresses the specific
issues of UN forces, or forces acting on the authority of the UN, in situations of
armed conflict. It could be said that this situation leaves military forces acting
under the control of the UN in somewhat of a limbo. However, the Institut de
droit internatonale has confirmed that the rules of the 'law of armed conflict'
apply as of right and they must be complied with in every circumstance by UN
forces engaged in hostilities. 55 If the UN is considered the sum of its parts, then
it comprises states. In this way a conflict involving the UN must also engage
individual states acting for or on its behalf. The UN is clear that it is capable of
being internationally responsible for an internationally wrongful act." While
the obligation to comply with the Conventions could be viewed as falling
simply on the states concerned, it does not seem correct to allow the
Organization under whose control and upon whose authority and behalf the
states are acting, to evade responsibility. 57 There should be no doubt that an
53 See especially arts. 57 & 58.
54 For instance the fair trial guarantees in Protocol 1 art. 75 and Protocol II art.
6 are clearly based upon, though are not identical to those in art. 14 of the ICCPR. For
a discussion of this point see S. Stavros, 'The Right to a Fair Trial in Emergency
Situations', 41 International and ComparativeLaw Quarterly, (1992),343.
55 Annuaire de l'Institut, 54 Vol. II, (1971), 466, and 56 Vol. II, (1975), 541.
See also Institute of International Law, 'The application of international humanitarian
law and fundamental human rights, in armed conflicts in which non-state entities are
parties', Fourteenth Commission, Berlin Session 1999, (25 August 1999), 4; and D.
Schindler and J. Toman, (eds.), The Laws of Armed Conflicts, Dordrecht: Martinus
Nijhoff, (1988),903 and 907.
56 See R. Dupuy (ed.), AHandbook on International Organizations, (2 nd. ed.),
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, (1998), 887 and Secretary-General's Report on
Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations, (Al511389), reproduced in 37 International Legal
Materials, (1998), 702, para. 4.
57 See generally C. F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the institutional law of
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organization is responsible for the delictual acts committed by that
organization, but not all acts or conduct can be attributable to the organization.
Unlike a state, it must be kept in mind that an international organization's
capacity to act is functional, not sovereign. 58
International and non-international armed conflicts
Although it may be argued that the distinction between international and non-
international armed conflict has lost much of its significance", it is submitted
that this is an overly optimistic assessment and determining whether a conflict
can be characterised as internal or international can still be critically
important. 60 This arises from the fact that the rules applicable during internal
conflicts remain rudimentary and skeletal compared to those that apply to
international conflicts.61 If a conflict can be regarded as international in
character, then the whole ius in bello of the Geneva Conventions (c. 400
articles) apply. However, the protection afforded under common Article 3 and
Protocol II governing non-international armed conflicts is much more limited in
scope. The International Court of Justice decision in the Nicaragua case
illustrates how far the evaluation of conflict status has shifted from dependence
on the classification by the sovereign state alone towards neutral external
international organization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1996), 223 -248,
and infra.
58 Dupuy, op. cit., 888. For further discussion, especially in regard to
'coalitions of the willing', see infra.
59 See D. Schindler, 'Significance of the Geneva Conventions for the
contemporary world', 836 International Review of the Red Cross, (1999), 715-729.
60 See T. Meron, 'War Crimes inYugoslavia and the Development ofIntemational
Law', 88 American Journal of International Law, (1994), 78-83 at 80; and C. Byron,
'Armed Conflicts: Internationalor Non-International?' 6 (1) Journal of Conflict and
Security Law, (2001),63-90.
61 C. Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law and United Nations
Military Operations', 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Dordrecht:
Kluwer, (1998), 3-34 at 9 and D. Schindler, 'The Different Types of Armed Coflicts
According to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols', 163 Recuil des Cours, (1979),
116-163. For an overview of international law applicable to armed conflicts to which
non-state entities are parties, see Institute of International Law, 'The application of
international humanitarian law and fundamental human rights, in armed conflicts in
which non-state entities are parties' , Fourteenth Commission, Berlin Session 1999, (25
August 1999), 3-5.
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measurement by international bodies.f Distinguishing between international
and non-international armed conflict in contemporary situations remains
difficult'", and this is evidenced by the contradictory decisions of the different
chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) on the nature of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia." But it is two
decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY that are of the most significance
in this context, i.e. the decision of the Tadic case whereby many principles and
rules previously applicable only in international armed conflict are now
applicable in internal armed conflicts, and serious violations of humanitarian
law committed within the context of such internal conflicts constituted war
crimes.f Secondly, on the issue of jurisdiction in the same case, it stated, inter
alia, that a non- international armed conflict occurs whenever there is
'protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised
62 Military and Paramilitary activities, Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J.
4, 122 esp. paras. 219 and 220. The ICJ contrasted the conflict between the Contras
and the Sandinista Government with that between the US and Nicaragua. The first, as
internal, was governed by common Article 3 only; the second, as international, fell
under the rules governing international armed conflicts. The Court also affirmed that
the fundamental general principles of humanitarian law (common Article 3, in the
opinion of the Court), belong to the body of general international law, in other words,
that they apply in all circumstances for the better protection of the victims, regardless
of the legal classification of armed conflicts. See R. Abi-Saab, 'Humanitarian Law and
Internal Conflicts: The Evolution of Legal Concern', Essays in Honour of F.
Kalshoven, Dordrecht: Maritinus Nijhoff, (1991), 209-223.
63 See generally M. Sassoli and A. Bouvier, 'The Law of Non-International
Armed Conflict' How Does Law Protect in War, Geneva: ICRC (1999), 201-217, and
ICRC reference document to assist Preparatory Commission to assist in its work on
elements of crimes for the ICC, Droit international humanitaire, 1.3 Cour penale
internationale, 1.3.3.3 General points common to the offences under Article 8 (2) (c) of
the ICC Statute, (1999).
64 See T. Meron, 'The Humanization of Humanitarian Law', 94 American
Journal of International Law, (2000), 239-278, esp. 261. See also C. Greenwood, 'The
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia', 69 International Affairs, 1993.
65 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-I-AR 72 (Oct. 2,
1995), 105 ILR 417, para 70, reprinted in 35 ILM 32 (1996) and available at
<http://www.un.orglicty/judgement.htm>. See P. Rowe, 'The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: The Substantive Jurisdiction of the Tribunal', 45
International and Compartive Law Quarterly, (1996), 696-701 and C. Greenwood,
'International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic case,' 7 European Journal of
International Law (1996), 265-283 esp. 276.
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armed groups or between such groups within a state' .66 In this way the Appeals
Chamber has encouraged the blurring of the distinction between international
and non-international armed conflicts as the traditional focus on state
sovereignty has shifted toward a human rights approach to international
problems.f" One potential problem with this aspect of the Tadic decision is that
it could have been interpreted as creating another category of armed conflict i.e.
where protracted armed violence occurs, and a similar line of reasoning was
adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (lCTR) in the
Akayesu case.68 Fortunately, more recent decisions of the ICTY have clarified
this potential anomaly/"
In all of these developments the impact of humanitarian law on UN
forces does not seem to have been given serious consideration.I" While the
intensity and classification of the conflict are fundamental determiners of the
application of humanitarian law where UN forces are deployed, they can also
be an important determiner of UN military involvement in intra-state conflicts
in the first place. As Somalia and Lebanon show, such conflicts are often not
amenable to simple 'quick fix' solutions. UN forces can find themselves
66 Ibid., para.70. See also T. Meron, 'Classification of Armed Conflict in the
Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua's Fallout', 92 American Journal of International Law,
(1998), 236-242.
67 The Statute of the ICC has also tended to blur the distinction, see T. Meron,
'The Humanization of Humanitarian Law', op. cit., at 262 and 275.
68 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
September 2, 1998, para. 619-621. It is noteworth that the language of Article 8 (2) (t)
of the Statute of the ICC is similar to that used in the Tadic decision and refers to
'protacted armed conflict', see O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statue of
the International Criminal Court, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verl.-Ges., (1999), 284-286.
69 For example, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgement, Appeals Chamber (July 15,
1999), paras.68-162 esp. 80-97. See also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgement, Trial
Chamber, (March 3, 2000), paras 63-72, 75-123, and Prosecutor v. Aleksovski,
Judgement, Appeals Chamber, No. IT-95-14/1-A (March 24, 2000), paras. 120-122,
available at <http://www.un.orglicty/judgement.htm>.
70 But it is noteworthy that in the Tadic case (Tadic Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case no. IT-94-1-AR72. October
2.1995), the Appeals Chamber referred to the ICJ decision in the Nicaragua v. US case
(merits) that Article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions 'lays down an obligation that is
incumbent, not only on states, but also on other international entities including the UN'
(para. 93).
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deployed in complex political situations where the international legal
framework within which they must operate is anything but clear. Despite
claims to the contrary, this is all the more so when it is considered that
humanitarian law does not apply to most kinds of UN military activities."
Recent UN operations have involved authorised and mandated operations
mounted in situations of conflict where clashes involving local actors or parties
and UN soldiers were inevitable. These have left casualties on both sides, and
they have involved both combatant and non-combatant alike. Often the parties
to such conflicts have undergone a sustained period of bitter and bloody
conflict. Many combatants are not soldiers of regular armies but militias or
groups of armed civilians with little discipline and an ill-defined command
structure." Fighters of this nature do not always fit easily into the matrix of
humanitarian law combatant status. There is also the vexed question of
responsibility for the actions or omissions of UN soldiers in the field, and what
to do when confronted with human rights abuses on a large scale. In this way,
the matter of the applicability of humanitarian law to UN forces is of much
more than academic interest. It is directly relevant to states contributing
contingents, and to the UN itself, even if it is not formally a party to the
relevant international treaties.
The UN and the maintenance of international peace and security.
It is useful to summarize the role of the UN in the maintenance of international
peace and security as it is one of the primary purposes of the Organization, and
it has significance for the application of humanitarian law to UN operations.
Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter are significant in this regard, and
Chapter VII permits the Security Council to decide on coercive measures or
undertake enforcement action against a state or states in response to breaches of
71 See P. Rowe, 'Maintaining Discipline in UN Peace Support Operations: The
Legal Quagmire for Military Contingents', 5 (1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law,
(2000), 45-62, esp. SO-58.
72 The Blue Helmets- A Review 0/ United Nations Peacekeeping, (3nd• Ed.),
New York, United Nations, (1996), 4. On the command and humanitarian law, see
generally C. Greenwood, Command and the Laws of Conflict, Pamphlet published by
Strategic and Combat Studies Institute for the Ministry for Defence, 1993
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the peace or acts of aggression. The importance attached to the Security
Council's power to order military measures did not stem from expectations that
it would often be necessary to do SO.73 It was thought that the threat of military
action would be sufficient to deter aggression and to induce states to comply
with measures deemed appropriate by the Security Council to maintain or
restore international peace and security. However, the reality is that although
the military agreements envisioned under Article 43 of the Charter did not
materialise, the UN has had a significant involvement in military operations of
one kind or another since the first major UN authorised operation during the
Korean conflict in 1950.
It is important at the outset to make a distinction between peacekeeping
and enforcement action. Nonetheless, this distinction can be somewhat blurred in
certain instances. This is complicated by the grey area that exists between
peacekeeping and so called 'peace enforcement'. With the end of the Cold War
this distinction has become further blurred. Prior to 1990, the UN had authorised
two enforcement missions, that against North Korea in 1950 and the Congo in
1960 (ONUC).74 It has since approved a number of major operations with similar
characteristics, in Kuwait, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, East Timor,
Albania", the Central African Republic and Sierra Leone. However, some of
these are UN mandated forces, while others are merely authorised 'coalitions of
the willing'. 76
73 Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, op. cit., 291.
74 ONUC amounted to at least de facto enforcement action, see N. D. White,
'The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues', in Pugh (ed.), in M.
Pugh (ed.), The UN, Peace and Force, London: Frank Cass, (1996),43-63 at 53. Cf.
Certain Expenses of the UN - Article 17(2), Advisory Opinion, July 20, 1962,
International Court of Justice Reports, 1962, 177, where the I.C,J. said the 'the
operation did not involve "preventative or enforcement measures" against any state
under Chapter VII' .
7S Though Albania had elements of traditional peacekeeping and peace
enforcement combined in one mandate, see D. Kritsiotis, op. cit., 511-547.
76 It is best to view the action by NATO forces in Kosovo during 1999 as sui
generis, see See B. Simma, ' NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects', 10
European Jounal oj International Law, (1999) 1-22; K. Ambos, 'NATO, the UN and
the Use of Force: Legal Aspects. A comment on Simma and Cassese', 2 Humanitiires
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In addition, since 1985 there has been a significant increase in the
number of peacekeeping missions established, with a corresponding increase in
the complexity of the mandates. These are often referred to as 'second
generation' peacekeeping operations." The resolution of internal or domestic
conflict has been a dominant feature of recent operations that involved the
establishment of democratic governments culminating in the nation building
attempted for a time in Somalia. Any interventions by UN forces may,
intentionally or otherwise, alter the delicate balance of power between the
warring parties. The UN may then be perceived as not impartial or even
hostile." Maintaining impartiality can present peacekeepers with a dilemma,
especially when they confront situations in which civilians are victimised, or
when UN forces are themselves the subject ofattack.79 The question of consent
to a UN presence is particularly problematic in those situations, and the blue
berets involved must be prepared to resort to force rather than be bystanders to
large-scale human rights abuses or even genocide. In this way, the continuum
from peacekeeping to peacemaking and enforcement can be difficult to track,
but when all else fails and the political will exists, the Security Council may
resort to the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
UN forces can take on many different forms, but the status and nature of a
force is important to evaluating the relevance and applicability of humanitarian
law principles. The difference between peacekeeping and enforcement action
operations is fundamental, but second generation operations, which while not
constituting enforcement action as originally envisaged under the Charter,
Volkerrecht, Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, (1999), 114-115; A. Cassesse, 'Ex injuria ius
oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian
Countermeasures in the World Community?' 10 European Journal of International
Law, (1999), 23-30 and C. Guicherd, 'International Law and the War in Kosovo',
41(2) Survival, (Summer, 1999), 19-34. See also 'The Kosovo crisis and interntional
humanitarian law', International Review of the Red Cross, No. 837, (2000), in which
the whole edition is devoted to contributions on the topic.
77 TheBlue Helmets, op. cit., 5.
78 J. Peck, 'The U.N. and the Laws of War: How Can the World's
Peacekeepers be Held Accountable', 21 Syracuse Journal Of International Law,
(1995), 283-310, at 288.
79 TheBlue Helmets, op. cit., 5.
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possess certain of the characteristics of both types of operations. There is also
the problem of distinguishing between UN mandated operations and those merely
authorised to be carried out by coalitions of the willing. These issues are
important in determining the extent, if any, of the application of humanitarian
law to UN forces. However, the fundamental question regarding the
application of humanitarian law remains the existence of an armed conflict.
Ultimately, it is the fact of participation in hostilities, not the existence of
authority to do so that is significant.t''
Peace Enforcement Operations
In more recent years, when the UN has decided to react to international crises
but the resources are not available, the Security Council has authorised groups
of states to organise 'peace enforcement' operations with specific goals in
mind. Again, the United States has been to the forefront of these operations in,
inter alia, Somalia, Haiti and the former Yugoslavia. The operations in
question, while not constituting enforcement action as originally envisaged
under the Charter, owed much to the half way house suggested by Boutros
Boutros-Ghali in his original Agenda for Peace document. 81 In all cases, the
relevant resolutions of the Security Council made specific reference to Chapter
VII of the Charter. Furthermore, the military action concerned was conducted
by states outside their own national borders and in the territory of a foreign
country, while being authorised by the UN. In this way it could not be said to
constitute aggression or the illegal use of force contrary to international law.
The military operations were similar to conventional operations involving
coalition forces under a complex but essentially unified operational command
structure and intended to be governed by the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocols, and the intemationallaw of armed conflict as a whole.82
80 Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military
Operations', op. cit., 11.
81 UN document: Al47/277 - S/24111, (June 1992).
Interviews, UN official and senior military officer seconded to UN DPKO,
New York, 1998.
82
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In addition, as discussed above, it is an accepted principle of
humanitarian law that it applies in equal measure to all parties involved,
irrespective of any other consideration, including the issue of the legality and
objective of the resort to the use of force. There would seem to be broad
agreement that humanitarian law norms do apply to UN military operations.f
This view is supported by the terms of the relevant Conventions. There is no
doctrine of ends and means in the application of humanitarian principles, and
the terms of the Geneva Conventions require that 'the High Contracting Parties
undertake to respect and ensure respect for the present Convention in all
circumstances'. 84 Not every armed confrontation triggers the application of
humanitarian law, but states involved are obliged to ensure its strict
implementation once the threshold of 'armed conflict' has been reached.
The most contentious missions, both from a legal and political
perspective, will probably be those operations where the peace is most
precarious. These missions may take place during international or non-
international armed conflicts, but in any event the distinction is not crucial to
this discussion. Such operations go well beyond traditional peacekeeping
precepts and often they slip from peace to conflict and from Chapter VI to
Chapter VII of the Charter, even in the course of a single operation.
Nevertheless, classifications are needed and standards must be sought." While
it is acknowledged that every deployment of troops outside their own territory
is subject to international political and legal ramifications, clarification of what
83 H. McCoubrey, 'International Law and National Contingents in UN Forces',
12 International Relations, at 46; Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law and
United Nations Military Operations', op. cit., 18 and M. Bothe, 'Peacekeeping' in
Simma (ed.), op. cit., 600. See also two resolutions adopted by the Institut de Droit
International: Resolution on the Conditions of Application of Humanitarian Rules of
Armed Conflict to Hostilities in which UN Forces may be engaged, adopted in Zagreb
in 1971, 54 (II) Annuaire de l'institut de droit international (1971) 465; and
Resolution on the Conditons of Application of Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict
to Hostilities in which UN Forces may be Engaged, adopted in Wiesbaden in 1975, 56
Annuarire de l'tnstitut de droit international (1975),540
Article 1, First Geneva Convention of 1949, and the Preamble to the
Additional Protocol I of 1977.
84
85 T. Pfanner, 'Application of International Humanitarian Law and military
operations undertaken under the UN Charter', Symposium, 50.
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these are is needed, especially when the UN troops involved are likely to be
engaged in hostilities with local actors.
Humanitarian law and UN operations.
Bowett addressed the issue of the application of the law of armed conflict to
operations by UN forces by examining two preliminary questions: first, what
different types of functions a UN force may assume, and, secondly, the
question of the different types of command structure that may be adopted for a
UN Force.86 An analysis of the different types of functions that may be
entrusted to UN Forces suggests that the application of the laws of armed
conflict may be relevant to certain types of functions, but not to others. The
most fundamental difference to identify in the first instance is that between
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter and traditional
peacekeeping, though as previously stated, in recent years the distinction is less
clear. It is still worthwhile making this initial distinction and dealing in the
first instance with enforcement action. Bowett's two questions are also
inextricably linked, as the command structure will largely depend on the
function of the force.87 A further complication arises by virtue of the kind of
operations conducted under Chapter VII and intended to be enforcement action
in nature, despite the failure to conclude the requisite agreements with the UN
under Article 43 of the Charter.88 The issue of who commands the force, the
UN or the states concerned, is especially relevant in operations involving
'coalitions of the willing'. 89
86 D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces, London: Stevens, (1964),484-485.
87 Ibid. at 487-88. Bowett identified thee types of command structures,
i ). Command delegated to a State of group of States by the UN; ii) Command
entrusted to an individual appointed by and responsible to the UN, but lacking
disciplinary authority; iii) Command entrusted to an individual appointed by and
responsible to the UN and having disciplinary authority.
88 Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, op. cit., 317-326 and Simma, op. cit., 636-
639
89 See Dupuy, op. cit., 891.
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More significantly, from the point of view of the applicability of
humanitarian law, nowhere in Chapter VII, and Article 42 in particular, is 'war'
mentioned. It refers to 'such action by, sea, air or land forces as may be
necessary ... [and] may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations
by air, sea or land forces of members of the UN.' The obvious implication of
this is that military action taken by the UN is not to be regarded as 'war', and
this was the commonly accepted view of the UN action in Korea.90 Given the
intensity of the hostilities during the conflict, this point may seem somewhat
esoteric and academic to the ordinary person on the street, or to the soldier
acting under UN 'command' .91 The tendency to view conflicts of this nature as
other than war may also confuse the issues somewhat and have its origins in the
old just war theory. The problem with this is that it may justify the use of
violence on a massive scale, and indirectly undermine humanitarian law
principles by failing to view those against whom the military action is being
taken as equally deserving of their protection.
Writing in 1964, Bowett stated that 'there [was] no known case in
which the UN Command ever claimed exemption from any of the accepted
rules of the laws of war, customary or conventional. ,92 In fact, there appears to
be no record of the UN ever claiming that humanitarian law does not apply to
operations authorised by or undertaken on behalf of the Organization. But the
policy of the UN with regard to the applicability of humanitarian law to forces
under its command or operational control is still ambivalent.f The end of the
Cold War has not brought the realisation of the early optimism associated with
that event, and the ambitions for the UN and the Security Council reflected in
the Secretary-General's 'Agenda for Peace'," did not materialise. A more
90 Bowett, op. cit., 53.
91 See Chapter 5, supra., and R. Murphy, 'The Legal Framework of UN
Peacekeeping Forces and the Issue of Command and Control', 4(1) Journal of Armed
Conflict Law, (1999),41-73.
92 Bowett, op. cit. 56.
93 See infra.
94 United Nations document: A/47/277 - S/24111, (June 1992).
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sobering and reflective sequel to this was published a short time later in which
the Secretary-General acknowledged certain limitations. In particular, the
limited ability of the Security Council and office of the Secretary-General, to
deploy, direct, command and control enforcement action operations in response
to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. The
consequences of this are well known, but worth restating. International and
internal armed conflicts have continued to flare around the globe, and one of
the ironies of the end of the Cold War is that local or internal conflicts have
increased." With the UN's inability to respond effectively to these crises, the
Security Council has left the establishment and management of international
forces to individual member states, in particular the United States. These
operations are outside the formal framework of the organization, and come
under the umbrella of traditional and reciprocal inter power relations to which
humanitarian law naturally applies." In some of these cases e.g. the UN has
divested itself explicitly of its competence in leading enforcement actions and
has instead 'authorised' member states to undertake enforcement measures by
use of force. The two most well known instances are the Korean and Gulf
conflicts of 1950 and 1991 respectively. Some have described the action by the
Security Council as a form of abdication of responsibility, with little or no
command and control by the UN, and no strategic direction either." Not
surprisingly, the matter of enforcing humanitarian law was left to the
contributing states. Given the universal nature of the principles, this should not
prove problematic, but a lot will depend on the country concerned and the level
of importance attached to dissemination and training among the armed forces.
Such an arrangement cannot be regarded as satisfactory, and it raises the issue
of UN responsibility for violations of international law in such instances.
9S See D. Smith, The State of War and Peace Atlas, International Peace
Research Institute, Oslo, London: Penguin, (1997).
96 P. Benvenuti, 'The Implementation oflntemational Humanitarian Law in the
Framework of Peacekeeping Operations', 1 Law in Humanitarian Crises, (European
Conunission, 1995), 83-120 at 88.
97 See N. White, Keeping the Peace, (2nd ed.) Manchester: Manchester
University Press, (1997), 115-128 esp, 117-118.
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While there can be no doubt that the UN is a subject of international
law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, an analysis of
what the International Court of Justice has said and done reveals that it is not
possible to give a categorical answer to the question of the legal consequences
of personality for international organizations" The UN is, however, a separate
legal person from and additional to its member states, and it is not simply an
aggregation of those states.99 Once the existence of international personality
and rights is conceded, it is not difficult to infer that this will also entail
obligations. In the WHO Agreement Case the International Court of Justice
specifically referred to the existence of obligations at customary international
law for international organizations.V" There are situations where the UN would
be responsible under customary international law for acts of persons or armed
forces acting under its control.l'" In fact, there have been claims by states
against the UN arising from violations of international law during the ONUC
(Congo) operation that were later settled by negotiation.l'"
The UN has generally accepted responsibility for illegal acts that may
have been committed by armed forces (belonging to member states) acting
under its control. to) Imputability to the UN is possible when national
contingents become organs of the UN by being placed under its authority and
control. This does not happen when a country or countries retain control of a
military force, as in the Gulf War, even if acting in the execution of a UN
98 Amerasinghe,op. cit., 92-93. See also B.Tittemore,op. cit., esp. 92-95.
99 Ibid., 229.
100 IC] Reports (1980),67 at 90.
101 Amerisinghe, op. cit., 240 - 241.
102 See UN Documents AlCN.4/195 and Add. 1 dated 7 April 1967. The
principal claimant was the Belgian government. Despite the nature of the
authorisation to use force in the ONUC operation, the IC] found that it 'did not involve
"preventive or enforcement" measures against any State under Chapter VII ',
Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, IC] Reports, 1962,177.
See Bowett, op. cit., 175-180.
Amerasinghe, op. cit., 242 and Dupuy, op. cit., 891. The UN has
acknowledged liability for activities carried out by both UNEF and ONUC.
103
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decision. Where national contingents come together to form 'coalitions of the
willing' in such cases, but do not become organs of the UN, or fall under its
command and control, then the UN cannot be held responsible for their acts.104
In such cases, the acts of military forces remain the responsibility of the states
concerned. However, definitive statements remain problematic due to the
linkage with the complex issues surrounding the command and control of UN
forces, and a lot will depend on the facts of a case.105 In the meantime, the
control test retains its central role in determining liability, and in some cases
may even allow for concurrent responsibility because of a limbo status
involving an ill-defined form of dual control.l'"
The UN position
In 1994, as Serb troops advanced on the UN declared 'safe area' of Bihac, the
municipal hospital stood in the middle of their line of advance.l'" The
Canadian Commander of the UN forces was reluctant to intervene. The UN
forces civil affairs officer, an American, urged that the hospital should be
protected owing to its special status under the Geneva Conventions and that
UNPROFOR had a duty to protect it. He drafted a memorandum to this effect
to his superior in Sarajevo who then instructed Bangladeshi troops to take up
positions with their armoured personnel carriers around the hospital. The Serbs
refrained from attacking the hospital, and by passed Bihac in the process.
Two weeks later, the UN Office of Legal Affairs issued a statement to
set the record straight and ensure that the 'Bihac incident' did not set any
precedents. UN forces are bound only by their Security Council mandate, and
they are not legally obliged to uphold the Geneva Conventions. From a strictly
104 Ibid., 243 and 891 respectively. See also F. Seyersted, 'United Nations
Forces: Some Legal Problems', 37 British Yearbook of Internatioanal Law, (1961),
362 and 421.
105 See Cpt. 5 supra., and R.Murphy, op. cit., 41-73.
106 See Nissan v. Attorney General [1968] 1 Queens Bench 286, and [1969] 1
All England Reports 629; and 1. Brownlie, 'Decisions of British Courts during 1968
Involving Questions of International Law', 42 British Yearbook of International Law
(1968-69), 217.
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legal point of view, obligations arising under humanitarian law are binding on
states. Article 103 of the UN Charter may also be relied upon to support the
argument that the obligations arising under the UN Charter on member states
(including those arising from Security Council resolutions), take precedence
over other international treaties, including the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocols. J08 The role of the UN is to carry out the will of the
international community as expressed by the Security Council.i'" When states
assign troops to peacekeeping duties, they are under the command or
operational control of the Security Council. This may be the theory, but even a
superficial knowledge of UN peacekeeping indicates that the reality is much
more complex. Few states ever relinquish full operational control to the VN.1IO
The 'Bihac incident' illustrates the UN's ambivalent attitude to humanitarian
law. Not surprisingly, it has been a source of tension between the ICRC and
the UN. The UN has declared its commitment to the application of
humanitarian law to peacekeeping operations, but it has consistently taken the
position that UN forces act on behalf of the international community, and
therefore they cannot be considered a 'party' to the conflict, nor a 'Power'
within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions. The mere presence of UN
peacekeeping soldiers in an area of conflict or a theatre of war, while
performing a humanitarian or diplomatic mission, does not necessarily mean
that humanitarian law binds these troops. I II
In addition, the UN is not in a position to become a party to the
Conventions or Additional Protocols as this would entail binding the
Organization to detailed provisions that are aimed at states, and do not fit the
R. Gutman, 'The UN and the Geneva Conventions' in Roy Gutman and
David Reif(eds.), Crimes of War, New York: Norton and Co., (1999), 361-364.
107
See Simma, op. cit., 1116-1125; and Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, op. cit.,
614-617. See also B.Tittemore,op. cit., esp. 101-108.
108
Ibid., statement to this effect attributed to S. Katz, OLA official, in R.
Gutman, 'UN and the Geneva Conventions', op. cit., 361-364 at 361.
109
110 See chapter 5 and R. Murphy, op. cit., 41-73.
This position has not altered with the Secretary-General's Bulletin on
Observance by UN forces of international humanitarian law, ST/SGB/1993/3 of 6
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role and function of an international organization.i'f Notwithstanding its
international legal personality, the UN is not itself a state and thus, it does not
possess the juridical or administrative powers to discharge many of the
obligations laid down in the Conventions.i" However, this does not mean that
the conduct of hostilities by UN forces will be free from humanitarian
constraint or that humanitarian law considerations do not apply.i'" While a
relevant factor in determining how UN forces will implement humanitarian
law, it is not a reason for concluding that it cannot be applicable to them. I IS
The IeRe has been instrumental in obtaining agreement from the UN
that international forces acting under UN authority would do so in accordance
with the 'principles and spirit' of relevant law.!" But once a provision to this
effect was incorporated in the Regulations of the Force and in the agreements
with troop contributing states, it did not entail the direct responsibility of the
UN to ensure respect for humanitarian law by members of its forces. In this
regard the relatively recent UNModel Agreement with troop contributing states
and the Model Status of Force Agreements between the UN and host states now
include an express provision to this effect.l17 Under that provision, the UN
August 1999. See Section 1(1) discussed infra ..
112 On the question of treaty making powers, see Amerasinghe, op. cit., 102-
103.
113 Reparations Case [1949] IC] Rep., 174, and Symposium, 43
114 Roberts and Guelff, (eds), op. cit., 721.
C. Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law and United Nations
Military Operations', op. cit., 15.
115
116 U. Palwankar, 'Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to UN
Peacekeeping Forces', 80 International Review of the Red Cross, (1993),227-240 at
229-33. A provision to this effect was incorporated into the UNEF, ONUC and
UNFICYP Force Regulations. As no Regulations were adopted in respect of UNIFIL,
no such provision exists for that force.
117 Shagra and Zacklin, Symposium, 44. The Model Agreement with troop
contributors contains the following provision:
• [The UN peacekeeping operation] shall observe and respect the principles and spirit
of the general international conventions applicable to the conduct of military
personnel. The international conventions referred to above include the four Geneva
Conventions of 12August 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 and the
UNESCO Convention of 14 May 1954 on the Protection of Cultural Property in the
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undertakes that the operations of the force in question will be conducted with
full respect for the principles and spirit of the general international conventions
applicable to the conduct of military personnel.
While these developments are welcome, they fail to address the
fundamental questions, and more importantly, it seems to suggest that the UN
does not have a duty to monitor the behaviour of third parties. The 'Bihac
incident' already referred to confirms this policy.l" This is crucial, as the
military culture requires that such duties be spelt out in clear terms. There is,
however, a lack of consistency in this regard, as UNIFIL did monitor the
behaviour of Israeli forces in Lebanon after the 1982 invasion.119
The recent Secretary-General's Bulletin on the observance by UN
forces of humanitarian law does go some way towards addressing these
problems.P" It adds significant weight to the ICRC position and it is important
in terms of legal certainty by giving obligations substance. Bulletins of this
nature are intended to be legally binding on UN personnel, in this case UN
forces, but the issue is not straightforward.l" Section I of the Bulletin states
that:
event of armed conflict. [The Participating State] shall therefore ensure that the
members of its national contingent serving...be fully acquainted with the principles and
spirit of the conventions'
118 R. Gutman, 'The UN and the Geneva Conventions' in R. Gutman and D.
Reif (eds.), op. cit., 361-364. There were also claims that UN forces in Bosnia-
Herzegovina ignored evidence of human rights abuses elsewhere.
Interview, T. Goksel, UNIFIL spokesman, Naqoura, Lebanon, 1998 and
personal experience of writer.
119
120 Secretary-General's Bulletin on Observance by UN forces of international
humanitarian law, ST/SGB/1993/3 of 6 August 1999. See P. Rowe, 'Maintaining
Discipline in UN Peace Support Operations: The Legal Quagmire for Military
Contingents',op. cit., 52; and M. Zwanenburg, 'The Secretary-General's Bulletin on
Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law: Some
Preliminary Observations', 5 (4-5) International Peacekeeping (Kluwer), (1999), 133-
139.
121 Personal interview, Official, UN Legal Division, New York, December
2000. Bulletins were described as part of the UN 'internal law, binding within the
Organization's own legal system'. Rowe has argued that in those countries where
international law has to be incorporated directly into national law, the Bulletin will
create no binding obligation, by itself, upon the soldier, see P. Rowe, 'Maintaining
Discipline in UN Peace Support Operations: The Legal Quagmire for Military
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The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian
law set out in the present Bulletin are applicable to UN forces when in
situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as
combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement.
They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, or in
peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-
defence.
The categorisation of UN troops as combatants in certain instances may seem
unusual, especially to troop contributing states. However, this Bulletin must be
judged in the context of the 1994 Convention on the Safety of UN and
Associated Personnel, and there is a problematic overlap in the respective
regimes covered.i" Both are incompatible because they are based on
fundamentally different principles. The objective of the Convention being to
protect UN personnel and ensure immunity from attack for other than those
engaged in enforcement operations under Chapter VII involving combat against
organized armed forces, while the remit of humanitarian law is much broader
and respects the combatants privilege to attack enemy forces once the general
rules of international law are followed, and is based on the cardinal principle
that combat forces are treated equally.123
The Bulletin appears to say that when UN forces, for whatever reason,
are required to resort to the use of force in armed conflict situations, and then
humanitarian law will apply. What degree, intensity and duration of force are
required is unclear, but some threshold must exist and be crossed before
triggering the application of humanitarian law. Commanders and soldiers will
still find themselves in a kind of legal no mans land trying to determine in the
first instance if the situation can be classified as one of armed conflict, and then
whether or not the use of force was sufficient to change their status from that of
peacekeeper or peace enforcer, to that of combatant. No pocket book of
humanitarian law of the kind usually supplied to military personnel will supply
Contingents',op. cit., 53.
122 Ibid., at 136 and 138, and infra.
123 See Roberts and Guelff, (eds), op. cit., 623-626. On combatants generally,
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easy answers to these questions. At least paragraph 9 (4) should provide an
answer to those that would see UN stand by in situations that arose in Bihac.
Under these provisions, the UN shall in all circumstances respect and protect
medical personnel and wounded.F" This places a clear onus on peacekeepers
to intervene and actively accept responsibility for the protection of these
categories of persons.
The Bulletin also commits the UN to ensurmg that members of
military personnel are fully acquainted with the rules of humanitarian law. It
accepts co-responsibility with the contributing states for this whether of not
there is a Status of Force Agreement. What liability the UN may be subject to
for breach of this duty is unclear. Most important, however, is Section 4 to the
effect that it is the responsibility of the national courts to prosecute military
personnel for violations of humanitarian law. This means that the UN will not
be required to establish a special tribunal to consider violations of humanitarian
law by UN troops, and the status quo ante remains.l"
What practical effect this Bulletin will have with the UN forces on the
ground, and the policy of contributing states, remains to be seen. Does it
impose a wider duty on UN forces to intervene to prevent violations of
humanitarian law by third parties in the absence of a specific provision to this
effect in the mandate? Common Article I of the Conventions provides that 'the
High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the
present Convention in all circumstances' .126 It can be argued that this, and a
see K. Ipsen, 'Combatants and Non-Combatants', in D. Fleck (ed.), op. cit., 65-104.
124 Paragraph 9.4 states: The UN shall in all circumstances respect and protect
medical personnel exclusively engaged in the search for, transport or treatment of the
wounded or sick, as well as religious personnel.
Paragraph 9.5 states: The UN shall respect and protect transports
of wounded and sick or medical equipment in the same way mobile medical units.
125 It has been proposed by the Security Council (22 December 2000) that the
Special Court for Sierra Leone have jurisdiction over crimes committed by
peacekeepers or related personnel, where the state that had sent the relevant personnel
was unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out an investigation or prosecution, see
Amnesty International, Sierra Leone - Renewed commitment needed to enc impunity,
24 September 2001, para. 3.6.
See Pictet, Commentary - Geneva Conventiion IV Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva: ICRe, (1958), 16.
126
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similar provision in Protocol 1, places a duty on UN forces to take action to
prevent such violations.V' Although this may not have been the original
intention of the negotiators of the Conventions 128 and Protocol, is such an
interpretation supported by the agreement to respect and observe the 'spirit and
principles' of humanitarian law and the recent Secretary-General's Bulletin? It
would seem that the UN remains reluctant to acknowledge a duty to intervene
in such circumstances'F', and that the Bulletin acknowledges such a duty in
very limited circumstances. In this way, as the law currently stands, a UN force
is not under a general legal duty to intervene on behalf of victims of violations
of applicable law in its area of operations, unless the mandate of the force
provides otherwise.
The real problem for the UN is that acknowledging a duty to intervene
then creates an onus to give the force( s) the means and capacity to do so
without exposure to unnecessary risk.130 If a force cannot intervene directly
without exposing troops to significant danger, then the duty of a commander
must first be to the safety of his/her personnel. Most lightly armed
peacekeepers will not be in a position to prevent large-scale abuses by a party
to the conflict, and this was the predicament of the Dutchbat at Srebrenica.':"
But peacekeepers should not be placed in such a position in the first instance132,
See Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law and United Nations
Operations', op. cit., 9, 32-33.
127
A. Roberts, 'The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation' in Law in
Humanitarian Crises, European Commission, op. cit., 13 at 31-32.
128
129 For a discussion of this issue, see R. Weiner and F. Ni Aolain, 'Beyond the
Laws of War: Peacekeeping in Search of a Legal Framework', 27 Columbia Human
Rights Law Review, (1996),293 at 312-320.
130 The recently published Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations,
UN, 23 August 2000 (Brahimi Report, available from <http.www.un.org.»,
recommended that UN peacekeepers -troops or police - be authorized to stop violence
against civilians, within their means, in support of basic UN principles. At present this
has no legal status, but it is a significant acknowledgement of the duty to intervene.
See generally R. Marx, 'A Non-Governmental Human Rights Strategy for
Peacekeeping, 14Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2,( June 1996), 126-145.
131 See R. Siekmann, 'The Legal Position of Ductchbat vis-a-vis Srebrenica', 1
Yearbook of International Humanitrian Law 1998, op. cit., 301-312.
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and in any event this will not relieve them of responsibility to take some action,
as protests and assertiveness on the ground at an early stage133, and later
through higher channels can have effect. This is the kernel of the dilemma, and
will commanders hide behind the cloak of preserving force security to excuse a
failure to protect. It can also be argued that intervention in such circumstances
will compromise the impartiality of the force, but if the policy adopted by the
UN is applied in a consistent and impartial manner, this argument may be
rebutted. Acknowledging that such a duty exists by expressly providing so in
the mandate of the force may make the mission more difficult, but it cannot be
right to allow a UN force stand idly by in circumstances where breaches of
humanitarian law are taking place in their area of operations.P"
The rene position
Having rendered the concept of the classical 'war' redundant, the UN
considered that it could not now set about regulating its conduct, and the
responsibility to codify and improve the principles of humanitarian law fell
upon the ICRC.13S The question of the applicability of humanitarian law to UN
forces was raised for the first time during the Korean conflict. This highlighted
a fundamental problem for the UN in regard to ensuring compliance with the
principles involved. Having been requested to apply de facto the humanitarian
law principles protecting war victims and especially common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, the UN commander replied that his instructions were to
abide by the humanitarian principles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
particularly Common Article 3, and by the detailed provisions of the Prisoners
of War Convention.!" The importance of the latter convention may have
arisen from the need to ensure that all prisoners were treated equally, whereas
132 See 'Lessons for the future', in Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to
General Assembly resoulution 53/35 - The fall of Srebrenica, General Assembly
Al54/49, 15 November 1999, para. 498.
Ibid. para. 264. This concluded that the Serb advance continued beyond that
originally planned when they met with no resistance.
133
See generally O. Ulich, 'Peacekeeping and Human Rights: Is there a Duty to
Protect', International Human Rights Advocacy, (Spring, 1996).
134
135 Supra.
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In the case of common Article 3, the principles concerned represent a
compulsory minimum to be applied irrespective of the nature of the conflict or
the issue of reciprocity.l'" However, as the UN Commander, he claimed that
he did not have the authority to accept, or the means to ensure the
accomplishment of responsibilities incumbent upon sovereign nations under the
detailed provisions of the other Geneva Conventions. Since then the ICRe has
drawn the attention of the Secretary-General to the application of humanitarian
law to the forces at his disposal, and to the desirability that these forces be
provided by their contributing governments with adequate instruction in this
area.138
The essence of the ICRC position is that humanitarian law principles,
recognised as part of customary international law, are binding upon all states
and upon all armed forces present in situations of conflict.139 If these rules are
binding on all states, then they must be binding on an international organization
that resorts to the use of force on their behalf. This is especially so when this
Organization is an independent subject of international law and it was
established by those states bound by the principles in the first place. In this
context, the status of the parties or the legality of the use of force is not an issue
that will determine the applicability of humanitarian law. Recognising that the
UN is not a party to the Conventions, and given the nature of the Organization,
it is accepted that the applicability of humanitarian law principles to the
O " Id h b . di 140rgamzation wou ave to e mutatis-mutan IS.
;'~
136 Shagra and Zacklin, Symposium,op. cit. 39-48 at 39.
137 Common Article 3, referred to as the mini convention, is contained in all
four Geneva Conventions. It applies to armed conflict 'not of an international
character'. See Pictet, op. cit., 25-44. The ICJ has deemed that 'certain general and
well recognised principles', including those contained in common article 3, reflect the
'elementary considerations of humanity', the Corfu Channel Case, 1949I.C.J. 4 at 22.
138 Both the ICRC and the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent on many occasions expressed their opinion on the applicability of
international humanitarian law to peacekeeping forces, see U. Palwankar, op. cit., 230-
31
139 Shagra and Zacklin, Symposium, op. cit., 43
Thus rules pertaining to prisoners of war of penal sanctions could not apply,
whereas rules pertaining to methods and means of combat, categories of protected
140
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When member states are authorised by the Security Council to
intervene in an internal conflict such as Somalia, the basic character of the
conflict remains internal.!" However, the forces of the participating member
states are carrying out an international mission on the basis of the UN
resolution. In the relations between the 'UN forces' and the parties to the
conflict, the rules applicable to international armed conflict must be applied. It
is acknowledged that the application of the rules of humanitarian law in their
entirety is problematic as this was intended for conflict between states.142
Nevertheless, it would be denial of the clear international dimension of such
missions if humanitarian law were to be restricted to common Article 3 or
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.
It is apparent that the adoption of military measures under Chapter VI
or VII of the Charter is likely to call for the application of humanitarian law
under various profiles. Action against the illegal use of force in the past has
involved the use of force by the UN or states acting on its behalf. Action of
this nature contra bellum operates in situations where humanitarian law calls
for the application of its ius in bello rules.l" In regard to peacekeeping
operations, it is commonly accepted that deployment in situations endangering
peace or constituting a threat to international peace and security may also call
for preventive measures involving the use of force. If and when conflict does
break out and humanitarian law is applicable, it makes little sense to argue that
UN forces on the ground in such a situation are not bound by these same
principles.l'" Adherence to these principles will also assist in facilitating a
restoration of the peace, a matter that is ultimately the goal of all UN forces.
persons and re~ect for recognised sighs, would be fully applicable. Statement by the
ICRC at the 47 Session of the General Assembly on 13November 1992.
141 Pfanner,op. cit., Symposium, 49-59 at 55.
142 Ibid.
143 Benvenuti, op. cit., p. 85.
144 Both the ICRC and the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent on many occasions expressed their opinion on the applicability of
international humanitarian law to peacekeeping forces, see U. Palwankar, op. cit., 230-
31
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The 1994 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel
In an effort to address some of the issues surrounding the protection of, and
regulations governing UN forces, the 1994 Convention on the Safety of UN and
Associated Personnel (the Convention) was adopted. The new Convention
clarifies the protective duties of the receiving or host state, and this is a
welcome initiative, but in the context of UN enforcement measures and
humanitarian law, the Convention raises some interesting issues. The outcome,
in terms of what has been achieved may in some ways be described as the
proverbial camel created by a committee established to design a horse.!"
Taking into account the Preamble, it is evident that the Convention was
drafted owing to the concerns of contracting states and contributors to UN
peacekeeping operations over the scale and frequency of attacks on
peacekeeping forces. It acknowledges the contribution of UN personnel in the
fields of preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peacekeeping, peace building
and humanitarian and other operations. It is noteworthy that there is no specific
mention of 'peace enforcement' operations. The importance of the fundamental
features and traditional characteristics of peacekeeping operations is also
emphasised. Also of importance in this context are the non-use of force except
in self-defence and the policy of impartiality.146 It is significant that the
Convention contains a number of 'savings clauses' to the effect, inter alia, that
nothing shall affect the applicability of humanitarian law and universally
recognised standards of human rights to UN operations and personnel, or their
responsibility to respect humanitarian law and standards."? One of the
interesting features of this provision is that it merely states that the law is
145 See W. G. Sharp, 'Protecting the Avatars of International Peace and
Security', 7 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, (1996), 93 -183.
Sharp is very critical of the Convention, and he suggest the adoption of a Geneva
Protocol III instead. C. Greenwood replied to Sharp's article in 'Protection of
Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime', 7 Duke Journal of Comparative and International
Law, (1996), 185-207.
146 Article 6 of the Convention calls on UN personnel to respect the laws of the
host state and to refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the impartial and
international nature of its duties. Article 20 and the Preamble emphasise the issue of
consent, while Article 21 refers to the right to use force in self- defence.
147 Article 20 (a) of the Convention.
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applicable, but fails to outline the circumstances when and where this is so.
Given the complexity of the issue, and the haste with which the Convention
was drafted, this is not surprising.l'" It is unfortunate that an opportunity to
clarify and even expand on this area was not availed of.
The Convention provides that UN personnel, including those involved
in maintaining peace and security, or providing emergency humanitarian
assistance, are protected from ettack.!" The negotiators realised that it was
necessary to have a clear separation between the situation where the
Convention would apply and that where humanitarian law is applicable, so that
UN and associated personnel and those who attack them would be covered by
one regime or the other, but not both. ISO An important reason for this was not to
undermine the Geneva Conventions, which rely in part for their effectiveness
on all forces being treated equally. If it became a crime to engage in combat
with UN forces acting as combatants, this could have a dramatic impact on
other parties willingness to adhere to accepted principles of humanitarian law.
Article 1 of the Convention is central to its applicability and scope.
The text provides for a two-fold definition. The operation must be established
by the competent organ of the UN in accordance with the Charter and under
148 Itwould seem that the Convention was adopted with undue haste. The Sixth
Committee adopted draft resolution AlC.6/49/L.9 by consensus on 16November 1994.
Resolution 49/59 adopting the Convention and declaring it open for signature and
ratification was adopted by the General Assembly by consensus on 9 December 1994.
See generally P. Kirsch, 'The Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated
Personnel', 2 (5) International Peacekeeping (Kluwer), (1995), 102-106.
149 E. Bloom, 'Protecting Peacekeepers: The Convention on the Safety of UN
and Associated Personnel', 89 American Journal of International Law, (1995), 621-
631 at 623-624. In essence, it covers two types of personnel who carry out activities in
support of the fulfilment of the mandate of a UN operation. In the first category are
those directly engaged as part of a UN mandated operation whether in a military,
police or civilian capacity. The second category covers 'associated personnel' i.e.
persons assigned by the Secretary-General or an intergovernmental organization with
the agreement ofa competent organ of the UN. For example, NATO forces asked to
assist UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and US assistance under UNITAF in
Somalia would fall within this element of the definition.
ISO Ibid. 625. However, Article 20(a) of the Convention, a 'savings clause',
indicates that the special protective status given to non-combatant UN forces neither
derogates from those provisions of humanitarian law that would protect such forces,
nor removes the responsibility of non-combatant UN forces to respect the law.
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UN authority and control. In addition, one of two further conditions must be
met i.e.
(i) The operations must be for the purpose of maintaining or restoring
international peace and security; or
(i) Where the Security Council or General Assembly has decided for the
purposes of the Convention, that there exists an exceptional risk to the
safety of the personnel participating in the operation.
This means that operations authorised, as opposed to mandated by the Security
Council, but carried our under the command and control of one or more states
are outside the scope of the Convention. The Convention also provides further
evidence to substantiate the view already advanced that enforcement measures
by the UN are subject to humanitarian law. In particular, Article 2, paragraph 2
of this Convention is entirely consistent with the aforementioned view and in
defining the scope and application, establishes that it:
shall not apply to a UN operation authorised by the Security Council as
an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN in
which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants against
organised armed forces and to which the law of international armed
conflict applies.l" [italics added]
Having reached agreement on the principles involved, states with the advice of
the ICRC, had to adopt criteria to determine which operations would be
covered by the Conventions, and those that would not. Chapter VII operations
are thus excluded from the scope of the Convention upon the fulfilment of this
cumulative list of conditions.P' Even if only part of the operation fulfils these
conditions, then all of the UN elements participating in that operation will be
excluded from its protection.
151 This should be read in conjunction with Article 1 (definitions) of the
Convention.
152 M. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, 'The Convention on the Safety of UN
and Associated Personnel', 44 International and Compartive Law Quarterly, (July
1995), 560-590 at 567.
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Initially the ICRC and some states had concerns regarding the reference
to international armed conflict, but the wording of Article 2 (2) proved
acceptable in the end because it was generally agreed that it was impossible for
the UN to be involved in internal armed conflict. Once UN or associated
personnel intervened or became engaged in a conflict with a local force (as
opposed to acting merely in self-defence), the conflict became by definition
'international' in character.l'" Identifying if any of the personnel are engaged
as combatants against organised armed forces and whether the operation is one
to which humanitarian law applies is problematic. The formulation was
designed to be consistent with Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions,
and thus the point of analysis is whether the operation involves combat during
an international armed conflict, which would trigger the application of Article 2
while excluding the application of the UN Convention.P" This provision will
prove difficult to interpret in practice, and the fact that there is no agreement on
which provisions of humanitarian law apply to UN personnel and in what
circumstances, will only add to the confusion. It can also be predicted that the
UN and troop contributing states will be reluctant to recognise that the
Convention has ceased to apply, and this may inflate the level of conflict
required before acknowledging 'armed conflict' is taking place.!"
Another interpretation is that humanitarian law would continue to apply
to UN personnel when, in the conduct of a Chapter VII mandated operation,
they are actively engaged in a combat mission, regardless of whether the armed
conflict is international or internal in character. Humanitarian law would also
be applicable in peace keeping operations, which however peaceful and
consensual they may be in theory, can in practice give rise to situations where
UN personnel can resort to the use of force in self-defence or to resist attempts
to prevent them carrying out their mandate.IS6 However, in most traditional
153 Kirsch, op. cit, 105.
154 Evan Bloom, op. cit., 625.
See C. Greenwood, 'Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime', op.
cit., at 200-202.
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peacekeeping operations, situations where force is used in self-defence are
short and could not be described as involving sustained periods of fighting.
Incidents of this nature do not by themselves remove the protection offered by
the Convention because the UN troops involved are not necessarily engaged as
combatants.P?
Under the Convention traditional peacekeeping forces enjoy a protected
status similar to that of non-combatants. However, it does not purport to
protect armed forces acting as combatants on behalf of the UN. Article 2,
paragraph 2 applies to troops acting under Chapter VII, in particular Article 43
of the Charter, in furtherance of UN collective security provisions. It is
submitted that what is also being referred to in this provision is enforcement
operations conducted by third states as occurred in the Gulf conflict. These
operations are authorised by the Security Council under the umbrella of
Chapter VII, and they arise as a direct result of the failure of member states to
conclude the necessary agreements for military forces under Article 43 of the
Charter. The element of consent, which has hitherto been an important factor
in distinguishing peacekeeping from enforcement operations, is absent. But the
criterion of consent should be applied with some caution. Even in the case of
UNIFIL, when deployed in 1978 with the consent of the Lebanese government,
the authority of the government barely extended beyond west Beirut. Likewise,
in the more recent case of Albania, the government there consented to the
deployment of a 'coalition of the willing' under a Chapter VII enforcement
mandate.l'" However, peace support operations, whether of the traditional
peacekeeping or peace enforcement kind, can be distinguished from
enforcement action as envisaged under collective security provisions of the UN
Charter. When a situation is deemed to pose a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression, the legal groundwork is then laid for military and
other action to compel a recalcitrant state to succumb to the will of the
156 Shagra and Zacklin, Symposium, 46-47. See R. Murphy 'UN Peacekeeping
in Lebanon and the Use of Force', 6 (2) International Peacekeeping (F. Cass), (1999),
38-63.
157 Bloom, op. cit., 625.
158 See D. Kritsiotis, op. cit., 511-547.
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international community. This may ultimately lead to combat by UN
authorised forces against the armed forces of a non-complying party or parties.
In this way, Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Convention provides additional
evidence of the applicability of humanitarian law to UN enforcement
operations of this nature.
The Convention effectively repeals the combatant's privilege: soldiers
in the field who attack UN military personnel pursuant to the orders of their
commanders are deemed to be committing a crime for which individual
criminal responsibility is established.l'" It has been argued that in effect the
Convention purports to change humanitarian law by criminalizing attacks on
UN forces and modifying the combatant's privilege as it applies to such
attacks, without a concomitant recognition that the UN is governed in such
situations by specific norms of the same body of law."" This conclusion is
flawed. Under humanitarian law, where only non-combatants are protected
from attack, UN personnel acting as combatants, are both bound to apply these
rules and to invoke their protection when appropriate. In this way the
Convention and humanitarian law are mutually exclusive, the former regime
applying to non-conflict situations, and the latter applying to any situation of
sufficient degree of conflict.!"
The exact scope and nature of UN operations covered by the
Convention is a matter on which there is a divergence of opinion. Originally
the Convention was to be limited to operations 'established pursuant to a
mandate approved by a resolution of the Security Council'. 162 A broader
material scope of application of the Convention was eventually agreed.l'" The
159 Article 9 of the Convention.
160 R. D. Glick, 'Lip Service to the Laws of War: Humanitarian Law and UN
Armed Forces', 17Michigan Journal of International Law 53, (1995), 53-107 at 81-
96.
161 Shagra and Zacklin, Symposium, op. cit., 46
162 Document NAC.2421L.2, proposal by New Zealand and Ukraine, Article 1,
paragraph 2. Civilian UN personnel were also unhappy with the original proposals,
interview, Ambassador P. Kirsch, former chairman of the negotiations on the
Convention, Galway, August 2000..
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view that the Convention applies to most kinds of UN operations falling short
of enforcement action itself is the dominant opinion, although the protection
provided for there under might not extend to all stages and components of the
military operation.l'" The confusion arises primarily from the different
perspectives among countries as to the purpose of the Convention in the first
place. Many were critical of the scope and expansion of the Security Council's
activities in recent years, but were powerless to prevent it. They saw the
approval of a Convention covering traditional peacekeepers as a means to
curtail these activities. But arguing that it should apply to traditional
peacekeeping operations only missed the point somewhat. It was precisely
because of the Somalia type operations that pressure was brought to bear to
deal with the legal deficiencies that existed in the international regime.165
The end result is still unsatisfactory in that the difficulty of
distinguishing between peacekeeping and enforcement operations, while
making provision for hybrid operations involving both, has not been properly
taken into account. This crucial issue, like the question relating to the
applicability of humanitarian law to UN operations, has been left unresolved by
the Convention. It now seems generally accepted that the Convention applies
to peace enforcement operations such as that established in Somalia. The
problem is when and who determines that a confrontation between UN troops
and others reaches the threshold that the participants may be regarded as
combatants under Article 2 (2) of the Convention. Did Aided's forces in
Somalia constitute 'organised forces' for the purposes of the Convention?
These are not straightforward questions. Why is the Convention so replete with
references to the characteristics of traditional peacekeeping duties, i.e.
163 For background see A. Bouvier, 'Convention on the Safety of UN and
Associated Personnel', 309 International Review of the Red Cross, (1995), 638-666
(available at www.icrc.org).
164 Shagra and Zacklin,op. cit., Symposium, 46. Stephen Lepper, 'War Crimes
and the Protection of Peacekeeping Forces', 28 Akron Law Review, (Spring, 1995),
411-415 at 415.
165 Interview, Kirsch, supra. There was also concern among some states to
avoid condoning the possible future presence ofNGO's on their territory, and the issue
of consent to the presence of UN forces in the first instance.
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impartiality, host state consent, and non-use of force except in self- defence? 166
The answer can only be that the Convention is a poorly drafted and ill thought
out document that was heavily influenced by political factors. As a
compromise document, governments like that of Canada and Ireland may take
some solace from the fact the troops serving with missions in Kosovo and
Bosnia- Herzegovina are protected by the terms of the Convention. But how
this will work in practice is anyone's guess, and it presents a potential
nightmare for a prosecutor seeking to invoke the terms of the Convention.
There is also the issue of European and Western neo colonialism
under the cloak of UN activity.167 How will the Convention operate in a
situation like Somalia when a major contributor to the UN force decides to
target a clan or militia leader, and sometimes operates outside the UN
command structure? The problem with accepting that peace enforcement
operations come within its remit is that is it seeks to criminalize action by
military forces against UN mandated or authorised peace enforcement
operations. What happens when these operations are outside the formal
framework of the organization, and come under the umbrella of traditional and
reciprocal inter power relations to which humanitarian law of armed conflict
naturally applies? During wartime combat operations, or hostile acts engaged
in during an armed conflict, combatants do not commit crimes by killing or
wounding the 'enemy' if this is carried out in a manner that does not conflict
with the rules of humanitarian law.168It cannot be correct that military action at
the behest of political or others leaders, which is otherwise in accordance with
humanitarian law, could render the combatants concerned liable to prosecution
166 Benvenuti, op. cit., 92
167 Some states have reviewed their positions and expressed reservations about
the Security Council's use of Chapter VII, see J. Ciechanski, 'Enforcement Measures
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: UN Practice after the Cold War', and D. Daniel
and B. Hayes, ' Securing Observance of UN Mandates Through the Employment of
Military Force', in M. Pugh (ed.),The UN, Peace and Force, op. cit .• 82-104 at 97 and
105-125 at 106 respectively.
168 Under the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War of August 12, 1949,75 U.N.T.S. 135 (Third Convention) prisoners of war, that is,
captured enemy combatants cannot be prosecuted or punished for having fought in
accordance the humanitarian law.
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under the Convention. Such a scenario would place these forces in an invidious
position, which it is submitted, is neither the intention nor the effect of the
Convention.
Doubts have been expressed about the Convention's usefulness and
the question was raised whether it did not rather belong to ius ad bellum - as it
contains the prohibition to wage war at the UN - than to ius in be//o.169 The
Convention does address what was a significant gap in international law.
While humanitarian law governs the conduct of combatants, no international
instrument prohibited or provided legal remedies for attacks upon traditional
peacekeeping forces acting in that role.170 This is no longer the case, and the
new regime is welcome. However, the Convention does not have a significant
impact on the humanitarian law implications of UN operations and its adoption
marked a lost opportunity to clarify rather than obfuscate the question further.
Nor is it clear from the Convention whether humanitarian law may be
applicable when the Convention itself applies. It also avoids the thorny issue of
the consequences if the procedure and/or the adoption of UN resolutions
authorising or mandating certain kinds of peace enforcement operations are
themselves in accordance the UN Charter and international law. It bears all the
scars of the behind the scenes battles regarding the separate, but linked issue of
the expanded powers of the Security Council.
Humanitarian Law and UN Forces in Lebanon and Somalia
The predicament of UNIFIL
UNIFIL in Lebanon is a traditional peacekeeping force based on consent of the
parties and the non-use of force except in self-defence. Though part of the
conflict in Lebanon may be classified as internal, the presence of, inter alia,
Israeli and Syrian forces meant it could also be classified as international in
character. The most obvious characteristic of peacekeeping forces that directly
raises the question of applicability of humanitarian law is that the members are
169 See comments to this effect in the Notes on the Conference on 'The UN and
International Humanitarian Law', Geneva, 119-20October 1995, in Martin Meijer, 2
(6) International Peacekeeping, (Kluwer), (1995), 136-138 at 137; and C. Greenwood,
'The Relationship ofIus ad Bellum and Ius in Bello', op. cit.
For the limited protection available under the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocols, see fn. 137.
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armed and permitted to use force, albeit in self-defence or to resist attempts to
prevent the implementation of the mandate.I"
At the time UNIFIL was being established, the President of the ICRC
wrote to the Secretary-General and drew attention to the necessity of
compliance with the Geneva Conventions by forces placed at the disposal of
the UN.172Later, the Secretary- General wrote to the permanent representatives
of troop contributing states. This letter pointed out that in situations where
members of UNIFIL have to use weapons in self-defence, the principles and
spirit of humanitarian law 'as contained, inter alia, in the Geneva Conventions
... [and] the Protocols of 8 June 1977 ... shall apply.' Troop contributing states
were obliged to ensure that their troops fully understand the principles of
humanitarian law. For its part, the UN undertook, 'through the chain of
command, the task of supervising the effective compliance with the principles
of humanitarian law by the contingents of its peacekeeping forces.' !73 But no
system for monitoring humanitarian law training and ensuring compliance with
relevant principles was ever put in place. Similarly, such training seemed to be
conducted on an ad hoc basis, and did not always achieve the desired level of
knowledge.l"
The Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation of most of south
Lebanon presented UNIFIL with a number of serious difficulties. It was never
envisaged that the peacekeeping Force would find itself alongside non-
Lebanese forces that were occupying the area UNIFIL was responsible for and
supposed to control. In the circumstances, UNIFIL was unable to enforce its
standing operating procedures or make any serious attempt to carry out its
171 Document S/12611, 19March 1978 provides, inter alia,
'd. The Force will be provided with weapons of a self-defensive character. It shall not
use force except in self-defence. Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by
forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate..... '
172 U. Palwankar,op. cit., 227-240 at 230.
173 Ibid., 232-233
174 This conclusion was arrived at from a visit to UNIFIL in 1998, and
discussions with a number of contingent commanders. See also the result of the
survey ofIrish forces at Appendix C, and infra.. 318-319.
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mandate. Not surprisingly, UN officials used every means at their disposal to
justify the continued presence ofUNIFIL in such an adverse situation.
The legality of Israeli actions and policy in Lebanon under international
law received little public attention up until the Report of the International
Commission to enquire into reported violations of international law by Israel
during its invasion of Lebanon.i" The 1982 invasion and the subsequent
policy pursued led to many complaints of grave and fundamental breaches of
the international legal order. In the absence of an official UN investigating
authority, it was considered essential to establish an independent international
tribunal or commission to investigate these complaints and related issues.176
The Commission dealt comprehensively with a wide range of matters arising
from Israeli policy throughout Lebanon, and concluded that Israel had violated
a number of international legal principles and conventions governing the laws
of war.!"
The question of the Israeli treatment of Lebanese civilians in the
aftermath of their invasion and occupation in 1982 was first brought before the
Security Council in 1984.178 After the Lebanese Government introduced two
draft resolutions to the Security Council calling on Israel to comply with the
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the regulations annexed to the
Hague Convention of 1907, UNIFIL was inadvertently presented with an
opportunity to play a role in ensuring Israeli observance of these
Conventions.i" While the Security Council prevaricated over what to do about
175 Israel in Lebanon, Report of the International commission to enquire into
reported violations of International Law by Israel during its invasion of the Lebanon,
London: Ithaca Press, (1983). See also Civilian Pawns - Laws of War Violations and
the Use of Weapons on the Israeli-Lebanon Border, New York: Human Rights Watch,
(1996).
176 Ibid., preface xi - x. The Commission was comprised of Mr. Sean MacBride
(Chairman), Prof. Richard Falk, Kadar Asmal, Dr. Brian Bercusson, Prof. G. de la
Pradelle and Prof. Stefan Wild.
177 Ibid. at 38,65,99, 103, 108, 121, 159-160, 187-197 andpassim.
178 Document S/16713, 24 August 1984, letter from representative of Lebanon
to Council President. The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949were ratified by Lebanon
and Israel in 1951. Neither were party to the Additional 1977 Protocols.
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the peacekeeping Force, the role of safeguarding the rights of a civilian
population under occupation provided a reasonable solution to the problem in
the short term. This policy was a reaction to events rather than a carefully
planned response.
Since the invasion had undermined the whole raison d'etre of the Force,
adopting such a role provided UNIFIL with an interim solution to the total
disregard of its authority by Israel. However, UNIFIL could do little to
influence the major events taking place elsewhere in the country and unless it
was prepared to intervene within its own area it risked being held responsible
for Israeli actions there.180 Faced with an impossible situation, UNIFIL did
perform a worthwhile function in highlighting breaches of humanitarian law.
More importantly, it ensured compliance with fundamental principles when it
appeared that they would be disregarded. This aspect ofUNIFIL's presence at
the time should not be underestimated. Even those Lebanese who were often
critical of its failure to carry out the mandate agreed that the Force played an
important role during the period, but this presented particular difficulties for
UNIFIL that deserve closer analysis.l'"
When Israeli forces adopted what became known as an 'iron fist'
policy in and close to the UNIFIL area during 1984 to deter further attacks, this
put UNIFIL in an impossible position.182 In the changed situation, there was an
179 The Lebanese draft resolution called upon Israel as the Occupying Power, to
respect strictly the rights of the civilian population in the area under its occupation and
to comply strictly with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The vote on
the text (S/16732) was fourteen in favour, to one against (the USA), there were no
abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted due to the negative vote of the
United States. See also S.C.O.R. 2552 Mtg., 29 August 1984 to 2556 Mtg., 4
September 1984.
180 There were also grave risks for UNIFIL of being caught in crossfire or being
deliberately targeted by parties to the conflict, see D. Turns, 'Some Reflections on the
Conflict in Southern Lebanon: The "Qana Incident" and International Humanitarian
Law', 5 Journal of Conflict and SecurityLaw, (2000), 177-209.
181 Personal experience of writer from discussions with Lebanese during 1989.
This was particularly true when the Israeli forces came under intense pressure after
their decision to re-deploy in 1985.
182 It began in February 1984, and involved, inter alia, the deportation of
Lebanese from their home villages, expulsions of local inhabitants, curfews, mass
arrests, internment, transfer of suspects and the increased destruction of homes
belonging to suspected resistance fighters. The policy was reportedly sanctioned by the
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urgent need to define the policy UNIFIL should adopt and in response the
Secretary-General issued the following statement,
..... a new situation has developed in southern Lebanon .... UNIFIL is
now stationed in an area where active resistance against IDF is in
progress, and in which the latter is engaged in active countermeasures.
UNIFIL, for obvious reason, has no right to impede Lebanese acts of
resistance against the Occupying force, nor does it have the mandate or
the means to prevent counter measures .... It seems to me that the only
course for UNIFIL is to maintain its presence and to continue within its
limited means to carry out its existing functions in the area .... 183
This highlighted the dilemma facing UNIFIL as it had neither the means nor
the authority to prevent resistance attacks against Israeli Forces and the
subsequent counter measures by Israel. Questions such as how UNIFIL was to
distinguish between Palestinian guerrillas and local resistance groups
attempting to infiltrate by night through UNIFIL lines, were not clarified.
UNIFIL was told to carry out its existing functions. Unfortunately, the
Secretary-General did not elaborate upon this. In attempting to monitor the
Israeli raids on villages, UNIFIL sometimes appeared to be in collusion with
them. The sight of UNIFIL soldiers standing by Israeli soldiers led some to
complain that UNIFIL was helping to carry out the raid.184 The policy also
meant UNIFIL avoided the potentially difficult issue of which, if any,
resistance groups were entitled to recognition.
Notwithstanding the policy adopted, a number of confrontations did
occur when UNIFIL denied passage through its checkpoints to unauthorised
armed personnel. An incident in the Irish area in November 1985 demonstrated
the anomalous and dangerous predicament in which UNIFIL found itself.18S It
Israeli Defence Minister and was likened to that used in the Gaza Strip in the early
1970's to curtail Palestinian unrest, see R. Fisk, The Times, 15 February and 21
February 1985. For a more extensive account by the same author in Pity the Nation,
London: Andre Deutsch, (1990), 243 to 281 andpassim.
183 UN Document S/17093, 11April 1985,para. 24.
184 The leader of Arnal, Mr. Nabbi Berri, accused UNFIIL of helping the Israelis
on occasions, The Irish Times, 23 January 1985. Other groups made similar
accusations, The Times, 22 February 1985.
18S Document S117684, 16 December 1985, Para 7. A confrontation developed
when Irish personnel apprehended four armed personnel. A UNIFIL patrol dispatched
to the scene was intercepted and detained by armed elements. Other Irish positions
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showed how easily armed elements could mobilise and deploy, and the
vulnerability of UNIFIL personnel when attempting to carry out the mandate.
It could be argued that the armed elements should have been allowed total
freedom of movement. This was consistent with the Secretary-General's policy
statement, but UNIFIL did have to draw the line somewhere. If it allowed
unauthorised Lebanese armed elements complete freedom of movement, it
would have relinquished the last vestiges of authority and control that it
possessed in the area. As it was, the policy of co-operating with Amal allowed
its members considerable scope in the area.
The situation deteriorated as the Israeli Defence Forces redeployed and
in certain instances clashes did occur between the Israeli forces and UNIFIL
troops. The French battalion in particular adopted a more forceful stance than
many of the other UNIFIL contingents.!" Irish UNIFIL troops also clashed
with the Israelis, especially during raids on the Shiite village of Yatar.187 For
the most part there was not much that UNIFIL could do. Its policy of
monitoring and reporting did little to instil confidence in UNIFIL among the
population, who accused it of being 'both the observer and protector of the
[Israeli] invasion army' .188 UNIFIL policy appeared to to be accomplishing
were quickly surrounded by armed elements and UNIFIL reinforcements fired on.
Fire was returned and the situation was later resolved by negotiations with senior
AMAL personnel.
186 In one incident they became involved in a fist fight with the Israelis when
trying to prevent the latter blowing up houses. They were also reported to have laid
the French Tricolour at the entrance to another village and threatened to shoot the first
Israeli to drive over it. The Israelis are reported to have retreated. R. Fisk, The Times,
28 February 1985.
187 In the first joint Israelil'South Lebanon Army' operation, during which the
latter forces played the leading role, an attempt to forcefully evict the Irish troops from
their post there was successfully resisted. See R. Fisk, The Irish Times, 8 March 1985.
The report was confirmed by Comdt. B. McKevitt who was serving with 56 Inf Bn at
the time. The Israelis used the South Lebanese Army to extend the 'Security zone'
and push the Irish back from certain posts in their way. The Irish refused to move
from posts, such as 'Charlies Mountain'(Al Yatun) despite Israeli demands that they
do so, The Irish Times 21, 22 March 1985 and 1 April 1985 and The Guardian, 21
March 1985.
Personal interview, senior Irish officer who served with UNIFIL at the time,
Dublin, June 1998.
188
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little and it led to allegations of collusion with the Israelis.!" This was despite
the fact that many UNIFIL personnel sent to monitor Israeli operations often
placed themselves in personal danger in attempting to mitigate the excessive
behaviour of the Israelis and their allies. UNIFIL was being placed in a 'no-
win' situation. It was not surprising that soon after the 'iron fist' policy began,
a serious threat was made against UNIFIL by one of the resistance groups.!"
In such circumstances, it was difficult to determine whether UNIFIL was
accomplishing sufficient to justify remaining in south Lebanon. Its role and
function was very unclear, while its overall predicament was unsatisfactory. In
fact, during 1985 and 1986 the reports to the Security Council were very
pessimistic and there seemed little hope of improving the situation. Despite
this, the Secretary-General continued to recommend extensions of the mandate.
The anomalous position of UNIFIL was evident during a serious
incident in February 1986 when Israeli and 'South Lebanon Army' personnel
were ambushed near the village of Kunin in the 'security zone'.!" Two Israeli
soldiers were abducted and this led to a large Israeli force carrying out a series
of cordon and search operation during which UNIFIL monitored the situation
as closely as possible and tried to prevent acts of violence against the local
population. 192 In so doing they put themselves at risk, especially in dealing
with the 'South Lebanon Army'. The Secretary-General's report of the
incident states that UNIFIL personnel observed some cases of what appeared to
be unacceptable treatment of prisoners by IDF/SLA personnel. The UNIFIL
reports of the incidents were transmitted immediately to the Israeli authorities
and their comments invited.!"
189 R. Fisk, The Times, 22 February 1985.
190 Ibid., the threat was made by the Shia Muslim Organization Hizbollah.
191 Document 8/17965, 9 April 1986,para 21.
192 UNIFIL reported that six persons, including one Israeli soldier, were killed
in the operation, ten more wounded and about one hundred and fifty others were taken
prisoner by the Israeli 'South Lebanon Army' forces. Eighty of the detained were
released soon afterwards, however, the other sixty were held indefinitely.
193 Ibid. Israel claimed that its forces had received clear instructions on how to
behave towards the local civilian population before and during the operation, and that
follow up investigations of all Israeli army units involved had found no deviation from
these instructions
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The operation led to a number of complaints being made by local
civilians regarding the treatment they received.i'" The most serious of these
was that the Israeli forces attempted to expel all the locals from the village of
Kunin in retaliation.l" and that Israeli actions violated a number of provisions
of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 196
While Israeli anger at what took place is understandable, it did not
justify the response.!'" The attempt to expel all the Shiite residents of Kunin
could not be justified on military or security grounds.!" The large numbers of
civilians detained indicated the follow up operation was a retaliation that was
intended to coerce information from those detained.l'" The ambush afforded
194 Personal interview with senior Lebanese Red Cross official, 19 September
1989 and local civilians from villages affected September/October 1989. The
Secretary-General's report states that following the incident an Israeli force of about
three mechanized battalions accompanied by members of SLA and supported by tanks
and helicopter troop carriers and gun ships carried out a series of cordon and search
operations in the UNFIIL area from 17 to 22 February. S/17965,op. cit., para 21.
195 Ibid and personal interview Mr. T. Goksel, op. cit.
196 Article 33 provides that no protected person may be punished for an offence
he or she has not personally committed. See Pictet, op. cit., 224-229, Roberts and
Guelff, op. cit., 312-313 and G. Schwarzenberger, International Law, Vol. II. The Law
of Armed Conflict, London: Stevens, (1968), 223-224. Collective penalties, and
likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism, are prohibited, including reprisals
against such persons or their property. Article 31 forbids any physical or morale
coercion against protected persons to obtain information, see Pictet, op. cit., 219-220.
197 Those detained were blindfolded and had their hands tied behind their backs.
Many of the suspects were beaten. Personal interviews with UNIFIL officers who
witnessed such events at the time. For an account of Israeli Defence Forces actions in
Lebanon see D. Yermiya, My War Diary - Israel in Lebanon, London: Pluto Press,
(1983). The pamphlet, Operation Iron Fist-Israeli Policy in Lebanon, published by
the League of Arab States, London: (May 1985), gives a somewhat bias chronology of
events.
198 Article 49 of the Geneva Convention IV states in para 2 that ' ... the
Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation if the security of the
population or imperative military reasons so demand ... ' Neither justification was
applicable in this instance, see Oppenheim, op. cit., 452, J. Stone, Legal Controls of
International Conflict, Sydney: Maitland Publications (1958), 704-705 and Pictet, op.
cit., 277-283.
199 At the time of the ambush the Israeli forces and the 'South Lebanon Army'
were considering establishing a 'sanitised zone' in the area immediately behind the so-
called security zone. Personal interviews, senior Irish officer with UNIFIL at the time,
Dublin 1986, and T. Goksel, op. cit.
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the opportunity to implement the proposed 'sanitised zone' policy in Kunin.
There was a similar threat to other villages in the UN area but UNIFIL's
interventions prevented this going ahead. For this reason, the peacekeeping
Force can take at least some credit for protecting the civilian population in the
area.200
The Israelis faced a dilemma in south Lebanon. Their tactics alienated
the population and meant international condemnation. However, they were still
apparently unable to defeat the resistance groups and Israelis themselves began
to question whether the tactics adopted were compatible with the so-called
'purity of arms' doctrine.i'" In fact, the policy was so evidently self-defeating
that it was difficult to discern any coherent long-term goal. Many of the Shiite
villages that suffered most during this period were strongly opposed to the
Palestinian presence prior to the invasion. Now their hatred switched to the
Israelis. Attempts to have the 'South Lebanon Army' adopt a more prominent
role only made matters worse. Figures compiled by the UN in 1985 indicated
that the 'iron fist' policy failed_202 The daily attacks on Israeli soldiers
increased considerably. In one well-publicised suicide attack by a Shiite
resistance fighter in March, twelve Israeli soldiers were killed.203 It was the
eighth attack of its kind. The Israeli response was predictable. A major
operation was launched against a number of villages that left at least thirty-two
dead.204 Throughout 1985, numerous cordon and search operations were
200 Israeli tactics led to widespread and unnecessary damage being caused to the
property and personal belongings of villagers, contrary to Article 53 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, S/17965, op. cit. paras. 13-15 and interviews with local
inhabitants living in the areas searched at the time, July to October 1989. When the
Israeli troops were assisted or followed by the de facto forces the damage caused to
property was much worse and the operation frequently turned into one of terrorising
and ill treating villagers. The 'South Lebanon Army' also engaged in looting and
harassment of UNIFIL troops. The Israeli troops made no attempt to restrain them
from the excesses despite their responsibility under Article 29 and Section III of the
Geneva Convention IV respectively.
201 The doctrine is known as Tohar Haneshek and penetrates all aspects of
Israeli Defence Forces life, see K.A. Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee. The Israeli
PLO war in Lebanon, Taranto: Collins, (1985), paras. 171-176.
202 The Times, 21 March 1985.
203 The Irish Times, 11 March 1985.
204 The Irish Times, 12 March 1985.
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carried out. The de facto forces also frequently shelled villages, particularly in
the Irish area.205 During this period, the Israelis continued their efforts to
impose the 'South Lebanon Army' on the people of the south while dangerous
confrontations ensued when UNIFIL tried to curtail the activities of this
militia.i'"
The maintenance of the security zone effectively precluded UNIFIL
from carrying out patrols in the battalion sectors for fear of being mistaken for
resistance fighters by the 'South Lebanon Army' .207 Many vulnerable
checkpoints and observation posts were closed, and consequently the
effectiveness of the Force was diminished considerably. There was criticism of
the manner in which Irish soldiers fulfilled their peacekeeping role and there
was a number of controversial incidents in the Irish sector.208 The abduction of
local resistance leaders from the Irish area of operations in December 1988 was
particularly serious. It seemed to some that the Irish had colluded in the affair,
and the next day a checkpoint was overrun and three Irish soldiers kidnapped
by armed elements. With the help of Amal, the soldiers were found alive and
well.209 The whole affair highlighted a number of weaknesses in the UNIFIL
and Irish performance in Lebanon.i'" Why were the Israelis able to enter the
area in daylight and abduct civilians? What was UNIFIL's function if it could
not or would not prevent such abductions? In March 1989, the resistance
20S Personal interview, Capt. G. Humphreys, op. cit.
206 Document S/17684, 16December 1985,paras. 2-7. The Norwegian battalion
had particular difficulty with these groups when restrictions were imposed on the
movement of UNIFIL personnel.
207 Ibid.
208 See for example the comments in the International Defence Review,
1111988,1434.
209 See Secretary-General's report S/20416, 24 January 1989. An extremist
group intended to take the soldiers to Beirut.
210 It was even said that 'Irish soldiers now see their prime task as staying alive
until the end oftheir period of duty'. This is hardly surprising given the relatively high
number of Irish casualties in Lebanon to date and the lack of co-operation from the
parties to the conflict.
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movement exacted its revenge for the perceived collusion when three Irish
soldiers were targeted and killed by a land mine.i"
The most serious aspect for UNIFIL as a whole was its reliance upon
the Amal movement to resolve the affair.2!2 While there were some serious
confrontations with Amal since the Israeli redeployment, in general, UNIFIL's
relations with the Movement improved gradually and in due course the level of
co-operation amounted to an unofficial alliance.i" There was no effective
Government authority in the south and Amal was the closest thing to some
form of authority. In any event, there were rival Governments in Beirut for a
prolonged period and Arnal's leader had been Minister for the south.i" The
Movement also had considerable influence and support in the area and was pro-
UNIFIL.2!5 The alternative was Hizbollah, which did not support the Force's
presence in Lebanon. Nonetheless, the level of co-operation between UNIFIL
and Amal risked comprising the Force's impartiality. This was one of the most
serious threats to UNIFIL's delicately balanced impartiality and general
acceptability in the area.
Summary
The consequences for UNIFIL of Israeli policy were very grave. The UN
response was a reaction to events rather than a carefully planned policy. The
focus of attention on Israeli violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention
marked a change in emphasis, up until then little attention was paid to Israeli
violations of international law in Lebanon. The degree of control exercised by
Israel before and after the 1985 redeployment was sufficient to justify the UN
decision to treat the Israeli forces as an Occupying Power under international
law and this in tum determined the nature ofUNIFIL's response. But there is
211 This conclusion is based on conversations with local resistance fighters
during 1989, see also H. McDonald, IRiSHBAIT -The Story of Ireland's Blue Berets
in the Lebanon, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, (1993), 116-117.
212 This was just one of many occasions UNIFIL had turned to Arnal for
assistance. Personal interview, senior UNIFIL officer, op. cit..
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid.
215 Personal interviews, Comdt. M. Hanrahan and Capt. 1. Walsh, Military
Information Officers with UNIFIL, Lebanon, August 1989.
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no escaping the fact that UNIFIL policy regarding the Occupying Power and
the indigenous resistance movements was inconsistent with its original mandate
and terms of'reference.i" In granting the Israelis the rights and privileges of an
Occupying Power, while at the same time deliberately avoiding impeding acts
of resistance, the peacekeeping Force made no progress whatsoever in
confirming the Israeli withdrawal or bringing about a cessation of hostilities.
Nonetheless, the performance of humanitarian tasks as an interim measure was
a worthwhile attempt to ease the plight of the local population and maintain
goodwill towards UNIFIL. It also undermined those within Lebanon that
sought to discredit the Force as a 'tool of American imperialism'r'!" However,
it did not justify a six thousand strong peacekeeping Force remaining in what
was effectively occupied territory, when it was unable to perform any of its
original tasks laid down by the Security Council. Whether UNIFIL would have
achieved as much or even more by withdrawing at the time will never be
known.i" In the long term, another peacekeeping force could have been
deployed under a more realistic mandate in circumstances more conducive to
the conduct of peacekeeping.
The presence of UNIFIL rendered the Israeli occupation of south
Lebanon unique and less harsh than otherwise would have been the case.i"
UNIFIL gave the local population support and protection by intervening to
prevent, by non-violent means, the demolition of public and private property
and the ill treatment of civilians.22o A major achievement during the period
was the ability to hinder the Israeli consolidation of its occupation of Lebanon.
216 According to Resolution 425 (1978), UNIFIL was supposed to confinn the
Israeli withdrawal, bring about a cessation of hostilities, and restore international peace
and security. See UN Document S112611, op cit.
217 The accusation was made by Hizbollah leaders.
The Government of the Netherlands obviously thought so when they
unilaterally withdrew their contingent. The Irish Times, 9 October 1985.
218
M. Heiberg, 'Observations on UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon', Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs, NUPI NOTAT No.305, (September 1984), 30.
219
220 Personal interview, Capt. G. Humphreys (Ret'd), former UNIFIL HQ
Information Officer at the time, Dublin, 1999.
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Some commentators were critical of the policy of treating the Israeli forces as
an Occupying Power, owing to the presence of UNIFIL as the legitimate
military power in its area of operation.F" However, UNIFIL was not an
instrument of the Lebanese Government or a replacement for the Lebanese
Army. It is true that there was a lack of consistency among the different
UNIFIL battalions in their policy towards the Israeli forces and the 'South
Lebanon Army' .222 The peacekeeping Force had no option but to accept the
reality of its predicament, 'without the mandate or firepower to do more,
UNIFIL found itself in the unenviable position of watching the rockets and
shells fire back and forth overhead, while on occasion falling victim to direct
hits itself _223The real shame is that the Security Council did nothing to change
this, and that UN forces were sidelined to fulfil a role essentially as witnesses
and protestors to violations of humanitarian law. The recent Brahimi Report
stated that 'UN peacekeepers - troops or police - who witness violence against
civilians should be presumed to be authorised to stop it, within their means'.224
But this requires a mandate for civilian protection, and the resources to carry
out this role. Experience to date, in Lebanon and elsewhere, does not augur
well for such developments in the near future.
Somalia
The Somalia situation, on the other hand, shows the limitations and difficulties
of attempts at too rigid an adherence to categories of UN military operations.
In the first place the Security Council deployed a traditional peacekeeping force
in an internal conflict situation, and then found that the situation was beyond
221 Ibid. 33 and M. Heiberg and J.J. Holst, 'Keeping the Peace in Lebanon:
Assessing International and Multinational Peacekeeping', Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs, NUPI NOTAT No.357, (June 1986), 13·14. See also M.
Heiberg and J.1. Holst, 'Peacekeeping in Lebanon - Comparing UNIFIL and the
MNF', Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, (1986), 406. Itwas submitted that
since UNIFIL continued to operate as a legitimate military authority, inside the area of
operation, the IDF did not exert exclusive control and therefore should not have been
regarded as an Occupying Power. See also by the same authors 'Keeping the Peace in
Lebanon: Assessing International and Multinational Peacekeeping'.
222 Ibid. This led to claims that some UNIFIL battalions were passive and
others more aggressive in their interpretation of UNIFIL Standing Operating
Procedures.
223 Human Rights Watch, Civilian Pawns, op. cit., 35.
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the traditional approaches. Later, the Security Council authorised member
states, under the leadership of the United States, to intervene in the internal
affairs of Somalia. But the forces of the participating member states were
acting under the mandate of the Security Council and carrying out a mission on
behalf of the international community.
In order to understand and apply the rules, the participant must first
know what the rules are, but in the theatre of military operations, the rules
depend on the level of conflict as this 'dictates the nature of the law
applicable ... either the internal law of the state or international humanitarian
law,.225 But the situation in Somalia was unclear in many ways, despite the
level of hostilities, the reported body count, and the armed confrontations and
shooting, it remained uncertain which if any of the laws of war applied.226 This
led at least one commentator to claim that applying the Geneva Conventions
and Additional Protocols to the situation in Somalia merely demonstrates the
inadequacies in the current international legal regime to meet the complexities
presented by peacekeeping operations.227
In the complex humanitarian emergency that was Somalia, UN forces
intervened with an ill-defined mission that contained conflicting and unrealistic
objectives.228 It is not surprising then that there is confusion regarding
applicable legal norms, especially when those norms themselves may also be ill
defined.229 Somalia shifted from a traditional peacekeeping mission to one of
the most robust peace enforcement missions of recent times. There seemed to
be little attention paid to the political and legal consequences of this escalation,
and it provided a stark example of UN military forces operating in the twilight
zone between peace and armed conflict or war. In the intervening no mans
224 Brahimi Report, op. cit., Executive Summary, page 3 of6.
225 R. Kiwanuka, 'Humanitarian Norms and Internal Strife: Problems and
Prospects' ,in F. Karlhoven and Y. Sandoz (eds), Implementation of International
Humanitarian Law, Dordrecht & London: Nijhoff, (1989), 229-234 ..
226 Turley,op. cit., 140.
227 Turley,op. cit., 156
228 See Chapter 6.
229 Turley,op. cit., 153.
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land, '[a] clear demarcation between a state of war and a state of peace no
longer exists, if it ever did' _230 Determining what, if any, international law
applies in these circumstances is a difficult task. Nevertheless, in the relations
between UNITAF forces and the parties to the conflict, it is submitted that the
rules of humanitarian were applicable.F' To accept anything less would be to
adopt a minimalist view that denied the clear international character of the
mission.
A military court in R. v. Brocklebank considered the matter of the
applicability of humanitarian law to Canadian forces in Somalia.232 This case
arose from incidents that occurred in the course of the Canadian participation in
the UNITAF mission during March 1993.233 These events ultimately led to a
military Board of Inquiry, several Courts Martial and appeals, and most
importantly, to the establishment of a civilian Commission of Enquiry into the
Deployment a/Canadian Forces to Somalia ('the Commission'). Although the
Commission discussed the issue and specifically the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols, it did not reach any firm conclusion in this regard.
This is unfortunate, but it is also preferable to making decisions on matters that
it may not have felt competent or able to decide in the circumstances.
The problem of determining the applicable international law to peace
support operations was not unique to UNIFIL or UNOSOM II, and the issue
also arose for consideration in the court martial of a United States army officer,
P. Zengel, 'Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict', 43 Mercer Law
Review, 615, at 644, 1992.
230
231 Pfanner, op. cit., Symposium, 55.
232 Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada, (1996) 134 DLR (4 th) 377. Pte.
Brocklebank was arrested for aiding and abetting the torture of Shidane Arone, a
Somali teenager who entered the Canadian Forces compound and was tortured and
beaten to death while in custody. See K. Boustany, 'Brocklebank: A Questionable
Decision of the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada', 1 Yearbook of International
Humanitarian Law, op. cit., 371-374 and J. Holland, 'Canadian Courts Martial
resulting from participation in the UNITAF Mission in Somalia', 1(4)International
Peacekeeping (Kluwer), (1994), 131-132.
233 For background on UNITAF and Somalia, see Chapter 8 and Commission of
Enquiry (fn. 5), vol. 1, pp. 351-363. See also RM.Young and M. Molina, 'IHL and
Peace Operations: Sharing Canada's lessons learned from Somalia', 1Yearbook of
International Humanitarian Law, op, cit., 362-370 at 370.
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Captain Lawrence P. Rockwood, as a result of action taken while on duty with
the United States led Multinational Force in Haiti.234 Captain Rockwood was
convicted of felony charges arising from his unauthorised human rights
inspection of Haiti's National Penitentiary in September 1994.235 In this case
the military trial judge ultimately refused to instruct the court-martial of the
applicability of international law, telling the members of the court that they
should bear in mind that the expert witnesses could not agree on the parameters
of international law applicable to the case.236 The outcome of this case supports
the notion that peacekeepers have a limited remit i.e. it emphasises the
preservation of peace to the detriment of a potential role in the protection of the
local population. However, peacekeeping also involves positive duties on
behalf of the military personnel involved. This is where humanitarian law has a
role to play. But in order to be useful in a military culture, the responsibilities
of the military must be spelt out in clear and concise terms, preferably in the
mandate. In this regard, the adoption of the role of Protecting Power by
traditional peacekeepers is one option that could be examined.i" However, it
is not appropriate for peace enforcement operations, as the requisite neutrality
would not exist in the case of peace enforcement forces.
The decision in Brocklebank concerned, inter alia, the applicability to
the case of the Unit Guide to the Geneva Conventions, which imposed on
members of Canadian forces at all times a duty to safeguard civilians in
Canadian Forces custody, whether or not these civilians are in that member's
custody.238 The Court took the view that as there was no declared war or armed
conflict in Somalia, and as the Canadian Forces deployed as part of the
234 United States v CaptainL. P. Rockwood II, (1998) 48 MJ 501.
235 The case is discussed in detail in Weiner and Ni Aolain, op. cit., 293-354.
236 Ibid.305.
237 Ibid. 331-333 and passim. A Protecting Power was anticipated in the
Geneva Conventions as a state that is neutral party to a conflict, instructed by the
belligerent parties to protect the interests of warring states' nationals, 'protected
persons' and those detained in an armed conflict. See Article 8 common to Geneva
Convention I, II and III.
238 See fn. 232.
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UNIT AF mission were performing peacekeeping duties, they were not engaged
in an armed conflict. In the circumstances, the Court held that Private
Brocklebank had no legal obligation to ensure the safety of the prisoner
because neither the Geneva Conventions nor Additional Protocol II applied to
Canadian Forces in Somalia. Furthermore, neither the Conventions nor
Protocols applied to a peacekeeping operation.
This analysis seems to have been flawed in a number of respects. In
the first place the judgement mentioned in several places that the mission of the
Canadian Forces at the time was a 'peacekeeping mission'. This was not the
case, as the UNIT AF mission had been authorised by the Security Council
under Chapter VII in circumstances that indicated the peacekeeping mission of
UNOSOM I was being replaced by a peace enforcement authorised operation
comprising a coalition of nations.239 It is also worth noting that Security
Council Resolution 794 (1992) establishing UNITAF also condemned
vigorously all violations of humanitarian law committed in Somalia.24o This
was a clear recognition by the Security Council that the conflict in Somalia was
of sufficient degree and intensity to trigger the application of humanitarian law.
Despite this, Decary lA. for the majority found that there was no evidence
there was an armed conflict. The Court does not appear to have heard any
evidence of the level of killings among the armed factions, and the casualties
among other contingents of UNITAF. Cognisance does not appear to have
been taken of the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on
the situation in Somalia up to and during this period. The judgement also
seems to have put too much emphasis on the need for a certificate from the
Secretary of State for External Affairs stating that at a certain time a state of
war or international or non-international armed conflict existed.v" Not
surprisingly, the Brocklebank decision has been questioned, most notably in the
Simpson Study, which made a strong case that the decision of the Court
239 Supra. Cpt. 7.
240 Adopted 3 December 1992.
241 Pursuant to Section 9 of the Geneva Conventions Act of 1956. See Simpson
Study,op. cit., 26-28.
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appears, a least partly, to have been based on the wrong provisions of the
Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocols.242
The difficulty surrounding this issue was evident in the inconclusive
findings of the Commission and the diverse views of other commentators.P'' It
is worth noting that a Belgian Military Court, acting as the Court of Appeals
also carne to the view that the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two
Additional Protocols of 1977 were not applicable to the armed conflict in
Somalia.r'" In addition, members of UNOSOM II could not be considered
'combatants' since their primary task was not to fight any of the factions, nor
could they be said to be an 'occupying force'. An Italian Commission of
Inquiry into events in Somalia also had difficulty grappling with this issue, and
it failed to make any legal evaluation of the facts, especially from the
perspective of humanitarian law.24s
Another view proffered is that the situation in Somalia was not an
international or non-international armed conflict within the established
treaties.r" However, some of the relevant international instruments contained a
242 Simpson Study, op. cit., 30-33. The CMAC may have failed to properly
consider the relevance of Article 4 and 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The
Canadian Forces may arguably have been a party to the conflict or occupying part of
Somalia within the meaning of the Fourth Convention. If so, this would create a group
of 'protected persons' that the court failed to recognise. The decision was also
questioned by K. Boustany, op. cit., at 371 and R.M.Young and M. Molina,op. cit., at
365-367.
243 Although the Commission avoided reaching a firm conclusion a number of
senior members of the Canadian Forces testified at the Commission's hearings that
they thought the law of armed conflict applied in Somalia, Simpson Study, op. cit.. 27
and Commission of Enquiry, op. cit.
244 Judgement of the Belgian Military Court regarding violations of IHL
committed in Somalia and Rwanda, Nr. 54 A.R. 1997,20 November 1997. Published
in Journal des tribunaux, 24 April/Avril 1998, 286-289 (French language), and
Comment by M. Cogen, 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, op. cit., 415-
416.
245 See N. Lupi, 'Report by the Enquiry Commission on the Behaviour ofItalian
Peacekeeping Troops in Somalia', 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, op.
cit., 375-379.
246 D. Hurley, 'An Application of the Laws of Armed Conflict', in Smith (ed)
The Force of Law: International Law and the Land Commander, Canberra: Australian
Defence Studies Centre/Australian Defence Forces Academy, (1994),179-187 at 182.
Col. Hurley commanded the 1Royal Australian Regiment in Somalia.
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substitute principle, the Martens Clause, which holds that in cases not explicitly
covered by treaty law, civilian persons and combatants remain under the
protection and authority of the principles of international law.247 Arguments
have also been put forward as to why the provisions of the Hague Rules, the
Fourth Geneva Convention, and customary rules concerning an 'occupying
power', could have applied in Somalia.i" The policy of the United States is
also illuminating, in that while applying the provisions of common Article 3, it
made it clear that it did not consider the Fourth Geneva Convention applied
during the UNIT AF deployment. 249 Despite the outcome of the Brocklebank
decision=", and whatever the category or qualification given to the situation in
Somalia, it is difficult not to conclude that Private Brocklebank failed a duty
incumbent upon any soldier in the circumstances. There can be no grey areas
when confronted with such blatant human rights abuses. Cognisance should
have been taken of the Martens Clause as it imposes at all times the minimal,
but overriding obligation to act in accordance with the laws of humanity and
the dictates of public conscience.P! No relativity such as that suggested by the
majority decision of the Court should be allowed in this regard.
247 T. Meron, 'The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of
Public Consciene', 94 American Journal of International Law, (2000), 78-89; A.
Cassese, 'The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?', 11(I) European
Journal of Interntional Law, (2000), 187-286 and R. Abi-Saab, 'Humanitarian Law
and Internal Conflicts: The Evolution of Legal Concern', in A. Delissen and G. Tanja,
(eds.), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, (1991),
222.
248 M. J. Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace
Operations, The Hague: Kluwer, (1999), esp. 111-182, and by the same author, 'Legal
Regimes and Law Enforcement on Peace Operations', in Smith, op. cit., 189-204 at
193. For reasons why the term 'belligerent' occupation was inappropriate for
UNOSOM forces in Somalia, see P. Rowe, 'Maintaining Discipline in UN Peace
Support Operations: The Legal Quagmire for Military Contingents', op. cit., esp. 55-
56. See also C. Greenwood, 'The Administration of Occupied Territories in
International Law' in E. Playfair (ed.), International Law and the Administration of
Occupied Territories, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1992).
249 Ibid. The US forces were ordered to apply the humanitarian provisions of
common Article 3.
250 See fn. 232.
251 This clause had previously been recognised as proof that under international
law war did not totally negate the protection accorded the civilian population-Pinta
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Summary - Practical difficulties applying the Conventions in Somalia
In spite of the most significant codification of humanitarian law, i.e. the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I and II, and there still remain
significant practical difficulties when these are applied to a situation like
Somalia_252 In the circumstances it is difficult to make a definitive
pronouncement on whether the situation in Somalia constituted an armed
conflict. The most important determinant of the applicability of the
humanitarian law is the level of hostilities, and Somalia was no exception to
this general rule. Common Article 2 states that the Conventions '[ s]hall apply
to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict, which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if a state of war is
not recognised by one of them'. One of the major difficulties with this
provision is the ill-defined nature of what constitutes any other armed conflict
itself. It fails to address in clear legal terms at what stage the level of violence
is sufficient to constitute armed conflict.253 In this way it may be described as
humanitarian, but hardly definitive.i" Its deliberately expansive nature is to
ensure that the humanitarian protections afforded by the Conventions are
applicable in cases short of declared war. In one sense this may be described as
strength, in that it may be invoked in circumstances that could not have been
envisaged at the time of drafting. However, this lack of precision can also be a
major weakness in that they may also abuse the discretion bestowed on
states.255 The need for recognition by one of the relevant states is also a
case, Canada High Court of Justice, 10 July 1989, ILR 82, p.435. Furthermore, in
Nicaragua v. USA, IC] Rep. (1949), p.22, the IC] referred to the terms of the Martens
clause as corresponding to what it had earlier identified under 'elementary
considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war'.
252 See Rowe, op. cit., where he lists a number of disadvantages to arguing that
soldiers are not well served by political leaders who argue that the humanitarian law
applies to peacekeeping forces.
253 Although 'War Crimes' are defined in Article 8 of the Statute of the ICC,
these too are linked to the existence of an armed conflict situation, see O. Triffterer,
op. cit., 173-288.
254 R. Miller, The Law of War, Lexington Maass.: Lexington Books,(1975), at
275. This is also the position of the ICRC.
255 C. Nier, Comment, 'The Yugoslavian Civil War, an Analysis of the
Applicability of the Laws of War Governing Non-International Armed Conflicts in the
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problem in that it does not envisage a situation where none of the parties
acknowledge that a state of war exists.256 Not surprisingly, there is
considerably support for the view that 'armed conflict' should be given a broad
interpretation and that the existence of international armed conflict should not
be regarded as contingent upon hostilities reaching a particular level of
intensity.257
The requirement of state recognition is especially problematical for
UN military operations, as the UN is neither a party to the Conventions nor a
state. It does not have the competence to recognise that an armed conflict
invoking the application of the Geneva Conventions exists.258 The UN also
lacks the legal and other structures for dealing with violations of humanitarian
law. The Additional Protocols of 1977 were intended to address some of the
more apparent deficiencies in the current system, but these too did not take into
account the deployment of UN forces and multinational forces authorised by
the Security Council.i" Protocol I would seem to have no application to
Somalia as the clan fighting and conflict in general did not qualify as a struggle
of self-determination, or a struggle against a racist regime.26o An interesting
aspect to the applicability of Protocol I, and some other relevant treaties, is that
not all states have ratified it and this could give rise to the situation where
different contingents in a unified force are governed by different principles of
law.261
Modem World,' 10 DickleyJournal of International Law, (1992), 303 at 317.
256 The drafters of the Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property
amended the phrase to read ' .... even if a state of war is not recognised by one or more
of them', Karlshoven, op. cit.27.
257 Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military
Operations', op. cit., 23.
258 Turley,op. cit. 158.
259 Protocol I refers to struggles 'in which people are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their
right of self determination', see Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1946, Geneva: ICRe, (1987) at 33.
260 See Chapter 6.
261 This situation arose in respect of the NATO forces engaged in the Kosovo
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Protocol II applies only when the conflict is between the armed forces
of a High Contracting Party and dissident groups within the same territory, and
the ICRC definition applies to struggles against a lawful government.P' The
problem here is that it is not possible to determine which if any faction in
Somalia could be deemed the 'lawful government'. A strong case can be made
that Aided fulfilled a number of important requirements to be regarded as a
dissident organised force in control of a defined area, but the issue is so
legitimately debatable that definitive conclusions are problematic. The level of
fighting could also be regarded as having exceeded that regarded in other cases
as sufficient to amount to armed conflict, and it meets the criteria suggested by
Pictet and the Appeals Chamber in Tadic.263 The experiences of Bosnia
Herzegovina and Somalia indicate that NATO and the UN adopt a certain cl la
carte policy when it comes to determining the existence of 'armed conflict' and
whether they are parties thereto. It would also seem that the threshold for
triggering armed conflict is higher in the case of military operations authorised
or mandated by the UN_264
The United States had the opportunity and authority to recognise that
an armed conflict took place in Somalia, but it pointedly declined to do so. The
Clinton Administration refused to declare it a war zone, arguing even after
thirty United States solders had been killed and nearly two hundred wounded,
and many hundreds more Somali casualties, that there had yet to be an event
'that makes it clear to everyone that this is combat, not peacekeeping' .265 What
difference does this make in practice if the United States agrees to act in a
humane and civilised manner in any event? When cognisance is taken of one
of the most recent accounts of American action against Aided, it is further
confirmation of excessive use of force and violations of fundamental principles
conflict during 1999.
262 Turley,op. cit., 160.
263 See Fn. 59 and Pictet, op. cit., 17-44.
264 Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military
Operations', op. cit., 24.
265 Cited in Turley, Texas Law Review, op. cit., 136.
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of humanitarian law in what were admittedly extreme conditions.f'" This is
where training and unequivocal rules apply. However, the lack of 'a method for
authoritatively and effectively determining that a situation justifies the
application of the laws of war is a major weakness of the contemporary laws'.
267 Basing a finding of the existence of war or armed conflict in a material
sense, inter alia, on the duration of the conflict merely serves to facilitate the
exclusion of short-term hostilities such as occurred in Somalia and elsewhere.
Surely it would be preferable if measures were taken to ensure that
humanitarian law applied to conflict situations, especially those involving UN
military forces, as a matter of law, rather than upon the finding of the existence
of material war or armed conflict.
Lessons for Ireland from recent Canadian experience in humanitarian law
training
Finding ways to ensure compliance with the rules of humanitarian law has
traditionally been a concern of the ICRC and other human rights organizations.
The widespread breach of these rules by the parties to the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia has highlighted the issue of non-compliance. In this regard certain
factors have been identified as contributing to instances of failure to comply, in
particular, ignorance of the law.268 The establishment of war crimes tribunals
and the accompanying publicity will go a long way towards eroding the cynical
assumption that the laws of war are not enforceable. War crimes trials can take
many forms, and at present the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) is probably the best known. They are not a new
phenomenon in that they have also been established under international
agreements like that at Nuremberg, or under municipal law like the Leipzig
266 See<http://www.nightstalkers.comltfrangerlblackhawkdownlDefault.html>
and M. Bowden, Black Hawk Down, New York: Penguin, (1999/2000). This account
of the US led attack and subsequent military action to extricate themselves is a realistic
outline of the dilemmas facing soldiers in such circumstances.
267 J. Peck, op. cit., 306.
G. Aldrich, 'The Laws of War on Land', 94 American Journal of
International Law, (2000), 42-59 at 54.
268
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trials conducted by the German tribunals after 1919.269 Military personnel
accused can also be dealt with in certain circumstances by military courts
martial, similar to those established by the United States military arising from
incidents during the Vietnam and Korean conflicts, and by Canada for crimes
committed while part of an international UN force in Somalia.
The establishment of the ICC is the most significant recent development
in this regard. Once a state has ratified the Statute, then all nationals of that state
will be subject to its provisions.27o Concern about implementing humanitarian law
was one of the driving forces behind proposals for its establishment. 271 The
United States was most concerned about the impact this might have on
participation in multinational and peacekeeping operations.272 However, the
Court to be established is not a serious alternative for the present system of
criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers.i" The Preamble to the Statute states that
the Court shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.V" In stark
contrast to the Statutes for the ICTY and ICTR, this acknowledges the primacy of
national authorities unless they are unable or unwilling to adequately investigate
and prosecute alleged offences. Once a state has ratified the Statute, then all
nationals of that state will be subject to its provisions. But fundamental problems
269 See generally C. Mullins, The Leipzig Trials: An Account of the War
Criminals Trials and a Study of the German Mentality, London: H. F. & G. Witherby,
(1921), and D. Schindler and J. Toman (eds.), op. cit., 57.
270 See generally Triffterer (ed.), op. cit., 180-288; W. A. Schabas, An
Introduction to the International Court, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001, esp. 1-20; M. C. Bassiouni, The Statute of the International Criminal Court - A
Documentary History, New York: Transnational, (1998); R. Lee (ed), The
International Criminal Court - The Making of the Rome Statute, Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1(999), 79-126; L. Caflisch, 'Toward the Establishment of a Permanent International
Criminal Jurisdiction', 4 (5) International Peacekeeping (Kluwer), (1998) 110-115,
and online at <http://www.igc.org/icc/>
271 A. Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War, Adelphi Paper 305, Oxford,
(1996),50.
272 M. Zwanenburg, 'The Statute for an International Criminal Court and the
United States: Peacekeepers under Fire?' 10 European Jounal of International Law,
(1999), 124-143 at 126.
273 Ibid. at 125.
274 ICC Statute, Preamble, para. 10 and Articles 1, 12-15, 17-19. Triffterer, op.
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remain, as states that refuse to ratify will not be subject to the jurisdiction of the
ICC unless an offence is committed by a national of that State on the territory of
another state party to the Statute.275 In addition, Article 8, which deals with war
crimes, is also linked to the notion of armed conflict (international and internal),
and is dependent on a minimum threshold of conflict being reached before the
relevant provisions can apply_276The Statute emphasizes the prosecution of war
crimes on a large scale, whereas the crimes committed by peacekeepers have been
isolated and not part of a plan or policy sanctioned by higher authorities. Despite
this, the possibility of a prosecution for a single act constituting a war crime still
exists, and contrasts with the threshold level of gravity for a crime against
humanity under the Statute.277
The war crimes trials to date indicate that one of the most serious
problems likely to arise is that of the knowledge of the accused.i" A
fundamental premise of military life is the obligation to obey all lawful orders.
This may seem like a simple statement of a self-evident rule, but it is not so
straightforward as it first appears. Knowledge affects the validity of any
attempt a soldier may make to rely on the defence of superior orders.279 How is
a soldier to judge the lawfulness or otherwise of a command? It would appear
that insufficient attention is paid to this dilemma in military training. Most
systems of municipal criminal law embody the principle ignorantia juris
cit., 15,59-61 andpassim.
275 See ICC Statute, Article 12 (2) (a), see Triffterer, op. cit., 329-342.
276 Triffterer, op. cit., 180-288esp. 264-278; Schabas, op. cit., 40-52, and Lee,
op. cit., 103-126. Lee notes that the Statute contains a substantially lower threshold
for internal armed conflict than that laid down in Protocol II (p.125).
277 M. Arsanjani, 'The Rome Statute of an International Criminal Court', 93
American Journal of International Law, (1999) 33. Article 7(1) of the Statute provides
that particular acts must have been committed as part of a 'widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, Triffterer, op. cit., 126-127.
278 L. C. Green, 'Humanitarian Law and the Man in the Field', XIV Canadian
Yearbook of International Law, (1976), 96-115 at 97.
279 L.C. Green, 'Superior Orders and the Reasonable Man', 8 Canadian
Yearbook of International Law (1970), 61-103, at 96 and passim. See also by the
same author, 'Peacekeeping and War Crimes' ,XXXIV Military Law and Law of War
Review, 1995,247-255.
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neminem excusat.280 This is a satisfactory principle when the rules are clearly
defined and reasonably accessible to the ordinary citizen of a state, but this is
by no means the situation with regard to international law where the rules are
not always clear cut and accepted by all states. This lack of international
consensus and certainty is all the more so in the case of humanitarian law and
the laws of war. For this reason it is necessary to examine the extent to which
states are obliged to inform all citizens and especially their military personnel,
of these laws, and the steps and methods that ought to be taken to this end.281
There is also the additional factor that a law that is not known cannot
be applied, and knowledge of humanitarian law should not be restricted to
times or situations of conflict. It should be seen in the overall context of human
rights education to promote 'understanding, tolerance and friendship among all
nations' in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.282 In
his authoritative commentary on the Geneva Conventions, Pictet, noted ' a
knowledge of law is an essential condition for its effective application. One of
the worst enemies of the Geneva Conventions is ignorance .' 283
Some of the more important provisions concerning dissemination of
information relating to humanitarian law are contained in Additional Protocol I
and Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.P" These are especially relevant to
Ireland after the coming into effect of the Geneva Conventions (Amendment)
280
'Ignorance of the law does not excuse'. Every person is presumed to know
the law. See 0' Loughlin v. O'Callaghan (1874) IR 8 CL 116. However, Article 32
and 33 of the Statute of the ICC recoginse that mistake of law may, in certain
circumstances, be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility, see Triffterer (ed.),
op. cit., 555-588.
281 The first recognition of the need to inform the armed forces of the rules of
war is in the Oxford Manual prepared by the Institut de Droit International in 1880, see
Schindler and Toman, op. cit., at 35.
282 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26, paragraph 2.
Jean Pictet et al, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 - Commentary:
I Geneva Convention, Geneva, Geneva: IeRC, (1952) at 348.
283
284
Article 81 and Article 82 of Protocol I, and Article 19, Protocol II, see
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1946, Geneva: ICRC, (1987), 947-968 and 1487-1489.
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Act, 1998, which enabled it to ratify the relevant Protocols after an inordinate
delay.285 Articles 82 and 83 place a significant legal obligation on all states
parties thereto to disseminate information to military personnel and civilians.r'"
The importance of the obligation to train military personnel was summed up by
Kalshoven when he said that 'it would be a sheer miracle if all members of the
armed forces were angels, or simply law abiding combatants - and if they
remained so through every phase of the war. Factors such as insufficiently or
wrongly oriented training programmes or a lack of discipline may playa role in
this respect'. 287At a minimum then, there should be a level of expertise among
all Defence Force legal officers owing to the small number in existence. The
syllabi and curricula of military training courses should also be revised to take
account of the obligations, and even law schools in civilian educational
institutions should be supported in placing emphasis on teaching humanitarian
law. Although a similar obligation exists in respect of Protocol II, it creates a
less onerous duty?88
While the principles and basic rules of humanitarian law may be
considered to represent fundamental values that have received almost universal
acceptance, peacetime efforts to implement them at the national level are
nonetheless insufficient.289 In fact, it is often a marginal item in military
training programmes.P'' Consequently, these rules of law are not as well
285 See C. Campbell and R. Murphy, 'Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act,
1998', Irish Current Statutes Annotated 1998, Dublin: Round Hall/Sweet and
Maxwell, (1998), 35.01-35.58. For a discussion of the minimalist effect of the Geneva
Conventions (Amendment) Act, 1995, in the United Kingdom, see P. Rowe & M.
Meyer, 'The Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act 1995 - A Genreally Minimalist
Approach', 45 International and Compartive Law Quarterly, (1996), 476-484.
286 See Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1946, op. cit., 947-968 and H. McCoubrey, International
Humanitarian Law, Aldershot: Dartmouth, (1990), 205-210.
287 F. Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War, Geneva: JCRC, (1987),
61.
288 Article 19 of Protocol I, see n. 226.
289 L. Geiger, 'Armed forces and respect for international humanitarian law:
Major issues', Symposium, 60-64 at 60.
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known or understood as they should be by those who must apply them,
especially members of the armed forces. Since the conflict in Korea, Canadian
troops have had infrequent involvement in combat situations where they would
have faced the ethical and legal challenges posed by the law of armed conflict.
Such issues did not cause serious concerns on traditional peacekeeping
missions. However, the conduct of Canadian and other contingents part of
UNOSOM II highlighted the need for training in this area.291
The success or failure of peacekeeping operations rests to a great degree
on the local population's perceptions of the peacekeepers, so the tactical and
strategic consequences of violating the laws of war in peacekeeping missions
could be greater than that during combat.292 However, the advent of peace
enforcement type operations has changed this. It was in this regard that the
Canadian Department of National Defence was found wanting in its failure to
take the necessary steps to ensure that their personnel were sufficiently
educated in the law of armed conflict.293 This had serious implications in the
light of two related developments. The first was the evolution in the content,
interpretation, and application of the law of armed conflict. The second more
important change was in the nature and extent of peacekeeping operations
themselves, and the emergence of a more complicated set of variables faced by
peacekeepers in second-generation peacekeeping operations dealing with
complex emergencies. As a result, widespread training in law of armed conflict
290 See generally D. Lloyd Roberts, 'Training the armed forces to respect
international humanitarian law-The perspective of the JCRC Delegate to the Armed
and Security Forces of South Asia', 319 International Review of the Red Cross,
(1997), 433-446; F. de Mulinen, The Law of War and the Armed Forces, Series Ius in
Bello, No.1, Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, (1992), and Y. Sandoz, 'Respect for the
Law of Armed Conflict: the JCRC's observations and experiences', International
Seminar on International Humanitarian Law in a New Strategic Environment:
Training ofArmed Forces, Stockholm, 17-18 June 1996.
291 Though this need was recognised much earlier by some, see L. C. Green,
'Humanitarian Law and the Man in the Field', XIV Military Law and Law of War
Review, (1976),96-115.
292 Blechman and Vaccaro, Trainingfor Peacekeeping, the UNRole, Report No.
12,The Henry L. Stimson Centre, (July 1994), 4.
293 P. LaRose-Edwards, J. Dangerfield and R. Weeks, Non-Traditional Military
Trainingfor Canadian Peacekeepers (hereafter 'Training study'), a study prepared for
the Report of the Somalia Commission of Enquiry.
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did not keep up with events. Substantive training was largely restricted to
military lawyers, primarily short lectures for officers, and minimal operational
training for rank and file.294 The Report recommended that education in the law
of armed conflict be available throughout the Canadian Forces.295
The situation pertaining in the Defence Forces today is very similar to
what existed in Canada prior to the Commission of Enquiry into events in
Somalia.F" Like Ireland today, peacekeeping in Canada was largely
concentrated in the ninety-day pre-deployment training period of a unit warned
for a UN mission. Otherwise, there was little training time devoted by uni ts to
specific peacekeeping training. The situation in Canada was summarised as
follows; there was no direct peacekeeping training at the basic level, very little
at individual level, and almost none in the generic annual training cycles of
units.297 In the case of Ireland the situation is even more serious, as units are
usually established specifically for such service. These are made up of men
and women who may never have served together before. It was the Canadian
study teams view that this situation was no longer appropriate for the new era
and more complex peacekeeping environment. This is also the case in regard
to the Irish Defence Forces. With members participating in Chapter VII
operations in the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo and East Timor, and membership
of the NATO sponsored Partnership for Peace likely to involve Irish troops in
similar complex emergencies in the future, the need for ongoing training in
peacekeeping operations at unit and sub unit level throughout the Defence
Forees is recommended.
294 In addition, many of the operational level personnel interviewed for the
report remarked that dry legal lectures by military lawyers were not particularly
helpful. It was considered that training by their own warrant and other officers would
have been preferable. Training study, 58.
295 The recommendations of the Report were adopted by the Report of the
Somalia Commission of Enquiry. See Recommendations, Chapter 21, paras 21.8 and
Chapter 40, paras. 40.41 - 40.45. See also Lt. Col. Vogt, 'Experiences of a German
Legal Adviser to the UNOSOM IIMission', XXXV The Military Law and Law a/War
Review 1-4, (1996),219-300 at 226-227.
296 See R. Murphy and C. Campbell, Correspondents Report-Ireland, 1
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, op. cit., 460-467, at 466.
297 Training study, 43
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One of the most telling conclusions of the Canadian study team was the
dichotomy it found.298 On the one hand, there were many separate and
unconnected examples of Canadian Forces organizations and individuals that
understood the changing peacekeeping environment and peacekeeping
requirements, and were taking some initiatives to meet those needs. On the
other hand, the study team could not ascertain a national, formalised, coherent,
integrated peacekeeping policy and training programme that did likewise. It
also concluded that the notion that a well trained combat capable soldier is all
that is required for a good peacekeeper is changing or at least being modified.
However, the bureaucracy had not caught up with the changing philosophy.
This too is the situation in Ireland among the mandarins in the Department of
Defence. The recently published White Paper on Defence does not address any
of these issues_299There is also the matter of training first and second line
reservists, especially as it seems that the policy regarding the participation of
the second line reservists in UN military operations may change in the near
future. For too long Ireland has relied on the peacekeepers capacity to use a
bit of 'blarney' to avoid escalation and confrontation. This has been remarkably
successful, but the downside is that it has encouraged an atmosphere of
complacency and smugness with regard to Ireland's suitability as a contributor
state to peacekeeping operations.
While it is acknowledged that there is a policy of support for the
principles of humanitarian law within the Defence Forces, and this is
particularly evident in its formal incorporation into military training and
briefings; there is still much room for improvement. Although there is a
genuine effort made to disseminate information regarding the humanitarian law
principles, the general approach seems to be minimalist. There seems to be
little or no recent material on humanitarian law published by the Defence
Forces or the Department of Defence, which is accessible and useful to
ordinary serving personnel, or the general public at large. A survey of Defence
Forces personnel serving with UNIFIL in 1998 indicated that 86% wanted to
know more about humanitarian law and some 71% considered that they did not
298 TrainingStudy, 83
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receive adequate instruction in this area.300 Not surprisingly, many considered
their knowledge of humanitarian law to be poor. It is noteworthy that many
also felt that humanitarian law was relevant on peacekeeping missions, and it
was in the training for UNIFIL that most had come to learn about humanitarian
law. Some 66% of those who completed the survey thought that humanitarian
law was relevant to modem armies.
It is by no means certain that this is enough to satisfy Ireland's
obligations under Protocol I. Despite efforts by individuals within the legal
service, much more could be done by the Department of Defence and the
military authorities to encourage interest and respect for the principles
involved. The Canadian Report concluded that training in the law of armed
conflict is of critical importance to effective peacekeeping: it cannot continue
to be provided for in an ad hoc manner. In this regard the office of the Judge
Advocate General of Canadian Forces was of critical importance, and the
Report recommended that this office should be the focus for such training. The
equivalent office in the Irish Defence Forces is that of the Deputy Judge
Advocate General. It too must receive sufficient resource and the use of
selected trained operators to conduct training at unit and sub unit level should
be considered. It is neither practical nor desirable for legal officers to oversee
or conduct all training in this field. The focus should be on integrating it into
the operational context, and that operational military such as infantry officers
and senior non commissioned officers are trained to deliver much of that
training. If Ireland is serious about human rights law and its implementation,
then real commitment of resources will have to be made.
Conclusions
It is undisputed that the UN has international legal personality and that it is a
subject of international law.301 But it does not automatically follow that all the
rules of international law, in particular those relating to humanitarian law, apply to
299 Dublin: Department of Defence, 2000.
300 See Appendix C.
301 Reparations Case [1949] IC] Rep. 174. See also M. Bothe, 'Peacekeeping
and international humanitarian law: friends or foes?, 3 International Peacekeeping
(Kluwer), (1996), 91-95 at 94.
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the UN. The arguments that the UN cannot be bound by such rules owing to their
specific nature and structure, and that the Organization does not possess the
necessary internal structure, are not compelling. In fact, the structures and
resources of the UN are superior to many smaller states. When the UN was
established, it became part of the existing international legal order. It was created
by the common accord of states within the system. It is not within the powers of
those states to create a functional international institution that is outside the
framework of the pre existing international legal order. There are of course
practical difficulties for the UN in ensuring troops under its command or
operational control do not infringe any of the applicable rules of international law.
Not least being the fact that no troops have ever served under the full command
and control of the UN, and it is unlikely that they will do so in the foreseeable
future.302
After the capture of a United States helicopter pilot shot down over
Mogadishu, it was said that the United States recognised too late that there was no
international law to protect him.303 A gap was deemed to exist in international
law as no international armed conflict was taking place and the Geneva
Convention protecting prisoners did not apply. But to rely upon humanitarian
principles in a conflict, both parties must be prepared to demonstrate willingness
to respect those principles. Reciprocity, while not a legal requirement, is a
practical necessity. A primary consideration in developing principles of
humanitarian law was the self-interest of the most protected class of person under
the original rules, the combatant. States, and in particular United States, sought to
fill a perceived gap in international law by way of the Convention to Protect UN
personnel. This Convention is far from perfect, and may not alter the risk to
which UN personnel will he exposed. Categorising those who oppose or threaten
302 In the case of Ireland, Additional Protocol I and IIbecame part of municipal
law and binding on Irish soldiers with the passing of the Geneva Conventions
(Amendment) Act 1998. Prior to that Irish troops part of IFOR and SFOR were not
bound by Protocol Ieither.
Supra. Cpt. 5 On command and control and R. Murphy, op. cit., Journal of
Armed Conflict Law, and H.McCoubrey, International Relations, op. cit., 41-44 ..
302
S .Lepper, 'War Crimes and the Protection of Peacekeeping Forces', 28
Akron Law Review, (1995), 411-415 at 415.
303
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UN personnel as criminals or outlaws carnes certain dangers, and if not
implemented with caution and skill, it could be associated with a new kind of
colonial mentality.r"
With regard to the initial question posed as to the relevant applicable law
to situations where UN forces are deployed, this will depend largely on the nature
and extent of the conflict. Nevertheless, there appears to be little doubt but that
the provisions of humanitarian law that have customary status do apply to UN
forces. Such provisions bind all states, and may reasonably be suggested to apply
to the UN itself.305 The most difficult question arises in respect of those rules that
have not yet attained customary status. There seems little sense in a system where
combatants engaged in conflict are subject to humanitarian law when they are
acting as members of national armed forces, whereas members of armed forces in
the same armed conflict acting as peacekeepers are exempted from the obligations
to respect the rights of protected persons. This is all the more absurd when these
UN soldiers represent the Organization charged with upholding and promoting the
fundamental human right that humanitarian law seeks to protect. 306 The
application of humanitarian law to UN forces will not compromise the mission to
promote peace. Moreover, as the declared aim of such operations is the
restoration of international peace and security, it is surely not the case that it can
be based on action in violation of existing principles of law. In addition, the legal
obligations of peacekeeping and other UN military forces should reflect the notion
that they will affirmatively seek to prevent abuses.
What can or should a UN force do when it becomes aware that parties
in the country where it is deployed are violating applicable international law.
Unless the mandate of a force states otherwise, as the law stands at present, there
is no legal duty to protect victims of such violations. However, international
military and civilian field personnel cannot be silent witnesses to gross
violations of humanitarian law.307 And nor do they wish to be. The legal
304 A. Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War,op. cit., at 70.
30S McCoubrey, International Relations, op. cit., 46.
306 See Article 1, UN Charter.
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obligations of peacekeeping and other UN military forces should reflect the notion
that they will affirmatively seek to prevent abuses. The Brahimi Report suggests
a more assertive and interventionist approach in such cases. If a force cannot
intervene directly without exposing troops to significant danger, then the duty
of a commander must first be to the safety ofhislher personnel. The post 1982
UNIFIL situation shows that most lightly armed peacekeepers will not be in a
position to prevent large-scale abuses by a party to the conflict. The Brahimi
recommendations are a welcome initiative, but it presupposes that UN personnel
will be given the means and capacity to act in this way when appropriate, a
presumption that past experience shows may not be taken for granted. This is the
kernel of the dilemma, and some commanders may hide behind the cloak of
preserving force security to excuse a failure to act.
Enforcement of humanitarian law is especially problematic in respect of
UN forces. Relying on the contributing states to use their disciplinary regimes to
enforce municipal law is one solution, but this requires the cooperation of those
states concerned and the existence of an appropriate legal structure to deal with
such offences. The Brocklebank, Rockwood and similar trials make it clear that
there is significant confusion regarding the applicability of international law to the
different kinds of UN military operations. The use of the courts martial or its
equivalent within contributing states still remains the most likely system for
dealing with disciplinary matters arising. While the independence of municipal
legal regimes and disciplinary procedures must be respected, the current
confusion is militating against a uniform and agreed formula for determining the
applicability of international law to such operations.
In order to ensure humanitarian law is applied and enforced in the course
of all relevant UN activities, it must first be clarified. This is not as simple a task
as it may first appear. In the case of IFOR and SFOR, and the current KFOR,
Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva Conventions was applicable to the Canadian
and German contingents, but not to the United States and France. This problem is
307 See comments to this effect in R. Siekmann, 'Notes on the Singapore
Conference on Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping Operations', 4 International
Peacekeeping (Kluwer), (1997), 19-21 at 21. More recently, there were reports that
UN troops deliberately avoided confronting militias in East Timor, and that French
troops part ofKFOR failed to protect ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, see The Irish Times,
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mitigated somewhat by the fact that many of the relevant norms are part of
customary international law which binds all states.308 Making it mandatory for all
UN personnel to be educated and trained in this area is essential. Such instruction
is a legal obligation on states party to the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols.i'" In addition, the UN and the ICRC should agree on the rules
applicable to military operations conducted on behalf of or by the UN. There is an
urgent need for codification of the law as 'ambiguity is always a fault in legal
norms and in international humanitarian law it is potentially a source of
disaster'r'!" Several commentators have called for the formation of an
independent body to police the application of humanitarian law and to
recommend revisions where necessary.'!' One means of clarifying the issues
raised would be for both organizations to identify precisely which rules have
achieved the status of customary law. Despite the universality of the Geneva
Conventions, not all the details of their provisions have simply become
declaratory of customary law.312 The situation is even more uncertain in regard to
Protocol I; moreover, not all customary rules may be applicable to operations
carried out by UN forces.
It is an unavoidable flaw that in relation to the purposes and functions of
the UN, humanitarian law only plays a secondary role. Furthermore, states
perceive criminal jurisdiction over their nationals as part of their jealously
30 August 2000 at 1, and 10 February 2000, at 14.
308 In the case of Ireland, Additional Protocol I and IIbecame part of municipal
law and binding on Irish soldiers with the passing of the Geneva Conventions
(Amendment) Act 1998. Prior to that Irish troops part of IFOR and SFOR were not
bound by Protocol I either.
309 McCoubrey, International Relations, op. cit., 43.
310 McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law. op. cit.. 17-18. Although
McCoubrey was addressing the confusion surrounding internal and international armed
conflicts, the basic logic applies to all issues concerning humanitarian law.
311 H. S. Levie, When Battle Rages: How Can Law Protect?, Working Papers
and Proceedings of the Fourteenth Hammarskjold Forum 6 (John Carey, ed. 1971), and
Miller, The Law of War, op. cit., at 275. Tittemore recommended the adoption of a
further Protocol to the Geneva Conventions permitting the UN to ratify the
agreements, or the adoption of a report by the Security Council, Tittemore, op. cit.,
114.
312 Pfanner,op. cit., Symposium, 49-59 at 49.
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guarded sovereignty, and considerable national sensitivities are associated with
participation in UN military operations.Y' The creation of a special tribunal or
court to deal with such matters is one potential solution, but the fact that few if
any countries actually place their forces under the full command of the UN could
be problematic. It would also create constitutional difficulties for countries like
Ireland. The matter would be complicated in respect of those countries with
dualist legal regimes that do not automatically incorporate international law
provisions into their domestic legal systems. Certainly the recent Secretary-
General's Bulletin regarding the field of application of humanitarian to UN forces
and the number of references to it in Security Council resolutions as a 'body of
law' to be applied 'in all circumstances', it may be argued that humanitarian law
is part of ius cogens.3!4
In most instances the task of applying theoretical principles of
international law to specific cases becomes the responsibility of armed forces
on the ground. There are a number of measures that contributing states could
take to improve the current situation. Up until recently, United States policy
was linked to the notion of armed conflict. In accordance with international
law, United States military were obliged to comply with humanitarian law in
conducting military operations in times of armed conflict. 3!S However, military
regulations are silent on when an engagement reaches the level of armed
conflict, or what demarcates the point at which the laws of armed conflict
apply. These distinctions are crucial to peacekeeping operations, and neither
the recent Secretary-General's Bulletin nor the Convention on the Protection of
UN Personnel shed much light on this area. In 1996 the United States
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an instruction that extended the
application of ' the law of war principles during all operations that are
313 H. McCoubrey, 'International Humanitarian Law and United Nations
Military Action in the "New World Order", 1 International Law and Armed Conflict:
Commentary, Nottingham: Nottingham University Press, (1994), 36 at 45.
314 See comments to this effect in the Notes on the Conference on 'The UN and
International Humanitarian Law', Geneva: 19-20 October 1995, in Martin Meijer, 2
(6) International Peacekeeping, (Kluwer), (1995), 136-138 at 137. The Secretary-
General issued his Bulletin on 6 August 1999, ST/SGB/1999/3.
315 Turley,op. cit., 148.
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characterized as Military Operations Other Than War,.316 This effectively
covers every conceivable military operation. Most significantly, there is no
triggering event wedded to the notion of armed conflict, which is a prerequisite
for the application of these principles under international law. This is a
welcome initiative, but from a legal perspective, it too has deficiencies in that
the instruction refers to principles of war, but gives no indication of what these
might be.
Humanitarian law represents fundamental principles of humanity
imposed on all of us, including the Security Council and agents of the UN. It
must be respected in all circumstances, regardless of the existence or nature of
the armed conflict. A solution would be for an acknowledgement and
declaration that humanitarian law binds UN personnel, and that UN military
and other personnel will be educated, trained and monitored in this regard.
Ensuring the universality of the treaties on humanitarian law, including the
Statute of the ICC, would serve as an additional guarantee of compliance. It is
to be hoped that the lessons learned from Canada's deployment to Somalia will
be studied and widely assimilated by armed forces around the world.317 After
one hundred years of law making, the primary objective must not be a new law,
but ensuring compliance with and effective implementation of the laws already
in existence."! It is the responsibly of the UN and all countries contributing
troops to UN operations to ensure that all personnel undergo systematic
training in humanitarian law, and that standing operating procedures be drawn
up to deal with violations when they occur.
316
'USA: International and Operational Law Note: When Does the Law of War
Apply: Analysis of Department of Defence Policy on Application of the Laws of
War', reprinted from The Army Lawyer, Department of the Army, June 1998 in 1
Yearbookof International Humanitarian Law, op. cit., 617-619.
317 RM.Young and M. Molina, op. cit., at 370.
318 C. Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and the Laws of War,
Preliminary Report for the Centennial Commemoration of the First Hague Peace
Conference 1899(May 1999), 3 (para. 1.6), quoting Sir Franklin Berman.
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSION
'The problem is a lack of vision, the opportunity is to provide that vision - the
challenge is to promote the view that can see pragmatic idealism prevail over
rather stale realism ... [which] is often a euphemism for a short-sightedness and
policies lacking in the necessary courage and vision'. I
The decision to allow Irish troops participate in the UN enforcement mission in
Somalia was one of the most significant developments in Irish defence and foreign
policy in recent years. The need to pass enabling legislation in Ireland arose from
the dualist nature of Ireland's legal system, rather than any new obligation
undertaken by the State in relation to UN membership. Despite all the reports of
recent years, defence policy in Ireland still lacks a coherent strategy. In addition, the
current strength of the Defence Forces is inadequate for the tasks it is intended to
fulfil. It will not be possible to meet the commitment to the UN Stand By force
arrangement, and the European Rapid Reaction Force, at the same time.
Successive governments have been neither honest nor realistic in their designation
of the role of the Defence Forces, and what is being signalled now is a clear move
away from traditional UN operations in favour of the post cold war model of
'tendered out' or delegated peace support operations. This may well be the way of
the future, but what is missing is an honest and clear policy from the government on
where Ireland stands on this and related issues.
Irish participation in recent peace support operations reflects a modification
in the position outlined to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations a
decade ago.' The controversial decision to join the NATO sponsored Partnership for
Peace programme, and the commitments under the European Common Foreign and
Security Policy have important implications. The development of co-operative
B. Urquhart, 'The United Nations in 1992, Problems and Opportunities', 68
International Affairs, 2, (April 1992), at 311.
2 See comments by Ireland to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations, UN General Assembly, Document AlAC.121/37, 29 March 1990, 13-15 at
14.
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military relations and compatibility with the Western European Union and NATO in
particular, albeit for peacekeepinglhumanitarian purposes, raises important issues
for Ireland. Because of its association with NATO, membership of the Partnership
for Peace may dilute Ireland's independent middle power identity even more than
has already occurred. The change in policy regarding NATO's Kosovo campaign is
just one manifestation of the consequences of seeking a joint European response.
The issues are complex, and the dilemmas confronting Ireland were evident
in the debate about participation in the multinational force in the former Yugoslavia.
Military neutrality, however, did not preclude Irish participation in this force, when
it was deemed appropriate to do so. In reality, both SFOR and KFOR are NATO
forces, albeit mandated by UN Chapter VII resolutions. In military terms, Ireland
does not possess the capacity to make any significant contribution to such large-
scale operations, but participation sets the scene for a longer-term re-orientation of
Irish policy. If Ireland is to retain its skills and reputation in the field of
peacekeeping, it is necessary to adapt and to participate in the organizations where
best contemporary practice is developed. But in doing so, is Ireland contributing to
the demise of the UN at the behest of the permanent members of the Security
Council?
The UN currently faces a huge financial crisis that threatens its
continued existence. But a far more serious threat is posed by the self-serving
agenda pursued by the permanent members of the Council. It is they who are
responsible for 85% of global arms exports, while at the same time they are
charged with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security. The victors of World War II have arrogated to themselves crucial
power within the Security Council. Its structure and procedures are inherently
anti-democratic. This ruling oligarchy represents one of the major obstacles to
the proper functioning of the UN and it is a major impediment to peace based on
justice and universal suffrage. The legitimacy of the Security Council derives
from the commitment of all member States to confer primary responsibility for
international peace and security on a body of limited membership. There must be
a balanced and fair representation, which reflects the global membership of the
UN, and the realities of regional and global power. It must not be a tool for
368
enhancing pre-existing hegemonic power; if anything, it should curtail and
control the potential abuse that the possession of such power often entails.
At the same time, there are issues that Ireland should not remain neutral in
respect of - the genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rapes, and other crimes against
humanity perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia are but one example. The reality is
that it has taken a NATO led force to impose some measure of peace, and prevent
the seemingly endless slaughter of so many innocent civilians in the former
Yugoslavia. But why have the same NATO powers left the UN strapped for cash
and unable to act? The unilateral NATO response to the Kosovo crises may provide
a more accurate insight into the true nature and purpose of these forces. NATO
makes for an unpredictable bedfellow, once it gave the UN full co-operation as part
of peacekeeping and enforcement missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, now it seems to
be competing with the UN and to have taken its place in the European area. This
may suit the a financially embarrassed UN in the short term, but what of NATO's
plans outside its own area of operations and without UN authorization? Where do
Ireland's interests lie in such a scenario? The lessons of history are clear, Ireland's
interests as a small state lie with the UN, collective security and international law.
The neutral states tradition of involvement in international peace support
operations was confirmed again by the agreement of European neutrals to send
soldiers to serve with the UN mandated but NATO commanded KFOR. This
participation raises the issue of the compatibility of a policy of political andlor
military neutrality with such operations.' Ireland is almost unique among the
European neutrals in that the Defence (Amendment) Act, 1993, permits the
participation of Defence Forces personnel in any kind of UN military operation.
The Swiss experience shows that the general public there are wary of the extended
parameters of recent UN military operations, and that the threat to neutrality is
perceived as very real. The blurring of the distinction between peacekeeping, peace
enforcement and enforcement action missions does not help this either.
In the current climate of rationalisation and 'downsizing' of armed
forces throughout the developed world, it may be that the problem confronting
Canadian and Irish participation in the more pro-active peace support operations
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of today is capability and capacity to participate. This may be an even more
important determiner of mission success than the nature of the conflict for which
intervention is being considered. Canada, despite membership of NATO, does
not appear to have compromised its status as a 'middle power.' As the European
Union moves closer to some form of security and defence arrangements, and
Ireland joins the NATO sponsored Partnership for Peace, Ireland must look to
countries like Canada in assessing the political and legal implications of such
changes. The risks of involvement for Ireland are not insignificant, as they were
during the Congo crisis nearly forty years ago, but the duty to act as responsible
member of the international community remains and is compelling, in particular,
given the shameful record of Ireland and other European countries throughout the
Yugoslav conflict.
Events in Somalia, Lebanon and elsewhere have highlighted deficiencies
in international institutions and organizations. The UN, the European Union and
the Organization for African Unity have all found that responding effectively to
internal or intrastate conflicts is very difficult. Critics of the UN have pointed to its
use of rhetoric when decisive action and leadership was required. Its bulging
bureaucracy often seems to epitomise inefficiency and inertia." In the fanner
Yugoslavia the UN was exposed as the paper tiger so many believe it to be.' The
peacekeeping operation was unsustainable as there was no peace to keep, while
enforcement action was unsustainable due to a lack of political will among the
permanent members of the Security Council. Many of the criticisms are true and
justified. However, the failure is usually not that of the UN, but rather its
See S. Dragon, 'Permanent Neutrality and Peacekeeping', 5 (1-2),
International Peacekeeping (Kluwer), (1999), 37-40.
3
4 See comments by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'Empowering the United
Nations', 71 Foreign Affairs, (1992/93), 100, to the effect that 'duplication is
widespread; co-ordination is often minimal; bureaucratic battles aimed at monopolising a
particular subject are rife, and organizational objectives are sometimes in conflict'.
5 See generally R. Vayrynen, 'Preventive Action: Failure in Yugoslavia', in
M. Pugh, (ed.), The UN, Peace and Force, 3 (4) International Peacekeeping, London:
Frank Cass, (1996), 21-42; W. Biermann and M. Vadset, UNPeacekeeping in Trouble:
Lessons learned from the former Yugoslavia, Aldershot: Ashgate, (1998) and L.
MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: the road to Sarajevo, Toronto: Harper Collins, (1994).
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membership as a whole. At the same time the successes of the UN are often
neglected or ignored.
Former United States President, Bill Clinton, said that the UN could not
engage in all the world's conflicts and that it must learn when to say no," but who
is to distinguish the worthy causes from those that should be ignored? Rwanda
was a disaster waiting to happen, and even if the international community was
willing to intervene, who would decide when, where and how. In the case of
Rwanda, unlike Bosnia, there was no pretence. Although the French did respond, it
was too late to prevent the genocide and was primarily motivated by French national
interest. France, a permanent member of the Security Council, was one of the main
suppliers of weapons to the perpetrators of the genocide and continued to lend
support to those militias in exile,"
One of most serious deficiencies in the UN system is the inability to respond
effectively to crisis involving violent intrastate or internal conflicts. Traditional
interstate war of the kind that led to the Gulf war and Operation Desert Storm is
quite rare. The reverse is true of conflicts within states. Africa and many parts of
the world are comprised mostly of artificially drawn state boundaries that often
divided traditional political, ethnic and national groups. Multi-nation states are far
more common than homogenous states. Ethnic and religious differences are not the
primary cause of conflict, no more than bad weather and crop failure are the sole
cause of famine and starvation. In order to respond to the problem of intrastate
conflict, there is need for reform of doctrinal foundations and structures in the UN
system. Military intervention in any internal conflict is fraught with uncertainty and
danger. The Agenda for Peace report, like most national governments, paid lip
service to non-governmental actors. There are many lessons to be learned from
Somalia, one of these is that non-governmental players, whether clan, community,
tribal or nation based, and international NGO's can play a significant role in
preventing a country or society imploding. But first this role must be recognised.
6 President Clinton, address to the UN General Assembly, New York, 27
September 1993,US Dept. of State 4 Dispatch 39 at 652. See generally M. Mackinnon,
US Peacekeeping Policy under Clinton, London: F. Cass, (1999).
7 Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Rwanda/Zaire, Vo1.7. No.4, May 1995.
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They are often the groups most aware of what is happening on the ground, and
proposals for deploying early warning monitors in potential trouble spots makes no
sense when those already working on the ground are not listened to. It is not just
policies that must change, but the attitudes of those that frame them.
Countries of the developing South have legitimate fears that
humanitarian intervention may be used as a pretext for destabilising selected
Governments or regimes. This is one reason why reform of the Security Council
and UN is so vital. A global society based on universal sovereignty and respect
for fundamental human rights has the potential to provide all peoples with
legitimate involvement in issues affecting the world as a whole. Who is to
blame for the debacles in Rwanda, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia? To some
extent the whole international community of states and peoples all share
responsibility. However, the Security Council set up all three UN missions.
They were ill conceived and short sighted, and placed the peacekeepers for the
most part in an impossible situation. The Council hesitated and prevaricated
when faced with starvation and genocide, and it refused to give UNPROFOR the
resources and support required to protect itself, let alone the peoples whose very
existence depended upon its protection. At the same time, the cosy consensus
surrounding the UN response to Iraq's unlawful invasion of Kuwait was a sham.
There was no mention of the economic intimidation that was imposed on the
more vulnerable states of the South to secure their support or silence."
There are many less aspirational matters concerning peace support
operations that need attention. Revision of the legal framework of UN
peacekeeping operations is long overdue. The ad hoc and improvised structures
and procedures have long since been a source of concern and difficulty. Usually
these forces have enough to contend with on the ground besides the ineptness of
their own organization. The Somalia operation shows that it is essential to the
success of a peace support operation that a valid and unified chain of command
be authorized. There is an urgent need to clarify the relationship between the
8 See P. Bennis, 'Blue Helmets - For what? Under whom? in E. Childers,
Challenges to the United Nations, New York: St. Martins Press, (1995),152-175 at 156;
and personal interview, Mr. E. Childers, former UN civil servant and Senior Advisor to
the UN Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation,
Galway, 1995.
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Security Council and 'coalitions of the willing', especially the command and
control mechanism adopted." These issues were foremost in the minds of NATO
political and military leaders. For this reason NATO is alert to the need to 'be
careful not to subordinate NATO to any other international body or compromise
the integrity of its command structure's'? The current force in Kosovo is UN
mandated. If the NATO led operation is not subordinate to the UN, then what is
its relationship with the Security Council? This depends on where the real
concentration of power is based? It is not with the Secretary-General, and nor is
it with the Security Council. This is a NATO led and de facto NATO
commanded operation. There is no strategic direction from the Military Staff
Committee, and the reality is that the Security Council is merely kept informed
Despite the complexities of providing a statutory basis in Irish law for
distinguishing between the overall command referred to in the Defence Act and
operational command andlor within the context of a UN force, there is an urgent
need to amend the existing statutory framework to reflect the reality on the
ground. The issue is even more complex in the context of the recent SFOR and
KFOR missions. This may be unconstitutional, and lor contrary to Irish military
law. In any event, this is an unsatisfactory situation. At the very least, Defence
Force Regulations could be introduced by the Minister for Defence providing for
different levels of command and control, and the Defence Acts amended to
provide for elements to be placed under the operational command or the
operational control of commanders of international forces organised and
established under the authority of the UN. The situation prevailing for Canadian
Forces has much merit and is a pragmatic attempt to balance the needs of the
mission with that of the Canadian requirement to retain overall national command
of the armed forces.
See D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective
Security, Oxford, Clarendon Press, (1999), esp., 247-285.
9
10 See Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott on NATO's future' Strategic
Concept', in B. Simma, 'NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects', 10
European Journal of International Law, (1999) 1-22, at 15.
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The litmus test for determining the nature of a UN operation i.e.
peacekeeping or peace enforcement remains the ability and willingness to resort
to the use of force. Despite this, the dividing line between the use of force in
self-defence on traditional peacekeeping operations, and that on peace
enforcement operations is not so clear cut in practice. Much will depend on
subjective variables that are difficult to predict, and these may influence the way
in which a mandate is interpreted and applied. Who, for example, has the
authority to determine what defence of the mandate or mission means in practice?
It is no coincidence that the commanders of traditional peacekeeping forces are
more often than not selected from neutral or non-aligned nations, and that the
first commander ofUNOSOM II was a general from a NATO member country.
The resolutions in respect of UNITAF and UNOSOM II expressly
referred to Chapter VII, and while the use of force was not mentioned
specifically, the implication of 'all necessary means' to carry out the mandate
was clear. It permitted the use of force without further authorisation and it was
quasi-enforcement in nature. The significance of Resolution 837 (1993) cannot
be overstated. Nevertheless, it is arguable whether it justified the nature and
intensity of the military campaign pursued by UNOSOM II forces in its
aftermath. The attack by US commanded forces culminated in an operation to
capture Aided that led directly to the US decision to withdraw from Somalia.
This was the turning point for US involvement, and it ultimately led to the break
up ofUNOSOM II as other countries followed suit.
While the Security Council had no hesitation in giving UNOSOM II a
peace enforcement mandate and granting the Secretary-General overall control, in
contrast, the Council and the Secretary-General were at all time clear that
UNIFIL was a peacekeeping mission. And as such, it would not be permitted to
adopt a peace enforcement role, incrementally or otherwise. The adoption of
resolutions invoking Chapter VII and phrased in such overtly militaristic terms
had the potential to escalate the level of violence unless strictly controlled. This
is what happened in Somalia. In operating outside the formal UN chain of
command, it could be said that the US 'hijacked' the mission, and pursued an
agenda not always consistent with the UN objectives. The abandonment of
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impartiality, and the consequent loss of credibility by both the US and the UN
proved a recipe for disaster.
A clear lesson is that UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations
alone cannot end a war, nor will the robust interpretation of a mandate provide
the solution to intra state conflict. The use of force by the UN, whatever the
circumstances, must be resorted to in the context of an overall political strategy
with clearly defined political goals. While military force is the best way to
achieve exclusively military objectives, using force to obtain a mix of military
and political objectives is more problematic. It was not the use of force that
brought the demise of the UN operation in Somalia, but a combination of factors,
one of which was the selective and excessive use of force.
The Lebanon and Somalia operations show the need for support from
the members of the Security Council, irrespective of the nature of the operation.
Both operations also illustrate that problems arise when missions are ill defined,
and this uncertainty was compounded in the case of Somalia by a dispute about
the authority to use force. What was an acceptable level of force to remain within
the parameters set by 'all necessary means'? UNOSOM II's experience provides
a salutary lesson on the limits of the use of force, and a willingness to accept the
responsibilities arising from such action. While some countries are not prepared
to take part in enforcement operations, it is also evident that unless the vital
interests of the US are at stake, there is little point in committing US forces to
combat roles abroad. Most of all, UNOSOM II showed the need to set clear
objectives when resorting to the use of force, and for the US and UN, there were
lessons on what could or what would work in the future. In some ways the
lessons to be had are contradictory. The use of force by the US was excessive for
the nature of any UN peace support operation, but inadequate for the purposes of
waging war, and although limited in nature, this ultimately is what the US
embarked upon against Aided.
Much of the criticism of the Lebanon and Somalia operations has arisen
from unrealistic expectations over what a UN military operation, whether
traditional peacekeeping or peace enforcement, can achieve in the context of
ongoing hostilities.
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The UN Commission of Inquiry recommended that the UN refrain from taking
peace enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of states. I I But UN forces
should never be deployed in a situation where they are forced to play a role as
silent witnesses to gross violations of humanitarian law. This raises the question
whether the UN should undertake peacekeeping and peace enforcement as part of
the one mission. It caused doctrinal confusion and contributed to mission failure
in Somalia. Nevertheless, UNIFIL shows that it is possible to use force in self-
defence and retain impartiality. But enforcement action of any kind is
inconsistent with the principles of peacekeeping, and Chapter VI operations
should not have elements of enforcement in the mandate that could lead to the
incremental adoption of a Chapter VII strategy. In this way, when not to use
force is as crucial a question as when to use it.
The UNIFIL experience shows that the principle of non-use of force has
been controversial and difficult to apply in practice. At an early stage in the
operation, it was decided that operational effectiveness would be curtailed in
order to adhere to the principle of non-use of force, and in this way the defence of
At-Tiri in 1980 is best regarded as sui generis. The debacle of the Multi National
Force's (MNF) involvement in Beirut during 1983, and the failure of the more
recent robust peacekeeping in Somalia, has vindicated this policy.
The Brahimi Report called for more robust ROE 10 operations
involving intra-state/transnational conflicts and bigger and better equipped
forces." It did not seem to take full cognisance of the fact that the use of force
must be accompanied by political will, a clear mandate and strategy, a
willingness to accept casualties, and a need for an effective command and control
mechanism to ensure cohesion and uniform application. It also failed to address
the issues raised by regional peacekeepers or coalitions of the willing acting
under the authority of the UN. Somalia shows that robust ROE and increased size
are not enough, and while it is imperative not to employ an emasculated UN
force, it is important to have a clear military and political strategy agreed at the
outset. Given the political difficulties that this may encounter, such a policy may
11 UN Commission of Inquiry, op. cit., para. 270.
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prove impossible to implement, even if the Report's recommended structural
reforms are implemented. The recommendation of the Report make interesting
reading, but UN controlled forces generally are not given adequate capabilities to
intimidate or enforce. Another UN report is unlikely to change this historical
fact.
Ensuring compliance with humanitarian law norms on peace support
operations also remains problematic. There are of course practical difficulties for
the UN in ensuring troops under its command or operational control do not infringe
any of the applicable rules of international law. Not least being the fact that no
troops have ever served under the full command and control of the UN, and it is
unlikely that they will do so in the foreseeable future. Enforcement of humanitarian
law is especially problematic in respect of UN forces, and the Brocklebank,
Rockwood and similar trials make it clear that there is significant confusion
regarding the applicability of humanitarian law to the different kinds of UN military
operations. Relying on the contributing states to use their civil or military legal
regimes to enforce municipal law is one solution, but this requires the co-operation
of those states concerned and the existence of an appropriate legal structure to deal
with such offences. While the independence of municipal legal regimes and
disciplinary procedures must be respected, the current confusion is militating
against a uniform and agreed formula for determining the applicability of
international law to such operations.
There seems little sense in a system where combatants engaged in conflict
are subject to humanitarian law when they are acting as members of national
armed forces, whereas members of armed forces in the same armed conflict
acting as peacekeepers are exempted. This is all the more absurd when these UN
soldiers represent the Organization charged with upholding and promoting the
fundamental human right that humanitarian law seeks to protect. The application
of humanitarian law to UN forces will enhance rather that compromise the
mission to promote peace. In addition, the legal obligations of peacekeeping and
other UN military forces should reflect the notion that they will affirmatively
seek to prevent abuses. This is best achieved by an express provision to this
See Report of the Panel of Peacekepers, UN, 23 August, 2000 (Al55/305-
S/2000/809). Available from <http.www.un.org.>
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effect in the mandate. The Brahimi Report suggests a more assertive and
interventionist approach be expressly provided for in the mandate of such forces.
This presupposes that UN personnel will be given the means and capacity to act
in this way, a presumption that past experience shows may not be taken for
granted. Making it mandatory for all UN personnel to be educated and trained in
this area is essential. In particular, contributors to peace support operations could
follow the example of Canada, and learn to remedy deficiencies identified in this
area.
The recent Convention on the Protection of UN Personnel has complicated
the matter somewhat. The exact scope and nature of UN operations covered by
the Convention is a matter on which there is a divergence of opinion. The view
that the Convention applies to most kinds of UN operations falling short of
enforcement action itself is the dominant opinion, although the protection
provided for there under might not extend to all stages and components of the
military operation. The confusion arises primarily from the different perspectives
among countries as to the purpose of the Convention in the first place. Many
were critical of the scope and expansion of the Security Council's activities in
recent years, but were powerless to prevent it. They saw the approval of a
Convention covering traditional peacekeepers as a means to curtail these
activities. But it was precisely because of the Somalia type operations that
pressure was brought to bear to deal with the legal deficiencies that existed in the
international regime.
The end result IS still unsatisfactory in that the difficulty of
distinguishing between peacekeeping and enforcement operations, while making
provision for hybrid operations involving both, has not been properly taken into
account. This crucial issue, like the question relating to the applicability of
humanitarian law to UN operations, has been left unresolved by the Convention.
It now seems generally accepted that the Convention applies to peace
enforcement operations like that of UNOSOM II. The problem is when and who
determines that a confrontation between UN troops and others reaches the
threshold that the participants may be regarded as combatants under Article 2 (2)
of the Convention. As it stands, the Convention is a poorly drafted and ill
thought out document that was heavily influenced by political factors. While is
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does address what was a significant gap in international law, how it will work in
practice is difficult to predict. Troop contributing states would be advised not to
place too much store in its ability to protect UN persons, and prosecutors should
be circumspect regarding efforts to invoke its terms.
Linked to this is the issue of European and Western neo colonialism under
the cloak of UN activity. How will the Convention operate in a situation like
Somalia when a major contributor to the UN force decides to target a clan or
militia leader, and sometimes operates outside the UN command structure? The
problem with accepting that peace enforcement operations come within its remit
is that is it seeks to criminalize action by military forces against UN mandated or
authorized peace enforcement operations.
It is an unavoidable flaw that in relation to the purposes and functions of the
UN, humanitarian law only plays a secondary role. Furthermore, states perceive
criminal jurisdiction over their nationals as part of their jealously guarded
sovereignty, and considerable national sensitivities are associated with participation
in UN military operations. The creation of a special tribunal or court to deal with
such matters is one potential solution, but the fact that few if any countries actually
place their forces under the full command of the UN could be problematic.
The UN has been criticised for its failure to fulfil the mandate in
Lebanon, and for the failure of the operations in Somalia. An often overlooked
factor is the fact that the Organization is resorted to by states most often when it
suited their purposes and the problem otherwise seems insoluble. The situation
created by the 1978 invasion of Lebanon was such an instance. Primarily
sponsored by the United States to facilitate a speedy withdrawal of Israel from
Lebanon, and to ensure that the so called Camp David Accords were not further
jeopardised, co-operation from Israel was vital to the success ofUNIFIL. When
it became evident that this was not forthcoming, the United States failed to put
sufficient pressure on Israel to co-operate. In the Security Council, the normal
political divisions were temporarily put aside due to the urgency of the crises.
Nonetheless, the mandate agreed upon was unrealistic and many elements of the
overall plan for the deployment of UNIFIL had obvious deficiencies.
A number of recent multinational interventions, whether under the banner
of the UN or an independent coalition, have often failed to make a long-term
379
improvement in the crisis situation." There has been a tendency to rely on short-
term political expediency to the detriment of long term strategic policies at the
operational level. The Somalia experience indicates that military establishments
need to re-examine their role in complex political and humanitarian emergencies,
and address the mistrust between civil and military components of such missions.
There is a need for the military to expand its concept of security to consider much
more than 'keeping the lid' on things. The failure to disarm the clans was a
serious flaw in the implementation phase of the UN operations, but even this
would have been insufficient without the creation of a safe environment. If you
want to create a secure environment, then peace must be made with, or imposed
upon, all the parties. Where the peace is imposed, as in the case of the former
Yugoslavia since the Dayton Agreement, then the price must be paid in terms of
resources and long term commitment to political rehabilitation. The narrow
focus on the humanitarian and military issues in Somalia meant the underlying
political problems did not receive sufficient attention, and this can be traced back
to, inter alia, an ambiguous mandate and objectives.
The long-term strategy in Somalia was unclear at the time of inception,
but by the end of the operation it was non-existent. What efforts were made at
rebuilding the war torn society were inept and imposed without sufficient
attention to indigenous political, cultural and social traditions. Instead of seeking
to marginalize all the major warlords, the UN targeted Aided. The unfolding
events showed that the United States and the UN forces failed to appreciate the
contradictions and inconsistencies in their confused roles of peacekeeping,
peacemaking and peace enforcement. When this was combined with United
States domination, and key positions held by difficult personalities, it was hardly
surprising that UNOSOM II became a major protagonist in a conflict it was
supposed to help resolve. Nor is it true to say that the UN broadened the mandate
against the wishes of the United States.
These issues did not arise in the case ofUNIFIL as this was an operation
13 J. MacKinlay & R. Kent, 'A New Approach to Complex Emergencies', 4
(4) International Peacekeeping, (Winter 1997), 31-49 at 36. For an analysis of the
neglect of developmental components of peace operations, see J. David Whaley,
'Improving UN Developmental Co-ordination within Peace Missions', in J. Ginifer, op.
cit. 107-122.
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with an almost exclusive military focus. The political objectives were clear, but
they were never intended to be the responsibility of UNIFIL, the Force would
merely facilitate their achievement by international diplomacy. Nor was there a
civil component to the mission. However, in the case of both missions, the
Security Council acted as if the mandate would be self-executing once the troops
were deployed.
There were similarities between the USIUN led mission in Somalia and
the British army deployment in Northern Ireland." At first both forces received a
friendly reception from the local population, but relations soured when
perceptions of their role changed as they failed to take account of its
contradictions and inconsistencies. Likewise, in the 1980's Indian intervention in
Sri Lanka and US intervention in Lebanon involved a similar confusion in roles
and a practical incompatibility in their intervention. IS Despite possessing the
weaponry of a superpower, the US marines were reduced to that of a militia in
Beirut. After the death of over one thousand Indian peacekeepers, the soldiers
were withdrawn as their presence presented an obstacle to achieving a peaceful
resolution of the conflict.
There were aspects to the UN operation that were especially
reprehensible. The defence offered to claims of excessive zeal in the use of force
had an all to familiar ring: provocateurs mingled in the crowds and fired first;
collateral damage was minimal and civilian casualties exaggerated; the
'terrorists' used women and children as shields etc. Reputable organizations like
the ICRC disputed the UN version of events. In addition, hundreds of Somalis
were held in administrative detention. The scale intensity and frequency of the
use of force converted UNOSOM II into a hostile army of occupations in the eyes
of many Somalis, and endangered all those participating in the operation. What
14 See R. Murphy, Ireland, Peacekeeping and Policing the 'New World
Order', Belfast: Centre for Research and Documentation, (1997), esp. 25-44; and
generally F. Ni Aolain, The Politics of Force, Belfast: Blackstaff, Belfast, (2000); R.
Evelagh, Peace Keeping in a Democratic Society - The Lessons of Northern Ireland,
London: Hurst and Co., (1978), and D. Hamill, Pig in the Middle, the Army in Northern
Ireland, London: Mehthuen, (1985); E. McCann, War and an Irish Town, 3rd. edn.,
London: Pluto Press, (1993).
IS See A. James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, London: Macmillan, (1990),
131-133.
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made matters worse is that this was done on behalf of the international
community by the very Organization committed to setting, promoting an
enforcing human rights standards by state governments. Apart from the loss of
life on all sides, the real tragedy of Somalia was its legacy and the failure to learn
the right lessons from a situation where the UN was called upon to do a range of
impossible and confused tasks
In deciding whether or not to initiate enforcement action or launch a
peacekeeping operation, the criteria must be objective. Mandates and resources
need to reflect the complexity of contemporary conflicts. The response must be
graduated and proportionate, and retain the support of the international
community as a whole. Bosnia and Somalia have shown that it is a mistake to
assume that the square peg of UN humanitarian intervention will fit into the
round hole of either peacekeeping or enforcement operations. UN peacekeeping
is one of the more successful multilateral attempts to maintain peace and security.
Despite recent setbacks, there is no reason why it cannot regain its lost credibility
and adapt to the changed regional and global circumstances. It is too easy to be
cynical and to view the UN as a vehicle for the exercise of self-interest and
realpolitik. Its founders intended that it embody a higher morality than that
which determined the responses of individual states. Like democracy itself, the
UN is an imperfect system, but there are few visions of a more effective
alternative.
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APPENDIX A
RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL - UNIFIL
RESOLUTION 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978
The Security Council,
Taking note of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon
and from the Permanent Representative of Israel,
Having heard the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon
and Israel,
Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East
and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace,
Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just
peace in the Middle East,
1. Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political
independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognised boundaries;
2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against
Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all
Lebanese territory;
3. Decides, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to
establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for
Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli
forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the
Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in
the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-
four hours on the implementation of the present resolution.
Adopted at the 2074th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions
(Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
RESOLUTION 467 (1980) of 24 April 1980
The Security Council,
Acting in response to the request of the Government of Lebanon,
Having studied the special report of the Secretary General on the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 11 April 1980 and the subsequent
statements, reports and addenda,
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Having expressed itself through the statement of the President of the
Security Council of 18April 1980,
Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978),427 (1978),434 (1978),
444 (1979), 450 (1979) and 459 (1979),
Recalling the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force, as
stated in the report of the Secretary General of 19 March 1978 confirmed
by resolution 426 (1978), and particularly:
a. That the Force "must be able to function as an integrated and
efficient military unit",
b. That the Force "must enjoy the freedom of movement and
communication and other facilities that are necessary for the performance
of its tasks",
c. That the Force "will not use force except in self defence",
d. That "self defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful
means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the
Security Council",
1. Reaffirms its determination to implement the above-mentioned resolutions,
particularly resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 459 (1979), in the
totality of the area of operation assigned to the United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon, up to the internationally recognised boundaries;
2. Condemns all actions contrary to the provisions of the above-mentioned
resolutions and, in particular, strongly deplores:
a. Any violation of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity;
b. The military intervention of Israel in Lebanon;
c. All acts of violence in violation of the General Armistice
Agreement between Israel and Lebanon;
d. Provision of military assistance to the so-called de facto forces;
e. All acts of interference with the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organisation:
f. All acts of hostility against the Force and in or through its area of
operation as inconsistent with Security Council resolutions;
g. All obstructions of the ability of the Force to confirm the complete
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, to supervise the cessation of
hostilities, to ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, to
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control movement and to take measures deemed necessary to ensure the
effective restoration of the sovereignty of Lebanon;
h. Acts that have led to loss of life and physical injuries among the
personnel of the Force and of the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organisation, their harassment and abuse, the disruption of communication,
as well as the destruction of property and material;
3. Condemns the deliberate shelling of the headquarters of the Force and
more particularly the field hospital, which enjoys special protection under
intemationallaw;
4. Commends the efforts undertaken by the Secretary General and by the
interested Governments to bring about the cessation of hostilities and to
enable the Force to carry out its mandate effectively without interference;
5. Commends the Force for its great restraint in carrying out its duties in very
adverse circumstances;
6. Calls attention to the provisions in the mandate that would allow the Force
to use its right to self-defence;
7. Calls attention to the terms of reference of the Force which provide that it
will use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to ensure
that its area of operation will not be utilized for hostile activities of any
kind;
8. Requests the Secretary General to convene a meeting, at an appropriate
level, of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission to agree on
precise recommendations and further to reactivate the General Armistice
Agreement conducive to the restoration of the sovereignty of Lebanon over
all its territory up to the internationally recognised boundaries;
9. Calls upon all parties concerned and all those capable of lending any
assistance to co-operate with the Secretary General in enabling the Force to
fulfil its mandate;
10. Recognises the urgent need to explore all ways and means of securing the
full implementation of resolution 425 (1978), including enhancing the
capacity of the Force to fulfil its mandate in all its parts;
11. Requests the Secretary General to report as soon as possible on the
progress of these initiatives and the cessation of hostilities.
Adopted at the 2218h meeting by 12 votes to none, with 3 abstentions
(German Democratic Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
States of America).
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RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL - SOMALIA
A. UN Security Council Resolution 794
December 3, 1992
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17
March 1992,751 (1992) of 24 Apri11992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992 and 775
(1992) of 28 August 1992,
Recognizing the unique character of the present situation in Somalia and mindful
of its deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate
and exceptional response,
Determining that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in
Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of
humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia
and underlining the urgent need for the quick delivery of humanitarian assistance
in the whole country,
Noting the efforts of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African
Unity, and in particular the proposal made by its Chairman of the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, at the
forty- seventh regular session of the General Assembly for the organization of an
international conference on Somalia, and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference and other regional agencies and arrangements to pro- mote
reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia and to address the humanitarian
needs of the people of that country,
Commending the ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies
and humanitarian organizations and of non-governmental organizations and of
States to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia,
Responding to the urgent calls from Somalia for the international community to
take measures to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia,
Expressing grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of
international humanitarian law occurring in Somalia, including reports of
violence and threats of violence against personnel participating lawfully in
impartial humanitarian relief activities; deliberate attacks on non combatants,
relief consignments and vehicles, and medical and relief facilities; and impeding
the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian
population,
386
APPENDIX B
Dismayed by the continuation of conditions that impede the delivery of
humanitarian supplies to destinations within Somalia, and in particular reports of
looting of relief supplies destined for starving people, attacks on aircraft and
ships bringing in humanitarian relief supplies, and attacks on the Pakistani
UNOSOM contingent in Mogadishu of the United Nations Operation in Somalia,
Taking note with appreciation of the letters of the Secretary-General of 21
November 1992 (5/24859) and of29 November 1992 (5/24868),
Sharing the Secretary-General's assessment that the situation in Somalia is
intolerable and that it has become necessary to review the basic premises and
principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia and that UNOSOM's existing
course would not in present circumstances be an adequate response to the tragedy
in Somalia,
Determined to establish as soon as possible the necessary conditions for the
delivery of humanitarian assistance wherever needed in Somalia, in conformity
with resolutions 751 (1992) and 767 (1992),
Noting the offer by Member States aimed at establishing a secure environment
for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible,
Determined also to restore peace, stability and law and order with a view to
facilitating the process of a political settlement under the auspices of the United
Nations, aimed at national reconciliation in Somalia, and encouraging the
Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue and intensify their
work at the national and regional levels to pro- mote these objectives,
Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear ultimate responsibility for national
reconciliation and the reconstruction of their own country,
1. Reaffirms its demand that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia
immediately cease hostilities, maintaining a cease-fire throughout the country,
and cooperate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Somalia as well as with the military forces to be established in pursuant to the
authorization given in paragraph 10 below in order to promote the process of
relief distribution, reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia;
2. Demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures
necessary to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies
and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the
affected population in Somalia;
3 Also demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all
measures necessary to ensure the safety of United Nations and all other personnel
engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including the military forces
to be established pursuant to the authorization given in paragraph 10 below;
4. Further demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia
immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law
including from actions such as those described above;
5 Strongly condemns all violations of international humanitarian law occurring in
Somalia, including in particular the deliberate impeding of the delivery of food
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and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population, and
affirms that those who commit or order the commission of such acts will be held
individually responsible in respect of such acts;
6. Decides that the operations and the further deployment of the 3,500 personnel
of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) authorized by paragraph
3 of resolution 775 (1992) should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-
General in the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground; and requests
him to keep the Council informed and to make such recommendations as may be
appropriate for the fulfillment of its mandate where conditions permit;
7. Endorses the recommendation by the Secretary-General in his letter of 29
November 1992 (S/24868) that action under (Chapter VII) of the Charter of the
United Nations should be taken in order to establish a secure environment for
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible;
8. Welcomes the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary- General's
letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (5/24868) concerning the
establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment;
9. Welcomes also offers by other Member States to participate in that operation;
10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the
Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer
referred to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as
possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia;
11. Calls on all Member States which are in a position to do so to provide
military forces and to make additional contributions, in cash or in kind, in
accordance with paragraph 10 above and requests the Secretary-General to
establish a fund through which the contributions, where appropriate, could be
channeled to the States or operations concerned;
12. Also Authorizes the Secretary-General and the Member States concerned to
make the necessary arrangements for the unified command and control of the
forces involved, which will reflect the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above;
13. Requests the Secretary-General and the Member States acting under
paragraph 10 above to establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination
between the United Nations and their military forces;
14. Decides to appoint an ad hoc commission composed of members of the
Security Council to report to the Council on the implementation of this
resolution;
IS. Invites the Secretary-General to attach a small UNOSOM liaison staff to the
field headquarters of the unified command;
16. Acting under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter, calls upon States,
nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures as
may be necessary to ensure strict implementation of paragraph 5 of resolution
733 (1992);
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17 Requests all States, in particular those in the region, to provide appropriate
support for the actions undertaken by States, nationally or through regional
agencies or arrangements, pursuant to this and other relevant resolutions;
18. Requests the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to
report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later
than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of the
present resolution and the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure
environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a
prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;
19. Also Requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan to the Council initially
within fifteen days after the adoption of the present resolution to ensure that
UNOSOM will be able to fulfill its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified
command;
20. Invites the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue their
efforts to achieve a political settlement in Somalia;
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
E. UN Security Council Resolution 814
March 26,1993
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17
March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 Apri11992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 775
(1992) of28 August 1992 and 794 (1992) of3 December 1992,
Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 47/167 of 18 December 1992,
Commending the efforts of Member States acting pursuant to resolution
794 (1992) to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in
Somalia,
Acknowledging the need for a prompt, smooth and phased transition from the
Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the expanded United Nations Operation in
Somalia (UNOSOM II),
Regretting the continuing incidents of violence in Somalia and the threat they
pose to the reconciliation process,
Deploring the acts of violence against persons engaging in humanitarian efforts
on behalf of the United Nations, States, and non-governmental organizations,
Noting with deep regret and concern the continuing reports of wide-spread
violations of international humanitarian law and the general absence of the rule of
law in Somalia,
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Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for
national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,
Acknowledging the fundamental importance of a comprehensive and effective
programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements and factions,
Noting the need for continued humanitarian relief assistance and for the
rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,
Concerned that the crippling famine and drought in Somalia, compounded by the
civil strife, have caused massive destruction to the means of production and the
natural and human resources of that country,
Expressing its appreciation to the Organization of African Unity, the League of
Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned
Countries for their cooperation with, and support of, the efforts of the United
Nations in Somalia,
Also expressing_its appreciation to all Member States which have made
contributions to the Fund established pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 794
(1992) and to all those who have provided humanitarian assistance to Somalia,
Commending the efforts, in difficult circumstances, of the initial United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992),
Expressing its appreciation for the invaluable assistance the neighboring
countries have been providing to the international community in its efforts to
restore peace and security in Somalia and to host large numbers of refugees
displaced by the conflict and noting the difficulties caused to them due to the
presence of refugees in their territories,
Convinced that the restoration of law and order throughout Somalia would
contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political
settlement, as well as to the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and
economy,
Convinced also of the need for broad-based consultations and deliberations to
achieve reconciliation, agreement on the setting up of transitional government
institutions and consensus on basic principles and steps leading to the
establishment of representative democratic institutions,
Recognizing that the re-establishment of local and regional administrative
institutions is essential to the restoration of domestic tranquility,
Encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue
and intensify their work at the national, regional and local levels, including and
encouraging broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, to promote the
process of political settlement and national reconciliation and to assist the people
of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy,
Expressing its readiness to assist the people of Somalia, as appropriate, on a
local, regional or national level, to participate in free and fair elections, with a
view towards achieving and implementing a political settlement,
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Welcoming the progress made at the United Nations-sponsored Informal
Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa from 4 to
15 January 1993, in particular the conclusion at that meeting of, three agreements
by the Somali parties, including movements and factions, and welcoming also
any progress made at the Conference on National Reconciliation which began in
Addis Ababa on 15March 1993,
Emphasizing the need for the Somali people, including movements and factions,
to show the political will to achieve security, reconciliation and peace,
Taking note a/the reports of States concerned of 17-December 1992 (5/24976)
and 19 January 1993 (5/25126) and, of the Secretary-General of 19 December
1992 (5/24992) and 26 January 1993 (5/25168) on the implementation of
resolution 794 (1992),
Having examined the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993 (5/25354
and Add. I and 2),
Welcoming the intention of the Secretary-General to seek maximum economy
and efficiency and to keep the size of the United Nations presence, both military
and civilian, to the minimum necessary to fulfill its mandate,
Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security
in the region,
A
1. Approves the further reports of the Secretary-General of 3, 11 and 22 March
1993;
2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for convening the
Conference on National Reconciliation for Somalia in accordance with the
agreements reached during the Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political
Reconciliation in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and for the progress achieved
towards political reconciliation in Somalia, and also for his efforts to ensure that,
as appropriate; all Somalis, including movements, factions, community leaders,
women, professionals, intellectuals, elders and other representative groups are
suitably represented at such conferences;
3. Welcomes the convening of the Third United Nations Coordination Meeting
for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March
1993 and the willingness expressed by Governments through this process to
contribute to relief and rehabilitation efforts in Somalia, where and when
possible;
4. Requests the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with
assistance, as appropriate, from all relevant United Nations entities, offices and
specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people
of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and
promoting political settlement and national reconciliation, in accordance with the
recommendations contained in his report of 3 March 1993, including in
particular:
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(a) Assistance in the provision of relief and in the economic rehabilitation of
Somalia, based on an assessment of clear, prioritized needs, and taking into
account, as appropriate, the 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for
Somalia prepared by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs of
the Secretariat;
(b) Assistance in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within
Somalia;
(c) Assistance to help the people of Somalia to promote and advance political
reconciliation, through broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, and
the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration
in the entire country;
(d) Assistance in the re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate at the
local, regional or national level to assist in the restoration and maintenance of
peace, stability and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating
the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law;
(e) Assistance to the people of Somalia in the development of a coherent and
integrated programme for the removal of mines throughout Somalia;
(t) Development of appropriate public information activities in support of the
United Nations activities in Somalia;
(g) Creation of conditions under which Somali civil society may have a role at
every level in the process of political reconciliation and in the formulation and
realization of rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes;
B
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
5 Decides to expand the size of the UNOSOM force, and its mandate in
accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraphs 56-88, of the
report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993, and the provisions of this
resolution;
6. Authorizes the mandate for the expanded UNOSOM (UNOSOM II) for an
initial period through 31 October 1993, unless previously renewed by the
Security Council;
7 Emphasizes the crucial importance of disarmament and the urgent need to build
on the efforts of UNIT AF in accordance with paragraphs 59-69 of the report of
the Secretary-General of3 March 1993;
8. Demands that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, comply
fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they
concluded at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation
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at Addis Ababa, and in particular with their agreement on implementing the
cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament (S/25168, annex. III);
9 Also demands that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, take
all measures to ensure the safety of the personnel of the United Nations and its
agencies as well as the staff of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations
engaged in providing humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia
in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political
settlement and national reconciliation;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to support from within Somalia the
implementation of the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992),
utilizing as available and appropriate the UNOSOM II forces authorized by this
resolution, and to report on this subject, with any recommendations regarding
more effective measures if necessary, to the Security Council;
11. Calls upon all States, in particular neighboring States, to cooperate in the
implementation of the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992);
12. Also Requests the Secretary-General to provide security, as appropriate, to
assist in the repatriation of refugees and the assisted resettlement of displaced
persons, utilizing UNOSOM II forces, paying particular attention to those areas
where major instability continues to threaten peace and security in the region;
13 Reiterates its demand that all Somali parties, including movements and
factions, immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international
humanitarian law and reaffirms that those responsible for such acts be held
individually accountable;
14Further Requests the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative to
direct the Force Commander of UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the
consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout
Somalia, taking account of the particular circumstances in each locality, on an
expedited basis in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report
of 3 March 1993, and in this regard to organize a prompt, smooth and phased
transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM 11;
c
15. Requests the Secretary-General to maintain the fund established pursuant to
resolution 794 (1992) for the additional purpose of receiving contributions for
maintenance of UNOSOM II forces following the departure of UNITAF forces
and for the establishment of Somali police, and calls on Member States to make
contributions to this fund, in addition to their assessed contributions;
16. Expresses appreciation to the United Nations agencies, intergovernmental
and non-governmental organizations and the IeRC for their contributions and
assistance and requests the Secretary-General to ask them to continue to extend
financial material and technical support to the Somali people in all regions of the
country;
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17 Also Requests the Secretary-General to seek as appropriate, pledges and
contributions from States and others to assist in financing the rehabilitation, of
the political institutions and economy of Somalia;
18. Further Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully
informed on action taken to implement the present resolution, in particular to
submit as soon as possible a report to the Council containing recommendations
for establishment of Somali police forces and thereafter to report no later than
every ninety days on the progress achieved in accomplishing the objectives set
out in the present resolution;
19. Decides to conduct a formal review of the progress towards accomplishing
the purposes of the present resolution no later than 31 October 1993;
20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
F. UN Security Council Resolution 837 June 6,1993
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992,746 (1992) of 17
March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April. 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992,775
(1992) of 28 August 1992,794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 and 814 (1993) of 26
March 1993,
Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 47/167 of 18December 1992,
Gravely alarmed at the premeditated armed attacks launched by forces apparently
belonging to the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA) against the personnel of
the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) on 5 June 1993,
Strongly condemning such actions, which directly undermine international efforts
aimed at the restoration of peace and normalcy in Somalia,
Expressing outrage at the loss of life as a result of these criminal attacks,
Reaffirming its commitment to assist the people of Somalia in reestablishing
conditions of nonnallife,
Stressing that the international community is involved in Somalia in order to help
the people of Somalia who have suffered untold miseries due to years of civil
strife in that country,
Acknowledging the fundamental importance of completing the comprehensive
and effective programme for disarming all Somali parties, including movements
and factions,
Convinced that the restoration of law and order throughout Somali would
contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political
settlement, as well as to the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and
economy,
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Condemning strongly the use of radio broadcasts, in particular by the USC/SNA,
to incite attacks against United Nations personnel,
Recalling the statement made by its president on 31 March 1993 (5125493)
concerning the safety of United Nations forces and personnel deployed in
conditions of strife and committed to consider promptly measures appropriate to
the particular circumstances to ensure that per- sons responsible for attacks and
other acts of violence against United Nations forces and personnel are held to
account for their actions,
Noting of the information provided to the Council by the Secretary-General on 6
June 1993,
Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security
in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Strongly condemns the unprovoked armed, attacks against the personnel of
UNOSOM II on 5 June 1993, which appear to have been part ofa calculated and
premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation UNOSOM
II from carrying out its mandate as provided for in resolution 814 (1993);
2. Expresses its condolences to the Government and people of Pakistan and the
families of the UNOSOM II personnel who have lost their lives;
3 Re-emphasizes the crucial importance of the early implementation of the
disarmament of all Somali parties, including movements and factions, in
accordance with paragraphs 56-69 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3
March 1993 (S/25354), and of neutralizing radio, broadcasting systems that
contribute to the violence and attacks directed against UNOSOM II;
4. Demands once again that all Somali parties, including movements and
factions, comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the
agreements they concluded at the informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali
Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, and in particular with their Agreement
on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament
(S/25168,annex III);
5. Reaffirms that the Secretary-General is authorized under resolution 814 (1993)
to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks
referred to in paragraph 1 above, including against those responsible for publicly
inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II
throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and
their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment;
6. Requests the Secretary-General urgently to inquire into the incident, with
particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders involved;
7. Encourages the rapid and accelerated deployment of all UNOSOM II
contingents to meet the full requirements of 28,000 men, all ranks, as well as
equipment, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report of 3 March 1993
(5/25354);
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8. Urges Member States to contribute; on an emergency basis, military support
and transportation, including armored personnel carriers, tanks and attack
helicopters, in order to provide UNOSOM II the capability appropriately to
confront and deter armed attacks directed against it in the accomplishment of its
mandate;
9. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council on the
implementation of the present resolution, if possible within seven days from the
date of its adoption;
10.Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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Question 1:
Have you ever heard of the Geneva Conventions and/or
the laws of war?
No
2%
Yes
98%
Question 2:
Indicate how you came to know about the Geneva
Conventions.
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Military Instruction
48%
APPENDIXC
Question 3:
When was the last time you received formal military
instruction in relation to the Conventions?
Other
Recruit/Basic
Training
25%
UNIFIL Training
67%
Question 4:
Do you think the Conventions and laws of war have any
practical relevance to modern armies?
Don't Know
No
22%
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Question 5:
Do you think the Geneva Conventions have any
relevance on peacekeeping missions?
Don't Know
5
No
71%
Question 6:
How would you rate your personal knowledge and
understanding of the Geneva Conventions?
None
2%
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Question 7:
Would you like to know more about the Geneva
Conventions? Don't Know
No 2%
Question 8:
Have you received adequate instruction in the Defence
Forces on the meaning and relevance of Geneva
Conventions?
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Question 9:
How do you find the current UNIFIL rules of
engagement?
as clear as can be
in the
circumstances
55%
Clear & concise
21%
confusing
24%
Question 10:
How do you find the current UNIFIL mandate?
of little practical
relevance in day to
day operations
50%
clear & relevant
40%
unclear and
confusing
10%
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Question 11:
Why did you volunteer for this mission?
seeking adventure
8%
financial reasons
37%
to support the UN in
Lebanon and to bring
peace
11%
family or personal
reasons
5%
break from barrack
routine
26%
Question 12:
Do you support the government policy of contributing
troops to peacekeeping operations?
No
2%
Yes
98%
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Question 13:
Do you feel that the level of casualties among Irish
soldiers in UNIFIL is acceptable for a peacekeeping
operation? Don't Know
2%
No
40%
Yes
58%
Question 14:
How would you rate the UNIFIL mission to date?
A Success
48%
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Map 2 - SOMALIA
UNOSOM IT Deployment as of November 1993
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The deployme~t of UNOSOM ITpeaked in November 1993 with some 29,3'00 troops, most of them located in the south and
centre of the country where armedecnflict among the Somali factions had been heaviest. The Joint Task Force (deployment
not shown here) and Qui~ Reaction Force (shown above as QRF), both organized and commanded by the Unked StateS, were
deployed in support of UNOSOM and comprised an additional 17,700 troops.'. .'.'
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Non-UN Missions / Non-Governmental Organisations,
,,-------~~= ..=...--~~-~
:~~~~e~gr;~inF8to 18Dec 58
UN Truce Supervision
:Organisation (UNTSO) ·18 Dec 58 to date
i Location: Middle Easti[--'---- -. ._-..... ...... . .....-.-............... ...~..;..~ ... '~== ...=..."-=-._;'" '----'=......==...':"'_"';,
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i (ONUC) Location: Zaire . 61911-"- '---'-'"'' . . .......--.. ,....- . ... .-'---,----.---- ..-
iUN Temporary Executive " F
!Authority (UNTEA) Location: 21 Aug 62 to 04 Oct 62 . Irish.c ..Omml..· .tm.en.t: 2l~~~t N~'Y (}_~i!le~(~~ ..st)Tian) .. .
UN Disengagement Observer ,Irish commitment:
Force (UNDOF) Location: '3 Jun 74 to date
,FromUNTSO
Golan Heights , )
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:Location: Baghdad and Teheran:
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:UN Military Observer Group in il28 S 87 t 26 J 92
: India and Pakistan(UNMOGIP)' ep 0 un
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I ~~~) -::~::~:e7:CyID 1_~eb88 to 30 JUD 92
UN Good Offices Mission in 'F
Afghanistan & Pakistan :25 Apr 88 to 15 Mar 90
: (UNQOMAP) ,
iO.ffice ~fthe Sec~etary-General 1r-~-6-M-ar-9-0-to--Jan95---'--'-I~~'sh ~~r:~~~~~-~·----II
AfQhan~stan_ Pak!stan (oS<JAP) .. I
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406
-IIrish commitment: 50
.. • --. -.- ._ !
Irish commitment: 392 I
,
I
\ 1
I Irish commitment: 12
I
:Irish commitment: 2
Ir-----'------I
: Irish commitment: 2
i
r--------~!I
,Irish commitment: 8
APPENDIXD
offic~ ~f th~ S~~retary-Gene;al IJ~ 9_5 to-;o;un 96 ~IIris~_~:mm__- i_tment2 ,1
~fgh~ist~1! (OSGA) _ __ _ _ _
I~~:~: ~~~). .__ ~l Jul 96~~~~--=E~~~~Ill1l1_i_n:~~J
J~~~~I~g~'jYObserver 114 Aug 88 to IDMar 91lIriSh commitment: 177.
_
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! Group IIINamibia (UNTAG) _r _ ____ ;
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Irish Refugee Agency,
Macedonia
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